Ex Parte Folkert et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 29, 2013

11084174 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/084,174 03/18/2005 Nathaniel Keith Folkert 50277-2551 8236 42425 7590 04/29/2013 HICKMAN PALERMO TRUONG BECKER BINGHAMWONG/ORACLE 1 Almaden Boulevard Floor 12 SAN JOSE, CA 95113 EXAMINER WITZENBURG, BRUCE A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2166 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/29/2013 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD _____________ Ex parte NATHANIEL KEITH FOLKERT, ABHINAV GUPTA, and ANDREW WITKOWSKI ____________________ Appeal 2010-007508 Application 11/084,174 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judges. JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2010-007508 Application 11/084,174 2 STATEMENT OF CASE1 Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a Final Rejection of claims 1-3, 5-7, 11-l3, 15-17, and 21-26.2 Claims 4, 8-10, 14 and 18-20 are cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. Introduction The claims are directed to allocating resources for a refresh of materialized views. Spec., Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations in italics, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for refreshing materialized views comprising: determining a schedule for refreshing a plurality of materialized views, wherein the schedule includes one or more levels, wherein the one or more levels constitute at least two same level materialized views at a certain level within said one or more levels, wherein the at least two same level materialized views may be refreshed concurrently; determining whether to allocate computer resources: (1) to concurrently refresh the at least two same level materialized views, or (2) to refresh in parallel only one materialized view of said at least two same level materialized views without concurrently refreshing any other materialized view of said at least two same level materialized views while performing said refresh in parallel of said only one materialized view; in response to determining to allocate computer resources for said refresh in parallel said only one materialized view: 1 Throughout the Decision, we refer to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed Nov. 9, 2009), and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Apr. 2, 2010), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Feb. 2, 2010). 2 The Real Party in Interest is Oracle International Corporation. Appeal 2010-007508 Application 11/084,174 3 allocating said computer resources to perform said refresh in parallel of said only one materialized view without concurrently allocating said computer resources to refresh any other of said at least two same level materialized views; and without concurrently refreshing any other of said at least two same level materialized views using said computer resources, performing and completing said refresh in parallel of said only one materialized view using said computer resources; wherein the determining steps and allocating step are performed by a computing device. Rejections The Examiner made the following rejections: Claims 1, 11, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as being unpatentable over Norcott (U.S. Patent No.6,334,128 B1) and Oracle, Oracle9i Materialized Views, An Oracle White Paper (May 2001) (hereinafter “Oracle9i White Paper”). Ans. 3-6. Claims 2, 3, 5-7, 12, 13, 15-17 and 22-26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as being unpatentable over Oracle9i White Paper, Norcott, and Schiefer (US Patent No. 5,778,353). See Ans. 6-12.3 3 The rejection of claims 2, 3, 5-7, 12, 13, 15-17 and 22-26 omits Oracle9i White Paper in the grounds. We find this to be harmless error, since these claims depend from claim 1, rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as being unpatentable over Norcott and Oracle9i White Paper. We thus consider the rejection of Claims 2, 3, 5-7, 12, 13, 15-17 and 22-26 as rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as being unpatentable over Oracle9i White Paper, Norcott, and Schiefer. Appeal 2010-007508 Application 11/084,174 4 ANALYSIS Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that Norcott and Oracle9i White Paper teach or suggest “determining whether to allocate computer resources to” refresh two or more materialized views in parallel as recited in claim 1? Appellants contend that Examiner failed to state what in Norcott or Oracle9i corresponds to the feature of “determining whether to allocate computer resources to” refresh two or more materialized views or refresh in parallel only one materialized view as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 10. Appellants contend that although Norcott may include a refresh schedule for materialized views, the mere possibility that materialized view can be partitioned does not teach or suggest a determination that allocates resources as found in claim 1. App. Br. 11. Appellants contend that neither the Oracle9i White Paper nor Norcott “describe anything about determining whether conditions for parallel refresh of multiple materialized views are met.” App. Br. 12. Appellants further argue that Norcott actually suggests that for multi-processor systems materialized views should always be refreshed concurrently. App. Br. 11 (citing Norcott, col. 12 ll. 30-32, 39- 42). Thus, Appellants argue, Norcott cannot teach or suggest option 2 of the determining step for parallel refresh of one materialized view as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 12. Finally, Appellants argue that neither Norcott nor Oracle9i White Paper teach or suggest that when only one materialized view is refreshed in parallel the refresh occurs “without concurrently allocating said computer resources to refresh any other of said at least two same level materialized views” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 12-13. Appeal 2010-007508 Application 11/084,174 5 The Examiner responds that claim 1 “merely requires that either option (1) or option (2) be present” in the determining step of claim 1 and that there is a determination to execute that option. Ans. 13. The Examiner agrees with Appellants that Norcott teaches or suggests multiple materialized views should always be refreshed concurrently on multi- processor systems. Ans. 13; App. Br. 11. The Examiner found that Norcott teaches or suggests a determination is made when refresh jobs for materialized views are given either the state of ACTIVE or SUSPENDED. Ans. 13-14 (citing Norcott, col. 12, ll. 23-42). The Examiner found that provisioning of the materialized view refresh jobs as active or suspended determines the allocation of resources and execution of materialized view refreshes. Id. The Examiner found that this determination to refresh active versus suspended materialized views, where two or more such views are processed in parallel as admitted by Appellants, meets the first option in the determination step as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 14. We agree with the Examiner’s interpretation of claim 1 as only requiring that either option 1 or option 2 be present in the determining step of claim 1. See Ans. 13. We disagree with Appellants that the prior art must teach or suggest both options. We find that the Examiner properly found Norcott executes active or suspended materialized views refresh jobs. Ans. 13-14; Norcott, col. 12, ll. 23-42. The designation determines which materialized views will be refreshed and which will not. Norcott, col. 12, ll. 23-42. In addition, we agree with both the Examiner and Appellants that Norcott suggests that multiple materialized should be refreshed concurrently with each other. See App. Br. 11; Reply 4; Ans. 13. We disagree with Appellants, however, that Appeal 2010-007508 Application 11/084,174 6 this concurrent processing indicates Norcott does not make any determination. See App. Br. 11; Reply 4. We find that Norcott teaches or suggests a determination when the refresh jobs for materialized views are either ACTIVE or SUSPENDED. See Norcott, col. 12, ll. 23-42. Appellants have not persuaded us that determining includes “conditions for parallel refresh of multiple materialized views” (App. Br. 12) or that Norcott must show a determination for a particular refresh order for multiple materialized views (Reply 5). Appellants’ remaining arguments that the Examiner erred refer to option 2 of the determining step for refreshing in parallel only one materialized view. App. Br. 12-18. In addition, Appellants’ argument that the claimed invention produces unexpected results when compared to typical refreshing of materialized views on multi-processor systems refers to determination factors that are beyond the scope of Appellants’ claimed invention. Because we agree with the Examiner that Appellants’ claim requires only one of the determining options (Ans. 13) and that Norcott’s concurrent processing of ACTIVE over SUSPENDEND jobs encompasses the limitations claimed in determining step 1 as recited in claim 1, we find that the Examiner did not err in finding that Norcott and the Oracle9i White Paper teach or suggest the “determining” step when applied to concurrent refresh of two or more materialized views. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C §103(a). Appellants rely on the same arguments presented for independent claim 1 in arguing dependent claims 11 and 21 (App. Br. 18), and dependent claims 2, 3, 5-7, 12, 13, 15-17 and 22-26 (App. Br. 19). Accordingly, we Appeal 2010-007508 Application 11/084,174 7 also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 3, 5-7, 11-l3, 15-17, and 21-26 under 35 U.S.C §103(a). DECISION For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3, 5-7, 11- l3, 15-17, and 21-26 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED tj