Ex Parte Fernandez et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 12, 2017

13285930 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/285,930 10/31/2011 Dennis S. Fernandez FERN-P003O 1128
22877 7590 12/14/2017
FERNANDEZ & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1175 Osborn Avenue
Atherton, CA 94027
EXAMINER
HUERTA, ALEXANDER Q
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2425
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/14/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
legalassistant @ iploft. com
jmharris@iploft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DENNIS S. FERNANDEZ and IRENE HU
Appeal 2016-002307
Application 13/285,930
Technology Center 2400
Before RICHARD E. SCHAFER, DAVID M. KOHUT, and
JASON V. MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2016-002307
Application 13/285,930
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Appellants seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 23 and 26—30.2 We have jurisdiction over the
appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
INVENTION
Appellants’ invention is directed to subscriber video conferencing
during program delivery. Spec. 2,11. 2-4.
Claim 23 is illustrative of the invention and is reproduced below:
23. A mobile digital television and gaming advertising
method comprising the steps of:
enabling multiple mobile digital television and gaming
receiver conferencing between multiple mobile digital
television and gaming subscribers;
monitoring program and data viewing of a mobile digital
television and gaming subscriber and mobile digital television
and gaming conferencing activity between mobile
digital television and gaming subscribers with a mobile digital
television and gaming controller, wherein the mobile digital
television and gaming controller authorizes and causes certain
mobile digital television and gaming receivers to be added or
removed dynamically from one or more mobile digital
television and gaming video conferencing active set or
selected logical group, as well as restricting selected mobile
digital television and gaming receivers from viewing certain
mobile digital television and gaming program and/or data; and
1 Our Decision makes reference to the Appellants’ Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,”
filed December 17, 2015), and Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed May 29,
2015), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed November 4, 2015), and
Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed July 17, 2014).
2 Claims 1—22 and 24—25 were cancelled. Claim 31 is currently withdrawn.
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directing personalized, targeted, incentive, and
advertising messages through an integrated mobile digital
television and gaming delivery system comprising both mobile
digital television and gaming program and data to multiple
mobile digital television and gaming subscriber receivers,
wherein the mobile digital television and gaming data
comprises internet data, wherein the mobile digital television
and gaming program comprises digital television program.
REFERENCES
Yu US 5,343
Moncreiff US 5,828
Lehtinen US 6,172
Enns US 6,658
Hendricks US 6,738
,240 Aug. 30, 1994
,839 Oct. 27, 1998
,673 B1 Jan. 9, 2001
,010 B1 Dec. 2, 2003
,978 B1 May 18,2004
REJECTIONS AT ISSUE
Claims 23 and 26—28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hendricks, Yu, Moncreiff, and Lehtinen. Final Act. 3.
Claims 29 and 30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hendricks, Moncreiff, Lehtinen, and Enns. Final Act. 7.
ISSUES
ISSUE 1 — Did the Examiner err in finding it obvious to combine
Hendricks, Yu, Moncreiff, and Lehtinen to reject independent claims 23 and
26-28?
ISSUE 2 — Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of
Hendricks, Yu, Moncreiff, and Lehtinen teaches “restricting selected mobile
digital television and gaming receivers from viewing certain mobile digital
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television and gaming program and/or data,” as recited in independent claim
23.
ISSUE 3 — Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of
Hendricks, Yu, Moncreiff, and Lehtinen teaches “wherein the mobile digital
television and gaming controller authorizes and causes certain mobile digital
television and gaming receivers to be added or removed dynamically from
one or more mobile digital television and gaming video conferencing active
set or selected logical group,” as recited in independent claim 23?
ISSUE 4 — Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of
Hendricks, Yu, Moncreiff, and Lehtinen teaches “enabling a mobile digital
television and gaming controller to serve as a mobile digital television and
gaming system headend,” as recited in independent claim 28?
ISSUE 5 — Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of
Hendricks, Moncreiff, Lehtinen, and Enns teaches “a mobile digital
television and gaming processor,” as recited in independent claim 29, and
similarly recited in independent claim 30?
ISSUE 6 — Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of
Hendricks, Moncreiff, Lehtinen, and Enns teaches “a network interface
configured for [Ethernet connection capabilities,” as recited in independent
claim 29, and similarly recited in independent claim 30?
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ANALYSIS
Claim 23
ISSUE 1 — As detailed below, Appellants raise numerous arguments
asserting that the combination of Hendricks, Yu, Moncreiff, and Lehtinen is
improper.
Independent claim 23 recites a “mobile” system. App. Br. 18. The
Examiner finds the combination of Hendricks, Yu, and Moncreiff teaches
the claimed invention but for the system being mobile. See Final Act. 5.
The Examiner relies on Lehtinen for providing increased mobility (see id.).
Appellants present the following arguments (1—5) regarding the Examiner’s
combination relying on Lehtinen’s teaching of mobility:
1. Appellants assert that Lehtinen is “non-analogous” art. App. Br.
9—10. We are not persuaded.
Firstly, Appellants’ statement does not explain sufficiently why
Lehtinen is non-analogous to the invention’s field of endeavor and therefore
amounts to attorney argument without supporting evidence. See In re
Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (stating that attorney’s
arguments cannot take the place of evidence). Secondly, “[wjhether a
reference in the prior art is ‘analogous’ is a fact question.” In re Clay, 966
F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Two criteria have evolved for answering the
question: “(1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless
of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of
the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to
the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Id. at 658—59.
Here, the Examiner finds Lehtinen is directed to “a mobile environment
which one of ordinary skill would clearly recognize is in the field of
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[Appellants’] endeavor (i.e., mobile TV) and also reasonably pertinent to the
particular problem with which the applicant was concerned (i.e., providing
mobile digital television).” Ans. 4. We thus find a preponderance of the
evidence supports the Examiner’s findings that Lehtinen is analogous art.
2. Appellants argue Hendricks fails to disclose how the network
controller communicates in a mobile environment. See App. Br. 9.
Appellants argue Hendricks individually, whereas the rejection is
based on the combination of Hendricks, Lehtinen, Yu, and Moncreiff. One
cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually when the
rejection is based on a combination of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413, 426 (CCPA 1981) and In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed.
Cir. 1986)). As correctly pointed out by the Examiner, “Hendricks was not
relied upon to teach a mobile digital television system. Lehtinen was relied
upon to teach . . . mobile.” Ans. 3. We are not persuaded, as the rejection is
based upon the combination that includes Lehtinen, and the Appellants did
not argue the combination.
3. Appellants further argue the combination of Lehtinen with
Hendricks, Yu, and Moncreiff fails to perform the claimed function. See
App. Br. 9-10; see also Reply Br. 4—8. Specifically, Appellants argue the
combination is “technically dysfunctional” because Lehtinen’s
unidirectional communication system would not support the bidirectional
communication required by Hendricks’ network. Id.
Contrary to Appellants’ assertion that Lehtinen has only unidirectional
communication, the preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s
finding that Lehtinen teaches bidirectional communications. See Ans. 4—5,
citing Lehtinen col. 2,11. 11—24 (“bidirectional at least to a limited
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extend[sic]”); also see Final Act. 9, citing Lehtinen col. 4,11. 19-22
(“bidirectional system”).
Moreover, we note “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the
features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference .... Rather, the test is what the combined
teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. See also In re Sneed, 710 F.2d
1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the
references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention.”); and
In reNievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of
references does not involve an ability to combine their specific
structures.”). Rather, “if a technique has been used to improve one device,
and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would
improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious
unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR Int 7 Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
Here, the rejection is not based on a bodily incorporation of
Lehtinen’s mobile system with Hendricks’ broadcast network. Rather, the
rejection is based on what the combined teachings of Hendricks (TV
broadcasting network) and Lehtinen (mobile subscribers for receiving TV
broadcasts) would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art.
Appellants have neither asserted nor provided sufficient evidence to show
that the proposed combination was beyond the capabilities of an ordinarily
skilled artisan.
Accordingly, we are not convinced that the Examiner’s combination
of Hendricks’ bidirectional broadcast system with Lehtinen’s bidirectional
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mobile system would have would have been technically dysfunctional or
otherwise beyond the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ans. 5.
4. Appellants argue that Hendricks and/or Lehtinen teach away from
the claimed solution. See Appeal Br. 8—12.
We are unpersuaded, as Appellants do not provide sufficient evidence
to show that Hendricks and/or Lehtinen teach away from the claimed
invention. Appellants do not point to any passages in Hendricks or Lehtinen
that “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” the use of mobile
technology in a digital television and gaming system. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d
1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (prior art does not teach away from claimed
subject matter unless the prior art also criticizes, discredits or otherwise
discourages the solution claimed). Additionally, Appellants do not address
the Examiner’s finding that Hendricks encourages the combination, in that
Hendricks teaches using its system with a cellular network. See Ans. 3,
citing Hendricks col. 7,11. 45—67 (“cellular networks”). Because Appellants
have neither shown that the references teach away from the claimed
invention nor addressed the Examiner’s specific findings regarding
Hendricks, we do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive.
5. Appellants argue that the Examiner provided insufficient reasoning
to combine Hendricks and Lehtinen. See App. Br. 10. Appellants contend
“it is not imperative to create the necessity of combining two co-existing
technologies with an expectation of success” and there is a “lack of
motivation to combine Hendricks with Lehtinen.” Id. We are not
persuaded.
A determination of obviousness requires “articulated reasoning with
some rational underpinning.” See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn,
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441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In this case, the Examiner finds mobile
systems were known, and concludes an ordinarily skilled artisan would have
been motivated to combine Hendricks with Lehtinen for providing increased
mobility. See Final Act. 5; see also Ans. 3. Appellants have merely
provided conclusory statements (see App. Br. 10) without specifically
addressing and rebutting the motivation articulated by the Examiner, i.e.,
“for the purpose of providing increased mobility” (Final Act. 5; Ans. 3).
Thus, Appellants fail to provide sufficient arguments and/or evidence
demonstrating why the Examiner’s reasoning is erroneous.
To the extent Appellants argue there was no reasonable expectation of
success in combining Hendricks and Lehtinen (App. Br. 10), the Examiner’s
proposed modifications to Hendricks do not appear to be uniquely
challenging, and Appellants have not sufficiently explained or provided
evidence as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had
an expectation of success in making the modifications. See In re O ’Farrell,
853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (all that is required is a reasonable
expectation of success, not absolute predictability of success).
For the reasons indicated above, Appellants have not shown that the
Examiner erred in combining Lehtinen with Hendricks, Yu, and Moncreiff
to arrive at a “mobile” system, as required by claim 23.
Claim 23 further requires “video” conferencing. App. Br. 18. The
Examiner finds Hendricks, Lehtinen, and Moncreiff lack video and relies on
Yu. Final Act. 4—5.
Appellants argue that Yu is nonanalogous art to video conferencing
between mobile subscribers. Appeal Br. 11; see also Reply Br. 9-10. As
discussed above, a reference is deemed analogous if the art is from the same
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field of the inventor’s endeavor. See In re Clay, 966 F.2d at 658—659. Here,
the Examiner cited Yu to teach video conferencing (see Final Act. 4), which
is from the same field of the inventor’s endeavor, i.e., video conferencing
during programming. A preponderance of the evidence establishes Yu as
analogous art.
Appellants argue the combination of Yu with Hendricks, Lehtinen,
and Moncreiff is “dysfunctional and fails to function as claimed due to
technical difficulties,” because Lehtinen’s unidirectional mobile system
would not support Yu’s video conferencing. App. Br. 11—12 (emphasis
omitted). Appellants also contend that Yu is not properly combinable with
Hendricks, Lehtinen, and Moncreiff, because Yu’s system requires a coaxial
cable network rather than a mobile network. Id. at 12. Appellants’
contentions are not persuasive of Examiner error.
As discussed above, Lehtinen discloses a bidirectional system. See
Lehtinen col. 2,11. 11—24 and col. 4,11. 19—22 (“bidirectional”). Thus,
Appellants’ dysfunctionality argument is based on the incorrect factual
assertion that Lehtinen’s system not bidirectional.
Further, the test for obviousness “is what the combined teachings of
the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In
re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Here, the Examiner finds Hendricks teaches
conferencing in a broadcast network, Yu teaches video conferencing in a
coaxial cable network, and Lehtinen teaches communication in a mobile
network. See Final Act. 4—5. The Examiner further finds Yu permits
modifications and does not preclude mobile video conferencing. Ans. 6.
Appellants have not sufficiently argued or shown evidence that the
Examiner’s proposed combination, i.e., Yu’s video to Hendricks’
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conferencing and Lehtinen’s mobile network, is not suggested by the
references or beyond the capabilities of one of ordinary skill in the art.
To the extent Appellants attack the Yu reference individually rather
than the combination of Hendricks, Lehtinen, Moncreiff, and Yu references,
we agree with the Examiner that nonobviousness cannot be established by
attacking references individually when the rejection is based on their
combination. Ans. 6 (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425).
Based on the forgoing reasons, Appellants have not shown Examiner
error in combining Yu’s video conferencing with Hendricks, Lehtinen, and
Moncreiff.
ISSUE 2 — Claim 23 also requires a controller “restricting selected . . .
receivers” from viewing certain program and/or data. App. Br. 18. The
Examiner finds Hendricks’ “controller monitors for authorized (or
unauthorized) channel access” to restrict certain receivers. Ans. 5; see also
Final Act. 4; see also Hendricks col. 4,11. 1—8 (“polling and automatic
report-back cycles occurs frequently enough to allow the network controller
to . . . monitor authorized channel access”).
Appellants argue Hendricks lacks the function of restricting selected
receivers, as Hendricks’ controller does not restrict receivers as “an active
process” (App. Br. 11) or “censor pre-defmed program or data classes or
titles” (Reply Br. 8).
In response to Appellants’ argument, the Examiner finds, and we
agree, the act of monitoring access through “polling and [an] automatic
report-back cycle” is “an active process since it requires actively
determining if subscribers are authorized.” Ans. 5, citing Hendricks col. 4,
11. 1—8; see also Final Act. 2, citing col. 4,11. 39-41.
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Moreover, Appellants have not effectively argued why the broadest
reasonable interpretation, consistent with Appellants’ disclosure, of the
phrase “restricting selected . . . receivers” requires censoring or would
preclude the active channel access monitoring disclosed in Hendricks. See
In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim language is given
its broadest reasonable interpretation during prosecution).
Further, we note that claim 23 does not recite “an active process” or
“censor pre-defmed program or data classes or titles.” App. Br. 18; Reply
Br. 8. As such, Appellants’ argument is unpersuasive because it is
incommensurate with the scope of the claim. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344,
1348 (CCPA 1982) (limitations not appearing in the claims cannot be relied
upon for patentability).
ISSUE 3 — Claim 23 also recites a controller causing receivers to be
“added or removed dynamically” from conferencing. App. Br. 18. The
Examiner finds Hendricks, Lehtinen, and Yu lack dynamically adding or
removing receivers, and relies on Moncreiff to cure this deficiency. See
Final Act. 4—5. The Examiner finds that Moncreiff s system dynamically
adds or removes receivers after a user inputs information (i.e., enters login
information or selects Retum/Exit). See Ans. 7.
Appellants argue that because Moncreiff requires input such as login
information, it does not teach adding or removing “dynamically.” App. Br.
13; see also Reply Br. 11—12. Appellants contend “dynamically” should be
construed as “without login information.” Id.
We are not persuaded. Claim language is given its broadest
reasonable interpretation during prosecution, consistent with Appellants’
disclosure. In re Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054. Consistent with its ordinary and
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customary meaning, the Examiner interprets the term “dynamically” to
include changing according to or occurring upon user input. See Ans. 7.
Moreover, Appellants have not pointed to anywhere in the Specification that
would suggest limiting the term “dynamically” to mean without input or
login information. See Appeal Br. 13. Because Appellants have not
sufficiently argued or provided evidence to the contrary, we find the
Examiner’s interpretation of the term “dynamically” to be reasonable and
consistent with Appellants’ disclosure. Therefore, we agree with the
Examiner that claim 23 does not require adding or removing receivers
“without login information.” Ans. 7. Accordingly, Appellants are arguing a
limitation (i.e., without login information) that does not appear in the claim;
hence, the arguments are not commensurate with the claim scope. In re Self,
671 F.2d at 1348. As such, Appellants have not shown error with respect to
the Examiner’s finding that Moncreiff teaches dynamically adding or
removing.
Based on the forgoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 23.
Claims 26 and 27
Appellants argue that independent claims 26 and 27 are patentable for
the same reasons as claim 23. App. Br. 8—12. As discussed above,
Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive. As we are not apprised of
Examiner error, we sustain the rejection of claims 26 and 27.
Claim 28
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Appellants argue that independent claim 28 is patentable for the same
reasons as claim 23, in addition to the argument set forth below. See App.
Br. 8-12.
ISSUE 4 — Claim 28 recites a “controller to serve as a . . . headend.”
App. Br. 19. The Examiner finds Hendricks discloses a controller {headend
208) that serves as a headend. Final Act. 6—7 citing Hendricks col. 3, lines
51—56. The Examiner finds the headend 208 performs “network monitoring
and control” (via the network controller 214) and “receives and processes
digitally compressed program signals” (via the signal processor 209 and dish
203). Ans. 8; see also Final Act. 8 citing Hendricks col. 15,1. 45—col. 16,1.
9.
Appellants argue that Hendricks fails to teach enabling a controller to
serve as a headend. App. Br. 13. Appellants argue “Hendricks merely
teaches that the network controller plays a crucial role in monitoring and
control of set top terminals within the headend, which is composed of
multiple embodiments including the network controller, cable headend
receiver, and the signal processor.” Id.', see also Reply Br. 12. Appellants
cite to Hendricks Figure 4 (App. Br. 13); Appellants’ arguments also pertain
to Hendricks Figure 3, which is reproduced below:
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operations
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Hendricks Figure 3 illustrates the primary components of a television
delivery system, including headend 208 comprising network controller 214,
signal processor 209, and (unlabeled) satellite receiver dish 203.
Specifically, Appellants argue that network controller 214 is “within”
headend 208 along with signal processor and satellite receiver dish,
therefore, the network controller by itself cannot “serve as” a headend. Id.
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We disagree with the Appellants’ characterization of the rejection.
The Examiner finds headend 208—including network controller 214—
rather than network controller 214 alone corresponds to the claimed
“controller.” See Final Act. 6—7; see also Ans. 8. Said differently, the
Examiner finds that the entire cable headend 208 (the combination of
network controller 214, signal processor 209, and dish 203) corresponds to
the claimed controller serving as a headend. See Ans. 8.
Accordingly, Appellants’ argument is unpersuasive because it
mischaracterizes the rejection. By not addressing the rejection as articulated
by the Examiner, Appellants have not demonstrated how the Examiner
erred. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 28.
Claim 29
ISSUE 5 — Independent claim 29 recites a unit comprising a
“processor.” App. Br. 20. Appellants argue Hendricks lacks a processor in
the unit, since network controller 214 is located outside the unit within
headend 208. See App. Br. 20; see also Reply Br. 13.
We do not agree with Appellants’ characterization of the rejection.
While Appellants argue that Hendricks’ network controller is located outside
of the unit, the Examiner does not designate the network controller as the
claimed processor. Instead, the Examiner finds Hendricks’ microprocessor
corresponds to the claimed processor. See Final Act. 8 citing col. 13,11. 8—
27; see also Hendricks col. 14,11. 2—11 (“microprocessor”).
Accordingly, Appellants’ argument is unpersuasive because it
mischaracterizes the Examiner’s rejection. In failing to address the rejection
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as articulated in the Final Action, Appellants have not demonstrated how the
Examiner erred in finding Hendricks teaches the claimed “processor.”
ISSUE 6 — Independent claim 29 recites a “network interface
configured for [Ethernet connection capabilities.” App. Br. 20. The
Examiner finds that the combination of Hendricks, Lehtinen, and Moncreiff
teaches the claimed invention but for Ethernet; the Examiner relies on Enns
for Ethernet. See Final Act. 9. Appellants argue: (1) Hendricks and
Lehtinen teach away from a network interface with Ethernet, (2) the
combination of Hendricks and Lehtinen lacks a network interface with
Ethernet, and (3) the combination fails to perform the claimed function.
App. Br. 15; see also Reply Br. 13. We are not persuaded.
First, we do not agree with Appellants’ teaching away argument,
because Appellants do not provide any arguments that Hendricks or
Lehtinen “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” mobile digital
television and gaming with a network interface for Ethernet. In re Fulton,
391 F.3d at 1201.
Second, Appellants’ argument attacking only Hendricks and Lehtinen
for lacking a “network interface configured for [Ethernet” is unpersuasive,
because the Examiner relies on Enns for Ethernet. Final Act. 8; see also
Ans. 10. Appellants simply point out Hendricks and Lehtinen individually
lack Ethernet but do not present arguments to the combination including
Enns. App. Br. 15. Because Appellants argue the references individually
rather than the combination, Appellants have not demonstrated the Examiner
erred in finding the combination suggests a network interface configured for
Ethernet. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 426 (“[0]ne cannot show non-
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obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the
rejections are based on combinations of references.”).
Lastly, we are unpersuaded that the combination would fail to
function as claimed. As noted above, Appellants incorrectly argue the
references individually as opposed to the combination. As such, Appellants
have not sufficiently explained why or how the combination would not
function, nor have Appellants demonstrated that the combination is beyond
the capabilities of one of ordinary skill in the art.
For the reasons stated above, we sustain the rejection of claim 29.
Claim 30
Appellants argue that independent claim 30 is patentable for the same
reasons as claim 29. See App. Br. 14—16. As discussed above, Appellants’
arguments are not persuasive; therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claim 30.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in finding it obvious to combine Hendricks,
Yu, Moncreiff, and Lehtinen to reject independent claims 23 and 26—28.
The Examiner did not err in finding the combination of Hendricks,
Yu, Moncreiff, and Lehtinen teaches “restricting selected mobile digital
television and gaming receivers from viewing certain mobile digital
television and gaming program and/or data,” as recited in independent claim
23.
The Examiner did not err in finding the combination of Hendricks,
Yu, Moncreiff, and Lehtinen teaches “wherein the mobile digital television
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and gaming controller authorizes and causes certain mobile digital television
and gaming receivers to be added or removed dynamically from one or more
mobile digital television and gaming video conferencing active set or
selected logical group,” as recited in independent claim 23.
The Examiner did not err in finding that the combination of
Hendricks, Yu, Moncreiff, and Lehtinen teaches “enabling a mobile digital
television and gaming controller to serve as a mobile digital television and
gaming system headend,” as recited in independent claim 28.
The Examiner did not err in finding that the combination of
Hendricks, Moncreiff, Lehtinen, and Enns teaches “a mobile digital
television and gaming processor,” as recited in independent claims 29, and
similarly recited in independent claim 30.
The Examiner did not err in finding that the combination of
Hendricks, Moncreiff, Lehtinen, and Enns teaches “a network interface
configured for [Ethernet connection capabilities,” as recited in independent
claim 29, and similarly recited in independent claim 30.
SUMMARY
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 23 and 26—28 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks, Yu, Moncreiff,
and Lehtinen is affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 29 and 30 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks, Moncreiff, Lehtinen, and
Enns is affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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