Ex Parte Finet

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 16, 2017

13433761 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 16, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/433,761 03/29/2012 Tristan FINET H0033519-HON10513P00760US 2750 93730 7590 03/20/2017 HONEYWELL/WOOD PHILLIPS Patent Services 115 Tabor Road P.O. Box 377 MORRIS PLAINS, NJ 07950 EXAMINER ALAM, MIRZA F ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2689 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/20/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ksanderson@woodphillips.com patentservices-us @ honey well, com docketing @ woodphillips .com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte TRISTAN FINET Appeal 2016-007335 Application 13/433,7611 Technology Center 2600 Before ERIC S. FRAHM, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and JOHN D. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—14, which constitute all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. 1 The real party in interest is identified as Honeywell International Inc. App. Br. 1. Appeal 2016-007335 Application 13/433,761 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The invention relates to a personal alert safety system (PASS) employing an accelerometer. Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal (disputed limitation emphasized): 1. A personal alert safety system comprising: a housing adapted to be worn by a user; an accelerometer in the housing; an alarm device operatively associated with the housing; and a control in the housing operatively connected to the accelerometer and the alarm device, the control being configured to operate the alarm device responsive to select acceleration movement of the housing sensed by the accelerometer. App. Br. 11 (Claims Appendix). THE REJECTIONS Claims 1, 4—6, 8, and 11—13 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Parkulo et al. (US 2007/0281745 Al; pub. Dec. 6, 2007) (“Parkulo”) in view of Campman (US 5,317,305; iss. May 31, 1994) (Campman ’305”). Final Act. 2—8. Claims 2, 3, 9, and 10 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Parkulo, Campman ’305, and Kim et al. (US 2010/0256947 Al; iss. Oct. 7, 2010) (“Kim”). Final Act. 9-12. Claims 7 and 14 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Parkulo, Campman ’305, and Campman (US 6,016,099; iss. Jan. 18, 2000) (“Campman ’099”). Final Act. 13—15. 2 Appeal 2016-007335 Application 13/433,761 ANALYSIS Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding Parkulo and Campman ’305 teach the claim 1 limitation a control in the housing operatively connected to the accelerometer and the alarm device, the control being configured to operate the alarm device responsive to select acceleration movement of the housing sensed by the accelerometer. App. Br. 3—7; Reply Br. 1-5. According to Appellant, Parkulo and Campman use an accelerometer to detect immobility to generate an alarm and this is consistent with the Specification in which “known PASS devices detect immobility of a fire fighter and generate a loud alarm to notify other personnel” and “may also include a control, such as a push button, to manually initiate an emergency alarm.” App. Br. 4. See for example, Specification, paragraph 6 “[i]f the PASS device detects the immobility of the firefighter, the PASS device generates a loud alarm to alert other personnel that a firefighter is in a hazardous situation. It helps to guide rescue personnel to the location of the incapacitated firefighter.” Appellant argues Parkulo teaches an accelerometer that provides “an indication as to whether the PASS unit 30 has been motionless for a predetermined period of time.” Id. at 4—5 (citing Parkulo 142). Appellant argues the claim term movement means “the act or process of moving people or things from one place or position to another” (citing Merriam-Webster Dictionary (www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary) and does not apply to the immobility of Parkulo, which is the absence of movement. Id. Regarding Campman, Appellant argues Campman’s accelerometer, like Parkulo, is used to detect lack of motion. App. Br. 5—6 (citing Campman 3 Appeal 2016-007335 Application 13/433,761 14:60-68). While Campman uses an accelerometer which determines whether or not motion is present “Campman teaches that an alarm occurs when no motion of the user is present for a period of time, as in Parkulo” and “[i]ndeed, for an emergency call function, a push button is used to provide an alarm sound.” App. Br. 6 (citing Campman 13:58; 14:60—68). Appellant argues there is no difference in the operation of the Parkulo and Campman devices and the combination of the combination of their teaching would not result in the claimed invention. App. Br. 6. According to Appellant: The claim specifies that the control operates the alarm device responsive to select acceleration movement of the housing sensed by the accelerometer. Detecting movement of the alarm device is not synonymous with operating the alarm device. Nowhere does Examiner’s answer state that the combination of Parkulo and Campman [’]305 operates an alarm device responsive to select acceleration movement of the housing sensed by the accelerometer. Indeed, as neither reference includes such a teaching, no combination could include such a teaching. To the contrary, both Parkulo and Campman [’]305 operate an alarm device responsive to immobility of the housing based on the accelerometer detecting lack of motion. Reply Br. 3. The Examiner finds Parkulo teaches a motion sensor which detects motionless of a PASS device but does not teach the alarm device responsive to select acceleration movement of the housing sensed by the accelerometer. Final Act. 3^4 (citing Parkulo | 77; Figs. 13, 14). The Examiner relies on Campman ’305 for this limitation because Campman’s accelerator detects motion (or lack of motion). Id. at 14; see also Ans. 3^4 (citing Campman 4:35—37; 7:48—53; Fig. 12). 4 Appeal 2016-007335 Application 13/433,761 We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. In particular, the Examiner’s interpretation of the term movement in the context of the claim 1 limitation to include no movement is overbroad and unreasonable as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, and is inconsistent with the Specification. Claim terms in a patent application are given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In view of the above, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1 and independent claim 8 which recites substantially the same limitations. We also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2—7 and 9—14. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[Djependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious . . . .”). DECISION We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—14. REVERSED 5