Ex Parte Garg et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 17, 2013

10548707 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 17, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte ATUL GARG, JAVIER DEL PRADO PAVON, SAI SHANKAR, AMJAD SOOMRO, and ZHUN ZHONG ____________________ Appeal 2010-006892 Application 10/548,707 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, KRISTEN L. DROESCH, and HUNG H. BUI, Administrative Patent Judges. BUI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1-6, 8-13, and 15-19. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. Pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we enter a new ground of rejection for claims 1 and 17. 1 Real Party in Interest is Koninklijke Phillips Electronics N.V. Appeal 2010-006892 Application 10/548,707 2 I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 Appellants’ Invention Appellants’ invention relates to a method of scheduling service periods included in a schedule frame element (SEF) as per standard IEEE 802.11 in a wireless local area network (WLAN) including at least one hybrid coordinator (HC) and at least one Quality of Service Station (QSTA). The service period is a contiguous time during which a set of one or more downlink frames or one or more transmission opportunities (TXOPs) are granted by the hybrid coordinator (HC) to the Quality of Service Station (QSTA). Since multiple TXOPs can be carried out in a single service period (as opposed to a single TXOP used in a particular service period as per standard IEEE 802.11), multiple separate power up procedures can be eliminated, thereby improving power saving and efficiency of WLAN resource use. See generally Spec. pg. 2, ll. 19-30; pg. 6, ll. 17-19; pg. 7, ll. 5-17 and Abstract. Claims on Appeal Claims 1 and 17 are independent. Claim 1 is representative of the invention, as reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized: 1. A method of sending traffic to and from a first device of a wireless local area network (WLAN) to a second device of the WLAN, the method comprising: setting a substantially absolute start time for a first service interval; and 2 Our decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed November 12, 2009 (“App. Br.”); Reply Brief filed March 29, 2010 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed February 2, 2010; and the original Specification filed September 8, 2005 (“Spec.”). Appeal 2010-006892 Application 10/548,707 3 sending the traffic to and from the first device to the second device in an interval of time after the start time; wherein a plurality of transmission opportunities (TXOP's) are sent in a single service period. Evidence Considered The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Myles U.S. 2004/0008661 A1 Jan. 15, 2004 Botton-Dascal U.S. 6,990,616 B1 Jan. 24, 2006 Kandala U.S. 7,372,855 B2 May 13, 2008 Mangold, IEEE 802.11 E - Fair Resource Sharing Between Overlapping Basic Service Sets, Proc. 13th IEEE PIMRC (2002) pp. 168–171; Tseng, Medium Access Control Enhancements for Quality of Service, IEEE Std 802.11 e/04.0 (November 2002), pp. 1–22; Catena,http://www.prorec.com/Articles/tabid/109/EntryID/67/default. aspx (Sept. 30, 1998) pp. 1–8; Heindl, The Impact of Backoff, EIFS, and Beacons on the Performance of IEEE 802.11 Wireless LANs, Proc. 4th IEEE IPDS (2000) pp. 103-112; and Choi, IEEE P802.11 Wireless LANs, IEEE 802.11-01/169r2 (May 2001) pp. 1-17. Appeal 2010-006892 Application 10/548,707 4 Examiner’s Rejections (1) Claims 1, 2, 17, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal and Mangold. Ans. 3-5. (2) Claims 3 and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, and Tseng. Ans. 6. (3) Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §1 03(a) over Botton- Dascal, Mangold, Tseng, and Kandala. Ans. 6-7. (4) Claims 4-6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, and Myles. Ans. 8. (5) Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, Tseng, and Catena. Ans. 8-9 (6) Claims 11, 13, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, Heindl, and Choi. Ans. 9-11. (7) Claims 12 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, Heindl, Choi, and Tseng. Ans. 11-12. (8) Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, Heindl, Choi, Kandala, and Tseng. Ans. 12-13. II. ISSUE The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the Examiner has erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal and Mangold. App. Br. 6-10; Reply Br. 4- 7. In particular, the issue turns on whether Mangold discloses or suggests Appeal 2010-006892 Application 10/548,707 5 “wherein a plurality of transmission opportunities (TXOP’s) are sent in a single service period” as recited in independent claims 1 and 17 (App. Br. 6- 10; Reply Br. 4-7) (emphasis added). III. DISCUSSION With respect to independent claims 1 and 17, Appellants contend that Mangold does not disclose that “a plurality of transmission opportunities (TXOPs) are sent in a single service period” as recited in claims 1 and 17. App. Br. 6-7; Reply Br. 4-5. In particular, Appellants argue that: (1) Mangold only discloses that multiple MSDUs (MAC “Medium Access Control” Service Data Units) are transmitted in a single EDCF-TXOP (Enhanced Distributed Coordination Function-Transmission Opportunity) (App. Br. 7); and (2) the Examiner’s broad interpretation that a transmission opportunity (TXOP) is a period for transmitting a set of RTS (Request to Send), CTS (Clear to Send), DATA and ACK (Acknowledgement) message frames as shown at the bottom of FIG. 3 (Ans. 16-17) is incorrect (Reply Br. 4). We agree with Appellants. The Examiner interprets TXOP as a time where a RTS, CTS, DATA, and ACK are sent (Ans. 15). However, this interpretation is too narrow in light of Appellants’ Specification. Indeed, while Appellants’ Specification does not provide an explicit definition of a “transmission opportunity (TXOP),” the Specification discusses the IEEE 802.11 standard and the “transmission opportunity (TXOP)” has an explicit meaning under the IEEE 802.11 standard. We find the Examiner’s interpretation is too narrow in light of the Specification and the IEEE 802. 11 standard. Appeal 2010-006892 Application 10/548,707 6 For example, as noted by Mangold, Section II(B) QoS Supporting Mechanisms of 802.11e, a “transmission opportunity (TXOP)” is defined as: an interval of time when a station has the right to initiate transmissions, defined by a starting time and a maximum duration. See Mangold, p. 167. FIG. 3 of Mangold is reproduced below. As shown in FIG. 3, Mangold describes multiple sets of MAC Service Data Units (MSDUs) including, for example, a first set of RTS, CTS, DATA and ACK frames and a second set of RTS, CTS, DATA and ACK frames are transmitted in a period labeled as “TXOP with EDCF-bursting.” We do not agree with the Examiner’s interpretation that each set of MSDU, including RTS, CTS, DATA and ACK constitutes a single TXOP (Ans. 16-17) in light of the meaning of a “transmission opportunity (TXOP)” in accordance with the IEEE 802.11 standard. For this reason, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 17 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal and Mangold. Appeal 2010-006892 Application 10/548,707 7 IV. NEW GROUND OF REJECTION New §103 Rejection of Claims 1 and 17 under 37 C.F.R. §41.50(b) However, using our authority under 37 C.F.R. §41.50(b), we reject claims 1 and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the same combination of Botton-Dascal and Mangold, but for different rationales. First, we adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings relative to claims 1 and 17 as outlined in the Final Office Action mailed September 14, 2009, and the Examiner’s Answer in response to each of the arguments raised by Appellants in the Appeal Brief, except for the Examiner’s finding that Mangold’s Figure 3 discloses a plurality of transmission opportunities (TXOPs). Ans. 17. Second, Mangold also discloses that multiple transmission opportunities (TXOP’s) can be granted by the hybrid controller (HC) for servicing. Specifically, Mangold discloses that “TXOPs are acquired via contention (EDCF-TXOP) or granted by the HC via polling (polled-TXOP).” See Section II(B) QoS Supporting Mechanisms of 802.11e, p. 167, of Mangold (boldface and underlining added). Since there is no definition of a “service period” in Appellants’ claims 1 and 17, we find that a skilled artisan would have had the requisite skill and knowledge to transmit multiple transmission opportunities (TXOPs) during a service period after these “TXOPs are acquired via contention (EDCF-TXOP) or granted by the HC via polling (polled-TXOP)” as suggested by Mangold. Third, as correctly found by the Examiner, Botton-Dascal discloses determining a start time at which a test of the network is to begin, i.e., choosing a time of sending a start message determined with reference to a local clock. Ans. 19-20 (citing col. 5, ll. 48-51 of Botton-Dascal). Appeal 2010-006892 Application 10/548,707 8 Moreover, “setting a substantially absolute start time for a first service interval” is merely a feature required by standard IEEE 802.11, which Appellants describe in connection with FIG. 2A as “a start time frame element (ST) 203” including “information from the [hybrid controller] HC of the absolute start time of the most imminent service interval.” See Appellants’ Spec. pg. 4, ll. 9-19. Such a start time for a service interval is further described in Mangold; see Section II(B) QoS Supporting Mechanisms of 802.11e. In view of these reasons, we conclude that independent claims 1 and 17 would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Botton-Dascal and Mangold. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) is a review body rather than a place of initial examination. We have made the rejection regarding independent claims 1 and 17 under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). However, we have not reviewed the remaining claims 2 and 18 for patentability over Botton- Dascal and Mangold. Our decision not to enter a new ground of rejection for all claims should not be considered as an indication regarding the appropriateness of further rejection or allowance of the remaining claims. Rather, we merely leave the patentability determination with respect to the remaining claims to the Examiner. See MPEP §1213.02. With respect to dependent claims 3-6, 8-13, 15-16, and 19, Appellants present no arguments for patentability of these claims separately from claims 1 and 17. App. Br. 11-14. However, in view of the new 35 U.S.C. §103(a) rejection of independent claims 1 and 17, we adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings and conclusions with respect to the teachings of Botton- Dascal, Mangold, Tseng, Kandala, Myles, Catena, Heindl, and Choi. Ans. 6- Appeal 2010-006892 Application 10/548,707 9 13. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 3-6, 8-13, 15-16, and 19 under 35 U.SC §103(a) over various combination of Botton- Dascal, Mangold, Tseng, Kandala, Myles, Catena, Heindl, and Choi. V. CONCLUSION On the record before us, we conclude that the Examiner has erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 17 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal and Mangold. However, we conclude that the Examiner has not erred in rejecting: (1) claims 3 and 8 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, and Tseng; (2) claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) over Botton- Dascal, Mangold, Tseng and Kandala; (3) claims 4-6 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, and Myles; (4) claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, Tseng and Catena; (5) claims 11, 13 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, Heindl, and Choi; (6) claims 12 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, Heindl, Choi, and Tseng; and (7) claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, Heindl, Choi, Kandala and Tseng. VI. DECISION As such, we reverse the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 2, 17 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal and Mangold. Appeal 2010-006892 Application 10/548,707 10 Pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we newly reject independent claims 1 and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the same combination of Botton-Dascal and Mangold. Rule 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) states that “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Further, § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new grounds of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. . . . We also affirm the Examiner’s final rejections of: (1) claims 3 and 8 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, and Tseng; (2) claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) over Botton- Dascal, Mangold, Tseng and Kandala; (3) claims 4-6 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, and Myles; (4) claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, Tseng and Catena; (5) claims 11, 13 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, Heindl, and Choi; (6) claims 12 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, Heindl, Choi, and Tseng; and (7) claim 16 Appeal 2010-006892 Application 10/548,707 11 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Botton-Dascal, Mangold, Heindl, Choi, Kandala and Tseng. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) msc