Ex Parte EBERLE et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 27, 2019

13774491 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/774,491 02/22/2013
158771 7590 03/29/2019
Bottomline Technologies (DE), Inc.
325 Corporate Drive
Portsmouth, NH 03801
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Robert EBERLE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
BT-076 9245
EXAMINER
KAZIMI, HAN! M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/29/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
rich.baker@bottomline.com
USPTO@dockettrak.com
kfaust@bottomline.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ROBERT EBERLE, AMY HOKE,
LYNNE HERRMAN, and MICHAEL MARCINELLI
Appeal2017-010956
Application 13/774,491
Technology Center 3600
Before LINZY T. McCARTNEY, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
JESSICA C. KAISER, Administrative Patent Judges.
McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner's final
rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
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Application 13/774,491
BACKGROUND
This patent application concerns "accelerating payment settlement to a
payment method with a reduced delay as compared to the method of
payment initially selected by a buyer." Specification 1 7: 18-21, filed
February 22, 2013 ("Spec."). Claim 1 illustrates the claimed invention:
1. An invoice payment acceleration system comprising:
a database stored on a non-transitory computer readable
medium, the database including a plurality of records, each
record corresponding to an invoice issued by a vendor for
payment from a buyer;
a network interface configured to receive a payment
initiation command from a buyer for payment of an invoice to a
vendor by a first payment method; and
a processor configured to analyze the invoice as to which
the payment command is received to determine whether the
invoice satisfies one or more predetermined criteria;
wherein the processor further is configured, when the
processor determines that the invoice satisfies the one or more
predetermined criteria, to convert the first payment method to a
second payment method, and the second payment method
provides for an accelerated payment as compared to the first
payment method.
Appeal Brief, Claims App'x at 1, filed February 24, 2016 ("Claims App'x").
REJECTI0N 1
Claims Basis
1-20 § 101
1 The Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 over Mabrey et al. (US 2004/0172360 Al; Sept. 2, 2004) and Johnson
et al. (US 6,999,943 Bl; Feb. 14, 2006). Ans. 3.
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DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejection and Appellants'
arguments, and we disagree that the Examiner erred. As consistent with the
discussion below, we adopt the Examiner's findings, conclusions, and
reasoning in the Final Office Action mailed September 3, 2015 ("Final
Act.") and the Answer mailed June 19, 2017 ("Ans.").
We address the § 101 rejection-the only rejection remaining in this
appeal-below. Appellants argue claims 1-20 together for this rejection, so
as permitted by 37 C.F.R. § 41.37, we decide the appeal based on claim 1.
See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
Section 101 Rejection
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof' is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
"Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable."
Alice Corp. v. CLSBankint'l, 573 U.S. 208,216 (2014) (quotingAss'nfor
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories,
the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first
to consider whether the claim is "directed to one of those patent-ineligible
concepts." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then examine "the elements of
[the] claim both individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine
whether the additional elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a
patent-eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)).
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That is, we examine the claim for an "inventive concept," "an element or
combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself."' Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73).
The Patent Office recently issued guidance about this framework. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) ("Revised Guidance"). Under the Revised Guidance, to decide
whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the
claim ( 1) recites one of the abstract ideas listed in the Revised Guidance and
(2) fails to integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51, 54. If the claim is directed to an
abstract idea, as noted above, we then determine whether the claim has an
inventive concept. The Revised Guidance explains that when making this
determination, we should consider whether the additional claim elements
add "a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-
understood, routine, conventional activity in the field" or "simply append[]
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality." Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56.
With these principles in mind, we tum to the Examiner's rejection of
claims 1-20 under § 101.
Abstract Idea
The Examiner determined that claim 1 is similar to claims that courts
have determined are directed to a mental process. See Ans. 7. The Examiner
also determined that claim 1 is directed to a fundamental economic practice.
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See Final Act. 3--4; see also Ans. 7. For the reasons discussed below,
Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred. We first address
whether claim 1 recites each of the abstract ideas identified by the Examiner.
We then consider whether claim 1 integrates these abstract ideas into a
practical application.
Mental Process
Claim 1 recites ( 1) "a database ... including a plurality of records,
each record corresponding to an invoice issued by a vendor for payment
from a buyer," (2) "a network interface configured to receive a payment
initiation command from a buyer for payment of an invoice to a vendor by a
first payment method," and (3) "a processor configured to analyze the
invoice as to which the payment command is received to determine whether
the invoice satisfies one or more predetermined criteria." Claims App 'x 1.
Claim 1 also recites ( 4) "wherein the processor further is configured, when
the processor determines that the invoice satisfies the one or more
predetermined criteria, to convert the first payment method to a second
payment method, and the second payment method provides for an
accelerated payment as compared to the first payment method." Claims
App'x 1.
People can perform the functions recited in most of these limitations
using their minds or pen and paper. A person can "receive a payment
initiation command from a buyer for payment of an invoice to a vendor by a
first payment method" by reading the recited command from a computer
screen or a piece of paper. In fact, the written description suggests that
businesses have traditionally performed similar steps on paper. See Spec.
1 :9-13 ("Traditional invoice presentment and payment solutions ... include
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paper-based invoice presentment and payment. In this scenario, the steps
required to send an invoice ... and receive, approve, and pay the invoice ...
rely on a series of paper-based procedures.").
A person can also "analyze the invoice as to which the payment
command is received to determine whether the invoice satisfies one or more
predetermined criteria" by mentally comparing aspects of the invoice to a
predetermined criterion. For example, the written description discloses that
the recited predetermined criteria can include a minimum dollar amount.
See, e.g., Spec. 8:22-25 ("For example, the system may be configured to
accelerate a payment transaction based upon a specified minimum dollar
amount ... [or] other criteria as may be deemed suitable."). People can
mentally compare the dollar amount of an invoice to a predetermined
minimum dollar amount.
Finally, a person can mentally "convert the first payment method to a
second payment method, [where] the second payment method provides for
an accelerated payment as compared to the first payment method" when "the
invoice satisfies the one or more predetermined criteria." Neither claim 1 nor
the written description explains how to convert one payment method to
another or limits the conversion to a particular method. Because neither the
claim nor the written description limits the scope of the claimed conversion,
the limitation encompasses any method of performing the recited
conversion, including methods that people can perform in their heads or
using pen and paper. Cf Cy her Source Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining that a claim encompasses
"essentially any method" of performing a fraud detection algorithm, "even
methods that can be performed in the human mind," when the specification
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did not disclose a particular fraud detection algorithm and the claim did not
limit its scope to a particular algorithm). For example, the limitation
encompasses a person mentally choosing to use the recited second payment
method instead of the first when the recited condition has been meet.
Appellants argue that "what renders the claimed invention valuable"
is "the slowness of the first payment method relative to the second payment
method" and that "the issues associated with the claimed invention do not
even arise until processing is implemented in electronic form." Reply Brief
4, filed August 18, 2017 ("Reply Br."). Appellants contend that claim 1 thus
concerns "[a]n electronic invoice processing system [that] is a tangible and
useful system that operates beyond what could be achieved by manual or
mental exercise." Reply Br. 4. According to Appellants, "one cannot sit [at]
a desk and perform a comparable analysis, and then switch payment
methods, in any comparable manner that would be useful because of the
time constraints involved." Reply Br. 4.
We find Appellants' arguments unpersuasive. Rather than recite "an
electronic invoice processing system," claim 1 simply recites "[a]n invoice
payment acceleration system" that involves a "first payment method" and a
"second payment method." Although the claimed system includes computer
components, we see nothing in the claim or the written description that
limits the claimed system to processing electronic payment methods. On
their face, the recited "first payment method" and "second payment method"
include paper-based payment methods such as paying by cash or check.
Even if claim 1 were limited to an electronic invoice processing
system, claim 1 would still recite a mental process. People could still read a
payment initiation command from a computer screen or a piece of paper and
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mentally compare the dollar amount of an electronic invoice to a
predetermined minimum dollar amount. In this situation, people would
choose a second electronic payment method rather than a first electronic
payment method, but they could still make this choice in their minds.
As for Appellants' assertion that a person cannot perform the recited
functions "in any comparable manner that would be useful because of the
time constraints involved," Appellants have provided no persuasive evidence
or reasoning to support this assertion. See Reply Br. 4. In any event, claim 1
encompasses performing the receiving, analyzing, and converting functions
for a single invoice and places no time limits on the process. See Claims
App'x 1. For the reasons explained above, these functions encompass a
person merely looking at a payment initiation command, mentally
comparing an invoice to a predetermined criterion, and mentally deciding to
use a second payment method rather than a first payment method.
Appellants have not persuaded us that these acts require so much time and
effort that people cannot perform them in a "comparable manner that would
be useful" as Appellants assert. Although a computer can likely perform
these functions faster than a person can, "[u]sing a computer to accelerate an
ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible."
Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d
1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Taken as a whole, the limitations discussed above recite functions that
people can perform in their heads or using pen and paper. Because people
can perform these functions mentally or by hand, the recited payment
acceleration concept is no different from other concepts that courts have
determined are mental processes. See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373
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( determining that a claim that recites steps that "can be performed in the
human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper" is directed to an
unpatentable mental process). This is true even though claim 1 recites that
computer elements perform the claimed functions. "Courts have examined
claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the
underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper
or in a person's mind." Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d
1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52
n.14 ("If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers
performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer
components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim
cannot practically be performed in the mind."). We therefore conclude that
claim 1 recites mental processes, one of the abstract idea groupings in the
Revised Guidance. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Claim 1 thus
recites an abstract idea.
Fundamental Economic Practice
We next consider whether claim 1 recites a fundamental economic
practice. As discussed above, the claimed "invoice payment acceleration
system" includes computing devices configured to receive a payment
initiation command, analyze an invoice to determine whether the invoice
satisfies at least one predetermined criteria, and convert a first payment
method to a second payment method that provides for an accelerated
payment. See Claims App'x 1. Like the concept of intermediated settlement
in Alice, the concept of accelerating invoice payments is "a fundamental
economic practice." Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (quoting Bilski v. Kappas, 561
U.S. 593, 611 (2010)). This concept amounts to no more than deciding to
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switch from a slower payment method to a faster one, and there can be no
serious dispute that doing so is fundamental to contemporary economic
practice. Using an intermediary "acceleration system" to perform this
concept does not make it patent-eligible. As the Court noted in Alice, "[t]he
use of a third-party intermediary ( or 'clearing house') is ... a building block
of the modem economy." Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20.
This determination is consistent with other decisions that have
determined that claims are directed to a fundamental economic practice. See,
e.g., Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (determining that claims concerning local processing
of payments for remotely purchased goods are directed to a fundamental
economic practice). Because the concept of accelerating invoice payments
by converting a slower payment method to a faster one is not meaningfully
different from other concepts courts have determined are fundamental
economic practices, we conclude that claim 1 also recites a fundamental
economic practice. Fundamental economic principles or practices are one of
the certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the Revised
Guidance. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. For this added reason,
claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
Practical Application
We next consider whether claim 1 integrates these abstract ideas into
a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. In doing
so, we consider whether there are any additional elements beyond the
abstract ideas that, individually or in combination, "integrate the [ abstract
ideas] into a practical application, using one or more of the considerations
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laid out by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit." Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54--55.
The additional elements recited in claim 1 include "a network
interface," "a processor," and "a database stored on a non-transitory
computer readable medium, the database including a plurality of records."
See Claims App 'x 1. The written description makes clear that these
components are generic. See, e.g., Spec. 10:24--27 (explaining that network
interface 21 "may include ... any suitable device"), 12: 10-11 ( explaining
that processor 40 "may include any suitable device"), 12: 14--17 ( explaining
that "a non-transitory computer readable medium" may be "any other
suitable medium"), 11: 19-22 ( disclosing that database 118 "may describe a
data structure which embodies groups of records or data elements stored in a
volatile or non volatile storage media"). The written description also makes
clear that the claimed system accelerates payments by selecting a faster
known payment method, not through an improvement in computer
technology. For example, the written description explains that buyers make
payments using known payment methods such as the Automated Clearing
House (ACH) system or a wire transfer. See Spec. 1:16-24, 2:4--15. The
written description notes that ACH payments take at least a day to settle,
while wire transfers settle almost immediately. See Spec. 1:28-30, 2:7-9.
The written description explains that the claimed system accelerates
payments by "converting" an ACH transaction to a wire transfer when
predetermined criteria have been met. See Spec. 2:25-28. That is, the system
selects the faster payment method (here, the wire transfer) when the
predetermined criteria have been met. See Spec. 2:25-28, 19:7-20. Any
acceleration in invoice payment processing time thus follows from selecting
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a faster payment method, not from improving how the generic computing
devices function.
Appellants argue that "the claimed invention is akin to improving
performance of a computer system itself, as invoice payments are processed
faster with the claimed invention as compared to conventional electronic
invoice processing systems." Appeal Brief 6, filed February 24, 2016 ("App.
Br."). Appellants assert that "the 'computer' is a network of connected
electronic devices that form the electronic invoice processing system" and
contend that "[ w ]hen considered from a system viewpoint, a clear
technological enhancement is achieved." Reply Br. 2.
Even if we consider the claimed system "a network of connected
electronic devices" that accelerates the processing of invoice payments, the
claimed system does not reflect an improvement in computer technology. As
discussed above, the written description makes clear that the claimed system
accelerates payment processing by selecting a faster existing payment
method, not through an improvement in computer technology.
We see no indication that these additional elements, considered alone
or together, are anything more than generic tools used to perform an abstract
idea. We thus determine that these additional elements do not integrate the
recited abstract ideas into a practical application. See Affinity Labs of Tex.,
LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("In this case,
the claims are directed not to an improvement in cellular telephones but
simply to the use of cellular telephones as tools in the aid of a process
focused on an abstract idea. That is not enough to constitute patentable
subject matter."); Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (explaining that
courts have identified "merely us[ing] a computer as a tool to perform an
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abstract idea" as an example of when a judicial exception may not have been
integrated into a practical application).
Inventive Concept
Finally, we consider whether claim 1 has an inventive concept, that is,
whether the additional claim elements "'transform the nature of the claim'
into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 78, 79). As discussed above, this requires us to evaluate whether
the additional claim elements add "a specific limitation or combination of
limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field" or "simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality."
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner determined that claim 1 does not recite an inventive
concept because the additional claim elements "are generic computer
components claimed to perform their basic functions" and the claim
limitations "amount[] to mere instructions to implement the abstract idea on
a computer." Ans. 8. The Examiner determined that the additional claim
elements do not (1) improve "the functioning of a computer itself' or
"another technology or technical field" or (2) "move beyond a general link
of the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment."
Final Act. 3.
In response, Appellants contend that claim 1 is similar to the claims
the Federal Circuit determined are patent eligible in DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). App. Br. 6-7. Appellants
assert that the DDR Holdings court determined that the claims before it are
patent eligible because the claims "address a business problem in using the
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Internet in connection with retaining website visitors." App. Br. 7 (emphasis
modified). Appellants argue that claim 1 is similar because the "claimed
invention uses a computer system to address a technical-based business
challenge that has not been overcome suitably by conventional systems."
App. Br. 7 ( emphasis modified).
The DDR Holdings court did not determine that the claims before it
are patent eligible simply because the claims address "a business problem in
using the Internet" as asserted by Appellants. Indeed, the court cautioned
"that not all claims purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are
eligible for patent." DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258. Rather, the court
determined that the claims "specify how interactions with the Internet are
manipulated to yield ... a result that overrides the routine and conventional
sequence of events." DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258. That is, "[i]nstead of
the computer network operating in its normal, expected manner," "the
claims recite an invention that is not merely the routine or conventional use
of the Internet." DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258-59.
That is not the case here. As explained above, each of the components
recited in claim 1 is a generic component, and neither the claim nor the
written description suggests that these components operate in anything other
than a conventional manner. In fact, claim 1 and the written description
provide little in the way of technical details about the claimed system.
Neither source explains how the claimed system "converts" one payment
method to another. Claim 1 simply recites that the processor is configured to
do so. See Claims App'x 1. And although the written description and
drawings repeatedly use some form of the word "convert," they do not
explain how the claimed invention performs this function. See, e.g., Spec.
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21: 12-27 (discussing conversion to a second payment method), Fig. 5 (step
340 "Convert to Second Accelerated Payment Method"). The written
description simply states that "[i]t will be apparent to a person having
ordinary skill in the art of computer programming of electronic devices and
servers how to program the components of the payment acceleration system
to operate and carry out logical functions associated with the payment
acceleration application." Spec. 12:2-5. Given the breadth of the claim and
the lack of details about how the claimed system functions, claim 1 is
"directed to nothing more than the performance of an abstract business
practice ... using a conventional computer. Such claims are not patent-
eligible." DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256.
Appellants also assert that "claim 1 recites additional, unconventional
steps that confine the claim[] in a manner that avoids preemption of
conventional aspects of invoice processing," specifically the recited
analyzing and converting steps. App. Br. 8.
We find Appellants' arguments unpersuasive. First, the analyzing and
converting steps relied on by Appellants form part of the identified abstract
ideas and thus are not "additional elements" that "'transform the nature of
the claim' into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). Second, even if we were to agree with Appellants
that the recited steps are novel and that the claim does not preempt the entire
field of invoice processing, neither fact would establish that claim 1 is patent
eligible. "[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea."
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016). And failing to preempt all of a particular field does not make a claim
less abstract. See, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
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1362---63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("And that the claims do not preempt all price
optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce
setting do not make them any less abstract."); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("While preemption
may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.").
Finally, Appellants argue in the Reply Brief that, under the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure and various court decisions, the recited
processor is a special-purpose computer because claim 1 recites that the
processor is "configured to" operate in a specific manner. See Reply Br. 5-8.
Appellants contend the Examiner found the recited configuration "both
novel and non-obvious, meaning that under the 'significantly more' prong
the processor configuration operates in a manner that is not routine, well-
recognized, [or] conventional." Reply Br. 8.
We find these arguments unpersuasive. First, Appellants forfeited
these arguments by failing to timely raise them. In the Final Office Action,
the Examiner found that the additional elements recited in claim 1 are
generic and operate in a conventional manner. See Final Act. 3--4, 14--16.
Yet Appellants first raised the argument that the "configured to" language
transforms the processor into a special-purpose computer in the Reply Brief.
Compare App. Br. 8-9, with Reply Br. 4--8. Although Appellants argued in
the Appeal Brief that claim 1 recites "a configured processor" that performs
"unconventional steps," Appellants did not argue that the words "configured
to" changed the processor into a special-purpose machine or mention the
authority that Appellants rely on in the Reply Brief. See App. Br. 8-9. And
Appellants have not explained why they failed to raise this argument earlier.
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See Reply Br. 4--8. Appellants have therefore forfeited this untimely
argument. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.37 (c)(l)(iv), 41.41 (b)(2).
Second, even if Appellants had raised these arguments in the Appeal
Brief, we would have found them unpersuasive. In Alice, the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that claims that recite "specific hardware" configured
to perform "specific computerized functions" are patent eligible when the
hardware was simply "a handful of generic computer components
configured to implement" an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. That is the
situation here. Claim 1 recites a processor "configured to" and "further
configured" to perform various operations, but the written description
explains that the processor is a generic computing device. See Spec. 12: 9-
13 ("[T]he processor 40 may have various implementations. For example,
the processor 40 may include any suitable device, such as a programmable
circuit, integrated circuit, memory and I/0 circuits, an application specific
integrated circuit, microcontroller, complex programmable logic device,
other programmable circuits, or the like." (emphases added)). We see
nothing in the written description or the claim that suggests that the
processer performs unconventional steps. The use of a generic processor to
perform the abstract ideas recited in the claims does not provide the
necessary inventive concept. In the words of the Federal Circuit, "after
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible." DDR Holdings,
773 F.3d at 1256.
The other elements recited in claim 1 also fail to provide an inventive
concept. The recited "network interface" and "database" are generic
components and there is no indication in the claims or the written
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description that these components operate in anything but a conventional
manner. See, e.g., Spec. 10:24--27 (explaining that network interface 21
"may include ... any suitable device"), 12: 14--17 (explaining that "a non-
transitory computer readable medium" may be "any other suitable
medium"), 11: 19-22 ( disclosing that database 118 "may describe a data
structure which embodies groups of records or data elements stored in a
volatile or non volatile storage media"). Considered separately or together,
the generic processor, database, and network interface do not amount to
"significantly more" than the abstract ideas recited in claim 1.
For the above reasons, the additional elements recited in claim 1 do
not provide "a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not
well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field." Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Rather, these elements "simply append[] well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality." Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56. As a result, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not
recite an inventive concept.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 1
under§ 101.
DECISION
1-20 § 101 1-20
Summar 1-20
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No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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