Ex Parte Cruz-Hernandez

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 28, 2017

12947321 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/947,321 11/16/2010 Juan Manuel Cruz-Hernandez IMM335 (51851/396751) 1671
7590
Kilpatrick Townsend and Stockton, LLP
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
PATEL, SANJIV D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/30/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficeaction @ appcoll.com
kts_imm_docketing @ kilpatricktownsend. com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JUAN MANUEL CRUZ-HERNANDEZ
Appeal 2015-003093
Application 12/947,321
Technology Center 2600
Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, JEFFREY A. STEPHENS, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) rejecting claims 1—10 and 12—
27, which are all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 The real party in interest is identified as Immersion Corp. App. Br. 1.
Appeal 2015-003093
Application 12/947,321
Claimed Subject Matter
Claims 1, 13, 17, and 21 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below,
illustrates the claimed subject matter.
1. An apparatus comprising:
a touch-sensitive display;
a first actuator coupled to the touch-sensitive display;
a second actuator coupled to the touch-sensitive display;
a processor coupled to the first and second actuators, the
processor configured to:
apply a first command signal to the first actuator to
output a first haptic effect from a first start time to a first
stop time;
determine that the first actuator has decelerated;
apply a second command signal to the second
actuator to output a second haptic effect from a second
start time to a second stop time, wherein the first stop time
occurs before the second start time and wherein the period
between the first stop time and second start time is such
that the first haptic effect is felt distinctly from the second
haptic effect; and
apply an AC voltage to at least a portion of the first
command signal to achieve a desired change in velocity
from the first actuator.
Rejections
1. Claims 1, 13, 17, and 21, and claims depending therefrom,
stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply
with the written description requirement. Final Act. 2—3.
2. Claims 1—8 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Shahoian et al. (US 2005/0052430 Al, published Mar. 10,
2005) (“Shahoian”), Grant et al. (US 2006/0119573 Al, published June 8,
2006) (“Grant”), and Nogami et al. (US 2007/0290988 Al, published Dec.
20, 2007) (“Nogami”). Final Act. 4—8.
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3. Claims 9 and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Shahoian, Grant, Nogami, and Shimabukuro et al. (US
8,210,942 B2)2 (“Shimabukuro”). Final Act. 8—10.
4. Claims 13—15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Shahoian, Nogami, and Grant. Final Act. 10-13.
5. Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Shahoian, Nogami, Grant, and Shimabukuro. Final Act.
13-14.
6. Claims 17—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Shimabukuro, Grant, and Nogami. Final Act. 14—18.
7. Claims 21—27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Shimabukuro, Bailey et al. (US 7,161,580 B2, issued Jan.
9, 2007) (“Bailey”), Colgate et al. (US 2007/0236450 Al, published Oct. 11,
2007) (“Colgate”), and Nogami. Final Act. 18—26.
ANALYSIS
Rejection 1
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1—10 and 12—27 as lacking written description support. App. Br. 23—24.
Claim 1 recites a processor configured to “determine that the first actuator
has decelerated.” The Examiner interprets claim 1 to “require[] that the
processor affirmatively determine that the first actuator has decelerated or
stopped.” Ans. 2. The Examiner finds there is insufficient support for this
claimed aspect in Appellant’s original disclosure. Id.
2 Shimabukuro’s PCT application published as WO 2007/117418 on October
18, 2007.
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Application 12/947,321
Appellant’s Specification provides that acceleration and deceleration
time of the actuators is stored in memory and “known to the processor.” In
particular, the Specification provides:
[T]he particular operating characteristics of the actuator 112 will
be known to the processor 104 in which the processor 104 is
provided information on how long it takes the actuator 112 to
accelerate from a stopped position to the desired magnitude and
frequency based on the applied voltage and current. Further, the
memory 106 may store information regarding how long it takes
for the actuator 112 to decelerate from its maximum operating
magnitude and frequency back to the stopped position. This is
because, in one embodiment, the acceleration and deceleration
time of the actuator 112, based on the type of current (i.e. AC vs.
DC), is already known and is stored in the memory 106 as data
or an instruction to be read by the processor and accordingly
provided to the actuators.
Spec. para. 38. The Specification further describes an example in which
“processor 104 determines a percentage of the stop time for an actuator 112,
114 to determine a minimum amount of time to wait after an actuator signal
has been terminated before a new signal may be begun.” Id. at para. 39.
The time is determined “based on actuator parameters stored in memory.”
Id.
The Examiner reasons that determining a time to wait is not the same
as a processor determining that an actuator has decelerated. Ans. 3. The
Examiner also reasons that a signal to stop an actuator’s driving signal or
brake the actuator’s motion is likewise not a determination that the actuator
has decelerated or stopped. Ans. 3^4.
The Examiner appears to interpret claim 1 to require that the actuator
have motion sensors that detect motion of the actuator and relay a signal to
the processor that may be used to determine that the actuator has
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Application 12/947,321
decelerated. We do not interpret the claim to require direct sensing of the
motion of the actuator. The Specification’s description in paragraphs 38 and
39 of the processor determining the actuator has decelerated based on
operating characteristics stored in memory sets forth at least one way of
making the claimed determination.3
Although claim 1 does not specify the method of determining that the
first actuator has decelerated, and is claimed perhaps more broadly than
described, the Examiner’s rejection relies on a narrower interpretation of the
claim to require a particular method of determining the first actuator has
decelerated. Because we do not agree with the Examiner’s interpretation, on
the record before us, we do not sustain the written description rejection of
claim 1. Independent claims 13, 17, and 21, as well as the dependent claims,
are rejected on the same basis. For the same reasons, we do not sustain the
written description rejection of these claims.
Rejection 2
Appellant argues claims 1—8 and 12 as a group. App. Br. 25—27. We
select claim 1 as representative. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments (App. Br. 25—27; Reply Br. 2-4). Appellant’s arguments do not
persuade us of error in the rejection of claim 1. We adopt as our own the
findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this
appeal is taken and in the Answer. We highlight and address specific
arguments and findings for emphasis as follows.
3 Because it is not before us, we do not decide whether the written
description also enables the full scope of the claim.
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The Examiner finds Shahoian and Grant teach most limitations of
claim 1, but do not expressly teach determining that the first actuator has
decelerated and that stop and start times for actuator signals occur “such that
the first haptic effect is felt distinctly from the second haptic effect.” Final
Act. 4—5. The Examiner relies on Nogami for these elements. Final Act. 6.
Nogami teaches generating torque at two vibration motors in a time-oriented
manner, which may involve overlapping torque “or a state in which a blank
occurs during the time of presenting torque.” Nogami para. 69. “The
overlap time or intervals between generations of torque may be set in any
way that allows a user to perceive a plane or object surface . . . .” Id. “The
optimal or permissible overlapped time or blank time of torque differs
depending on a human body portion to which stimulus is given, and the
individual difference of perception . . . .” Id. at para. 70. The Examiner
finds it would have been obvious to combine Nogami’s deceleration
determination and distinct haptic effects with Shahoian and Grant because
one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized “the predictable result
of applying a vibration profile in order to facilitate sensation of a plane or
object surface.” Final Act. 6.
Appellant argues one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been
motivated to combine Shahoian, Grant, and Nogami. In particular,
Appellant contends “it would not make sense to combine the wearable
Nogami system with the systems disclosed by Shahoian and Grant.” App.
Br. 25. Nogami teaches a virtual reality system comprising actuators that
are placed on the user’s body, and in particular, on one or more of the user’s
fingers. Id. (citing Nogami Figs. 1, 11—15, 17—20). Appellant contrasts
Nogami’s wearable actuators with those described in Shahoian and Grant,
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which relate to mobile devices. App. Br. 25—26 (citing Grant para. 16;
Shahoian paras. 57, 54). Appellant contends that “one would not simulate a
surface in the way described by Nogami on a mobile device” because
Shahoian’s “touch-sensitive display already includes a surface.” App. Br.
26.
Appellant’s challenge to the Examiner’s findings and reasoning is not
persuasive. As the Examiner finds, Shahoian and Grant, like Nogami, relate
to providing haptic feedback. Grant teaches tactile displays that provide
vibration and other haptic effects. Ans. 5 (citing Grant para. 3). In
particular, Grant teaches that an electronic device’s vibration effects can be
useful for “providing realistic feedback to create greater sensory immersion
within a simulated or virtual environment.” Grant para. 3.
Shahoian similarly teaches that tactile or haptic displays are known in
the art. Ans. 5 (citing Shahoian Figs. 1—3, paras. 4—5). Shahoian also
specifically teaches that “haptic versions of joysticks, mice, gamepads,
stee[r]ing wheels, or other types of devices can output forces to the user
based on events or interactions occurring within the graphical environment,
such as in a game or other application program.” Shahoian para. 4. As the
Examiner points out, the rejection does not propose to incorporate the
wearable actuators of Nogami, but relies on Nogami to show an actuator
comparable to the actuators of Shahoian and Grant. Ans. 5—6. Thus,
Appellant’s arguments premised on combining wearable actuators from
Nogami with the teachings of Shahoian and Grant are inapposite.
Moreover, the Examiner’s reasoning regarding sensation of a plane or
object surface refers to interactions within the graphical environments of
Shahoian and Grant, e.g., to actuate vibrations in a specific way that conveys
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Application 12/947,321
to the user a perception of ongoing interaction with a plane or object surface
within the graphical environment. Appellant’s contention that Nogami’s
teachings regarding simulating a surface would not be applicable to
Shahoian’s device that “already includes a surface” appears directed to the
fact that the user of Shahoian or Grant would be able to perceive physically
holding the device, but does not address the use of tactile feedback to
facilitate perceptions of virtual surfaces. Appellant also does not contend
that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have known how to
incorporate Nogami’s teachings regarding vibration profiles in order to
“facilitate sensation of a plane or object surface” in the graphical
environment of Shahoian modified by Grant.
We agree with the Examiner that a person having ordinary skill in the
art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Nogami with
Shahoian and Grant. Ans. 5. For the same reasons, we are not persuaded
that adapting the specific teachings from Nogami identified by the Examiner
for use with the teachings of Shahoian and Grant would change Nogami’s
principle of operation.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above and by the Examiner,
we are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Shahoian, Grant, and Nogami.
Thus, we sustain the rejection of representative claim 1, as well as claims 2—
8 and 12.
Rejections 3—6
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejections 3 through 6 are in error for
the same reasons argued in support of claim 1. App. Br. 27—28. For the
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same reasons that we sustain the rejection of claim 1, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejections under § 103(a) of: claims 9 and 10 over Shahoian,
Grant, Nogami, and Shimabukuro; claims 13—15 over Shahoian, Nogami,
and Grant; claim 16 over Shahoian, Nogami, Grant, and Shimabukuro; and
claims 17—20 over Shimabukuro, Grant, and Nogami.
Rejection 7
Appellant argues claims 21—27 as a group. App. Br. 28—30. We
select claim 21 as representative.
Similar to the arguments presented in support of claim 1, Appellant
argues one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to
combine the wearable actuators of Nogami with the systems disclosed by
Shimabukuro or Colgate. App. Br. 28—29. Appellant contrasts Nogami’s
wearable actuators with Shimabukuro, which teaches “[a] handheld gaming
machine including one or more actuators for providing vibrational cues or
feedback during play of a wagering game” (Shimabukuro Abstract), and
with Colgate, which describes “haptic devices that can provide indirect
haptic feedback and virtual texture sensations to a user by modulation of
friction of a touch surface of the device” (Colgate para. 11). App. Br. 29.
For the same reasons discussed above as to claim 1, we agree with the
Examiner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to
use Nogami’s vibration profiles (including the determination that the
actuator has decelerated) with the combined teachings of Shimabukuro,
Bailey, and Colgate “in order to facilitate sensation of a plane or object
surface.” Final Act. 21.
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Application 12/947,321
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above and by the Examiner,
we are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Shahoian, Grant, and Nogami.
Thus, we sustain the rejection of representative claim 21, as well as claims
22-27.
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—10 and 12—27
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—10 and 12—27
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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