Ex Parte DAMANI et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 30, 2019

14873790 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/873,790 10/02/2015
7055 7590 05/02/2019
GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN, P.L.C.
1950 ROLAND CLARKE PLACE
RESTON, VA 20191
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Rajiv J. DAMAN!
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
P48342 4708
EXAMINER
PADGETT, MARIANNE L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1717
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/02/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
gbpatent@gbpatent.com
greenblum.bernsteinplc@gmail.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RAJIV J. DAMAN! and ARNO REPKE
Appeal2018-002730
Application 14/873,790
Technology Center 1700
Before BRADLEY R. GARRIS, ROMULO H. DELMENDO, and
JENNIFER R. GUPTA, Administrative Patent Judges.
GUPTA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
final decision rejecting claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.
1 In this Decision, we refer to the Specification filed October 2, 2015
("Spec."), the Final Office Action dated March 16, 2017 ("Final Act."), the
Appeal Brief filed August 16, 2017 ("Appeal Br."), the Examiner's Answer
dated November 15, 2017 ("Ans."), and the Reply Brief filed January 16,
2018 ("Reply Br.").
2 Appellant is the Applicant, OERLIKON METCO AG, WOHLEN, which,
according to the Appeal Brief, is the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
According to Appellant, the Assignee's name was listed as OERLIKON
METCO AG in the Assignment recorded on October 5, 2015, at
Appeal2018-002730
Application 14/873,790
The subject matter on appeal relates to a method for the manufacture
of a coating having a columnar structure. Spec. ,r 2. Claim 1, reproduced
below from the Claims Appendix of the Appeal Brief, is illustrative of the
claims on appeal.
1. A method for the manufacture of a coating having a
columnar structure, in which method a coating material in the
form of primary corpuscles is injected with a carrier gas into a
thermal process beam, the coating material is transformed into a
vapor phase in the process beam and is deposited as a
condensate in the form of a columnar coating on a substrate and
the primary corpuscles are formed of an agglomerate of
particles which are held together by cohesive forces of a
connecting medium or by adhesive forces, characterized in that
the primary corpuscles are disintegrated in the process beam by
mechanical and thermal interaction and particles of the
agglomerate of particles are dispersed so that coating material is
vaporized fully or partly by thermal action on the particles.
Appeal Br. 25 (Claims App.).
REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains the following rejections on appeal:
Rejection 1: Claims 5, 10, 11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written
description requirement;
Rejection 2: Claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite;
Rejection 3: Claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Schmid et al. (EP 1 479 788 Al, published
Reel 036716, Frame 0614, but Appellant is in the process of correcting the
Assignee's name to OERIKON METCO AG, WOHLEN. Appeal Br. 3.
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Application 14/873,790
November 24, 2004) 3 ("Schmid"), in view of Dorfam et al.
(WO 02/45931 Al, published June 13, 2002) ("Dorfam"), and considering
Barbezat et al. (US 2005/0129965 Al, published June 16, 2005)
("Barbezat");
Rejection 4: Claims 7, 9-11, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Schmid, Dorfam, and considering Barbezat, and further in
view of Hass et al. (US 2008/0220177 Al, published September 11, 2008 or
WO 2007 /005832 A2, published January 11, 2007) ("Hass") for claim 7, and
further considering Kitamura et al. (US 2006/0116274 Al, published
June 1, 2006) ("Kitamura") or Kato et al. (US 2006/0134343 Al, published
June 22, 2006) for claim 9;
Rejection 5: Claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 on the ground of
non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting over claims 1-23 of
Barbezat et al. (US 7,678,428 B2, issued March 16, 2010)4 ("Barbezat '428),
in view of Dorfam, and optionally further considering Kitamura or Kato for
claim 9, and Hass for claim 7; and
Rejection 6: Claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 on the ground of
non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting over claims 1-21 of
Schmid et al. (US 7,482,035 B2, issued January 27, 2009) 5 ("Schmid '035"),
3 The Examiner relies on Schmid et al. (US 2004/0234687 Al published
November 25, 2004) as an English language equivalent to Schmid et al.,
EP 1 479 788 Al (Final Act. 15). The Appellant does not object (Appeal
Br. 6-24). Therefore, in our discussion below, we cite to and rely on the
English language equivalent, i.e., the US document.
4 US 7,678,428 B2 previously published on June 16, 2005 as
US 2005/0129965 Al.
5 US 7,482,035 B2 previously published on November 25, 2004,
US 2004/0234687 Al.
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Application 14/873,790
in view of Dorfam, and Barbezat, and optionally further considering
Kitamura or Kato for claim 9, and Hass for claim 7.
DISCUSSION
After review of the cited evidence in light of the Appellant's and the
Examiner's opposing positions, we determine that the Appellant has not
identified reversible error in the Examiner's rejections except where
otherwise explained below. Thus, where we affirm the Examiner's
rejections, we do so for the reasons expressed in the Final Office Action, the
Answer, and below. 6
Rejection 1
"[T]he test for [compliance with the written description requirement]
is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys
to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed
subject matter as of the filing date." Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en bane) (citation omitted).
Claims 10 and 11
With respect to claim 10, the Examiner found the original claim
language recited: "oxide ceramic materials are used as the coating materials;
in that the materials are oxides of Zr, Al, Ti, ... , Mn, Sr or combination of
these chemical elements," whereas claim 10 on appeal recites "the coating
material comprises oxides of Zr, Al, Ti, ... , Mn, or Sr." The Examiner
6 To the extent Appellant advances new arguments in the Reply Brief, not
responsive to an argument raised in the Examiner's Answer, and without
showing good cause, Appellant has waived such arguments. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41 (b )(2).
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found that original claim 10 requires the oxides to be ceramics that employ
one or a combination of the listed elements, whereas claim 10 on appeal uses
the open-ended transitional term "comprises," and thus includes all other
possible elements in the oxides with the listed elements, as well as other
non-oxide materials. Final Act. 6.
The Examiner found that claim 11 has problems analogous to those
discussed above with respect to claim 10, due to the lack of support in the
original Specification, and the substitution of "comprises one of' for "oxides
or a combination of these oxides." Id. at 7. In addition, the Examiner found
that claim 11, as amended, "no longer requires the claimed oxides to be
employed in a coating material composition must be capable of being used
as a thermal barrier coating or must be capable of being stabilized as
previously claimed." Id.
Appellant argues that "[a] comparison of original claim 10 with the
pending claim 10 should reveal that Appellant essentially [] removed
superfluous language," and at most "pending claim 10 has merely been
broadened as compared to original claim 10 - which does not per se render
the claim non-compliant with the written description requirement." Appeal
Br. 7. Appellant makes similar arguments regarding claim 11. Id. at 8.
Appellant's arguments are not persuasive of reversible error. For the
reasons well-expressed in the Examiner's Answer, claims 10 and 11 on
appeal encompass subject matter not described in the original
Specification-i.e., by using the open-ended transitional term "comprises,"
claim 10 includes other possible elements in the oxides with the listed
elements, as well as other non-oxide materials, and does not limit the coating
material to the originally claimed ceramic oxides. Final Act. 6-8. Thus, we
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sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 10 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
first paragraph.
Claims 19 and 20
The Examiner found that the individual limitations labeled "a)," "b ),"
"c )," and "d)" of claims 19 and 20 come from the last five lines of original
claim 11, but are claimed without the context in claim 11-"these materials
being able to be present in a fully stabilized or partially stabilized form and
with the following stabilizers and concentration range being provided with a
TBC of Zr02." Final Act. 7-8.
Appellant argues that every feature currently recited in claims 19 and
20 were "recited in original claim 11," and "the Examiner has identified no
legal basis for the 'encompasses new matter' requirement." Appeal Br. 8-9.
Appellant's argument is not persuasive of reversible error. As the
Examiner explains, because claims 19 and 20 comprise limitations a), b ), c)
and d) of original claim 11, but fail to also include the context of the original
claim 11-"the following stabilizers and concentration ranges being
provided with a TBC of Zr02," claims 19 and 20 are broader in scope and
thus encompass subject matter not described in the original Specification.
Ans. 7-8. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 19 and 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
Claims 5 and 14-17
The Examiner found that current claims 5 and 14--17 derive from
original claim 5, which depended from original claim 4, and recited
parameters and introduced a relationship between "the thermal process
beam" and "a defocusing plasma beam." Final Act. 9. Current claims 5 and
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14--17, however, depend from claim 1, and only require employing a non-
plasma, generic thermal process beam with the parameters of original
claim 5, and thus are not supported by the original Specification. Id.
Appellant argues that claim 5 "merely removed superfluous and
optional claim language, i.e., language that begins with terms such as
'preferably' and 'in particular,"' and changed the dependency of claim 5
from claim 4 to claim 1, which "merely broadens claim 5 [ and] does not per
se render the claim non-compliant with the written description requirement."
Appeal Br. 6.
Appellant's arguments are not persuasive of reversible error. For the
reasons well-expressed in the Examiner's Answer, by deleting the
intervening requirements of claim 4 from claim 5, Appellant has changed the
scope of claim 5-impermissibly broadening the claims to encompass
subject matter not described in the original Specification. Ans. 5. Thus, we
sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 5 and 14--17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph.
Rejection 2
Claims 1, 5-11, and 14-17
The Examiner found that independent claim 1, as amended,
introduced a new relationship whose meaning and scope is not clear. Final
Act. 11-12. Claim 1 recites "the primary corpuscles are formed of an
agglomerate of particles," and further recites "particles of the agglomeration
of particles are dispersed so that coating material is vaporized fully or
partially by thermal action on the particles." The Examiner found that it is
unclear whether Appellant intended the two recitations of "particles" ( one
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without antecedence and one with antecedence) to refer to the same or
different sets of particles. Ans. 9; Final Act. 11. The Examiner found the
same issue regarding claim 9. Final Act. 12.
Appellant argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art, having read
the Specification and Drawings, e.g., Figure 2, would clearly understand
what is meant by the particles and primary corpuscles, and the Examiner has
not demonstrated otherwise. Appeal Br. 10.
Although the limitation "particles of the agglomeration of particles"
lacks antecedent basis, a lack of antecedent basis does not always render a
claim indefinite. Rather, if the scope of a claim would be reasonably
ascertainable by those skilled in the art, then the claim is not indefinite.
Energizer Holdings Inc. v. Int'! Trade Comm 'n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1370-71
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that "anode gel" provided by implication the
antecedent basis for "zinc anode").
Despite a lack of antecedent basis, it appears reasonably clear that
"particles of the agglomeration of the particles" are an inherent result of
"agglomeration of the particles" recited in claim 1, and that "the particles"
refer to "particles of the agglomeration of the particles." Thus, we do not
sustain the rejection of claims 1, 5-11, and 14--17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph.
Claim 3
The Examiner found that as presently written, claim 3 is unclear
because there is no formal connection or necessary relationship between "a
binder" recited in claim 2, and "a binder portion" recited in claim 3. Final
Act. 12.
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Appellant argues that "there is no inconsistency between claim 3 and
claim 1, from which it depends." Appeal Br. 10. Appellant further argues
that "[a] person of ordinary skill in the art, having read the specification and
drawings (the proper standard for evaluating indefiniteness), would clearly
understand what is meant by the language of claim 3 and the Examiner has
not demonstrated otherwise." Id. at 10-11.
Although as the Examiner points out, Appellant has not explained
how "a binder portion" and "a binder" should be considered related, it
appears reasonably clear from reading claim 3 that "a binder portion" is an
inherent result of a binder in the spray powder-i.e., a binder portion of the
spray powder. Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 3
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
Claims 2, 19, and 20
Appellant does not present arguments contesting the Examiner's
separate reasons for rejecting 2, 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph. Compare Final Act. 10, 12, with Appeal Br. 9-11.
Consequently, we summarily sustain the separate reasons for rejecting those
claims. See Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 107 5 (BP AI 2010)
(precedential) ("If an appellant fails to present arguments on a particular
issue- or, more broadly, on a particular rejection-the Board will not, as
a general matter, unilaterally review those uncontested aspects of the
rejection."), and Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1205.02
(9th ed., August 2017) ("If a ground of rejection stated by the examiner is
not addressed in the appellant's brief, appellant has waived any challenge to
that ground of rejection and the Board may summarily sustain it, unless the
examiner subsequently withdrew the rejection in the examiner's answer.").
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Rejection 3
Appellant presents separate arguments regarding claims 1 and 7.
Appeal Br. 11-16. We discuss claims 1 and 7 below. Dependent claims 2,
3, 5, 6, 8-11, 14--17, 19, and 20, which are not argued separately, will stand
or fall with claim 1, the independent claim from which they depend.
37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
Claim 1
The Examiner found that Schmid teaches a thermal spray process that
uses plasma spraying of particles that includes most of the limitations of
claim 1 's method, but fails to specify whether or not the spray particles used
in its process are agglomerated or provide teachings concerning how the
solid spray particles are formed. Final Act. 15-17 ( citing Schmid ,r,r 4--6,
11-14, 16-18, 21). The Examiner found, however, that Schmid's teachings
reasonably suggest that one of ordinary skill in the art would have looked to
the prior art, such as Dorfam, which teaches powders for thermal spray
applications, for expected useful and effective powders or other alternative
compositions for use in Schmid's plasma defocusing spray process. Id.
at 17.
The Examiner found that Dorfam teaches that powders for thermal
spray applications, such as thermal barrier coatings of yttria stabilized
zirconium (YSZ) materials used in Schmid's coatings (Schmid ,r 17), have
been conventionally made by spray drying processes to create agglomerated
powders of appropriate sizes, including mixing particulates with water and
an organic binder to form a slurry, then performing spray drying thereof. Id.
at 17-18 (citing Dorfam, Abstract, 1, 11. 19-22, 2, 11. 3-16, 4, 11. 7-21, 5, 11.
16-21, 6, 1. 10 - 7, 1. 5). The Examiner found that Dorfam further teaches
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that their techniques of employing pre-alloyed YSZ powders in a spray
drying process is advantageous, as subsequent processing for alloying is not
required, and their process produces size ranges that can be easily thermally
sprayed. Final Act. 18; Dorfam 4, 11. 7-21.
The Examiner concluded that it would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art given the teachings of Schmid regarding thermal
spray deposition using a thermal process jet (e.g., a plasma defocusing jet),
but lacking a specific discussion of powder requirements and formation
processes, to look to the prior art, such as Dorfam, for techniques of forming
thermal spray powders useful for thermal sprayed insulating turbine
coatings. Final Act. 19. The Examiner found that Barbezat provides further
motivation and a reasonable expectation of success to employ powders as
formed in Dorfam in Schmid's process. Id. at 20 (citing Barbezat ,r,r 5, 6,
13, 14, 18, 19, 24).
Appellant admits that Dorfam teaches an agglomerated powder (see
Abstract), but argues that Dorfam teaches melting the agglomerate of
particles and depositing them as a coating with "splat boundaries," which
Appellant contends is "not necessarily consistent with coatings having a
columnar structure." Appeal Br. 13 (citing Dorfam 7, 1. 9). Appellant
further argues that Dorfam is silent regarding primary corpuscles being
injected with a carrier gas into a thermal process beam, and/or that the
coating material is transformed into a vapor phase in the process beam and is
deposited as a condensate in the form of a columnar coating on a substrate.
Id. at 14.
Appellant's arguments lack persuasive merit because they attack the
Dorfam reference individually when the Examiner's rejection is based on the
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collective teachings of Schmid and Dorfam. See In re Merck & Co.,
800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Non-obviousness cannot be
established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based
upon the teachings of a combination of references."). As the Examiner
explains, Dorfam, like Schmid, teaches composition having agglomerated
particles are useful in a thermal spray application. Ans. 11. On this record,
we are unpersuaded that the Examiner reversibly erred in finding that one of
ordinary skill in the art would reasonably have expected the spray dried
particle compositions of Dorfam intended for thermal spraying to have been
effective in Schmid's plasma spraying technique. Compare Ans. 11, with
Appeal Br. 11-15. Nor has Appellant presented sufficient evidence or
explanation that melting the agglomerate of particles and depositing them as
a coating with "splat boundaries" would not be consistent with coatings
having a columnar structure, such as in Schmid. Thus, we sustain the
Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Schmid in view ofDorfam, and considering
Barbezat.
Claim 7
The Examiner acknowledges that Schmid, Dorfam, and Barbezat
"appear to be silent with respect to depositing in a geometrical shadow," but
found that Schmid' s teachings of defocusing the plasma beam and producing
a uniform coating distribution from the widely expanded coating material
(Schmid ,r,r 3, 12) would have reasonably indicated that the melted and/or
vaporized coating material moving in the plasma jet is not moving in a line
of sight fashion. Spec. ,r 42 ( describing "line-of-sight processes" as thermal
spray processes where the thermal process beam impacts directly-i.e.,
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regions located in the geometrical shadow are not directly exposed to the
process beam and are not coated in such process).); Final Act. 24; Ans. 13.
Appellant argues that the Examiner's assertion at page 24 of the Final
Office Action "is conclusory, lacks any basis in the applied art, and is an
insufficient basis for supporting a prim a facie case of unpatentability."
Appeal Br. 15-16.
Appellant's argument is not persuasive of reversible error because
Appellant's conclusory statement fails to discuss why the teachings and
reasons relied upon in the Examiner's analysis are insufficient or lack basis.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
Rejection 4
Claim 7
In Rejection 4, the Examiner relied on the same findings regarding
Schmid, Dorfam, and Barbezat as in Rejection 3 discussed above. Final
Act. 25. In addition, the Examiner found that Haas teaches a system for
forming both bond coatings and thermal barrier coatings ( or multilayers
thereof) using a direct vapor deposition (DVD) technique that includes
coating in regions not in line of sight of the thermal process beam (i.e.,
encompasses claimed geometrical shadow regions of the substrate) where
the material has been plasma activated and forms columnar deposits. Final
Act. 2 7-28 ( citing Haas ,r,r 4, 7, 8, claim 1 ).
Appellant admits that non-line of sight coating is discussed by Haas,
but argues that Haas teaches an entirely different coating method, and does
not mention using non-line sight coating in the claimed manner. Appeal
Br. 18.
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Appellant's argument is not persuasive of reversible error. As
discussed with regard to Rejection 3, claim 7 above, Appellant fails to
discuss why the teachings and reasons relied upon in the Examiner's
analysis regarding Schmid, Dorfam, and Barbezat are insufficient or lack
basis. Appeal Br. 16-19. Likewise, Appellant's additional argument
regarding Haas does not address, with any specificity, why the teachings and
reasons relied upon by the Examiner's analysis regarding Haas are
insufficient. Appeal Br. 18. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Claims 9-11, 19, and 20
Appellant does not present arguments contesting the Examiner's
rejection of claims 9-11, 19, and 20. Compare Final Act. 25-29, with
Appeal Br. 19. Consequently, we summarily sustain the separate reason for
rejecting those claims. See Frye, 94 USPQ2d at 1075.
Rejections 5 and 6
In both obviousness-type double patenting rejections, the Examiner
relied on Dorfam in combination with either Barbezat '428 (Rejection 5) or
Schmid '035 (Rejection 6). Final Act. 29-32. As with Rejection 1, the
Examiner relied on Dorfam for teaching powders for thermal spray
applications conventionally made by spray drying processes to create
agglomerated powders of appropriate sizes. Id. at 29-31; Dorfam, Abstract,
1, 11. 19-22, 2, 11. 3-16, 4, 11. 7-21, 5, 11. 16-21, 6, 1. 10-7, 1. 5. The
Examiner concluded that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art to employ Dorfam's conventional technique for producing
agglomerated particles in Barbezat '428's method for depositing a thermally
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insulating layer or Schmid '035's method for depositing a coating. Id. at
30-32.
As with Rejection 3 above, Appellant admits that Dorfam teaches an
agglomerated powder, but argues that Dorfam teaches melting the
agglomerate of particles and depositing them as a coating with "splat
boundaries," which according to Appellant "is not necessarily consistent
with coatings having a columnar structure." Appeal Br. 20, 22.
Appellant's arguments lack persuasive merit because they attack the
Dorfam reference individually when the Examiner's rejection is based on
either Barbezat '428 or Schmid '035 claimed method in combination with
Dorfam. See Merck, 800 F .2d at 1097. As the Examiner explains, Dorfam
teaches compositions having agglomerated particles are useful in a thermal
spray application. See Ans. 15-16. On this record, we are unpersuaded that
the Examiner reversibly erred in finding that it would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art to employ Dorfam's technique for forming
thermal spray powders (i.e., having agglomerated particles) in
Barbezat '428's or Schmid '035's coating methods with a reasonable
expectation that it would have formed an effective coating on the substrate.
Compare Ans. 15-16, with Appeal Br. 19-23. Moreover, Appellant has not
presented sufficient evidence or explanation that melting the agglomerate of
particles and depositing them as a coating with "splat boundaries" would not
be consistent with coatings having a columnar structure. Thus, we sustain
the Examiner's obviousness-type double patenting rejections of claims 1-3,
5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 over: (1) claims 1-23 ofBarbezat '428 in view of
Dorfam, and (2) claims 1-21 of Schmid '035 in view ofDorfam and
Barbezat.
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DECISION
The rejection of claims 5, 10, 11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written
description requirement is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite is affirmed as to claims 2,
19, and 20, and reversed as to claims 1, 3, 5-11, and 14--17.
The rejection of claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Schmid in view of Dorfam, and considering
Barbezat is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 7, 9-11, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Schmid, Dorfam, considering Barbezat, and further in
view of Hass for claim 7, and further considering Kitamura or Kato for
claim 9 is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 on the ground of
non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting over claims 1-23 of
Barbezat '428, in view of Dorfam, optionally further considering Kitamura
for claim 9, and Hass for claim 7 is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 on the ground of
non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting over claims 1-21 of
Schmid '035 in view of Dorfam, and Barbezat, and optionally further
considering Kitamura or Kato for claim 9, and Hass for claim 7 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
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AFFIRMED
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