Ex Parte Georgiev et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 26, 2017

13553950 (P.T.A.B. May. 26, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/553,950 07/20/2012 Hristo Tzanev Georgiev 4353
112140 7590
Hristo Georgiev
Seestrasse 30
Walenstadt, SG,
SWITZERLAND
05/26/2017 EXAMINER
JACKSON, JAKIEDA R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2657
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/26/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HRISTO TZANEV GEORGIEV and
MARIA THERESIA GEORGIEV(-GOOD)
Appeal 2015-000597
Application 13/553,9501
Technology Center 2600
Before JEAN R. HOMERE, JON M. JURGOVAN, and
NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
1 Appellants identify Hristo Georgiev as the real party in interest. (Br. 3.)
Appeal 2015-000597
Application 13/553,950
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1—4. (Br. 3.) We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
CLAIMED INVENTION
The claims are directed to text-to-voice machine translation of natural
language sentences and texts with a natural, human voice. (Br. 3.) Claim 3,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
3. An automated, intelligent, computer system having a database
of coded information, comprising the steps of:
(a) a computer processor linked to one or more users;
wherein the computer processor can receive the user’s written
input; and
(b) an automated intelligent system which is controlled by the
computer processor,
wherein the automated intelligent system has a machine program
code,
wherein the machine program code is executable to perform a
programmed analytical process,
wherein the programmed analytical process is tied to a database
of words with coded information,
wherein the coded information comprises part-of-speech
information, including morphological, grammatical, syntactical
and semantical information,
wherein the programmed analytical process is tied to a built-in
syntactic and semantic representation of word meanings and their
relationships,
wherein the automated intelligent system analyses user’s written
input,
wherein the automated intelligent system understands the
grammatical and syntactical structure of user’s written input and
its meaning,
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wherein the automated intelligent system translates and speaks
user’s written input.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1 and 2 stand rejected under 35U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph. (Final Act. 2-A.)
Claims 1 and 2 stand rejected under 35U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
as failing to comply with the written description requirement. (Final Act. 4—
5.)
Claim 1 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Bellegarda
(US 2008/0091430 Al, April 17, 2008), Huang (US 2003/0202641 Al,
October 30, 2003), Choi (US 2012/0116749 Al, May 10, 2012), Izumida
(US 2008/0120093 Al, May 22, 2008), Nitisaroj (US 2009/0048843 Al,
February 19, 2009), and Amento (US 2009/0210229 Al, August 20, 2009).
(Final Act. 5—10.)
Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Drewes
(US 2008/0177528 Al, July 24, 2008), Izumida, Nitisaroj, Choi, and
Amento. (Final Act. 10—13.)
Claims 3 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on
Chong (US 5,535,120, July 9, 1996) and Bellegarda. (Final Act. 14—15.)
ANALYSIS
§112 Rejections
Appellants do not argue against the rejections of claims 1 and 2 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first and second paragraphs. (Final Act. 2—5.)
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the Examiner’s rejections of these
claims. See MPEP § 1205.02 (“If a ground of rejection stated by the
examiner is not addressed in the appellant’s brief, appellant has waived any
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challenge to that ground of rejection and the Board may summarily sustain
it, unless the examiner subsequently withdrew the rejection in the
examiner’s answer. See 37 [C.F.R.] § 41.39(a)(1).”)
§ 103(a) Rejections
Appellants submit several general arguments as to why their invention
distinguishes over the prior art. (Br. 7—9.) However, Appellants do not
identify where these arguments are supported by corresponding language in
the claims, which is a requirement under the rules for appeals. (37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(l)(c)(iv) (“Each ground of rejection contested by appellant must be
argued under a separate heading, and each heading shall reasonably identify
the ground of rejection being contested (e.g., by claim number, statutory
basis, and applied reference, if any).”) Accordingly, Appellants’ arguments
are unpersuasive for this reason.
Furthermore, the rules for appeals require that “[t]he arguments shall
explain why the examiner erred as to each ground of rejection contested by
appellant.” (37 C.F.R. § 41.37(l)(c)(iv).) Here, Appellants do not identify
where the Examiner allegedly erred as to factual findings concerning the
references, the reasons for combining the references, the legal conclusion of
obviousness of the claims, or some other basis. Without identification of
specific instances of Examiner error, we have no basis on which to decide
this appeal in favor of Appellants.
Moreover, Appellants’ Appeal Brief identifies several rejections to be
reviewed on appeal. (Br. 6—7.) However, none of the identified rejections
are those the Examiner actually made. (Final Act. 5—15.) “An appellant’s
brief must present arguments responsive to every ground of rejection stated
by the examiner in the Office action from which the appeal has been taken
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(as modified by any advisory action and/or pre-appeal brief conference
decision). See 37 [C.F.R.] § 41.31(c) and 37 [C.F.R.] § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).”
MPEP § 1205.02. Accordingly, Appellants’ Appeal Brief is non-responsive
to the Examiner’s rejections, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of
claims 1—4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for this additional reason.
Appellants’ arguments (Br. 7—9) assert the following points regarding
the claimed invention: (1) it does not use speech synthesis; (2) it uses
context and other factors to determine what is meant by the input text rather
than pronouncing only what is written; (3) it translates text and produces
speech in another language; (4) it produces a non-synthetic, natural voice;
(5) it is unrestricted in the text that can be input (unlike electronic books);
(6) it disambiguates homographs and other language ambiguities from
context (including those occurring in languages with melodic
pronunciation); (7) it produces sound using pre-recorded voice (MP3) files;
(8) it uses tagging to determine the role of a word in wider context in a
sentence using up to five consecutive or non-consecutive words; and (9) it is
not statistical.
Regarding Appellants’ point (1), the only language we find in claims
1 and 2 that could possibly support Appellants’ argument is the recitation of
a “non-synthetic, human voice.” Although Appellants may have intended
this to mean that the claimed methods do not use speech synthesis, this
phrase can also mean that the voice does not sound synthetic or artificial. In
this regard, we emphasize that “the PTO is obligated to give claims their
broadest reasonable interpretation during examination.” In re Am. Acad, of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Appellants do not
show persuasively that this or any other language in the claims precludes
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speech synthesis when given its broadest reasonable interpretation. Claims 3
and 4 contain no mention of a “non-synthetic, human voice” and thus this
argument is not supported by language in these claims.
Also, regarding Appellants’ point (1), the Examiner found that
Bellegarda discloses a speech synthesis system that performs grammatical
and semantic analysis on the input text to generate more natural sounding
speech. (Ans. 3, citing Bellegarda Abstract, Figure 1.) Appellants do not
present any argument, let alone persuade us, that Bellegarda’s “speech that
sounds more natural” is not equivalent to the claimed “non-synthetic, human
voice.” (Bellegarda Abstract).
Regarding Appellants’ point (2), the Examiner finds that Bellegarda
performs grammatical and semantic analysis, which are contextual in nature.
(Bellegarda Abstract, Fig. 1). Thus, Bellegarda discloses determining the
meaning of the input text from its context. We also note there is no
language in the claims that excludes the possibility of the system
pronouncing only what is written without contextual analysis, so Appellants’
argument in this respect is not supported by corresponding language in the
claims.
Regarding Appellants’ point (3), the Examiner states that Huang
discloses translation of written text into speech in another language. (Ans. 3,
citing Huang || 64, 66.) The cited sections of Huang mention a text-to-
speech synthesis system for e-mail (1 64) and teaches “in applications such
as dialog or e-mail reading, it is possible to switch voices and languages as
desired at run-time.” (Huang 166.) Appellants do not explain why these
paragraphs of Huang do not disclose the claimed feature.
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Regarding Appellants’ point (4), the Examiner indicates that
Bellegarda discloses generating a “non-synthetic, human voice” as recited in
claims 1 and 2. (Ans. 3, citing Bellegarda Abstract, Figure 1.) Specifically,
Bellegarda states “[a] method and apparatus is provided for generating
speech that sounds more natural.” (Bellegarda Abstract.) Appellants do not
explain why the Examiner’s finding is in error. Furthermore, claims 3 and 4
contain no mention of any “non-synthetic, human voice,” so there is no basis
for this argument in these claims.
Regarding Appellants’ point (5), there is no language in the claims
supporting the distinction that the claimed methods, system or computer-
readable medium are unrestricted in the text that can be input, unlike
electronic books. In any case, the Examiner finds Bellegarda also does not
place any restrictions on the input data. (Ans. 4.) Appellants do not
persuasively refute the Examiner’s finding.
Regarding Appellants’ point (6), the Examiner notes that Nitisaroj
teaches homographs can have different pronunciations, and that they can be
disambiguated by the part of speech to identify the correct pronunciation.
(Ans. 4—5 citing Nitisaroj | 68.) We agree with the Examiner this teaching
of Nitisaroj discloses disambiguation insofar as claim 2 recites such a
limitation. Claims 1,3, and 4 contain no mention of disambiguation of
homographs.
Regarding Appellants’ point (7), only claims 1 and 2 mention the use
of “previously recorded voice file[s].” The Examiner indicates that Amento
discloses the claimed feature. (Ans. 5; Final Act. 10, 13 citing Amento Fig.
2 [203], [221], 127.) Specifically, Amento states “audio files that are
associated with recognized words may be accessed and played within
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revised messages.” (Amento 127.) We agree with the Examiner that
Amento teaches use of pre-stored audio files for pronouncing textual words.
Regarding Appellants’ point (8), none of the claims mention tagging
words for contextual analysis. Thus, Appellants’ argument is not supported
by corresponding language in the claims.
Regarding Appellants’ point (9), the claims contain no mention that
they are “non-statistical” in some aspect, much less explain what the
intended meaning of “non-statistical” is such that a person of ordinary skill
in the art could understand it. Appellants’ argument is entirely unsupported
by any language in the claims.
In order to sustain a rejection under Section 103(a), “there must be
some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 417-18 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir.
2006)). In the case before use, we find the Examiner provided the requisite
reasoning and factual underpinning to support the obviousness rejections. In
sum, Appellants have not shown that the claims are “more than the
predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.” Id. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
1^1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
We summarily affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1 and 2
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written
description requirement.
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We summarily affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1 and 2
under 35U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
We affirm the rejections of claims 1—4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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