Ex Parte Dry et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 9, 2018

14565749 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 9, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/565,749 12/10/2014
28415 7590 04/11/2018
PRICE HENEVELD LLP
FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC
695 KENMOOR S.E.
P. 0. BOX 2567
GRAND RAPIDS, MI 49501-2567
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Alan George Dry
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83466443 3644
EXAMINER
WAGGENSPACK, ADAM J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3782
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/11/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
ptomail@priceheneveld.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ALAN GEORGE DRY,
GUNNAR GROESBECK, and JOE S. TALAMONTI
Appeal2017-007637
Application 14/565,749
Technology Center 3700
Before JOHN C. KERINS, EDWARD A. BROWN, and
LYNNE H. BROWNE, Administrative Patent Judges.
BROWNE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Alan George Dry et al. (Appellants) appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134
from the rejection of claims 1-12 and 14--20. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
Appeal2017-007637
Application 14/565,749
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 9, and 17 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. An electronic device holder, comprising:
a mounting surface configured to receive an electronic
device;
first and second doors disposed at opposite sides of the
mounting surface and gearingly engaged to one another on a rear
side of the mounting surface for synchronized lateral movement
between open and closed positions; and
an actuator disposed on one of the first and second doors
and moveable to an actuated position for actuating the doors to
the open position.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Wang
Mori
Beletsky
Yamada
Schedivy
Fan
Camevali
Lai
Funk
Rosen
Jahn
us 5,457,745
us 5,895,094
US 6,769,582 Bl
US 6,969,118 B2
US 7,149,078 B2
US 7 ,272,984 B2
US 7,551,458 B2
US 8,727,192 B2
US 8,833,716 B2
US 6,292,236 Bl
US 2014/0209648 Al
2
Oct. 10, 1995
Apr. 20, 1999
Aug.3,2004
Nov. 29, 2005
Dec. 12, 2006
Sept. 25, 2007
June 23, 2009
May 20, 2014
Sept. 16, 2014
Sept. 18, 2001
July 31, 2014
Appeal2017-007637
Application 14/565,749
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1-12 and 14--16 1 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph, as being indefinite.
II. Claims 1 and 3 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as
anticipated by Funk.
III. Claims 2 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Funk, Camevali, and Fan.
IV. Claims 5 and 6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Funk and Wang.
V. Claims 7 and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Funk, Wang, Lai, and Beletsky.
VI. Claims 17-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Schedivy, Jahn, Rosen, and either Mori or
Yamada.
DISCUSSION
Rejection I: Indefiniteness of Claims 1-12 and 14-16
The Examiner cites Process Control Corp. for the proposition that:
Where applicant acts as his or her own lexicographer to
specifically define a term of a claim contrary to its ordinary
meaning, the written description must clearly redefine the claim
1 The Examiner identifies claims 1-20 as being rejected under this ground.
Final Act. 3. However, claim 13 is canceled and claims 17-20 are not
discussed in this rejection. See Amendment filed June 24, 2016; Appeal Br.
4; Final Act. 3-5. We thus understand this rejection as being directed only
to claims 1-12 and 14--16.
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term and set forth the uncommon definition so as to put one
reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the applicant intended
to so redefine that claim term.
Final Act. 3, 4 (citing Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d
1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Applying Process Control Corp, the Examiner
determines that Appellants improperly redefine the claim terms "doors" and
"lever," thus rendering the meaning of these terms unclear. See Final Act.
3-5. In support of this determination, the Examiner explains that
[t ]he term "doors" is used by the claims to mean "a moving
part of the electronic device holder that is operable
between open and closed positions", while the accepted
meaning is "a movable piece of wood, glass, or metal that
swings or slides open and shut so that people can enter or
leave a room, building, vehicle, etc."
Id. at 3. The Examiner also explains that
[ t ]he term "lever" is used by the claims to mean "a moving
part that is operable between first and second positions for
imparting a force on or actuating movement of another
part", while the accepted meaning is "a rigid piece that
transmits and modifies force or motion when forces are
applied at two points and it turns about a third;
specifically[]: a rigid bar used to exert a pressure or sustain
a weight at one point of its length by the application of a
force at a second and turning at a third on a fulcrum."
Id. at 4. The Examiner takes the position that the Specification does not
clearly redefine these terms. See id. at 3, 4.
In response to this rejection Appellants direct our attention to
paragraphs 66 and 68 of the Specification which respectively define the
terms "door" and "lever". Appeal Br. 5. In particular, paragraph 66 states:
As used throughout this disclosure, the term "door" is meant to
identify a moving part of the electronic device holder 10 that is
operable between open and closed positions for securing an
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Application 14/565,749
electronic device in the electronic device holder 10. Further,
the term "door" may refer to a cover mechanism operable
between open and closed positions for selectively providing
access to a seatback dock as further described below.
Paragraph 68 states "[a]s used throughout this disclosure, the term 'lever' is
meant to identify a moving part of the electronic device holder 10 that is
operable between first and second positions for imparting a force on or
actuating a movement of another part(s) of the electronic device holder 1 O."
Spec. i-f i-f 66, 68. Appellants submit that "when the claims are read in light
of the specification, the terms 'doors' and 'levers' are clearly defined and
structurally identified for purposes of determining what the terms mean and
further what these terms encompass." Appeal Br. 4. Given the explicit
definitions of the terms "door" and "lever" in paragraphs 66 and 68, we
agree. One skilled in the art reading these claim terms in light of the
Specification would understand that, to the extent that Appellants are using
them in accordance with a definition other than the ordinary and customary
meanings of these terms, Appellants have sufficiently redefined the terms
"door" and "lever" in the Specification such that their meanings are clear.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's decision rejecting
claims 1-12 and 14--16 as indefinite.
Rejection II: Anticipation of Claims 1 and 3 by Funk
The Examiner finds that Funk discloses all of the limitations of
independent claim 1 and its dependent claim 3. Final Act. 6-7. In
particular, the Examiner finds that Funk discloses an electronic device
holder comprising first and second doors (engagement arms 104, 105) and
"an actuator ... disposed on one of the first and second doors and moveable
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Application 14/565,749
to an actuated position for actuating the doors to the open position," because
the "perpendicular end portion[ s] of [engagement arms] 104 or 105 or
alternately the inward sections along the longitudinal length near the end
clamping portions" are capable of moving to an actuated position for
actuating the doors to the open position. Final Act 6, Fig. 2A. The
Examiner explains that these portions of the engagement arms 104 and 105
"can be gripped and used to actuate the doors, and the position in which the
doors are open can be considered an actuated position." Id.
Appellants contend that Funk does not disclose an actuator that is
disposed on one of the first and second doors for actuating the doors to the
open position. Appeal Br. 5. Appellants point out that "an actuator is a
mechanical device for moving or controlling an object." Id. at 6. Appellants
argue the Examiner's interpretation "is improper as there is no part of the
engagement arms 104, 105 that is moveable beyond the entirety of the
engagement arms themselves." Id.
In response, the Examiner asserts that the claims do not require the
actuator to be movable separately from the doors and that a definition was
not provided for an "actuator." Ans. 19--20. The Examiner's assertion is not
responsive to the argument raised by Appellants. Appellants do not contend
that Funk fails to disclose a separately movable actuator. Rather, Appellants
contend that Funk fails to disclose an actuator at all. See Appeal Br. 6.
The rejection identifies the "perpendicular end portion of 104 or 105
or alternately the inward sections along the longitudinal length near the end
clamping portions" of Funk's doors as corresponding to the claimed
actuator. Final Act. 6. These portions of Funk's doors, however, do not
actuate anything. Rather, as admitted by the Examiner, the user's hands
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Application 14/565,749
actuate the doors. See id. Thus, the Examiner's finding that Funk discloses
"an actuator disposed on one of the first and second doors and moveable to
an actuated position for actuating the doors to the open position" as claimed
1s m error.
For this reason, the rejection of claim 1, and claim 3 depending
therefrom, is not sustained.
Rejections 111-V: Obviousness of
Claims 2 and 4 Based on Funk, Carnevali, and Fan,
Claims 5 and 6 Based on Funk and Wang, and
Claims 7 and 8 based on Funk, Wang, Lai, and Beletsky.
Rejections III-V rely on the same erroneous finding as Rejection II.
Final Act. 7-12. The Examiner does not rely on any of Camevali, Fan,
Wang, Lai, or Beletsky to cure the deficiencies in this finding. Accordingly,
we do not sustain Rejections III-V for the reasons discussed supra.
Rejection VI: Obviousness of Claims 17-20
Based on Schedivy, Jahn, Rosen, and either Mori or Yamada.
Appellants argue claims 17-20 as a group. Appeal Br. 9-10. We take
claim 1 7 as representative of this group, and claims 18-20 stand or fall with
claim 17.
The Examiner finds that Schedivy discloses a mounting system
comprising a seatback frame having a mounting bracket (base portion 305,
first hinge 306, arm 307, second hinge 308) supported thereon, a cover (door
302, base portion 305, first hinge 306) disposed over the mounting bracket
having a seatback dock (base portion 305, first hinge 306), and an electronic
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device (video display 304). Final Act. 12; see also Schedivy, Fig. 3B. The
Examiner acknowledges that Schedivy does not disclose a door disposed on
the cover and operable between extended and retracted positions, wherein
the door covers the seatback dock when the door is in the extended position
and provides access to the seatback dock when the door is in the retracted
position. Id. The Examiner finds that Rosen discloses a vehicle mounted
attachment structure for an electronic device comprising a door (viewing
surface cover 34) disposed on a cover and operable between extended and
retracted positions. Id. at 13 (citing Rosen, Figs. 1-2). The Examiner
concludes that it would have been obvious to replace the pivoting cover or
door of Schedivy with a cover having a sliding door as taught by Rosen, "in
order to allow for a sliding motion to open the door so as to allow opening of
the door in situations in which objects might obstruct the pivoting door
.... " Id. at 15.
Appellants point out that the Examiner "indicate[ s] that although no
seatback dock is shown in the Rosen reference, if one were present, opening
the door 34 would provide such access." Appeal Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 6.
Appellants argue that this assertion by the Examiner is improper. Appeal
Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 6. According to Appellants, the Examiner's
statement that a seatback dock is accessible in the Rosen reference is
conclusory. Appeal Br. 10; see also Reply Br. 6-7. As such, Appellants
argue that "the access to the viewing surface 32 of the Rosen reference does
not render obvious access to a seatback dock as presently claimed in claim
17." Appeal Br. 10; see also Reply Br. 7.
Appellants' contentions are unconvincing as they are directed to
Rosen alone and not the combined teachings of Schedivy and Rosen. The
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rejection, as noted above, relies on Schedivy's disclosure of a seatback dock.
See Final Act. 12. The Examiner relies on Rosen as teaching "a vehicle
mounted attachment structure for an electronic device comprising a door
(34) disposed on the cover and operable between extended and retracted
positions." Id. at 13. It is clear that the Examiner acknowledges that Rosen
does not disclose a seatback dock. As such, we understand the Examiner's
rejection as applying the door of Rosen to the seatback dock of Schedivy in
order to conceal the seatback dock or provide access to the seatback dock.
In other words, the Examiner's position is that once Schedivy 's structure is
modified to have the door of Rosen, the modified structure would provide
access to the seatback dock in a retracted position. As such, Appellants
merely attack the references. "Non-obviousness cannot be established by
attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the
teachings of a combination of references[]." In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d
1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Thus, Appellants do not apprise us of error.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 17 as unpatentable over
Schedivy, Jahn, Rosen, and either Mori or Yamada, with claims 18-20
falling with claim 17.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-12 and 14--16 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite is REVERSED.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1 and 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)
as anticipated by Funk is REVERSED.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 2 and 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Funk, Camevali, and Fan is REVERSED.
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The Examiner's rejection of claims 5 and 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Funk and Wang is REVERSED.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 7 and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Funk, Wang, Lai, and Beletsky is REVERSED.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 17-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Schedivy, Jahn, Rosen, and either Mori or Yamada is
AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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