Ex Parte Cun

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 24, 2019

14273325 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
14/273,325 05/08/2014 David Cun
118665 7590 01/28/2019
Armstrong Teasdale LLP (HPT)
7700 Forsyth Blvd.
Suite 1800
St Louis, MO 63105
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
Hl l 40625USO 1
(30992-281)
5037
EXAMINER
LUDWIG, PETER L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3687
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/28/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uspatents@armstrongteasdale.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DAVID CUN
Appeal 2018-000318 1
Application 14/273,325
Technology Center 3600
Before ERIC B. CHEN, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and ADAM J. PYONIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner's decision to reject all pending claims. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 "The real party in interest in connection with the instant appeal is Honda
Motor Co., Ltd." App. Br. 1.
Appeal 2018-000318
Application 14/273,325
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Application is directed "to battery electric vehicles (EV s )," and to
"charging control systems that reduce the charging time of EV s at charging
stations to reduce congestion at charging stations." Spec. ,r,r 1-2. Claims 9-
17 and 24--34 are pending. App. Br. 1. Claim 9, the sole independent claim,
is reproduced below for reference ( emphases and line numbering added):
1 9. An electric vehicle charging control system comprising:
2 a battery for operating the electric vehicle, the battery
3 configured to be charged by a charging connection to a charging
4 station;
5 a user interface associated with the electric vehicle, the
6 user interface having a display and a user input device;
7 a controller for controlling charging of the electric vehicle,
8 the controller receiving a state of charge of the battery;
9 a communication system communicating with the
10 charging station without establishing the charging connection
11 with the charging station, the communication system receiving
12 charging information from the charging station relating to a type
13 of billing model used by the charging station, wherein the type
14 of billing model is one of a plurality of different types of billing
15 models;
16 wherein the controller determines the type of billing model
11 used by the charging station based on the charging information,
18 the controller configured to receive charging information
19 associated with the plurality of different types of billing models;
20 and
21 wherein, after the charging information is received, the
22 controller determines a charging profile based on the determined
23 type of billing model used by the charging station, the controller
24 configured to determine a different charging profile for each of
25 the plurality of different types of billing models, the charging
26 profile being adjustable based on operator inputs to the user input
27 device to change at least one of an operator desired charging time
28 and an operator desired post-charging battery state of charge,
29 wherein the controller controls charging of the battery according
30 to the charging profile.
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Application 14/273,325
THE EXAMINER'S REJECTIONS
The following is the prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting
the claims on appeal:
Boll
Aziz
Brandon, II ("Brandon")
Lee
Gadh
us 5,623,194
US 7,370,013 Bl
US 2011/0121790 Al
US 8,422,654 B 1
US 2013/0179061 Al
Apr. 22, 1997
May 6, 2008
May 26, 2011
Apr. 16, 2013
July 11, 2013
Claims 9-17 and 24--34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
being indefinite for lacking sufficient antecedent basis. Final Act. 2.
Claims 9-16, 27, 28, and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I02(a)
as being anticipated by Gadh. Final Act. 3.
Claims 17 and 24--26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
obvious over Gadh and Lee. Final Act. 8.
Claims 29, 30, and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
obvious over Gadh and Aziz. Final Act. 9.
Claim 31 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious over
Gadh, Aziz, and Brandon. Final Act. 11.
Claim 33 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious over
Gadh and Boll. Final Act. 11.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellant's
arguments, considering only those arguments Appellant actually raised in
the Briefs. Except as indicated below with respect to the obviousness
rejection of dependent claim 17, we disagree with Appellant that the
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Application 14/273,325
Examiner erred and adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by
the Examiner. We highlight and address specific issues for emphasis, in the
order presented in the Appeal Brief.
A. Anticipation
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding Gadh anticipates
claim 9, because Gadh does not disclose the limitations relating to the
claimed "plurality of different types of billing models." See App. Br. 4.
Particularly, Appellant contends "throughout the disclosure, Gadh
references only a single type of billing model that uses a cost per kilowatt-
hour ($/kWH) model to calculate the cost for charging an electric vehicle."
App. Br. 6.
In the Answer, the Examiner finds "that the different billing models
could also be ' [ t ]he cost per kWh of charge at the charging station may be
static or dynamic"' as disclosed by Gadh. Ans. 5 (citing Gadh ,r 15).
Appellant argues this portion of Gadh does not disclose the disputed claim
limitations, because "the 'static' and 'dynamic' costs referenced in
paragraph [0015] of Gadh relate to whether the cost per kWh charged at an
EV charging station is fixed or varied," and "different costs per kWh are
not different types of billing models - they are different rates for the same
type of billing model- namely, a per-unit-energy billing model." Reply
Br. 2.
"The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest reasonable
interpretation in light of the specification is ... an interpretation that
corresponds with what and how the inventor describes his invention in the
specification, i.e., an interpretation that is 'consistent with the
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Application 14/273,325
specification."' In re Smith Int'!, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (citations omitted). Here, Appellant's Specification provides
examples, but no definition, of a billing model: "charging stations may have
one or more of the following billing models available for charging the EV
100, such as a free billing model, a flat fee billing model, a bill-per-unit-
energy billing model, a bill-per-unit-time billing model, or another billing
model." Spec. ,r 30.
Consistent with the Specification, we agree with the Examiner that
Gadh discloses a plurality of different types of billing models, within the
meaning of the claim. Gadh's costs are per unit energy for the electricity, as
Gadh discloses "a nearby charging station pushing realtime charging
information to the smart phone 402 resulting in a cost per kWh." Gadh ,r 97.
Gadh, however, discloses two "billing models" using these costs, as the
pricing may be static or dynamic. Gadh ,r,r 15, 61. Contrary to Appellant's
argument, these are not merely different rates for the same type of billing
model (see Reply Br. 2) as more than just the rate changes-in Gadh, the
underlying scheme of billing (static versus dynamic rates) differs. Thus,
corresponding with what and how the invention is described in the
specification, Gadh's disclosure of charging a static price per unit energy is a
different type of billing model from Gadh's disclosure of dynamically
pricing the unit energy. See Ans. 5; see also Spec. ,r 36 ("The charging
station 200 may have other billing models and some billing models may be a
combination of the billing models listed above, such as a billing model that
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Application 14/273,325
charges a connection fee and then a fee per quantity of electricity or a fee per
time.").
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding Gadh
discloses the limitations of independent claim 9. See Ans. 2-5.
B. Obviousness
Claim 17 depends from claim 9, and further recites (emphasis added):
wherein the electric vehicle is a first electric vehicle, and
wherein the communication system receives a congestion signal
from the charging station when a second electric vehicle is
waiting for charging by the charging station while the first
electric vehicle is connected to the charging station by the
charging connection, the user interface prompting an operator
of the first electric vehicle that the second electric vehicle is
waiting for charging by the charging station after the congestion
signal is received.
The Examiner finds Gadh in view of Lee teaches or suggests the
claim, as Lee teaches a conference calling system "where the administrator
can be notified of users waiting for user, where the signal received from the
at least one user waiting is the congestion signal." Final Act. 9 (citing Lee,
Fig. 3B); see also Ans. 6.
Appellant argues the Examiner's obviousness rejection is in error,
because "Lee is non-analogous art, and does not disclose a congestion signal
as recited in [c]laim 17." Reply Br. 3. Particularly, Appellant argues "Lee
would not have logically commended itself to an inventor's attention in
addressing problems associated with congestion at electric vehicle charging
stations because Lee is not related to congestion"; instead, Lee addresses the
problem of people waiting to join a conference call by "sending a
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Application 14/273,325
notification to a chairperson indicating the presence of one or more
participants that are waiting to join the conference call." App. Br. 9--10.
We are persuaded the Examiner errs. Appellant's Specification
describes congestion signals as "relat[ing] to other EVs using the charging
station 200 or desiring to use the charging station 200." Spec. ,r 40; see also
Spec ,r 49. This comports with the applicable plain and ordinary meanings
of congestion: to concentrate in a small or narrow space; clog (i.e., to fill
beyond capacity). 2 Lee's signal, which "indicates an amount of time that a
given 45 participant has been waiting," is not a congestion signal. Lee 6: 14--
15. Rather than indicating the conference call is filled beyond capacity (i.e.,
congested), such signal indicates that the conference has at least a required
minimum number of people and is ready to start. See Lee 6:60-66.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent
claim 17.
C. Indefiniteness
The Examiner finds claim 9 is indefinite, because it is unclear if the
third recitation of "charging information" is "the same 'charging
information' or different 'charging information"' as the other recitations of
"charging information." Final Act. 2.
Appellant argues "one of ordinary skill in the art would readily
understand what is claimed by [ c ]laim 9 when the claim is read in its
entirety," because "the term 'charging information' appears in line 14 as part
2 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/congestion (last visited January 3, 2019); MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/clog (last visited January 3,
2019).
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Application 14/273,325
of the phrase 'charging information associated with the plurality of different
types of billing models,' which is the first instance of this phrase in [ c ]laim
9." App. Br. 12. Appellant contends "[t]he Section 112 rejection of [c]laim
9 appears to be based on a reading of [ c ]laim 9 that considers the term
'charging information' in isolation, separate from the immediately
succeeding phrase." App. Br. 13.
We are not persuaded the Examiner errs. Claim 9 recites "charging
information" in lines 12, 17, 18, and 21, as shown above on page 2 of this
Decision. The third recitation of charging information (line 18), does not
start with "the." Thus, we agree with the Examiner the claim is not clear as
to whether this is the same or a different type of charging information as the
other recitations. Ans. 6. It is inconsequential that the third recitation is part
of the phrase "charging information associated with the plurality of different
types of billing models," because this phrase further limits the charging
information without explaining whether it is the same or different as the
other charging information limitations. Moreover, if Appellant wishes to
claim a third recitation of "charging information" that is the same or
different from the other recitations, the claims can be amended during
prosecution to clearly reflect such a requirement. See In re Prater, 415 F .2d
1393, 1404---05 (CCPA 1969) (During prosecution, "the applicant may then
amend [the] claims, the thought being to reduce the possibility that, after the
patent is granted, the claims may be interpreted as giving broader coverage
than is justified.").
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's indefiniteness rejection of
independent claim 9.
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CONCLUSION
We sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) rejection of
independent claim 9, and claims 10-17 and 24--34 which depend thereon.
We sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) rejection of
independent claim 9. Appellant advances no further substantive argument
on dependent claims 10-16 and 27-34. See App. Br. 8, 11, 12.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejections of these claims for
the same reasons discussed above.
We do not sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of
dependent claim 1 7, or claims 24--26 which depend thereon.
DECISION
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 9-17 and 24--34 is affirmed.
The Examiner's decision is affirmed because we have affirmed at
least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal. See
37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(a)(l).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal maybe extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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