Ex Parte D et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 21, 2018

14601060 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 21, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/601,060 01/20/2015 37945 7590 11/26/2018 DUKEW. YEE YEE AND AS SOCIA TES, P.C. P.O. BOX 802333 DALLAS, TX 75380 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Salvatore D'Alo UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. FR920050014US2 4597 EXAMINER HUANG, TSAN-YU J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3685 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/26/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ptonotifs@yeeiplaw.com mgamez@yeeiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SALVATORE D' ALO, ARCANGELO DI BALSAMO, ALESSANDRO DONATELLI, and CLAUDIO MARINELLI 1 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 Technology Center 3600 Before JAMES R. HUGHES, ERIC S. FRAHM, and NORMAN H. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judges. HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134(a) of the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1, 11, 12, 14--16, and 18-21. Claims 2-10, 13, and 17 have been canceled. Final Act. 1-2. 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b). We affirm. 1 The real party in interest is International Business Machines Corp. See Appeal Br. 2. 2 We refer to Appellants' Specification ("Spec.") filed Jan. 20, 2015 ( claiming benefit of EPO 05105994. 7 filed July 1, 2005); Appeal Brief ("Appeal Br.") filed Sept. 15, 2016; and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.") filed Apr. 10, 2017. We also refer to the Examiner's Final Office Action (Final Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 Appellants 'Invention The invention relates generally to "data processing," and more specifically, to "control[ling] ... usage of products in a data processing system (such as a license management system)" (Spec. 1:7-10). See Spec. 3: 16-4:32; Abstract. Representative Claim Independent claim 1, reproduced below, further illustrates the invention: 1. A system for controlling usage of digitally encoded products in a data processing system, each product being associated with a set of usage rights for enabling data processing entities to which the usage rights are assigned to use the product, the system comprising a data processor and a storage device having instructions stored therein that are operable, when executed by the data processor, to perform steps of: receiving by the data processing system a reservation request to use a selected product for a selected timeframe by an entity, wherein a start time of the selected timeframe is delayed with respect to the reservation request, and wherein the reservation request specifies the start time and an end time of the selected timeframe; reserving a usage right for the entity to use the selected product for the selected timeframe in response to the reservation request thereby preventing assigning the reserved usage right for the selected timeframe to other entities, the usage right remaining available for assignment to the other entities until the start time of the selected time frame, wherein the reserved usage right is one usage right out of a predetermined, limited number of usage rights associated with the selected product; Rejection) ("Final Act.") mailed May 27, 2016, and Answer ("Ans.") mailed Feb. 10, 2017. 2 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 assigning the reserved usage right to the entity for the selected timeframe; verifying an availability of at least one usage right of the set of usage rights to use the selected product for the selected time frame; attempting to release at least one reserved usage right relating to the selected timeframe in response to a non- availability of the at least one usage right to use the selected product; reserving the at least one reserved usage right in response to the release occurring within a predefined delay; and refusing the reservation request in response to the release not occurring within the predefined delay, wherein the step of attempting includes: requesting a set of the other entities to release the at least one reserved usage right; and releasing the at least one reserved usage right in response to acceptance of the request to release by at least one other entity of the set of the other entities. Rejection on Appeal The Examiner rejects claims 1, 11, 12, 14--16, and 18-21 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. RELATED APPEAL The instant Appeal is related to Appeal No. 2012-000188 for US 11/427 ,431. In that decision (Appeal No. 2012-000188) ("Decision") mailed on Sept. 24, 2014, the Board affirmed the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claims 1--4, and reversed the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claims 5-8. In Appeal No. 2012-000188, the Examiner withdrew a rejection under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101, in the Examiner's Answer. See Examiner's 3 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 Answer mailed Apr. 29, 2011, at 2. The issue of patent eligibility under Â§ 101 was not addressed by the Board. ISSUE Based upon our review of the record, Appellants' contentions, and the Examiner's findings and conclusions, the issue before us follows: Did the Examiner err in finding Appellants' claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101? ANALYSIS Claims 1 and 14 The Examiner rejects claims 1, 11, 12, 14--16, and 18-21 as a group based on claim 1 (see Final Act. 9-12) and finds claim 1 is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter in that claim 1 is "directed to the abstract idea of making a reservation and resolving conflicting reservations" (Final Act. 9), which "is a method of organizing human activity" and "is an idea of itself' (Final Act. 10), both of which were held to be abstract ideas in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Banklnt'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). See Final Act. 9- 11; Ans. 3--4. The Examiner further determines that "the additional claim element(s)," whether considered individually or as an ordered combination, do not provide meaningful limitation( s) to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the claim(s) amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. The additional claim element(s) requires no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry and has been held to be not enough to qualify as "significantly more" under Alice Corp. 4 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 Final Act. 11; see Final Act. 11-12; Ans. 4--6. Additionally, the Examiner addresses Appellants' contentions (infra) concerning claims 11, 12, 15, 16, and 18-21. See Ans. 6-7. Appellants contend the Examiner has not properly evaluated and/ or characterized Appellants' claims, and that the Examiner has not established that Appellants' claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See Appeal Br. 12-29; Reply Br. 2-11. Specifically, Appellants contend that "Claim 1 is not directed to a method of 'organizing human activities' since no human activity organization is recited in the claimed steps/actions" (Appeal Br. 16), "the Examiner's assertion of human activity organization is untethered from the actual claim language" (Reply Br. 3), "[t]he Examiner has also impermissibly analyzed only a portion of the claims" (Appeal Br. 17), and "the Examiner provides no judicial precedent of a parallel concept to [the] alleged abstract idea of itself' (Appeal Br. 17). See Appeal Br. 16- 18; Reply Br. 2-3. Appellants also contend the Examiner's allegedly "abstract idea of 'making a reservation and resolving conflicting reservations' results [describes] the claim at [ an impermissibly] high level of abstraction [that is] untethered from the language of the claim" (Appeal Br. 18). Appellants further contend claim 1 recites "a technology-based solution" for managing "digitally encoded product usage rights" (Appeal Br. 18), which is "an improvement to the data processing system itself' (Appeal Br. 19), and, therefore, claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 18-19; Reply Br. 5. Additionally, Appellants contend the Examiner has impermissibly conflated the "Alice Step 2A" and "Alice Step 2B" analysis (i.e., the first and second parts of the Alice/Mayo analysis (discussed infra)). See Reply Br. 3--4. 5 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 With respect to the second part of the Alice/Mayo analysis ("Alice Analysis Step 2B"), Appellants contend "Claim 1 recites novel steps that are not standard or routine computer performed steps" and "numerous steps/actions over and above [the] alleged ... [abstract idea], and therefore Claim 1 is directed to 'significantly more' than the alleged abstract idea" (Appeal Br. 19). See Appeal Br. 19--20; Reply Br. 5---6. Appellants also contend claim 1 does not "cover all ways for 'making a reservation and resolving conflicting reservations', and therefore Claim 1 would not pre- empt all ways of performing the alleged abstract idea" (Appeal Br. 20). See Appeal Br. 20-22; Reply Br. 6. Appellants further contend that "Claim 1 also provide[ s] improvements to the technical field of data processing in a data processing system," which provides "a floating licensing solution to a technical problem of inefficient use of usage rights/licenses for digitally encoded products" similar to the claims discussed in DDR Holdings. Appeal Br. 22 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). With respect to claims 11 and 15 (see Appeal Br. 23-24; Reply Br. 7), claims 12 and 16 (see Appeal Br. 24; Reply Br. 7-8), claim 18 (see Appeal Br. 24--26; Reply Br. 8), claim 19 (see Appeal Br. 26-27; Reply Br. 9), claim 20 (see Appeal Br. 27-28; Reply Br. 9-10), and claim 21 (see Appeal Br. 28-29; Reply Br. 10-11), Appellants contend that the Examiner has not properly analyzed the claims and the Examiner fails to meet the requisite burden for both "Alice Step 2A" and "Alice Step 2B." See Appeal Br. 23- 29; Reply Br. 7-12. Further, Appellants contend the additional enumerated limitations of claims 11, 12, and 18-21, "provide[] a technology-based 6 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 solution for controlling usage of digitally encoded products" "satisfying Step 2A of Alice" (Reply Br. 7; see Reply Br. 7-12). Under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101, a patent may be obtained for "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." The Supreme Court has "long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (quoting Ass 'nfor Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77-80 (2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. Assuming that a claim nominally falls within one of the statutory categories of machine, manufacture, process, or composition of matter, the first step in the analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts" (id.), e.g., to an abstract idea. For example, abstract ideas include, but are not limited to, fundamental economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, an idea of itself, and mathematical formulas or relationships. Id. at 2355-57. If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered "individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 ( quoting Mayo, 566 7 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 U.S. at 78-79). This second step is described as "a search for an 'inventive concept'-i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ' ... significantly more than ... the [ineligible concept] itself."' Id. at 2355 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). The Court acknowledged in Mayo that "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas." Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look to whether the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Alice Step 1 Analysis Turning to the first step of the eligibility analysis, "the first step in the Alice inquiry ... asks whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities ... or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an 'abstract idea' for which computers are invoked merely as a tool." Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335-36. "The abstract idea exception prevents patenting a result where 'it matters not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished."' McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853)). The Examiner determines independent claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of "making a reservation and resolving conflicting reservations" (Final Act. 9), which "is a method of organizing human activity" and "is an idea of itself' (Final Act. 10). The Examiner enumerates the usage right reservation process steps (see Final Act. 9-10) and explains 8 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 how the enumerated steps are similar to "managing transactions between people" (Final Act. 10) and a hotel reservation process (making reservations and resolving conflicting reservations) (see Final Act. 10; Ans. 3--4). The Examiner also explains how the enumerated steps are a mental process. See Final Act. 10-11. Conversely, Appellants attack the Examiner's determinations as being an inaccurate characterization, lacking sufficient analysis and explanation, and lacking sufficient support ( citation to judicial precedent) and, thus, the Examiner's reasoning and analysis do not include sufficient substance to establish that Appellants' claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See Appeal Br. 16-19; Reply Br. 2-5. We agree with the Examiner that Appellants' claim 1 ( and the other pending claims) are directed to patent-ineligible abstract ideas or concepts. With respect to Appellants' contentions attacking the sufficiency of the Examiner's rejection, Appellants misconstrue the relevant law and precedent. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly noted that "the prima facie case is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production." Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). As explained in our Frye decision, the Examiner has the initial burden-"to set forth the basis for any rejection so as to put the patent applicant on notice of the reasons why the applicant is not entitled to a patent on the claim scope that he seeks-the so-called 'prima facie case."' Ex Parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (Precedential). The USPTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. Â§ 132 by notifying the applicant of the reasons for rejection, "together with such information and references as may be useful in 9 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application." In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, a prima facie rejection need only set forth the statutory basis of the rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice requirement ofÂ§ 132. Id. Here, in rejecting the claims (in particular claim 1) under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101, the Examiner analyzed the claims using the Mayo/Alice two-step framework, consistent with the guidance set forth in the USPTO's "2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility," 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014), in effect at the time the rejection was made, i.e., on May 27, 2016. The Examiner notified Appellants of the reasons for the rejection "together with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application." 35 U.S.C. Â§ 132. See Final Act. 5-7, 9-12. Contrary to Appellants' assertions, in doing so, the Examiner set forth a prima facie case of unpatentability such that the burden of production shifted to Appellants to demonstrate that the claims are patent-eligible. To the extent Appellants argue that evidentiary support and/ or citation to judicial precedent is required under the first part of the Alice eligibility test to establish a prima facie case of patent-ineligibility (see Appeal Br. 17- 18; Reply Br. 2-3}-Appellants again misconstrue the relevant law and precedent. We are aware of no controlling precedent that requires the Office to provide factual evidence to support a finding that a claim is directed to an abstract idea. With respect to Appellants' contentions that the Examiner mischaracterized, insufficiently analyzed, or over-simplified the claims (see 10 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 Appeal Br. 16-18; Reply Br. 2-5}-claim 1 recites a system performing a process that controls usage of digitally encoded products associated with a set of usage rights in a data processing system. The system includes a processor (data processor), a storage device, and instructions stored in the storage device operable to perform usage rights processing. The usage rights process receives a reservation request (information/data) to use a selected product for a selected timeframe, which specifies a start time and an end time. The process explicitly contemplates a scenario where the start time of the selected timeframe is delayed due to a reservation conflict. The usage rights process reserves a usage right to use the selected product for the selected timeframe responsive to the reservation request, assigns the reserved usage right for the selected timeframe, and prevents assignment of the reserved usage right for the selected timeframe to others-i.e., makes a reservation to use a specified product within a specified timeframe according to the reservation request. The usage right remains available for assignment to the others until the start time of the selected timeframe. The usage rights process verifies availability of one or more usage rights for the selected time frame, and attempts to release at a reserved usage right ( relating to the selected timeframe) when a usage right to use the selected product for the selected timeframe is not available. The attempt to release procedure requests other entities to release a reserved usage right ( to use the selected product for the selected timeframe) and releases the reserved usage right responsive to acceptance of the request to release. When the release occurs within a predefined delay, the usage rights process reserves the released (previously reserved) usage right responsive to the release. When a release does not occur within the predefined delay, the process refuses the 11 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 reservation request ( does not reserve a usage right to use the selected product for the selected timeframe ). See Spec. 3: 16-4:32. In sum, as the Examiner finds, claim 1 is directed to "making a reservation and resolving conflicting reservations" (Final Act. 9), and amounts to receiving, analyzing, and manipulating information (receiving information, verifying availability (i.e., comparing data), reserving the usage right (manipulating information), and resolving conflicting reservations (by requesting release), which is "a method of organizing human activity" and/or "an idea of itself' (Final Act. 1 O)," i.e., an abstract idea. See Final Act. 9-11; Ans. 3--4. Although we could characterize claim 1 with more detail, for example, as being directed to reserving a usage right based on a reservation request and resolving a reservation conflict "in a peer fashion" (Appeal Br. 18) by sending a request to release a usage right (see Appeal Br. 18-19), a more succinct characterization (as proffered by the Examiner) does not alter the eligibility analysis. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240--41 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("An abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction .... The Board's slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability analysis."). Utilizing the above-identified characterization, we analyze whether claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Instead of using a fixed definition of an abstract idea and analyzing how claims fit ( or do not fit) within the definition, "the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen - what prior cases were about, and which way they were decided." Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 12 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 2016)). As part of this inquiry, we must "look at the 'focus of the claimed advance over the prior art' to determine if the claim's 'character as a whole' is directed to excluded subject matter." Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, Appellants' claims generally, and independent claim 1 in particular, relate to receiving reservation information (in a reservation request), analyzing the information (verifying the requested usage right reservation information against stored data (previously made reservations)), and manipulating information to reserve and assign the usage right and, in the event of a conflict, resolving the conflicting reservation(s). That is, if the reservation cannot be verified (because there is a conflict), resolving the conflict by requesting others release a usage right (for the same product and time frame). Accordingly, Appellants' claims relate to receiving, analyzing, manipulating, and communicating information (usage right reservation data) utilizing un-recited processes or algorithms to control usage rights. This is consistent with how Appellants describe the claimed invention. See Appeal Br. 4--5 (citing Spec. 1:7-10, 3:16-4:3, 6:25-32, 9:17-23, 10:23-26, 11:2-9, 12:23-13:4, 13:7-10, 14:18-21). The present claims are analogous to a number of cases in which courts have identified similar claims as encompassing abstract ideas. Our reviewing court has held that abstract ideas include receiving/gathering, organizing, analyzing, and manipulating information. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354 (finding claims directed to a "combination of ... abstract- idea processes ... of gathering and analyzing information" to be abstract). Similarly, our reviewing court has held that abstract ideas include gathering, organizing, analyzing, and storing information. See Two-Way Media Ltd. v. 13 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 Comcast Cable Commc 'ns, LLC., 874 F.3d 1329, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding claims directed to the functional results of accumulating, converting, and monitoring records manipulate data "but fail[] to do so in a non-abstract way"); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat 'l Ass 'n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding the "claims generally recite ... extracting data ... [and] recognizing specific information from the extracted data" and that the "claims are drawn to the basic concept of data recognition"). Here, the collection, analysis, manipulation, and communication of information (data}--in the form of receiving usage right reservation information; organizing and analyzing the information (verifying the information against stored information); and manipulating information to create a reservation or resolve a conflict based on the information-are analogous to the abstract ideas of collecting, analyzing, and manipulating information discussed in Electric Power Group, Two-Way Media, and Content Extraction. As explained by the Examiner "making a reservation and resolving conflicting reservations" (Final Act. 9) is an abstract idea in that the concept entails "a method of organizing human activity" and "an idea of itself' (Final Act. 10). These alternative characterizations of claim 1 are merely a description of the abstract idea summarized by the Examiner. It is well- established that utilizing and manipulating information to determine a result (verifying a reservation and assigning the verified reservation), or similar concepts relating to analyzing information in a way that could be performed mentally, represent "an idea of itself." See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ("the 14 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 underlying concept embodied by the limitations merely encompasses the abstract idea itself of organizing, displaying, and manipulating data of particular documents"); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("the claims are directed to a combination of ... abstract-idea categories" (id. at 1093-94}-namely, "analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, ... [ which are] essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category" (id. at 1093) and "collecting and analyzing information" (id. at 1093)). Similarly, associating information in a received reservation request (usage right reservation request) with product usage right, verifying the (usage right) reservation against stored information, and assigning the usage right (making the reservation), or resolving conflicting reservations based on collected, analyzed, and manipulated information is analogous to the process of making and resolving hotel reservations, which is a method of organizing information relating to human activity. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("tracking financial transactions to determine whether they exceed a pre-set spending limit (i.e., budgeting)" "using a 'communication medium"' "is not meaningfully different from the ideas found to be abstract in other cases before the Supreme Court and our court involving methods of organizing human activity"); Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 ("collecting data, ... recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and ... storing that recognized data in a memory" is an abstract idea because "data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known" and "humans have always performed these functions"). 15 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 In summary, the abstract concepts identified by the Examiner ("a method of organizing human activity" and "an idea of itself' (Final Act. 10)) are just complimentary ways of expressing the same concepts. Each of these cases is analogous to collecting and analyzing information to determine and display certain results as in Electric Power Group. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353-54. Contrary to Appellants' arguments, claim 1 is not "a technology-based solution" (for managing "digitally encoded product usage rights") (Appeal Br. 18) that is "an improvement to the data processing system itself' (Appeal Br. 19). Appellants' claim 1 (as well as the other pending claims) is distinguishable from patent-eligible claims such as those in Enfzsh that are directed to "a specific improvement to the way computers operate." Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. Appellants' claims are directed to the results of data analysis and manipulation (receiving and verifying information to determine if a conflict exists (by unidentified means)), assigning a reservation, and/or resolving a conflict by communicating information ( again by unidentified means), rather than "a particular way of performing" or "inventive technology for performing those functions" or, in other words, "achiev[ing] these results in a non-abstract way." Two-Way Media, 874 F.3d at 1337-38 (internal quotations omitted). In summary, "the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools." Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to the abstract ideas of collecting, analyzing, and manipulating information utilizing a computer. 16 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 Alice Step 2 Analysis Having found Appellants' claims are directed to an abstract idea under Alice's step 1 analysis, we next address whether the claims add significantly more to the alleged abstract idea. As directed by our reviewing court, we search for an "'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application."' McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355). The implementation of the abstract idea involved must be "more than performance of 'well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry."' Content Extraction, 77 6 F .3 d at 134 7--48 ( alteration in original) ( quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359). The "inventive concept" "must be significantly more than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer." Bascom Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Here, the Examiner determined that Appellants' claims do not add significantly more. See Final Act. 11-12; Ans. 4---6. Appellants, on the other hand, reiterate the recited steps of claim 1-"Claim 1 recites" "assigning the reserved usage right," "attempting to release at least one reserved usage right" "requesting a set of the other entities to release the at least one reserved usage right; and releasing the at least one reserved usage right in response to acceptance of the request to release" (Appeal Br. 19 (quotations omitted)}- and contend "Claim 1 is directed to 'significantly more' than the alleged abstract idea" (Appeal Br. 19). See Appeal Br. 19- 20; Reply Br. 5---6. 17 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 Appellants fail to persuade us of error in the Examiner's rejection with respect to the second Alice step. We agree with the Examiner that Appellants' claim 1 ( and the other pending claims) does not evince an "inventive concept" that is significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Here, Appellants simply reiterate the limitations of claim 1 and conclude that the limitations amount to "significantly more than" the alleged abstract idea of "making a reservation and resolving conflicting reservations." Appeal Br. 19 ( quotations omitted); see Appeal Br. 19-20; Reply Br. 5-6. Appellants do not explain how the limitations (individually and in combination) are not routine or are unconventional. We agree with the Examiner that the additional limitations, separately, or as an ordered combination, do not provide meaningful limitations (i.e., do not add significantly more) to transform the abstract idea into a patent- eligible application. See Final Act. 11-12; Ans. 4---6. Claim 1 (and the other pending claims) merely recites functions (processes) for receiving, analyzing, and manipulating data using known conventional computers and/ or equipment to effect conventional reservation transactions-verifying and assigning a reservation, and/or resolving conflicting reservations. It is immaterial that such reservation transactions involve usage rights. The processes of receiving and/or communicating information and comparing information (data) in a conventional computer remain the same regardless of the information content. Appellants' Specification belies their contentions that the systems and/or processes are unconventional. For example, Appellants' Specification explains: [I]t is possible to replace the computer with any code execution entity (such as a PDA, a mobile phone, and the like). 18 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 It should be readily apparent that the application of the present invention is not limited to any specific licensing application and/or technique for identifying the products launched or in use on the workstations; likewise, the licenses may be of any other type or they may be replaced with equivalent usage rights. Spec. 16:2-10. Further, Appellants' Specification explains: In any case, the program may take any form suitable to be used by or in connection with any data processing system, such as external or resident software, firmware, or microcode ( either in object code or in source code). Moreover, the program may be provided on any computer-usable medium; the medium can be any element suitable to contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transfer the program .... In any case, the solution according to the present invention lends itself to be carried out with a hardware structure ( for example, integrated in a chip of semiconductor material), or with a combination of software and hardware. Spec. 18:10-25. Such conventional computer processes operating on conventional computer hardware "do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter." FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1096 (citing DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256). Appellants also contend that claim 1 ( and the other pending claims) does not preempt the Examiner's asserted abstract idea-the "claims do not cover all ways for 'making a reservation and resolving conflicting reservations', and therefore Claim 1 would not pre-empt all ways of performing the alleged abstract idea" (Appeal Br. 20). See Appeal Br. 20- 22; Reply Br. 6. Although preemption is the concern that drives the exclusionary principle of judicial exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter (see Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354), preemption is not a separate test of patent- 19 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 eligibility, but is inherently addressed within the Alice framework. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility."). Appellants further contend that claim 1 ( and the other pending claims) provide "improvements to the technical field of data processing in a data processing system," similar to the claims discussed in DDR Holdings. Appeal Br. 22. We disagree. In DDR Holdings, the court held that a claim may amount to more than an abstract idea recited in the claims when it addresses and solves problems only encountered with computer technology and online transactions, e.g., by providing (serving) a composite web page rather than adhering to the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257-59. In contrast, claim 1 performs a process of receiving, analyzing and manipulating information, utilizing conventional computer networks and systems. See Spec. 1:7-10, 3: 16-4:32, 6:25-32, 9: 17-23, 10:23-26, 11 :2-9, 12:23-13:4, 13:7-10, 14:18-21, 16:2-10, 18:10-25. As we previously explained, the instant claims are more akin to the claims for analyzing and manipulating information found to be abstract in Electric Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1353. For at least the reasons above, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection under Â§ 101 of independent claim 1 and independent claim 14, which was not argued separately. Claims 11 and 15 Appellants contend claim 11 ( and 15) recites additional limitations that "further bolster the 'significantly more' aspect of the Part 2B Alice 20 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 analysis since this is not a standard, generic computer implemented process." Appeal. Br. 23; see Reply Br. 7. As with claim 1 (supra), Appellants simply reiterate the limitations of the claim and do not explain how the limitations (individually and in combination) are not routine or are unconventional. Additionally, Appellants contend the Examiner did not provide sufficient evidence with respect to the second part of the Alice/Mayo test- "nor has the Examiner established by objective evidence a contrary finding." Appeal Br. 23; see Appeal Br. 23-24. Again, we disagree. The Examiner provides an explanation as to why claim 1 (and claim 11) is patent ineligible under the second Alice step. See Final Act. 11-12; Ans. 4--5. The Examiner also provides supporting evidence in comparing the claim limitations to the features found ineligible in Alice. See Final Act. 11-12; Ans. 4--5. We agree with the Examiner that the receipt, communication, analysis, and manipulation of information, utilizing undisclosed means ( algorithms, processes, and/or devices) utilizing a generic computer system and processor (see discussion supra; Spec. 16:2-10, 18:10-25) does not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. For at least the reasons above, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claims 11 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection underÂ§ 101 of independent claim 11 and independent claim 15, which was not argued separately. Claims 12 and 16 Similar to claims 11 and 15 (supra), Appellants contend claim 12 (and 16) recites an additional limitation that "is not a standard, generic computer implemented process" and that the Examiner did not provide sufficient 21 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 evidence. Appeal. Br. 24; see Reply Br. 7-8. As with claims 1 and 11 (supra), Appellants simply reiterate the limitation of the claim and do not explain how the limitation is not routine or is unconventional. Also, as we explain with respect to claim 11 (supra), the Examiner provided some objective evidence. Further, as with claim 11 (supra), we agree with the Examiner (see Final Act. 11-12; Ans. 4---6) that the receipt, communication, analysis, and manipulation of information, utilizing undisclosed means ( algorithms, processes, and/ or devices) utilizing a generic computer system and processor (see discussion supra; Spec. 16:2-10, 18: 10-25}- specifically, "releasing an already assigned usage right" (Ans. 6}-does not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. For at least the reasons above, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claims 12 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection underÂ§ 101 of independent claim 12 and independent claim 16, which was not argued separately. Dependent Claims 18-21 Appellants, similar to claims 11 and 12 (supra), contend dependent claims 18-21 recite additional limitations that were not properly addressed by the Examiner. See Appeal Br. 24--29; Reply Br. 8-11. As with claims 11 and 12 (supra), Appellants simply reiterate the limitations of the claim and do not explain how the limitations (individually and in combination) are not routine or are unconventional. The Examiner, albeit briefly, addresses Appellants' contentions. See Ans. 6-7. Similar to claims 11 and 12, we agree with the Examiner that the receipt, communication, analysis, and manipulation of information, utilizing undisclosed means ( algorithms, processes, and/or devices) utilizing a generic computer system and processor 22 Appeal2017-007417 Application 14/601,060 (see discussion supra; Spec. 16:2-10, 18:10-25) does not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. For at least the reasons above, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claims 18-21 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection under Â§ 101 of dependent claims 18-21. CONCLUSION Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 11, 12, 14--16, and 18-21 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 11, 12, 14--16, and 18-21. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. Â§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 23