Ex Parte Esselink et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 14, 2019

14097537 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 14, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/097,537 12/05/2013
28395 7590 03/18/2019
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L
1000 TOWN CENTER
22NDFLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Chad Evert Esselink
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83374702 4899
EXAMINER
ADNAN, MUHAMMAD
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2686
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/18/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHAD EVERT ESSELINK,
DAVID RANDOLPH ROBERTS, CHRISTIAN KROZAL,
THOMAS WOLOSZYN, ROBERT BRUCE KLEVE,
JULIUS MARCHWICKI, and DAVID CHASE MITCHELL
Appeal2018-007192
Application 14/097,537
Technology Center 2600
Before JENNIFER S. BISK, LARRY J. HUME, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges.
DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
Appellants2 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner's rejection of claims 5-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b ). We affirm.
1 This Decision uses the following abbreviations: "Spec." for the original
specification, filed Dec. 5, 2013; "Final Act." for the Final Office Action,
mailed July 12, 2017; "App. Br." for Appellants' Appeal Brief, filed
Dec. 1, 2017; "Ans." for Examiner's Answer, mailed May 9, 2018; and
"Reply Br." for Appellants' Reply Brief, filed July 9, 2018.
2 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. App. Br. 1.
Appeal2018-007192
Application 14/097,537
BACKGROUND
Appellants' disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to
providing access to a vehicle via a temporary access code usable during a
time period. Abstract.
Claim 5, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject
matter (emphasis added to disputed limitation):
5. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
receive input of a temporary access code;
verify the access code;
verify that a specified access code enablement time has passed;
enable the access code if the enablement time has passed;
provide access to the vehicle if the access code is enabled; and
enable usability of a physical key for vehicle start-up usage if
the access code is enabled and access to the vehicle is
provided.
App. Br. App'x 1 (Claims App'x) (emphasis added).
THE REJECTIONS
RI. Claims 5-8, 11, 13-17, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over Zaid (US 2011/00112969 Al, published May 12,
2011), Kobres (US 2012/0105197 Al, published May 3, 2012), and Denison
(US 2012/0011367 Al, published Jan. 12, 2012). Final Act. 2---6.
R2. Claims 10 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over Zaid, Kobres, Denison, and Simon (US 2007/0136083 Al,
published Jun. 14, 2007). Final Act. 6.
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R3. Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Zaid, Kobres, Denison, and Ford (US 2015/0070135 Al, filed Sep. 4, 2012,
published Mar. 12, 2015). Final Act. 7.
R4. Claims 12 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over Zaid, Kobres, Denison, and Harvey (US 2009/0219135 Al,
published Sep. 3, 2009). Final Act. 7-9.
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 4--6), we decide the appeal
of obviousness Rejection RI of claims 5-8, 11, 13-17, and 19 on the basis
of representative claim 5. Appellants note independent claim 13 includes
similar limitations, except it does not require a single processor to perform
the recited steps. App. Br. 6. Accordingly, independent claim 13 and its
dependents stand or fall with the remaining arguments presented with
respect to claim 5.
Remaining claims 9, 10, 12, 18, and 20 in obviousness Rejections R2
through R4 are not argued separately (see App. Br. 7), and thus, they stand
or fall with the respective independent claim from which they depend.
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 107 5 (BP AI 2010)
(precedential). To the extent Appellants have not advanced separate,
substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments
are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
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We have considered all of Appellants' arguments and any evidence
presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis in our analysis below.
Claim 5
Claim 5 recites a processor configured to receive and verify an access
code, enable the access code if an enablement time has passed, and if the
access code is enabled, provide access to a vehicle. App. Br. App'x 1
(Claims App'x). The claim also states the processor is configured to "enable
usability of a physical key for vehicle start-up usage if the access code is
enabled and access to the vehicle is provided." Id. (referred to in this
Decision as the "key limitation"). Appellants contend the key limitation is
not taught or suggested by the references. App. Br. 4---6; Reply Br. 2-3.
For the key limitation, the Examiner relied upon a combination of
Zaid, Kobres, and Denison. Final Act. 3--4. Specifically, the Examiner
found Zaid teaches enabling access to a vehicle after verifying a reservation,
Kobres provides access to a vehicle's physical key for a vehicle reservation,
and Denison enables and disables a physical key used to access a lock. Id.
at 3--4 (citing Zaid, ,r,r 127-29, Fig. 6; Kobres ,r 36; Denison, ,r,r 209-10,
322). Specifically, Zaid's system grants access to a vehicle after
authenticating a vehicle reservation. Zaid ,r,r 127-28. In Zaid, "granting
access includes opening the vehicle door, and/or allowing engine to be
turned on by the user." Id. ,r 129. However, the cited portion of Zaid does
not explicitly state that a physical key is used for this vehicle access. Id. ,r,r
127-29; see Final Act. 3. Kobres teaches providing a renter with a physical
key by remotely unlocking the car. Kobres ,r 36. Denison teaches an
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Application 14/097,537
electronic key that is enabled or disabled based upon specified parameters,
such as location of the key or time of day. Denison ,r 322. The Examiner
found it would have been obvious to combine these references to supplement
Zaid's system with a physical key that is enabled during a reservation to
facilitate a renter's access to and use of the vehicle and to avoid
unauthorized use of the vehicle. Ans. 8 ( citing Denison ,r 322); Final
Act. 3--4, 10-11.
Appellants argue the combination of Zaid, Kobres, and Denison fails
to teach or suggest the key limitation because it does not "enable usability of
a physical key" for starting the vehicle. App. Br. 4---6. Specifically,
Appellants contend merely obtaining access to a key (as disclosed by
Kobres) does not "enable usability" of the key. Id. at 4--5 (citing Spec. ,r 63
as defining "enable usability"). 3 Next, Appellants allege Denison fails to
teach or suggest this limitation because Denison's key enables itself based
on preset parameters. Id. at 4--6; Reply Br. 2. Appellants explain the claim
requires a processor configured both to "enable usability" of the key and to
receive and verify an access code, and Appellants contend this processor
must be external to the key. App. Br. 4--6. From this, Appellants submit
Denison fails to teach this claimed processor as Denison's key enables itself.
Id. at 5---6. Finally, because Denison's key is enabled based on preset
parameters stored on the key, Appellants conclude it cannot be combined
with Denison with Kobres, which operate in response to a received code. Id.
at 4---6.
3 We do not address Appellants' argument regarding Kobres' teaching
because the Examiner relied upon Denison to teach "enable usability." Final
Act. 4. As explained infra, we are not persuaded of error in this finding.
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Appellants' arguments do not persuade us of error. First, Appellants
contend Denison fails to teach the disputed limitation because Denison does
not teach an "external processor" that is configured to enable a key and
perform the other steps recited by the claim. App. Br. 6. Although we agree
with Appellants that claim 5 requires a processor configured to perform
several steps including the disputed "enabl[ing] usability," we do not agree
that the claimed processor must be external to the key. See App. Br.
App'x 1 (Claims App'x). Appellants identify no basis in the claim or
Specification for imposing a requirement on the location of the processor,
and we are aware of no reason to limit the claim in the manner proposed by
Appellants. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("In
the patentability context, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable
interpretations."). Accordingly, we conclude claim 5 does not require the
processor to be external to the key. Thus, Appellants' argument does not
persuade us of error in the Examiner's conclusion that the claimed processor
would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in light of the references.
In addition, Appellants argue Denison cannot be combined as
proposed by the Examiner because Denison enables its key "based on 'facts'
(location, time)" stored on the key, where Zaid and Kobres respond to a
reservation request received from an external device. App. Br. 5---6.
However, the fact that certain modifications might be required for a person
of skill to integrate the teachings of multiple prior-art references does not
mean that the combination of those references is unpredictable or cannot
support an obviousness rejection. MCM Porifolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("The test for obviousness is not
whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated
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into the structure of the primary reference." (quoting In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413,425 (CCPA 1981)); In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374,
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[W]e do not ignore the modifications that one
skilled in the art would make to a device borrowed from the prior art.").
Appellants fail to show the identified differences between Zaid and Denison
undermine the Examiner's findings and conclusions regarding obviousness.
For example, Appellants do not contend the proposed combination is beyond
the level of skill of one of ordinary skill in the art, or the modifications are
more than the use of known elements to yield predictable results. In
addition, similar to Zaid, Denison describes a two-way communication
between a key and a lock. Denison ,r 210 (Key receives and verifies
encrypted key code from lock.), ,r 322 (Key is enabled for operation based
on parameters.); see also Zaid ,r,r 127-29 (Vehicle access kit receives and
verifies reservation and provides access to the vehicle), ,r 90 (The vehicle
access kit may "provide[] access to the vehicle" with a component that
"emulates a key fob."), ,r 83 ("[T]he vehicle access kit is in the form of a
portable vehicle key or remote that communicates with the vehicle.").
Accordingly, Appellants' argument does not persuade us that it would not
have been obvious to combine and modify the references as proposed by the
Examiner.
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the cited prior art
combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 5, nor do we
find error in the Examiner's resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection RI of
independent claim 5. Because we are not persuaded by any of Appellants'
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arguments, we also sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection RI of
independent claim 13. See Claim Grouping, supra. Grouped claims 6-8,
11, 14--1 7, and 19 fall with independent claims 5 and 13, and we sustain the
rejection RI of these dependent claims. See id.
Claims 9, 10, 12, 18, and 20 depend (indirectly) from independent
claims 5 and 13. As noted above, for these dependent claims, Appellants
rely on the arguments presented above with respect to independent claims 5
and 13. App. Br. 7; see Claim Grouping, supra. Accordingly, these claims
fall with their respective independent claims, and we sustain the Examiner's
obviousness rejections R2 through R4 of claims 9, 10, 12, 18, and 20.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 5-20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a )(1 )(iv). See 3 7
C.F.R. § 41.50(±).
AFFIRMED
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