Ex Parte FuehrerDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 17, 201713892972 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 17, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/892,972 05/13/2013 Thomas Fuehrer BOSC.P8093US/11603365 6501 24972 7590 08/21/2017 NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP 1301 Avenue of the Americas NEW YORK, NY 10019-6022 EXAMINER HEINLE, COURTNEY D ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3668 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/21/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): nyipdocket@nortonrosefulbright.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte THOMAS FUEHRER1 Appeal 2015-007949 Application 13/892,972 Technology Center 3600 Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, JAMES P. CALVE, and LEE L. STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judges. BAHR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Robert Bosch GmbH (Appellant) appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. 1 Appellant is the Applicant, Robert Bosch GmbH, which, according to the Appeal Brief, is the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2015-007949 Application 13/892,972 THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claim 1, reproduced below with pertinent limitations italicized for emphasis, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter. 1. A method for establishing a driving profile, comprising: recording, by a processing device of a control unit, a value of an operating characteristic of a motor vehicle ascertained at a first point in time with the aid of a sensor situated in the motor vehicle; linking, by the processing device of the control unit, the recorded value of the operating characteristic to a piece of location information indicating a position of the motor vehicle to obtain a linked piece of information; transferring, by the processing device of the control unit, the linked piece of information to a server; evaluating, by a processing device of the server, a plurality of linked pieces of information to ascertain a driving profile which includes location-dependent values of the operating characteristic; transferring, by the processing device of the server, the driving profile to the motor vehicle; and ascertaining, by the processing device of the control unit, a deviation between a value of the operating characteristic of the motor vehicle and a value of the operating characteristic included in the driving profde at a position of the motor vehicle at a second point in time. REJECTION Appellant requests our review of the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Huang (US 8,280,560 B2, issued Oct. 2, 2012), Okabe (US 2010/0030434 Al, published Feb. 4, 2010), and Benedikt (US 2011/0210867 Al, published Sept. 1,2011). 2 Appeal 2015-007949 Application 13/892,972 DISCUSSION Claims 1—3, 5—7, and 9—20 The Examiner found that Huang discloses all the limitations of claim 1, with the exception of the two transferring steps. Final Act. 4—6. The Examiner relied on Okabe and Benedikt for these features. Id. at 5—6. Appellant argues that Huang does not disclose “ascertaining, by the processing device of the control unit, a deviation between a value of the operating characteristic of the motor vehicle and a value of the operating characteristic included in the driving profile at a position of the motor vehicle at a second point in time,” as required in claim 1 (Appeal Br. 7 (Claims App.)). Appeal Br. 4—6. More specifically, Appellant contends that “i) Huang does not describe determining whether or not there is a deviation based on operating characteristics of a vehicle at different points in time, and ii) Huang does not actually ascertain a deviation.” Id. at 5. In addressing the aforementioned “ascertaining ... a deviation” limitation asserted by Appellant to be lacking in Huang, the Examiner cited, in pertinent part, Figure 4 and column 8, lines 22—24 of Huang. Final Act. 5. In construing the term “operating characteristic,” the Examiner looks to Appellant’s Specification, which defines “[t]he term ‘operating characteristic’ ... in the context of [the description of the invention as] each variable and piece of information which characterizes and quantifies an operating mode, an operation type, or the operation of [the] motor vehicle . . . in general.” Ans. 3; Spec. 6,11. 6—9. The Examiner maintains that Huang’s driving style is “a piece of information in the form of a numerical value ranging from 1 to 5, that quantifies the operation of a motor vehicle in general (1 for conservative, 5 for sporty)” and, thus, “under Appellant’s own 3 Appeal 2015-007949 Application 13/892,972 broad definition,” is “an operating characteristic” as called for in claim 1. Ans. 3 (underlining omitted). Appellant first asserts that the Examiner is applying the broadest reasonable interpretation of the terminology (“driving style”) of the applied reference (Huang), and not the broadest reasonable interpretation of “operating characteristic.” Reply Br. 2. This assertion is not correct. The Examiner, correctly, applies the explicit definition of “operating characteristic” set forth in Appellant’s Specification in determining the broadest reasonable interpretation of “operating characteristic.” Ans. 3; see In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that an applicant is permitted to define specific terms used to describe the invention by setting forth a definition for terms with reasonable clarity, deliberateness and precision); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (instructing the PTO, in interpreting claim language, to apply the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description). Appellant next asserts that Huang’s driving style characterizes the vehicle operator, and not the operation of the motor vehicle. Reply Br. 3. We disagree with Appellant that Huang’s driving style does not characterize and quantify the operation of the motor vehicle. Huang’s driving style is determined from vehicle sensors, such as a hand-wheel angle sensor, a vehicle speed sensor, wheel speed sensors, longitudinal and lateral accelerometers, headway distance sensors, forward-looking radar-lidar or a camera, a throttle opening sensor, and a brake pedal position/force sensor, as 4 Appeal 2015-007949 Application 13/892,972 well as traffic/road condition information, during identified characteristic maneuvers. Huang, col. 6,1. 4—col. 7,1. 27. The rate at which the subject vehicle is closing in on a preceding vehicle (i.e., the range rate), “the subject vehicle speed and other relevant signals are used to classify the driver's driving style based on how fast the subject vehicle closes in on the preceding vehicle, and the following distance between the subject vehicle and the preceding vehicle.” Id., col. 2,11. 1—11. Thus, Huang’s driving style, while indicative of qualities (i.e., driving style or skill level) of the operator, characterizes or quantifies the operation of the motor vehicle by the operator. As such, the Examiner correctly determined that Huang’s driving style value is a piece of information that quantifies the operation of the motor vehicle in general and, therefore, is “a value of an operating characteristic of a motor vehicle” as called for in claim 1. Appellant contends that Huang merely recognizes that there might be a deviation in the numerical driving style value between the historical driver profile and the current trip, but “does not actually describe ascertaining this deviation, or making a comparison” or disclose “how to compute or analyze such a deviation.” Appeal Br. 6. The Examiner explains that “Huang explicitly describes using historical driver style data with driver style data collected during a current trip to find a deviation.” Ans. 5 (citing Huang, col. 8,11. 22—24). In this regard, Huang discloses storing the driving style value in style profile trip- logger 54 for each characteristic maneuver. Huang, col. 7,11. 24—29. Trip- logger 54 is a simple data array in which each entry array contains a time index, maneuver identifier, traffic/road information, and the corresponding characterization result (i.e., driving style value). Id., col. 7,11. 29—34. 5 Appeal 2015-007949 Application 13/892,972 Huang also teaches that “a history separate style profile can be built up for each driver over multiple trips” and that “a deviation of the style exhibited in the current trip from that in the profile history may imply a change in driver state.” Id., col. 8,11. 19-21, 23—24. “For example, a conservative driver driving aggressively may indicate that he or she is in a hurry or under stress” and “a sporty driver driving conservatively may indicate that he or she is tired or drowsy.” Id., col. 8,11. 24—28. Huang also discloses trend analysis processor 86, which outputs a “Driver Condition Change.” Id., col. 8,11. 13— 14; Fig. 4. Together, these disclosures convey a teaching to identify, or discover, a deviation of the driving style exhibited in the current trip from the driving style in the profile history to identify a driver condition change. Appellant concedes that “[t]he deviation of the style described by Huang . . . identifies when the style is different than the expected style” and that “Huang . . . emphasizes identification that the expected driver style is different than the actual driving style.” Reply Br. 3^4 (citing Huang, col. 8, 11. 22—28). However, Appellant contends that “calculation of a difference value between the expected and actual driver style values is neither described by Huang nor meaningful in view of Huang’s disclosure” and that “Huang does not describe determination of the exact deviation.” Id. at 4. We agree with Appellant that Huang does not explicitly disclose calculating a difference value between the driving style value in the current trip and the driving style value in the profile history (i.e., history separate style profile). However, claim 1 does not recite calculating a deviation value. Rather, claim 1 recites “ascertaining ... a deviation between a value of the operating characteristic of the motor vehicle and a value of the operating characteristic included in the driving profile ... at a second point 6 Appeal 2015-007949 Application 13/892,972 in time.” Appeal Br. 7 (Claims App.). This recitation is articulated differently, for example, from the earlier recitation in claim 1 of “a value of an operating characteristic of a motor vehicle ascertained at a first point in time with the aid of a sensor.” Id. (emphasis added). Further, Appellant does not direct our attention to any indication in the Specification of a special definition of the term “ascertaining” that differs from the conventional meaning of discovering with certainty. See, e.g., Ascertain Definition, The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, http ://www. credoreference. com/entry/hmdictenglang/ascertain (last visited Aug. 11, 2017) (“1. To discover with certainty, as through examination or experimentation.”). Appellant asserts that “[t]he Specification does, in fact, support that the deviation is a computed value.” Reply Br. 4. Even accepting Appellant’s assertion, however, “the name of the game is the claim.” In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998). We must be careful not to read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.”). As noted, claim 1 does not recite computing a deviation value. 7 Appeal 2015-007949 Application 13/892,972 For the above reasons, Appellant does not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, as well as claims 2, 3, 5—7, and 9-20, for which Appellant does not present any separate arguments for patentability, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Huang, Okabe, and Benedikt. See Appeal Br. 6. Claim 4 Claim 4 depends from claim 1, and further recites, “wherein the operating characteristic is one of a speed, an acceleration, a braking deceleration of the motor vehicle, a distance between the motor vehicle and a preceding or a following other motor vehicle, or a selected gear stage of the motor vehicle.” Appeal Br. 7—8 (Claims App.). The Examiner specifically addresses claim 4, finding that Huang “discloses [an] embodiment in which ‘driver style’ depends on one of a speed, an acceleration, a braking deceleration of the motor vehicle, or a distance between the motor vehicle and a preceding other vehicle.” Ans. 4 (citing Huang’s disclosure (col. 6,11. 6—12) that sensor suite 42 includes one or more of an enumerated list of sensors). According to the Examiner, “[i]n Huang, as for Appellant’s invention, raw sensor signal data is processed to produce a value that is characteristic of one of speed, or acceleration, or braking deceleration, etc.” and, “[therefore, Huang discloses the operating characteristic recited in claim 4.” Id. Appellant contests the Examiner’s finding that Huang determines driving style from data from a single sensor. Reply Br. 7. Even accepting the Examiner’s finding that Huang discloses deriving a driving style using data from only one sensor, we agree with Appellant that Huang’s driving style is not one of the particular parameters enumerated in claim 4. See id.', 8 Appeal 2015-007949 Application 13/892,972 Huang, col. 6,1. 18—col. 7,1. 27 (describing broadly the process of detecting and identifying a characteristic maneuver, recording data from the one or more sensors of the sensor suite during the maneuver, identifying the end of the maneuver to stop recording data, and processing the data, along with traffic and road information, to output a driving style value). Thus, the Examiner’s finding that Huang discloses that the driving style depends on one of the parameters recited in claim 4 is not sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Huang’s driving style (on which the Examiner reads the claimed “operating characteristic,” in which claim 4, by virtue of its dependence from claim 1, requires a deviation to be ascertained) is one of the parameters recited in claim 4. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Huang, Okabe, and Benedikt. Claim 8 Claim 8 depends from claim 1, and further recites, “wherein a value of the operating characteristic included in the driving profile is an average value of values of the operating characteristic transmitted to the server.” Appeal Br. 8 (Claims App.). In the Final Action, the Examiner cited Huang, column 10, lines 18-45, as disclosing this feature. Final Act. 8. This passage of Huang refers to “the average speed” of surrounding vehicles and estimating range variable R as “a weighted average” between the headway distance and the running average of adjacent lane vehicle gaps. Huang, col. 10,11. 23—24, 43—45. However, this disclosure is unavailing because, as discussed above, the Examiner reads the “operating characteristic” of claim 1, in which a deviation is ascertained, on Huang’s driving style, not on either the speed of surrounding vehicles or range variable R. 9 Appeal 2015-007949 Application 13/892,972 Perhaps appreciating this deficiency in the rejection, the Examiner shifts position in the Answer, finding that “Huang . . . discloses an embodiment wherein the ‘driver style’ is an average value of the values of the driver style.” Ans. 3. In making this finding, the Examiner construes “average” not in accordance “with the more precise mathematical term ‘arithmetic mean,’” but, rather, “as ‘a level that is typical of a group, class, or series.’” Id. The Examiner states: As set forth in Huang, a driver style is a value that is typical of a group of data, including one or more of speed, acceleration, braking deceleration, and distance between the motor vehicle and a preceding vehicle. See Huang, 6:6-12. Therefore, Huang discloses the operating characteristic recited in claim 8. Id. at 3^4. The Examiner’s position appears to be that because Huang’s driver style is derived from a group of data, it is typical of that group of data, and, thus, is an average of that group of data. This position is untenable. First, the Examiner’s construction of “average” as meaning something other than “arithmetic mean” in the context of claim 8 is unreasonable. See Appeal Br. 8 (Claims App., claim 8 reciting “an average value of values”). Moreover, as discussed above in regard to claim 4, none of the data input into style characterization processor 52 from sensor suite 42 to derive the driving style value is itself a driving style value. Thus, even if the driving style value were to be considered an average value of the values of the input data from which the driving style value is derived, this value of the operating characteristic (driving style) would not be an average value of values of the operating characteristic (driving style), as called for in claim 8. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Huang, Okabe, and Benedikt. 10 Appeal 2015-007949 Application 13/892,972 DECISION The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—20 is AFFIRMED as to claims 1—3, 5—7, and 9-20, and is REVERSED as to claims 4 and 8. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 11 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation