Ex Parte Georgiev et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMay 26, 201713553950 (P.T.A.B. May. 26, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/553,950 07/20/2012 Hristo Tzanev Georgiev 4353 112140 7590 Hristo Georgiev Seestrasse 30 Walenstadt, SG, SWITZERLAND 05/26/2017 EXAMINER JACKSON, JAKIEDA R ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2657 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/26/2017 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte HRISTO TZANEV GEORGIEV and MARIA THERESIA GEORGIEV(-GOOD) Appeal 2015-000597 Application 13/553,9501 Technology Center 2600 Before JEAN R. HOMERE, JON M. JURGOVAN, and NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 Appellants identify Hristo Georgiev as the real party in interest. (Br. 3.) Appeal 2015-000597 Application 13/553,950 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1—4. (Br. 3.) We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. CLAIMED INVENTION The claims are directed to text-to-voice machine translation of natural language sentences and texts with a natural, human voice. (Br. 3.) Claim 3, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 3. An automated, intelligent, computer system having a database of coded information, comprising the steps of: (a) a computer processor linked to one or more users; wherein the computer processor can receive the user’s written input; and (b) an automated intelligent system which is controlled by the computer processor, wherein the automated intelligent system has a machine program code, wherein the machine program code is executable to perform a programmed analytical process, wherein the programmed analytical process is tied to a database of words with coded information, wherein the coded information comprises part-of-speech information, including morphological, grammatical, syntactical and semantical information, wherein the programmed analytical process is tied to a built-in syntactic and semantic representation of word meanings and their relationships, wherein the automated intelligent system analyses user’s written input, wherein the automated intelligent system understands the grammatical and syntactical structure of user’s written input and its meaning, 2 Appeal 2015-000597 Application 13/553,950 wherein the automated intelligent system translates and speaks user’s written input. REJECTIONS Claims 1 and 2 stand rejected under 35U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. (Final Act. 2-A.) Claims 1 and 2 stand rejected under 35U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. (Final Act. 4— 5.) Claim 1 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Bellegarda (US 2008/0091430 Al, April 17, 2008), Huang (US 2003/0202641 Al, October 30, 2003), Choi (US 2012/0116749 Al, May 10, 2012), Izumida (US 2008/0120093 Al, May 22, 2008), Nitisaroj (US 2009/0048843 Al, February 19, 2009), and Amento (US 2009/0210229 Al, August 20, 2009). (Final Act. 5—10.) Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Drewes (US 2008/0177528 Al, July 24, 2008), Izumida, Nitisaroj, Choi, and Amento. (Final Act. 10—13.) Claims 3 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Chong (US 5,535,120, July 9, 1996) and Bellegarda. (Final Act. 14—15.) ANALYSIS §112 Rejections Appellants do not argue against the rejections of claims 1 and 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first and second paragraphs. (Final Act. 2—5.) Accordingly, we summarily affirm the Examiner’s rejections of these claims. See MPEP § 1205.02 (“If a ground of rejection stated by the examiner is not addressed in the appellant’s brief, appellant has waived any 3 Appeal 2015-000597 Application 13/553,950 challenge to that ground of rejection and the Board may summarily sustain it, unless the examiner subsequently withdrew the rejection in the examiner’s answer. See 37 [C.F.R.] § 41.39(a)(1).”) § 103(a) Rejections Appellants submit several general arguments as to why their invention distinguishes over the prior art. (Br. 7—9.) However, Appellants do not identify where these arguments are supported by corresponding language in the claims, which is a requirement under the rules for appeals. (37 C.F.R. § 41.37(l)(c)(iv) (“Each ground of rejection contested by appellant must be argued under a separate heading, and each heading shall reasonably identify the ground of rejection being contested (e.g., by claim number, statutory basis, and applied reference, if any).”) Accordingly, Appellants’ arguments are unpersuasive for this reason. Furthermore, the rules for appeals require that “[t]he arguments shall explain why the examiner erred as to each ground of rejection contested by appellant.” (37 C.F.R. § 41.37(l)(c)(iv).) Here, Appellants do not identify where the Examiner allegedly erred as to factual findings concerning the references, the reasons for combining the references, the legal conclusion of obviousness of the claims, or some other basis. Without identification of specific instances of Examiner error, we have no basis on which to decide this appeal in favor of Appellants. Moreover, Appellants’ Appeal Brief identifies several rejections to be reviewed on appeal. (Br. 6—7.) However, none of the identified rejections are those the Examiner actually made. (Final Act. 5—15.) “An appellant’s brief must present arguments responsive to every ground of rejection stated by the examiner in the Office action from which the appeal has been taken 4 Appeal 2015-000597 Application 13/553,950 (as modified by any advisory action and/or pre-appeal brief conference decision). See 37 [C.F.R.] § 41.31(c) and 37 [C.F.R.] § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).” MPEP § 1205.02. Accordingly, Appellants’ Appeal Brief is non-responsive to the Examiner’s rejections, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for this additional reason. Appellants’ arguments (Br. 7—9) assert the following points regarding the claimed invention: (1) it does not use speech synthesis; (2) it uses context and other factors to determine what is meant by the input text rather than pronouncing only what is written; (3) it translates text and produces speech in another language; (4) it produces a non-synthetic, natural voice; (5) it is unrestricted in the text that can be input (unlike electronic books); (6) it disambiguates homographs and other language ambiguities from context (including those occurring in languages with melodic pronunciation); (7) it produces sound using pre-recorded voice (MP3) files; (8) it uses tagging to determine the role of a word in wider context in a sentence using up to five consecutive or non-consecutive words; and (9) it is not statistical. Regarding Appellants’ point (1), the only language we find in claims 1 and 2 that could possibly support Appellants’ argument is the recitation of a “non-synthetic, human voice.” Although Appellants may have intended this to mean that the claimed methods do not use speech synthesis, this phrase can also mean that the voice does not sound synthetic or artificial. In this regard, we emphasize that “the PTO is obligated to give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation during examination.” In re Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Appellants do not show persuasively that this or any other language in the claims precludes 5 Appeal 2015-000597 Application 13/553,950 speech synthesis when given its broadest reasonable interpretation. Claims 3 and 4 contain no mention of a “non-synthetic, human voice” and thus this argument is not supported by language in these claims. Also, regarding Appellants’ point (1), the Examiner found that Bellegarda discloses a speech synthesis system that performs grammatical and semantic analysis on the input text to generate more natural sounding speech. (Ans. 3, citing Bellegarda Abstract, Figure 1.) Appellants do not present any argument, let alone persuade us, that Bellegarda’s “speech that sounds more natural” is not equivalent to the claimed “non-synthetic, human voice.” (Bellegarda Abstract). Regarding Appellants’ point (2), the Examiner finds that Bellegarda performs grammatical and semantic analysis, which are contextual in nature. (Bellegarda Abstract, Fig. 1). Thus, Bellegarda discloses determining the meaning of the input text from its context. We also note there is no language in the claims that excludes the possibility of the system pronouncing only what is written without contextual analysis, so Appellants’ argument in this respect is not supported by corresponding language in the claims. Regarding Appellants’ point (3), the Examiner states that Huang discloses translation of written text into speech in another language. (Ans. 3, citing Huang || 64, 66.) The cited sections of Huang mention a text-to- speech synthesis system for e-mail (1 64) and teaches “in applications such as dialog or e-mail reading, it is possible to switch voices and languages as desired at run-time.” (Huang 166.) Appellants do not explain why these paragraphs of Huang do not disclose the claimed feature. 6 Appeal 2015-000597 Application 13/553,950 Regarding Appellants’ point (4), the Examiner indicates that Bellegarda discloses generating a “non-synthetic, human voice” as recited in claims 1 and 2. (Ans. 3, citing Bellegarda Abstract, Figure 1.) Specifically, Bellegarda states “[a] method and apparatus is provided for generating speech that sounds more natural.” (Bellegarda Abstract.) Appellants do not explain why the Examiner’s finding is in error. Furthermore, claims 3 and 4 contain no mention of any “non-synthetic, human voice,” so there is no basis for this argument in these claims. Regarding Appellants’ point (5), there is no language in the claims supporting the distinction that the claimed methods, system or computer- readable medium are unrestricted in the text that can be input, unlike electronic books. In any case, the Examiner finds Bellegarda also does not place any restrictions on the input data. (Ans. 4.) Appellants do not persuasively refute the Examiner’s finding. Regarding Appellants’ point (6), the Examiner notes that Nitisaroj teaches homographs can have different pronunciations, and that they can be disambiguated by the part of speech to identify the correct pronunciation. (Ans. 4—5 citing Nitisaroj | 68.) We agree with the Examiner this teaching of Nitisaroj discloses disambiguation insofar as claim 2 recites such a limitation. Claims 1,3, and 4 contain no mention of disambiguation of homographs. Regarding Appellants’ point (7), only claims 1 and 2 mention the use of “previously recorded voice file[s].” The Examiner indicates that Amento discloses the claimed feature. (Ans. 5; Final Act. 10, 13 citing Amento Fig. 2 [203], [221], 127.) Specifically, Amento states “audio files that are associated with recognized words may be accessed and played within 7 Appeal 2015-000597 Application 13/553,950 revised messages.” (Amento 127.) We agree with the Examiner that Amento teaches use of pre-stored audio files for pronouncing textual words. Regarding Appellants’ point (8), none of the claims mention tagging words for contextual analysis. Thus, Appellants’ argument is not supported by corresponding language in the claims. Regarding Appellants’ point (9), the claims contain no mention that they are “non-statistical” in some aspect, much less explain what the intended meaning of “non-statistical” is such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could understand it. Appellants’ argument is entirely unsupported by any language in the claims. In order to sustain a rejection under Section 103(a), “there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417-18 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In the case before use, we find the Examiner provided the requisite reasoning and factual underpinning to support the obviousness rejections. In sum, Appellants have not shown that the claims are “more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” Id. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1^1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). DECISION We summarily affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1 and 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. 8 Appeal 2015-000597 Application 13/553,950 We summarily affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1 and 2 under 35U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. We affirm the rejections of claims 1—4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation