Ex Parte Ellerbrock et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 28, 201713835191 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 28, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/835,191 03/15/2013 Philip J. Ellerbrock 5013899.061US1 5921 128836 7590 06/30/2017 Wnmhle Parlvle SanHriHae Rr Rioe T T P EXAMINER Attn: IP Docketing P.O. Box 7037 YEW, CHIE W Atlanta, GA 30357-0037 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2131 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/30/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipdocketing @ wcsr. com patentadmin @ B oeing. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte THE BOEING COMPANY1 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 Technology Center 2100 Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., JASON V. MORGAN, and IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges. MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Introduction This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—7 and 9—15. Claims 8 and 16 are canceled. App. Br. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART and enter NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION. 1 The inventors are Philip J. Ellerbrock, Robert N. Zettwoch, and Joseph P. Winkelmann. Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 Invention The disclosed invention is directed to an apparatus that includes a non-volatile memory coupled to a device interface including a volatile “shadow memory configured to store an image of the plurality of locations of the non-volatile memory in a corresponding plurality of locations of the volatile shadow memory.” Spec., Abstract. Exemplary Claim 1. An apparatus comprising: a non-volatile memory configured to store data in a plurality of locations, the non-volatile memory including a base memory and an expanded memory; and a device interface coupled to the non-volatile memory and including a volatile shadow memory configured to store an image of the plurality of locations of the non-volatile memory in a corresponding plurality of locations of the volatile shadow memory, the volatile shadow memory including a base shadow memory configured to store an image of the base memory, and an expanded shadow memory configured to store an image of a only selectable subset of the expanded memory, wherein the device interface is couplable to a bus controller via a digital network bus, and configured to receive a command across the digital network bus from the bus controller, and in response thereto, the device interface is configured to write data from the digital network bus to a location in the non-volatile memory, wherein the device interface being configured to write data to the location in the nonvolatile memory includes the device interface being configured to write the data to the corresponding location in the volatile shadow memory, and thereafter write the data from the corresponding location in the volatile shadow memory to the location in the non-volatile memory, and 2 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 wherein in a first instance, the location in the non-volatile memory is a location in the base memory and the corresponding location in the volatile memory is a location in the base shadow memory, and in a second instance, the location in the non volatile memory is a location in the expanded memory and the corresponding location in the volatile memory is a location in the expanded shadow memory. Rejections The Examiner rejects claims 1—7 and 9-15 under 35U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 4—6. The Examiner rejects claims 1 and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Russell (US 5,623,604, issued. Apr. 22, 1997) and Mantey (US 2003/0020512 Al, published Jan. 30, 2003). Final Act. 6—16. The Examiner rejects claims 2 and 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Russell, Mantey, Aral (US 2012/0005452 Al, published Jan. 5, 2012), and Chen (US 2010/0306448 Al, published Dec. 2, 2010). Final Act. 16-21. The Examiner rejects claims 3 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Russell, Mantey, Aral, and Alexander (US 5,363,334, issued Nov. 8, 1994). Final Act. 22—27. The Examiner rejects claims 4, 5, 12, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Russell, Mantey, Aral, Alexander, Nakagawa (US 2008/0082744 Al, published Apr. 3, 2008), and Lin (US 2004/0019754 Al, published. Jan. 29, 2004). Final Act. 27—35. The Examiner rejects claims 6, 7, 14, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Russell, Mantey, Aral, and Nakagawa. Final Act. 36-43. 3 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph—Claims 1—7 and 9—15 The Examiner rejects claims 1—7 and 9—15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, because the Examiner finds the Specification does not “disclose the details of writing data specifically from the base shadow memory of volatile memory to the base memory of nonvolatile memory” or “details of writing data specifically from the expanded shadow memory of volatile memory to the expanded memory of the non-volatile memory.” Final Act. 5. Thus, the Examiner finds the Specification provides insufficient written description support for “‘writing from shadow memory to non-volatile memory’ [that] results in writing base shadow memory into base memory of non-volatile memory and writing expanded shadow memory into expanded memory of non-volatile memory.” Id. The Examiner also objects to the Specification as failing to provide proper antecedent basis for the claimed subject matter. Id. at 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1) and MPEP § 608.01(o)). Because both this objection and the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, rejection turn on the same issue of whether the claimed subject matter finds adequate support in the original disclosure, our decision is dispositive to both the objection and the rejection. Cf. MPEP §§ 2163.06(11); 608.04(c). Appellant contends the Examiner erred because the Specification discloses that “the base shadow memory and expanded shadow memory of the volatile shadow memory shadow respectively the base memory and expanded memory of the non-volatile memory.” App. Br. 5 (citing Spec. 14, 1. 7—15,1. 5). Appellant notes the Specification discloses that “[a] device memory write command may point to a memory location, and may be used 4 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 to update data in the shadow memory, after which a write cycle back to the non-volatile memory may start.” App. Br. 6 (citing Spec. 24—25). Appellant’s arguments accord with the Specification, which discloses that “shadow memory 504 may include a base shadow memory 504a where the base memory 502a of the non-volatile device storage memory 502 may be fully shadowed” (Spec. 14,11. 21—23) and that similarly “a selectable portion of the expanded memory, such as a subset (e.g., one) of the expanded memory segments, may be shadowed in the expanded shadow memory at any given time” {id. at 14,1. 30—15,1. 1). The Specification further details that “device-memory write command may be used to update data in the shadow memory 504 (both base 504a and expanded 504b), which after a write start timeout time may start a write cycle back to the non volatile device storage memory 502.” Id. at 25,11. 15—17. The Examiner responds by noting “[t]he mere fact that the shadow memory stores corresponding images of the non-volatile memory does not imply that [a] write to base shadow memory results in [a] subsequent write back to base memory.” Ans. 44. The Examiner cites to Parley (US 2010/ 0174847 Al, published July 8, 2010) as secondary evidence that memory writes from an address in base shadow memory need not necessarily result in a write back to the same address in base memory. See Ans. 44-45 (citing, e.g., Parley, Figs. 22A—B). That is, the Examiner relies on Parley to show that the Specification “does not appear to explicitly disclose ‘write from an address (for example address OOOh) in base shadow memory to the same address (for example address OOOh) in base memory during write back.’” Ans. 44. 5 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 The Examiner’s findings are insufficient because the feature at issue—the feature the Examiner finds is not actually or inherently disclosed by the Specification’s written description—is not claimed. Claim 1 recites a location in non-volatile memory and a corresponding location in volatile shadow memory without reciting that the location and the corresponding location have the same address. Claim 1 has similar recitations directed to a location in non-volatile memory being either a location in base memory or a location in expanded memory and a location in volatile memory being a location in base shadow memory or a location in expanded shadow memory. Thus, the locations and corresponding locations, as recited, must merely correspond—rather than having identical addresses. Moreover, the Specification discloses the shadowing of base memory 502a in base shadow memory 504a, and the shadowing of expanded memory 502b in expanded shadow memory 504b, in a manner consistent with the disputed recitations. See Spec. 14,11. 21—30, 25,11. 15—17, and Fig. 5. Thus, we agree with Appellant that the Specification conveys with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that the inventors were in possession of the claimed invention. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563—64 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, rejection of claim 1, and claims 2—7 and 9-15, which are similarly rejected. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)—Claims 1—7 In rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner finds that Russell’s Ethernet network controller 206 and DRAM 220 disclose a device interface (Ethernet network controller) coupled to the non-volatile memory 6 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 and including a volatile shadow memory (DRAM). Final Act. 8 (citing Russell, Figs. 3, 4). Russell’s Figure 4 is reproduced below. 216 PRINTER EXPANSION PORT Russell’s Figure 4 illustrates Ethernet Network Controller 206 coupled to multiple other components, including DRAM 220. Appellant contends the Examiner erred because “[t]he network controller is coupled to DRAM. By contrast, the device interface of the claimed invention includes volatile shadow memory.” App. Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 5—6. The Examiner does not present findings that show Russell teaches or suggests having Ethernet Network Controller 206 include DRAM 220. Rather, the Examiner interprets the disputed recitation to include “wherein ‘the coupling includes a volatile shadow memory.’” Ans. 48 (emphasis added). However, the Examiner’s interpretation of the claimed invention is unreasonably broad. 7 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 The Examiner interprets the recitation of “including a volatile shadow memory” as modifying a coupling even though claim 1 recites “a device interface coupled to the non-volatile memory and including a volatile shadow memory” (emphasis added). That is, the claim describes a feature of the device interface (i.e., that it is “coupled to” a non-volatile memory) without explicitly reciting a noun such as a “coupling” that implements the claimed feature. The Examiner’s interpretation of “including” as modifying the non-existent “coupling” recitation is grammatically untenable. Thus, we agree with Appellants that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention requires that the device interface, not a coupling, includes the volatile shadow memory. Because the Examiner’s findings do not show that Russell, even in combination with the other references, teaches or suggests the claimed device interface including a volatile shadow memory, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 1, and claims 2—7, which contain the same recitation. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)—Claims 9—15 Method claim 9 does not recite a device interface including a volatile shadow memory in the manner of claim 1. Therefore, our reasoning for reversing the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 1 is inapplicable to claim 9. Russell teaches that “[a] ROM firmware image is . . . downloaded to the DRAM .... [Subsequently,] the EPROM [electronically erasable read only-memory] is flashed with the new ROM image.” Russell col. 22,11. 57— 63. In rejecting claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner finds that this flashing of a ROM image from DRAM to an EPROM teaches or 8 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 suggests a volatile shadow memory configured to store an image of the plurality of locations of the non-volatile memory in a corresponding plurality of locations of the volatile shadow memory. Final Act. 12 (citing, e.g., Russell, Fig. 4, col. 22,11. 57—63). Russell further teaches that “it is possible to select the specific modules that are retrieved from EPROM 222 for execution out of DRAM 220.” Russell col. 23,11. 63—65. The Examiner finds that this capability of selecting modules in the EPROM to be stored in the DRAM teaches or suggests the non-volatile memory including an expanded shadow memory configured to store an image of “a onlf [sic] selectable subset of the expanded memory. Final Act. 12—13 (citing, e.g., Russel col. 23,11. 58—66). Mantey teaches programming field programmable gate array (FPGA) code into an EEPROM associated with FPGAs. Mantey 12. In particular, Mantey teaches updating FPGA codes to an EEPROM by first transferring appropriate FPGA configuration code to a memory system (e.g., RAM) and thereupon transferring the FPGA configuration code into EEPROM devices. Id. 127. The Examiner finds this transfer teaches or suggests the claimed locations features in a first instance, while Russell’s ROM image flashing teaches or suggests the claimed locations features in a second instance. Final Act. 14—15 (citing, e.g., Mantey ^fl[ 2, 27, and Fig. 2). Appellant contends the Examiner erred because “Russell does not disclose that the EEPROM stores the ROM firmware in locations, and that the DRAM stores the ROM firmware image in corresponding locations, as is required by the claim.” App. Br. 10; see also id. at 11—12; Reply Br. 6—7. However, we agree with the Examiner that RusselFs ROM image comprises data at multiple locations. See Ans. 49. Moreover, as discussed above with 9 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 respect to the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, rejection, the claimed location and corresponding location need not have identical addresses in both memories for the locations to correspond. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the locations in Russell’s DRAM where data in a ROM image is stored correspond to the locations in Russell’s EPROM to which the data from the ROM image is flashed. See Russell col. 22,11. 57— 63. Appellant further contends the Examiner erred because the Examiner relies on another feature of Russell—selection of firmware modules from the EPROM for loading into and execution from DRAM—that “has nothing to do with the ROM firmware image or its being flashed from the DRAM to EEPROM, cited by the Examiner for storage of the image of only a subset of expanded memory.” App. Br. 11 (citing, e.g., Russell col. 23,11. 58—66); see also Reply Br. 7—8. However, Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claimed invention. In particular, the claimed invention recites both “a volatile shadow memory configured to store an image of the plurality of locations of the non volatile memory in a corresponding plurality of locations of the volatile shadow memory” and “an expanded shadow memory [included in the volatile shadow memory] configured to store an image of a only [sic] selectable subset of the expanded memory.” A volatile shadow memory, and an expanded shadow memory included in the volatile shadow memory, can be configured to or capable of storing images from different sources for different purposes. The Examiner’s findings are consistent with evidence that Russell both discloses: (1) the storing of an image in the DRAM (i.e., the volatile 10 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 shadow memory as a whole) for purposes of flashing the image to the EPROM (i.e., the non-volatile memory) and (2) the storing of an image in a portion of the DRAM (i.e., an expanded shadow memory) for purposes of reading a selected module from the EPROM (i.e., from an expanded non volatile memory) for execution. See Final Act. 12—13. These teachings and suggestions fall within a reasonably broad interpretation of the disputed recitations for the reasons discussed above. Appellant also argues that the Examiner erred in relying on Mantey because Mantey merely “discloses that an FPGA code is transferred to RAM (base shadow memory), and then from the RAM to an EEPROM (base memory).” App. Br. 12; see also Reply Br. 9-10. In particular, Appellant argues “Mantey does not disclose data written to a location in the EEPROM is written to a corresponding location in the RAM, and then from the corresponding location in the RAM to the location in the EEPROM.” App. Br. 12. However, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to Russell’s teachings of flashing an image to an EPROM, Appellant’s argument does not distinguish the claimed writing of data in a first instance from the teachings and suggestions of Mantey. Appellant further argues that the Examiner erred in combining the teachings and suggestions of Russell and Mantey because “Russell’s system does not include an FPGA [and] therefore has no need for . . . Mantey’s method of programming FPGA code.” Id. at 13; see also Reply Br. 10-11. However, the Examiner’s findings show that “programming FPGA code into [an] EEPROM associated with FPGAs, or into an EEPROM of FPGAs, through a central point” was known in the art. Final Act. 16 (citing Mantey 12). The Examiner’s findings also show that an artisan of ordinary skill 11 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 would have recognized that Mantey’s teachings and suggestions relate to Russell’s configuration code teachings. Ans. 54. Appellant’s conclusory contention that “Russell’s system [would not] yield any benefit from[] Mantey’s method of programming FGPA code” (App. Br. 13) is unpersuasive because the Examiner’s findings show that modifying Russell using the teachings and suggestions of Mantey would have represented the combination of familiar elements using known methods to yield predictable results. For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 9, and claims 10-15, which Appellants do not argue separately with persuasive specificity. App. Br. 13—15. NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION We newly reject claims 1—7 and 9-15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Both independent claims 1 and 9 recite: wherein in a first instance, the location in the non-volatile memory is a location in the base memory and the corresponding location in the volatile memory is a location in the base shadow memory, and in a second instance, the location in the non volatile memory is a location in the expanded memory and the corresponding location in the volatile memory is a location in the expanded shadow memory. This “wherein” clause, being directed to first and second instances, is directed to method steps (i.e., operations at different instances). This renders apparatus claim 1 indefinite because it is unclear whether infringement occurs when the apparatus is created or when the apparatus is used in the first and second instances. See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 12 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 Method claim 9 does not share this exact defect. However, this “wherein” clause renders both claim 1 and claim 9 indefinite by creating ambiguity in the meaning of “location” and “corresponding location” in the recitations that precede the “wherein” clause. For example, both claims have recitations directed to writing “data to the location in the non-volatile memory” (emphasis added). Such writing includes writing “the data to the corresponding location in the volatile shadow memory” (emphasis added). It is only “thereafter” that “the data from the corresponding location in the volatile shadow memory to the location in the non-volatile memory” is written (emphases added). This data writing, to a corresponding location in the volatile shadow memory and thereafter a location in the non-volatile memory, encompasses the two writes occurring at different instances (as evidenced by the second write taking place after the first write). The “wherein” clause recites the location and the corresponding location being different in first and second instances (i.e., a location in base memory and a corresponding location in base shadow memory in a first instance and a location in expanded memory and a corresponding location in expanded shadow memory in a second instance). Due to the “wherein” clause referring to the first and second instances, the meaning of location and corresponding location are explicitly not fixed between instances. Thus, the claims encompass scenarios such as writing, in a first instance, data to a corresponding location in base shadow memory and, thereafter (i.e., in a second instance), writing the data to expanded memory. Therefore, the claims are ambiguous as to: (1) whether the claimed write to a location in non-volatile memory and write to a corresponding location on volatile shadow memory is limited to situations 13 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 where the types of memories (i.e., base vs. expanded) written to match or (2) whether the claimed writes encompass situations where the types of memories can differ given that the writes occur at different instances. As such, the scope of claims 1 and 9 is amenable to two plausible interpretations rendering claims 1 and 9 ambiguous and therefore indefinite. Accordingly, we newly reject claims 1 and 9, and claims 2—7 and 10- 15, which contain the same recitations, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite. DECISION We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—7 and 9—15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 9—15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We newly reject claims 1—7 and 9—15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. This Decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides: When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant, within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: 14 Appeal 2017-002236 Application 13/835,191 (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart. (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under §41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is sought. Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01 (9th Ed., Rev. 07.2015, Nov. 2015). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 37 C.F.R, § 41.50(b) 15 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation