Ex Parte Dry et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 9, 201814565749 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 9, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/565,749 12/10/2014 28415 7590 04/11/2018 PRICE HENEVELD LLP FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 695 KENMOOR S.E. P. 0. BOX 2567 GRAND RAPIDS, MI 49501-2567 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Alan George Dry UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 83466443 3644 EXAMINER WAGGENSPACK, ADAM J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3782 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/11/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): ptomail@priceheneveld.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ALAN GEORGE DRY, GUNNAR GROESBECK, and JOE S. TALAMONTI Appeal2017-007637 Application 14/565,749 Technology Center 3700 Before JOHN C. KERINS, EDWARD A. BROWN, and LYNNE H. BROWNE, Administrative Patent Judges. BROWNE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Alan George Dry et al. (Appellants) appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the rejection of claims 1-12 and 14--20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. Appeal2017-007637 Application 14/565,749 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claims 1, 9, and 17 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. An electronic device holder, comprising: a mounting surface configured to receive an electronic device; first and second doors disposed at opposite sides of the mounting surface and gearingly engaged to one another on a rear side of the mounting surface for synchronized lateral movement between open and closed positions; and an actuator disposed on one of the first and second doors and moveable to an actuated position for actuating the doors to the open position. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Wang Mori Beletsky Yamada Schedivy Fan Camevali Lai Funk Rosen Jahn us 5,457,745 us 5,895,094 US 6,769,582 Bl US 6,969,118 B2 US 7,149,078 B2 US 7 ,272,984 B2 US 7,551,458 B2 US 8,727,192 B2 US 8,833,716 B2 US 6,292,236 Bl US 2014/0209648 Al 2 Oct. 10, 1995 Apr. 20, 1999 Aug.3,2004 Nov. 29, 2005 Dec. 12, 2006 Sept. 25, 2007 June 23, 2009 May 20, 2014 Sept. 16, 2014 Sept. 18, 2001 July 31, 2014 Appeal2017-007637 Application 14/565,749 REJECTIONS I. Claims 1-12 and 14--16 1 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite. II. Claims 1 and 3 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as anticipated by Funk. III. Claims 2 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Funk, Camevali, and Fan. IV. Claims 5 and 6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Funk and Wang. V. Claims 7 and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Funk, Wang, Lai, and Beletsky. VI. Claims 17-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Schedivy, Jahn, Rosen, and either Mori or Yamada. DISCUSSION Rejection I: Indefiniteness of Claims 1-12 and 14-16 The Examiner cites Process Control Corp. for the proposition that: Where applicant acts as his or her own lexicographer to specifically define a term of a claim contrary to its ordinary meaning, the written description must clearly redefine the claim 1 The Examiner identifies claims 1-20 as being rejected under this ground. Final Act. 3. However, claim 13 is canceled and claims 17-20 are not discussed in this rejection. See Amendment filed June 24, 2016; Appeal Br. 4; Final Act. 3-5. We thus understand this rejection as being directed only to claims 1-12 and 14--16. 3 Appeal2017-007637 Application 14/565,749 term and set forth the uncommon definition so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the applicant intended to so redefine that claim term. Final Act. 3, 4 (citing Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Applying Process Control Corp, the Examiner determines that Appellants improperly redefine the claim terms "doors" and "lever," thus rendering the meaning of these terms unclear. See Final Act. 3-5. In support of this determination, the Examiner explains that [t ]he term "doors" is used by the claims to mean "a moving part of the electronic device holder that is operable between open and closed positions", while the accepted meaning is "a movable piece of wood, glass, or metal that swings or slides open and shut so that people can enter or leave a room, building, vehicle, etc." Id. at 3. The Examiner also explains that [ t ]he term "lever" is used by the claims to mean "a moving part that is operable between first and second positions for imparting a force on or actuating movement of another part", while the accepted meaning is "a rigid piece that transmits and modifies force or motion when forces are applied at two points and it turns about a third; specifically[]: a rigid bar used to exert a pressure or sustain a weight at one point of its length by the application of a force at a second and turning at a third on a fulcrum." Id. at 4. The Examiner takes the position that the Specification does not clearly redefine these terms. See id. at 3, 4. In response to this rejection Appellants direct our attention to paragraphs 66 and 68 of the Specification which respectively define the terms "door" and "lever". Appeal Br. 5. In particular, paragraph 66 states: As used throughout this disclosure, the term "door" is meant to identify a moving part of the electronic device holder 10 that is operable between open and closed positions for securing an 4 Appeal2017-007637 Application 14/565,749 electronic device in the electronic device holder 10. Further, the term "door" may refer to a cover mechanism operable between open and closed positions for selectively providing access to a seatback dock as further described below. Paragraph 68 states "[a]s used throughout this disclosure, the term 'lever' is meant to identify a moving part of the electronic device holder 10 that is operable between first and second positions for imparting a force on or actuating a movement of another part(s) of the electronic device holder 1 O." Spec. i-f i-f 66, 68. Appellants submit that "when the claims are read in light of the specification, the terms 'doors' and 'levers' are clearly defined and structurally identified for purposes of determining what the terms mean and further what these terms encompass." Appeal Br. 4. Given the explicit definitions of the terms "door" and "lever" in paragraphs 66 and 68, we agree. One skilled in the art reading these claim terms in light of the Specification would understand that, to the extent that Appellants are using them in accordance with a definition other than the ordinary and customary meanings of these terms, Appellants have sufficiently redefined the terms "door" and "lever" in the Specification such that their meanings are clear. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-12 and 14--16 as indefinite. Rejection II: Anticipation of Claims 1 and 3 by Funk The Examiner finds that Funk discloses all of the limitations of independent claim 1 and its dependent claim 3. Final Act. 6-7. In particular, the Examiner finds that Funk discloses an electronic device holder comprising first and second doors (engagement arms 104, 105) and "an actuator ... disposed on one of the first and second doors and moveable 5 Appeal2017-007637 Application 14/565,749 to an actuated position for actuating the doors to the open position," because the "perpendicular end portion[ s] of [engagement arms] 104 or 105 or alternately the inward sections along the longitudinal length near the end clamping portions" are capable of moving to an actuated position for actuating the doors to the open position. Final Act 6, Fig. 2A. The Examiner explains that these portions of the engagement arms 104 and 105 "can be gripped and used to actuate the doors, and the position in which the doors are open can be considered an actuated position." Id. Appellants contend that Funk does not disclose an actuator that is disposed on one of the first and second doors for actuating the doors to the open position. Appeal Br. 5. Appellants point out that "an actuator is a mechanical device for moving or controlling an object." Id. at 6. Appellants argue the Examiner's interpretation "is improper as there is no part of the engagement arms 104, 105 that is moveable beyond the entirety of the engagement arms themselves." Id. In response, the Examiner asserts that the claims do not require the actuator to be movable separately from the doors and that a definition was not provided for an "actuator." Ans. 19--20. The Examiner's assertion is not responsive to the argument raised by Appellants. Appellants do not contend that Funk fails to disclose a separately movable actuator. Rather, Appellants contend that Funk fails to disclose an actuator at all. See Appeal Br. 6. The rejection identifies the "perpendicular end portion of 104 or 105 or alternately the inward sections along the longitudinal length near the end clamping portions" of Funk's doors as corresponding to the claimed actuator. Final Act. 6. These portions of Funk's doors, however, do not actuate anything. Rather, as admitted by the Examiner, the user's hands 6 Appeal2017-007637 Application 14/565,749 actuate the doors. See id. Thus, the Examiner's finding that Funk discloses "an actuator disposed on one of the first and second doors and moveable to an actuated position for actuating the doors to the open position" as claimed 1s m error. For this reason, the rejection of claim 1, and claim 3 depending therefrom, is not sustained. Rejections 111-V: Obviousness of Claims 2 and 4 Based on Funk, Carnevali, and Fan, Claims 5 and 6 Based on Funk and Wang, and Claims 7 and 8 based on Funk, Wang, Lai, and Beletsky. Rejections III-V rely on the same erroneous finding as Rejection II. Final Act. 7-12. The Examiner does not rely on any of Camevali, Fan, Wang, Lai, or Beletsky to cure the deficiencies in this finding. Accordingly, we do not sustain Rejections III-V for the reasons discussed supra. Rejection VI: Obviousness of Claims 17-20 Based on Schedivy, Jahn, Rosen, and either Mori or Yamada. Appellants argue claims 17-20 as a group. Appeal Br. 9-10. We take claim 1 7 as representative of this group, and claims 18-20 stand or fall with claim 17. The Examiner finds that Schedivy discloses a mounting system comprising a seatback frame having a mounting bracket (base portion 305, first hinge 306, arm 307, second hinge 308) supported thereon, a cover (door 302, base portion 305, first hinge 306) disposed over the mounting bracket having a seatback dock (base portion 305, first hinge 306), and an electronic 7 Appeal2017-007637 Application 14/565,749 device (video display 304). Final Act. 12; see also Schedivy, Fig. 3B. The Examiner acknowledges that Schedivy does not disclose a door disposed on the cover and operable between extended and retracted positions, wherein the door covers the seatback dock when the door is in the extended position and provides access to the seatback dock when the door is in the retracted position. Id. The Examiner finds that Rosen discloses a vehicle mounted attachment structure for an electronic device comprising a door (viewing surface cover 34) disposed on a cover and operable between extended and retracted positions. Id. at 13 (citing Rosen, Figs. 1-2). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to replace the pivoting cover or door of Schedivy with a cover having a sliding door as taught by Rosen, "in order to allow for a sliding motion to open the door so as to allow opening of the door in situations in which objects might obstruct the pivoting door .... " Id. at 15. Appellants point out that the Examiner "indicate[ s] that although no seatback dock is shown in the Rosen reference, if one were present, opening the door 34 would provide such access." Appeal Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 6. Appellants argue that this assertion by the Examiner is improper. Appeal Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 6. According to Appellants, the Examiner's statement that a seatback dock is accessible in the Rosen reference is conclusory. Appeal Br. 10; see also Reply Br. 6-7. As such, Appellants argue that "the access to the viewing surface 32 of the Rosen reference does not render obvious access to a seatback dock as presently claimed in claim 17." Appeal Br. 10; see also Reply Br. 7. Appellants' contentions are unconvincing as they are directed to Rosen alone and not the combined teachings of Schedivy and Rosen. The 8 Appeal2017-007637 Application 14/565,749 rejection, as noted above, relies on Schedivy's disclosure of a seatback dock. See Final Act. 12. The Examiner relies on Rosen as teaching "a vehicle mounted attachment structure for an electronic device comprising a door (34) disposed on the cover and operable between extended and retracted positions." Id. at 13. It is clear that the Examiner acknowledges that Rosen does not disclose a seatback dock. As such, we understand the Examiner's rejection as applying the door of Rosen to the seatback dock of Schedivy in order to conceal the seatback dock or provide access to the seatback dock. In other words, the Examiner's position is that once Schedivy 's structure is modified to have the door of Rosen, the modified structure would provide access to the seatback dock in a retracted position. As such, Appellants merely attack the references. "Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references[]." In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Thus, Appellants do not apprise us of error. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 17 as unpatentable over Schedivy, Jahn, Rosen, and either Mori or Yamada, with claims 18-20 falling with claim 17. DECISION The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-12 and 14--16 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite is REVERSED. The Examiner's rejection of claims 1 and 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as anticipated by Funk is REVERSED. The Examiner's rejection of claims 2 and 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Funk, Camevali, and Fan is REVERSED. 9 Appeal2017-007637 Application 14/565,749 The Examiner's rejection of claims 5 and 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Funk and Wang is REVERSED. The Examiner's rejection of claims 7 and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Funk, Wang, Lai, and Beletsky is REVERSED. The Examiner's rejection of claims 17-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Schedivy, Jahn, Rosen, and either Mori or Yamada is AFFIRMED. AFFIRMED-IN-PART 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation