Ex Parte Do et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 22, 201211153846 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 22, 2012) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte PHUC K. DO and JUSTIN M. PIERCE ____________ Appeal 2010-006815 Application 11/153,846 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, JEFFREY S. SMITH, and ANDREW CALDWELL, Administrative Patent Judges. RUGGIERO, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection of claims 1-12, 14-18, and 25-28. Claims 13 and 19-24 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and the Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed Oct. 22, 2009), the Answer (mailed Jan. 8, 2010), and the Reply Brief (filed Mar. 1, 2010). We have considered in Appeal 2010-006815 Application 11/153,846 2 this decision only those arguments Appellants actually raised in the Briefs. Any other arguments which Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellants’ Invention Appellants’ invention relates to a virtualized file system in which file system views are created for each application executed by a particular user. These user-specific file system views include operating system files needed to run the particular application along with file system changes made for the particular application for the particular user. Changes made to the file system during execution are permitted but the changes are not visible to other applications or to other users. See generally Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and reads as follows: 1: A computer-implemented method of providing a file system, comprising: automatically creating, by a file system access layer that controls all access to the file system, a file system view for each application executed by each particular one of a plurality of users of the file system, each of the file system views comprising all files created by or changed by the application as it executes on behalf of the particular user, thereby isolating the files in each of the file system views created for the particular user from access by any of the other users and from access by any other application executed by the particular user; and upon completion of each of the executed applications, persisting the created file system view created therefor, such that each of the changed or created files is available for a next execution of the application by the particular user through use of the persisted file system view. Appeal 2010-006815 Application 11/153,846 3 The Examiner’s Rejections The Examiner’s Answer cites the following prior art references: Hayes, Jr. (Hayes) US 6,339,826 B2 Jan. 15, 2002 Chtchetkine US 6,356,915 B1 Mar. 12, 2002 Schmidt US 2002/0095479 A1 July 18, 2002 Claims 1-3, 9, 14-18, and 25-28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schmidt in view of Chtchetkine. Claims 4-8 and 10-12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schmidt in view of Chtchetkine and Hayes. ANALYSIS Appellants’ arguments, with respect to the obviousness rejection of independent claims 1, 25, and 27 based on the combination of Schmidt and Chtchetkine, contend that neither applied reference, individually or collectively, teaches all of the claimed elements. In particular, Appellants contend that the “compute capsules” of Schmidt are disclosed (¶ [0038]) as including “one or more processes,” which Appellants have argued are analogous to the claimed “applications.” According to Appellants (App. Br. 10), therefore, the file system views created for the “compute capsules” of Schmidt would encompass more than one process, i.e., application, in contrast to the claimed requirement of a file system view for each application. We do not agree with Appellants. As pointed out by the Examiner (Ans. 15), the compute capsules of Schmidt could each have only one process (application) and, therefore, the files system views created for each compute capsule would necessarily be created for each application as claimed. Contrary to Appellants’ contention (Reply Br. 5-6) that the Appeal 2010-006815 Application 11/153,846 4 Examiner’s interpretation is an attempt to “force-fit” Schmidt’s approach into the present claim language, support for the Examiner’s interpretation is taken directly from Schmidt’s disclosure. As recognized by Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 10), Schmidt discloses that a compute capsule can contain “one or more processes . . . .” ((quoting ¶ [0038] (emphasis added))). We also find unpersuasive Appellants’ related argument which directs attention to Schmidt’s disclosure that the compute capsules include an arbitrary set of processes (Abstract). According to Appellants (App. Br. 10), this disclosure is contrasted with the claimed requirement that all files which are created or changed by an executing application are included in a system view. It is apparent, however, that Schmidt’s use of the term “arbitrary” means nothing more than that a user’s compute capsule will contain a set of processes selected from a larger set of available processes. As explained by the Examiner (Ans. 16), Schmidt indeed discloses that all files in a compute capsule which are modified will appear and persist in a private compute capsule view (¶ [0048]). Further, contrary to Appellants’ contention (Reply Br. 2-5), we do not interpret the Examiner’s stated position as improperly relying on two different elements from Schmidt, i.e., the compute capsules and the system views, as corresponding to Appellants’ claimed system views. While we agree with Appellants (Reply Br. 2) that Schmidt’s compute capsules are not the same as his system views, we find that the Examiner’s analysis fully recognizes this distinction. As explained by the Examiner (Ans. 15-16), Schmidt discloses that after a user selects and configures the contents of a compute capsule, the file system views within the compute capsule are Appeal 2010-006815 Application 11/153,846 5 automatically populated, i.e., “created” as claimed, with system directories and necessary files (¶ [0048]). Turning to a discussion of the applied Chtchetkine reference, Appellants have undertaken a detailed analysis of Chtchetkine as it relates to the claimed file system view feature (App. Br. 11-15). As pointed out by the Examiner (Ans. 19-20), however, it is Schmidt, not Chtchetkine, that is relied upon for a teaching of the file system view feature. It is apparent from the Examiner’s stated position (Ans. 4) that Chtchetkine is relied upon solely for an explicit teaching to address the claimed “file system access layer” feature. We further find that the Examiner has provided a valid articulated line of reasoning with a rational underpinning to support the conclusion of obviousness with respect to the proposed combination of Schmidt and Chtchetkine. We agree with the Examiner that a skilled artisan would have recognized and appreciated that Chtchetkine’s teaching of a file system access layer that controls all access to the file system would have served as an obvious enhancement in the system of Schmidt thereby enabling the isolation of applications from direct interaction with file system storage hardware (Ans. 4, 19). KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). We also agree with the Examiner (Ans. 17) that Chtchetkine discloses (col. 5, ll. 35-50) a file system view isolation feature which buttresses Schmidt’s teaching of such feature. Lastly, we recognize that Appellants have provided arguments directed to the merits of the Examiner’s stated rationale for combining Schmidt and Chtchetkine at page 8 of the Reply Brief. Since these arguments were presented for the first time on appeal in the Reply Brief, they are therefore deemed to be waived. See Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d Appeal 2010-006815 Application 11/153,846 6 1473, 1473-74 (BPAI 2010) (“informative”1) (Absent a showing of good cause, the Board is not required to address an argument newly presented in the Reply Brief that could have been presented in the principal Brief on Appeal.). For the above reasons, the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claims 1, 25, and 27, as well as dependent claims 2, 3, 9, 14-18, 26, and 28 not separately argued by Appellants, is sustained. Claims 4-8 and 10-12 We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claims 4-8 and 10-12 in which the Examiner has applied Hayes to the combination of Schmidt and Chtchetkine to address the various features of the rejected claims. Appellants (App. Br. 17) have not argued the rejected claims with any particularity but, instead, have relied upon arguments asserted against the rejection of independent claims 1, 25, and 27, which arguments we have found unpersuasive as discussed supra. CONCLUSION OF LAW Based on the analysis above, we conclude that the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-12, 14-18, and 25-28 for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 1 Designated as “Informative Opinion” at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/index.jsp. Appeal 2010-006815 Application 11/153,846 7 DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-12, 14-18, and 25-28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2010). AFFIRMED babc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation