Ex Parte DAMANI et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardApr 30, 201914873790 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/873,790 10/02/2015 7055 7590 05/02/2019 GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN, P.L.C. 1950 ROLAND CLARKE PLACE RESTON, VA 20191 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Rajiv J. DAMAN! UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. P48342 4708 EXAMINER PADGETT, MARIANNE L ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1717 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/02/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): gbpatent@gbpatent.com greenblum.bernsteinplc@gmail.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RAJIV J. DAMAN! and ARNO REPKE Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 Technology Center 1700 Before BRADLEY R. GARRIS, ROMULO H. DELMENDO, and JENNIFER R. GUPTA, Administrative Patent Judges. GUPTA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's final decision rejecting claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 In this Decision, we refer to the Specification filed October 2, 2015 ("Spec."), the Final Office Action dated March 16, 2017 ("Final Act."), the Appeal Brief filed August 16, 2017 ("Appeal Br."), the Examiner's Answer dated November 15, 2017 ("Ans."), and the Reply Brief filed January 16, 2018 ("Reply Br."). 2 Appellant is the Applicant, OERLIKON METCO AG, WOHLEN, which, according to the Appeal Brief, is the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. According to Appellant, the Assignee's name was listed as OERLIKON METCO AG in the Assignment recorded on October 5, 2015, at Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 The subject matter on appeal relates to a method for the manufacture of a coating having a columnar structure. Spec. ,r 2. Claim 1, reproduced below from the Claims Appendix of the Appeal Brief, is illustrative of the claims on appeal. 1. A method for the manufacture of a coating having a columnar structure, in which method a coating material in the form of primary corpuscles is injected with a carrier gas into a thermal process beam, the coating material is transformed into a vapor phase in the process beam and is deposited as a condensate in the form of a columnar coating on a substrate and the primary corpuscles are formed of an agglomerate of particles which are held together by cohesive forces of a connecting medium or by adhesive forces, characterized in that the primary corpuscles are disintegrated in the process beam by mechanical and thermal interaction and particles of the agglomerate of particles are dispersed so that coating material is vaporized fully or partly by thermal action on the particles. Appeal Br. 25 (Claims App.). REJECTIONS The Examiner maintains the following rejections on appeal: Rejection 1: Claims 5, 10, 11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement; Rejection 2: Claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite; Rejection 3: Claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Schmid et al. (EP 1 479 788 Al, published Reel 036716, Frame 0614, but Appellant is in the process of correcting the Assignee's name to OERIKON METCO AG, WOHLEN. Appeal Br. 3. 2 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 November 24, 2004) 3 ("Schmid"), in view of Dorfam et al. (WO 02/45931 Al, published June 13, 2002) ("Dorfam"), and considering Barbezat et al. (US 2005/0129965 Al, published June 16, 2005) ("Barbezat"); Rejection 4: Claims 7, 9-11, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over Schmid, Dorfam, and considering Barbezat, and further in view of Hass et al. (US 2008/0220177 Al, published September 11, 2008 or WO 2007 /005832 A2, published January 11, 2007) ("Hass") for claim 7, and further considering Kitamura et al. (US 2006/0116274 Al, published June 1, 2006) ("Kitamura") or Kato et al. (US 2006/0134343 Al, published June 22, 2006) for claim 9; Rejection 5: Claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 on the ground of non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting over claims 1-23 of Barbezat et al. (US 7,678,428 B2, issued March 16, 2010)4 ("Barbezat '428), in view of Dorfam, and optionally further considering Kitamura or Kato for claim 9, and Hass for claim 7; and Rejection 6: Claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 on the ground of non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting over claims 1-21 of Schmid et al. (US 7,482,035 B2, issued January 27, 2009) 5 ("Schmid '035"), 3 The Examiner relies on Schmid et al. (US 2004/0234687 Al published November 25, 2004) as an English language equivalent to Schmid et al., EP 1 479 788 Al (Final Act. 15). The Appellant does not object (Appeal Br. 6-24). Therefore, in our discussion below, we cite to and rely on the English language equivalent, i.e., the US document. 4 US 7,678,428 B2 previously published on June 16, 2005 as US 2005/0129965 Al. 5 US 7,482,035 B2 previously published on November 25, 2004, US 2004/0234687 Al. 3 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 in view of Dorfam, and Barbezat, and optionally further considering Kitamura or Kato for claim 9, and Hass for claim 7. DISCUSSION After review of the cited evidence in light of the Appellant's and the Examiner's opposing positions, we determine that the Appellant has not identified reversible error in the Examiner's rejections except where otherwise explained below. Thus, where we affirm the Examiner's rejections, we do so for the reasons expressed in the Final Office Action, the Answer, and below. 6 Rejection 1 "[T]he test for [compliance with the written description requirement] is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date." Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en bane) (citation omitted). Claims 10 and 11 With respect to claim 10, the Examiner found the original claim language recited: "oxide ceramic materials are used as the coating materials; in that the materials are oxides of Zr, Al, Ti, ... , Mn, Sr or combination of these chemical elements," whereas claim 10 on appeal recites "the coating material comprises oxides of Zr, Al, Ti, ... , Mn, or Sr." The Examiner 6 To the extent Appellant advances new arguments in the Reply Brief, not responsive to an argument raised in the Examiner's Answer, and without showing good cause, Appellant has waived such arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41 (b )(2). 4 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 found that original claim 10 requires the oxides to be ceramics that employ one or a combination of the listed elements, whereas claim 10 on appeal uses the open-ended transitional term "comprises," and thus includes all other possible elements in the oxides with the listed elements, as well as other non-oxide materials. Final Act. 6. The Examiner found that claim 11 has problems analogous to those discussed above with respect to claim 10, due to the lack of support in the original Specification, and the substitution of "comprises one of' for "oxides or a combination of these oxides." Id. at 7. In addition, the Examiner found that claim 11, as amended, "no longer requires the claimed oxides to be employed in a coating material composition must be capable of being used as a thermal barrier coating or must be capable of being stabilized as previously claimed." Id. Appellant argues that "[a] comparison of original claim 10 with the pending claim 10 should reveal that Appellant essentially [] removed superfluous language," and at most "pending claim 10 has merely been broadened as compared to original claim 10 - which does not per se render the claim non-compliant with the written description requirement." Appeal Br. 7. Appellant makes similar arguments regarding claim 11. Id. at 8. Appellant's arguments are not persuasive of reversible error. For the reasons well-expressed in the Examiner's Answer, claims 10 and 11 on appeal encompass subject matter not described in the original Specification-i.e., by using the open-ended transitional term "comprises," claim 10 includes other possible elements in the oxides with the listed elements, as well as other non-oxide materials, and does not limit the coating material to the originally claimed ceramic oxides. Final Act. 6-8. Thus, we 5 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 10 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Claims 19 and 20 The Examiner found that the individual limitations labeled "a)," "b )," "c )," and "d)" of claims 19 and 20 come from the last five lines of original claim 11, but are claimed without the context in claim 11-"these materials being able to be present in a fully stabilized or partially stabilized form and with the following stabilizers and concentration range being provided with a TBC of Zr02." Final Act. 7-8. Appellant argues that every feature currently recited in claims 19 and 20 were "recited in original claim 11," and "the Examiner has identified no legal basis for the 'encompasses new matter' requirement." Appeal Br. 8-9. Appellant's argument is not persuasive of reversible error. As the Examiner explains, because claims 19 and 20 comprise limitations a), b ), c) and d) of original claim 11, but fail to also include the context of the original claim 11-"the following stabilizers and concentration ranges being provided with a TBC of Zr02," claims 19 and 20 are broader in scope and thus encompass subject matter not described in the original Specification. Ans. 7-8. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Claims 5 and 14-17 The Examiner found that current claims 5 and 14--17 derive from original claim 5, which depended from original claim 4, and recited parameters and introduced a relationship between "the thermal process beam" and "a defocusing plasma beam." Final Act. 9. Current claims 5 and 6 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 14--17, however, depend from claim 1, and only require employing a non- plasma, generic thermal process beam with the parameters of original claim 5, and thus are not supported by the original Specification. Id. Appellant argues that claim 5 "merely removed superfluous and optional claim language, i.e., language that begins with terms such as 'preferably' and 'in particular,"' and changed the dependency of claim 5 from claim 4 to claim 1, which "merely broadens claim 5 [ and] does not per se render the claim non-compliant with the written description requirement." Appeal Br. 6. Appellant's arguments are not persuasive of reversible error. For the reasons well-expressed in the Examiner's Answer, by deleting the intervening requirements of claim 4 from claim 5, Appellant has changed the scope of claim 5-impermissibly broadening the claims to encompass subject matter not described in the original Specification. Ans. 5. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 5 and 14--17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Rejection 2 Claims 1, 5-11, and 14-17 The Examiner found that independent claim 1, as amended, introduced a new relationship whose meaning and scope is not clear. Final Act. 11-12. Claim 1 recites "the primary corpuscles are formed of an agglomerate of particles," and further recites "particles of the agglomeration of particles are dispersed so that coating material is vaporized fully or partially by thermal action on the particles." The Examiner found that it is unclear whether Appellant intended the two recitations of "particles" ( one 7 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 without antecedence and one with antecedence) to refer to the same or different sets of particles. Ans. 9; Final Act. 11. The Examiner found the same issue regarding claim 9. Final Act. 12. Appellant argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art, having read the Specification and Drawings, e.g., Figure 2, would clearly understand what is meant by the particles and primary corpuscles, and the Examiner has not demonstrated otherwise. Appeal Br. 10. Although the limitation "particles of the agglomeration of particles" lacks antecedent basis, a lack of antecedent basis does not always render a claim indefinite. Rather, if the scope of a claim would be reasonably ascertainable by those skilled in the art, then the claim is not indefinite. Energizer Holdings Inc. v. Int'! Trade Comm 'n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that "anode gel" provided by implication the antecedent basis for "zinc anode"). Despite a lack of antecedent basis, it appears reasonably clear that "particles of the agglomeration of the particles" are an inherent result of "agglomeration of the particles" recited in claim 1, and that "the particles" refer to "particles of the agglomeration of the particles." Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 1, 5-11, and 14--17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Claim 3 The Examiner found that as presently written, claim 3 is unclear because there is no formal connection or necessary relationship between "a binder" recited in claim 2, and "a binder portion" recited in claim 3. Final Act. 12. 8 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 Appellant argues that "there is no inconsistency between claim 3 and claim 1, from which it depends." Appeal Br. 10. Appellant further argues that "[a] person of ordinary skill in the art, having read the specification and drawings (the proper standard for evaluating indefiniteness), would clearly understand what is meant by the language of claim 3 and the Examiner has not demonstrated otherwise." Id. at 10-11. Although as the Examiner points out, Appellant has not explained how "a binder portion" and "a binder" should be considered related, it appears reasonably clear from reading claim 3 that "a binder portion" is an inherent result of a binder in the spray powder-i.e., a binder portion of the spray powder. Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Claims 2, 19, and 20 Appellant does not present arguments contesting the Examiner's separate reasons for rejecting 2, 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Compare Final Act. 10, 12, with Appeal Br. 9-11. Consequently, we summarily sustain the separate reasons for rejecting those claims. See Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 107 5 (BP AI 2010) (precedential) ("If an appellant fails to present arguments on a particular issue- or, more broadly, on a particular rejection-the Board will not, as a general matter, unilaterally review those uncontested aspects of the rejection."), and Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1205.02 (9th ed., August 2017) ("If a ground of rejection stated by the examiner is not addressed in the appellant's brief, appellant has waived any challenge to that ground of rejection and the Board may summarily sustain it, unless the examiner subsequently withdrew the rejection in the examiner's answer."). 9 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 Rejection 3 Appellant presents separate arguments regarding claims 1 and 7. Appeal Br. 11-16. We discuss claims 1 and 7 below. Dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 8-11, 14--17, 19, and 20, which are not argued separately, will stand or fall with claim 1, the independent claim from which they depend. 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). Claim 1 The Examiner found that Schmid teaches a thermal spray process that uses plasma spraying of particles that includes most of the limitations of claim 1 's method, but fails to specify whether or not the spray particles used in its process are agglomerated or provide teachings concerning how the solid spray particles are formed. Final Act. 15-17 ( citing Schmid ,r,r 4--6, 11-14, 16-18, 21). The Examiner found, however, that Schmid's teachings reasonably suggest that one of ordinary skill in the art would have looked to the prior art, such as Dorfam, which teaches powders for thermal spray applications, for expected useful and effective powders or other alternative compositions for use in Schmid's plasma defocusing spray process. Id. at 17. The Examiner found that Dorfam teaches that powders for thermal spray applications, such as thermal barrier coatings of yttria stabilized zirconium (YSZ) materials used in Schmid's coatings (Schmid ,r 17), have been conventionally made by spray drying processes to create agglomerated powders of appropriate sizes, including mixing particulates with water and an organic binder to form a slurry, then performing spray drying thereof. Id. at 17-18 (citing Dorfam, Abstract, 1, 11. 19-22, 2, 11. 3-16, 4, 11. 7-21, 5, 11. 16-21, 6, 1. 10 - 7, 1. 5). The Examiner found that Dorfam further teaches 10 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 that their techniques of employing pre-alloyed YSZ powders in a spray drying process is advantageous, as subsequent processing for alloying is not required, and their process produces size ranges that can be easily thermally sprayed. Final Act. 18; Dorfam 4, 11. 7-21. The Examiner concluded that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art given the teachings of Schmid regarding thermal spray deposition using a thermal process jet (e.g., a plasma defocusing jet), but lacking a specific discussion of powder requirements and formation processes, to look to the prior art, such as Dorfam, for techniques of forming thermal spray powders useful for thermal sprayed insulating turbine coatings. Final Act. 19. The Examiner found that Barbezat provides further motivation and a reasonable expectation of success to employ powders as formed in Dorfam in Schmid's process. Id. at 20 (citing Barbezat ,r,r 5, 6, 13, 14, 18, 19, 24). Appellant admits that Dorfam teaches an agglomerated powder (see Abstract), but argues that Dorfam teaches melting the agglomerate of particles and depositing them as a coating with "splat boundaries," which Appellant contends is "not necessarily consistent with coatings having a columnar structure." Appeal Br. 13 (citing Dorfam 7, 1. 9). Appellant further argues that Dorfam is silent regarding primary corpuscles being injected with a carrier gas into a thermal process beam, and/or that the coating material is transformed into a vapor phase in the process beam and is deposited as a condensate in the form of a columnar coating on a substrate. Id. at 14. Appellant's arguments lack persuasive merit because they attack the Dorfam reference individually when the Examiner's rejection is based on the 11 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 collective teachings of Schmid and Dorfam. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references."). As the Examiner explains, Dorfam, like Schmid, teaches composition having agglomerated particles are useful in a thermal spray application. Ans. 11. On this record, we are unpersuaded that the Examiner reversibly erred in finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably have expected the spray dried particle compositions of Dorfam intended for thermal spraying to have been effective in Schmid's plasma spraying technique. Compare Ans. 11, with Appeal Br. 11-15. Nor has Appellant presented sufficient evidence or explanation that melting the agglomerate of particles and depositing them as a coating with "splat boundaries" would not be consistent with coatings having a columnar structure, such as in Schmid. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Schmid in view ofDorfam, and considering Barbezat. Claim 7 The Examiner acknowledges that Schmid, Dorfam, and Barbezat "appear to be silent with respect to depositing in a geometrical shadow," but found that Schmid' s teachings of defocusing the plasma beam and producing a uniform coating distribution from the widely expanded coating material (Schmid ,r,r 3, 12) would have reasonably indicated that the melted and/or vaporized coating material moving in the plasma jet is not moving in a line of sight fashion. Spec. ,r 42 ( describing "line-of-sight processes" as thermal spray processes where the thermal process beam impacts directly-i.e., 12 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 regions located in the geometrical shadow are not directly exposed to the process beam and are not coated in such process).); Final Act. 24; Ans. 13. Appellant argues that the Examiner's assertion at page 24 of the Final Office Action "is conclusory, lacks any basis in the applied art, and is an insufficient basis for supporting a prim a facie case of unpatentability." Appeal Br. 15-16. Appellant's argument is not persuasive of reversible error because Appellant's conclusory statement fails to discuss why the teachings and reasons relied upon in the Examiner's analysis are insufficient or lack basis. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Rejection 4 Claim 7 In Rejection 4, the Examiner relied on the same findings regarding Schmid, Dorfam, and Barbezat as in Rejection 3 discussed above. Final Act. 25. In addition, the Examiner found that Haas teaches a system for forming both bond coatings and thermal barrier coatings ( or multilayers thereof) using a direct vapor deposition (DVD) technique that includes coating in regions not in line of sight of the thermal process beam (i.e., encompasses claimed geometrical shadow regions of the substrate) where the material has been plasma activated and forms columnar deposits. Final Act. 2 7-28 ( citing Haas ,r,r 4, 7, 8, claim 1 ). Appellant admits that non-line of sight coating is discussed by Haas, but argues that Haas teaches an entirely different coating method, and does not mention using non-line sight coating in the claimed manner. Appeal Br. 18. 13 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 Appellant's argument is not persuasive of reversible error. As discussed with regard to Rejection 3, claim 7 above, Appellant fails to discuss why the teachings and reasons relied upon in the Examiner's analysis regarding Schmid, Dorfam, and Barbezat are insufficient or lack basis. Appeal Br. 16-19. Likewise, Appellant's additional argument regarding Haas does not address, with any specificity, why the teachings and reasons relied upon by the Examiner's analysis regarding Haas are insufficient. Appeal Br. 18. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 9-11, 19, and 20 Appellant does not present arguments contesting the Examiner's rejection of claims 9-11, 19, and 20. Compare Final Act. 25-29, with Appeal Br. 19. Consequently, we summarily sustain the separate reason for rejecting those claims. See Frye, 94 USPQ2d at 1075. Rejections 5 and 6 In both obviousness-type double patenting rejections, the Examiner relied on Dorfam in combination with either Barbezat '428 (Rejection 5) or Schmid '035 (Rejection 6). Final Act. 29-32. As with Rejection 1, the Examiner relied on Dorfam for teaching powders for thermal spray applications conventionally made by spray drying processes to create agglomerated powders of appropriate sizes. Id. at 29-31; Dorfam, Abstract, 1, 11. 19-22, 2, 11. 3-16, 4, 11. 7-21, 5, 11. 16-21, 6, 1. 10-7, 1. 5. The Examiner concluded that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to employ Dorfam's conventional technique for producing agglomerated particles in Barbezat '428's method for depositing a thermally 14 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 insulating layer or Schmid '035's method for depositing a coating. Id. at 30-32. As with Rejection 3 above, Appellant admits that Dorfam teaches an agglomerated powder, but argues that Dorfam teaches melting the agglomerate of particles and depositing them as a coating with "splat boundaries," which according to Appellant "is not necessarily consistent with coatings having a columnar structure." Appeal Br. 20, 22. Appellant's arguments lack persuasive merit because they attack the Dorfam reference individually when the Examiner's rejection is based on either Barbezat '428 or Schmid '035 claimed method in combination with Dorfam. See Merck, 800 F .2d at 1097. As the Examiner explains, Dorfam teaches compositions having agglomerated particles are useful in a thermal spray application. See Ans. 15-16. On this record, we are unpersuaded that the Examiner reversibly erred in finding that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to employ Dorfam's technique for forming thermal spray powders (i.e., having agglomerated particles) in Barbezat '428's or Schmid '035's coating methods with a reasonable expectation that it would have formed an effective coating on the substrate. Compare Ans. 15-16, with Appeal Br. 19-23. Moreover, Appellant has not presented sufficient evidence or explanation that melting the agglomerate of particles and depositing them as a coating with "splat boundaries" would not be consistent with coatings having a columnar structure. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness-type double patenting rejections of claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 over: (1) claims 1-23 ofBarbezat '428 in view of Dorfam, and (2) claims 1-21 of Schmid '035 in view ofDorfam and Barbezat. 15 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 DECISION The rejection of claims 5, 10, 11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement is affirmed. The rejection of claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite is affirmed as to claims 2, 19, and 20, and reversed as to claims 1, 3, 5-11, and 14--17. The rejection of claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Schmid in view of Dorfam, and considering Barbezat is affirmed. The rejection of claims 7, 9-11, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Schmid, Dorfam, considering Barbezat, and further in view of Hass for claim 7, and further considering Kitamura or Kato for claim 9 is affirmed. The rejection of claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 on the ground of non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting over claims 1-23 of Barbezat '428, in view of Dorfam, optionally further considering Kitamura for claim 9, and Hass for claim 7 is affirmed. The rejection of claims 1-3, 5-11, 14--17, 19, and 20 on the ground of non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting over claims 1-21 of Schmid '035 in view of Dorfam, and Barbezat, and optionally further considering Kitamura or Kato for claim 9, and Hass for claim 7 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). 16 Appeal2018-002730 Application 14/873,790 AFFIRMED 17 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation