Ex Parte Farooq et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 6, 201813228661 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 6, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/228,661 09/09/2011 46169 7590 12/10/2018 SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P. (Cerner Corporation) Intellectual Property Department 2555 GRAND BOULEVARD KANSAS CITY, MO 64108-2613 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Faisal Farooq UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. CRNI.224515 7975 EXAMINER KANAAN, MAROUN P ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3686 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/10/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): IPDOCKET@SHB.COM IPRCDKT@SHB.COM BPARKERSON@SHB.COM PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte FAISAL F AROOQ, ROMER E. ROSALES, SHIPENG YU, BALAJI KRISHNAPURAM, and BHARAT R. RA0 1 Appeal2017-010134 Application 13/228,661 Technology Center 3600 Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, J. JOHN LEE, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges. THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-20, all the pending claims in the present application. See Claims Appendix. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellants name Cemer Innovation, Inc. as the real party in interest (App. Br. 3). Appeal2017-010134 Application 13/228,661 The present invention relates generally to automatically surveying medical treatment. See Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative: 1. A method for automated surveillance of medical treatment, the method comprising: obtaining patient records, from an electronic storage system, for a plurality of patients taking a medication, the medication being a post-market medicine after labeling approval; monitoring, with a processor, the patient records for the patients taking the medication; identifying, with the processor, a patient reaction profile reflecting a possible adverse reaction of at least one of the patients to the medication in response to the monitoring, the patient reaction profile indicating an outlier feature of a side effect, the outlier feature unexpected from a clinical trial of the medication; and reporting the possible adverse reaction; wherein identifying the possible adverse reaction comprises correlating the patient reaction profile for the medication with a known reaction profile for the medication of a progression of multiple symptoms for a specific adverse reaction different than adverse reactions known from the clinical trial of the medication, and identifying the specific adverse reaction as the possible adverse reaction when a probability from the correlating is above a threshold. Appellants appeal the following rejection: Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (Final Act. 2-3). We review the appealed rejection for error based upon the issues identified by Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 107 5 (BP AI 2010) (precedential). 2 Appeal2017-010134 Application 13/228,661 ANALYSIS Re} ection under § 101 Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter? Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), identifies a two-step framework for determining whether claimed subject matter is judicially excepted from patent eligibility under § 101. According to Alice step one, "[ w ]e must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept," such as an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 23 5 5. "If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea [ or other patent-ineligible concept], the inquiry ends. If the claims are 'directed to' an abstract idea, then the inquiry proceeds to the second step of the Alice framework." McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In analyzing whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, we look to other decisions where similar concepts were previously found abstract by the courts. See Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In this regard, with respect to independent method claim 1, and similarly, system claim 18 and computer readable medium claim 14, the Examiner determines that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of "using categories to organize, store and transmit information" (Final Act. 3) which "is described by the obtaining, monitoring, identifying, and reporting steps in claim 1" (id.). The Examiner further determines that the concepts in the claims are similar to Electric Power Group (Ans. 3--4) and are "recited at a high level of generality and [ recited] as performing generic computer functions routinely used in computer applications" (id. at 5). See, e.g., Elec. 3 Appeal2017-010134 Application 13/228,661 Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis" are "abstract-idea processes"). The Examiner further determines that the claimed steps of "performing the steps of obtaining patient records, monitoring the patient records, identifying a patient reaction, reporting the possible adverse reaction, and identifying the possible adverse reaction" in claim 1 "describe the concept of automating surveillance of medical treatment, which corresponds to concepts identified as abstract ideas by the courts, such as comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify options as seen in [ SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App'x 950 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 24, 2014) (nonprecedential)]" (Final Act. 4). We determine that the Examiner's cogent analysis relying on judicial examples (see Ans. 2-7; Final Act. 2---6), shows the Examiner provided an adequate basis for determining that the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Appellants challenge the Examiner's determinations on the ground that "[t]he Office provides no explanation for how the functional steps recited demonstrate that the claims are directed to either using categories to organize, store and transmit information" and "therefore does not present a primafacie case" (App. Br. 13). Here, in rejecting claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner analyzed the claims using the Mayol Alice two-step framework, consistent with the guidance set forth in the USPTO's "2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility," 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014). Thus, the Examiner notified Appellants of the reasons for the rejection 4 Appeal2017-010134 Application 13/228,661 "together with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application." 35 U.S.C. § 132. Therefore, contrary to Appellants' assertions, in doing so, the Examiner set forth a prima facie case of unpatentability such that the burden shifted to Appellants to demonstrate that the claims are patent- eligible. Appellants further contend that "[t]he present claims are distinguishable from Cyberfone" (App. Br. 14) because "the claims in Cyberfone did not include, at least, the automated surveillance features" (id. at 16). In Cyberfone, the Court held that "using categories to organize, store, and transmit information is well-established," and "the well-known concept of categorical data storage, i.e., the idea of collecting information in classified form, then separating and transmitting that information according to its classification, is an abstract idea that is not patent-eligible." Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN Interactive Grp., Inc., 558 F. App'x 988, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2014 ). Here, as in Cybe,fone, information is received, stored, organized, and transmitted. Although Appellants are c01Tect that Cybe,:fone did not include automated surveillance features, we point out that according to LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App'x 991, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2016), "automating conventional activities using generic technology does not amount to an inventive concept." Appellants also contend that the present claims are distinguishable from SmartGene (App. Br. 15) because "unlike the facts of SmartGene [] the [present] claims do not recite steps that doctors routinely and consciously perform" (id. at 17). We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument. 5 Appeal2017-010134 Application 13/228,661 Appellants fail to persuasively show that doctors do not mentally note additional adverse reactions to medicine. In SmartGene, the Federal Circuit concluded that claims reciting methods and systems of selecting a therapeutic treatment regimen for a patient with a known disease were directed to an abstract idea. SmartGene, 555 F. App'x 950. The court concluded the claims at issue were abstract because the claims did "no more than call on a 'computing device,' with basic functionality for comparing stored and input data rules, to do what doctors do routinely." SmartGene, 555 F. App'x at 954. The court explained that other than generic computing components, "every [ claimed] step is a familiar part of the conscious process that doctors can and do perform in their heads." SmartGene, 555 F. App'x at 955. Appellants fail to persuasively distinguish the present claims from SmartGene. As such, the abstract idea here is not meaningfully different from the ideas determined to be abstract in other cases. We now tum to the second step of the Alice framework: "a search for an 'inventive concept'-i.e., an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."' Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73 (2012)). The Examiner determines that the "[g]eneric computer components recited as performing generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and unconventional activities amount to no more than implementing the abstract idea with a computerized system" (Ans. 3; see also Final Act. 3, citing Appellants' Spec. ,r 15). 6 Appeal2017-010134 Application 13/228,661 Appellants challenge said determinations on the ground that "the Office [conceded] that the claims are novel and non-obvious" (App. Br. 17). However, a finding of novelty or non-obviousness does not require the conclusion that the claimed subject matter is patent-eligible. Although the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework is termed a search for an "inventive concept," the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or nonobviousness, but, rather, is a search for "an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."' Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. A novel and non-obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981) ("The 'novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the§ 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter."). Appellants further contend that "the claims' narrow limitations provide a specific process that use particular techniques to analyze particular information which are used in a practical application" (App. Br. 19). Here, the claimed sequence of steps in claim 1 merely cover employing a processor to perform functions, such as obtaining records, monitoring records, identifying a patient reaction, reporting a reaction, and correlating reaction profiles (see claim 1 ). However, as noted supra, information collection and analysis, including when limited to particular content, is within the realm of abstract ideas. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353. Further, as recognized by the Supreme Court, "the mere 7 Appeal2017-010134 Application 13/228,661 recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358-59 ( concluding claims "simply instruct[ing] the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer" not patent eligible). Furthermore, data management has been a function of computers for as long as computers have existed and will not transform an abstract concept into a patentable invention. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359. Regarding Appellants' reference to DDR Holdings (see App. Br. 17- 18), we point out that in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F .3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the subject claim was held patent-eligible because it encompassed "an inventive concept" for resolving a "particular Internet-centric problem." In contrast, we find Appellants' method performed by a processor ( claim 1) does not provide a solution "necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks." DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. Because we find all claims on appeal merely use a generic computer or processor as a tool that is used in the way a computer normally functions, we conclude that the claims fail to impart any discernible improvement upon the computer or processor; nor do Appellants' claims solve "a challenge particular to the Internet" as considered by the court in DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256-57. As for Appellants' contention that "the claims are more similar to those in BASCOM' (App. Br. 20), we conclude that Appellants have not persuasively rebutted the Examiner's conclusion that "general-purpose computers" are being used (see Final Act. 3) and Appellants have not adequately explained how the claims are performed such that any claimed 8 Appeal2017-010134 Application 13/228,661 limitations beyond the abstract idea are not routine, conventional functions of a generic computer. The claims at issue do not require any nonconventional computer or display components, or even a "non- conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces," but merely call for performance of the claimed data collection, analysis, correlating, and reporting "on a set of generic computer components." BASCOM Glob. Internet Serv., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349--52 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, considering the features of the claims, individually and as an ordered combination, we find there are no additional elements that transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. We also disagree with Appellants' contention that "the instant claims are similar to McRo" (App. Br. 20). In McRO, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claim, when considered as a whole, was directed to a "technological improvement over the existing, manual 3-D animation techniques" through the "uses [ of] the limited rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry practice." McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the claimed rules allow computers to produce accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters that previously could only be produced by human animators; and the rules are limiting because they define morph weight sets as a function of phoneme sub-sequences. Id. at 1313. In contrast, here, Appellants have not identified any analogous improvement attributable to the claimed invention. Although providing information based 9 Appeal2017-010134 Application 13/228,661 at least in part on post-market monitoring of adverse reactions may improve a treatment process, it does not achieve an improved technological result. We see no parallel between the limiting rules described in McRO and the results-based rules recited in Appellants' claims. Finally, regarding Appellants' contention that the claims "pose 'no comparable risk of pre-emption"' (App. Br. 21 ), we point out that "the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, because we hold the claimed subject matter covers patent- ineligible subject matter, the pre-emption concern is necessarily addressed. "Where a patent's claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, [] preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot." Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 1379. Because Appellant's independent claims 1, 14, and 16 2 are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract concept under the first step of Alice and do not recite something "significantly more" under the second step of the Alice analysis, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of these claims as well as the respective dependent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non- statutory subject matter in light of Alice and its' progeny. For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's contentions are unpersuasive as to error in the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's§ 101 rejection. 2 Alice also confirmed that if a patent's systems claims are no different in substance from its method claims, they will rise and fall together. 134 S. Ct. at 2360. The same was true of the Alice patent's media claims. Id. 10 Appeal2017-010134 Application 13/228,661 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 11 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation