Ex Parte Corbett

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 20, 2017

13482429 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/482,429 05/29/2012 James Corbett 58083-842234 (B720C1) 7891
72058 7590 12/22/2017
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
Adobe Systems, Inc. 58083
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309-4530
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, LUU-PHUONG T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2177
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/22/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
KT S Docketing2 @ kilpatrick. foundationip .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JAMES CORBETT
Appeal 2017-003106
Application 13/482,4291
Technology Center 2100
Before HUNG H. BUI, KEVIN C. TROCK, and NABEEL U. KHAN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1 and 3-20, which are all the claims
pending in the application. Claim 2 has been canceled. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Adobe Systems
Incorporated. App. Br. 1.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed June
28, 2016; Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed December 20, 2016; Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.”) mailed November 3, 2016; Final Office Action (“Final
Act.”) mailed January 14, 2016; and original Specification (“Spec.”) filed
May 29, 2012.
Appeal 2017-003106
Application 13/482,429
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to “systems and methods [shown in
Figure 3] for accelerated playback of rich internet applications.” Spec. ^ 2;
Title; Abstract. According to Appellant,
“[a] rich internet application (RIA) typically is a collection of
content that is wrapped within programming code to be executed
by a playback routine. For example, some rich internet
applications may have a flash, or SWF, format and may comprise
animations, interfaces, games, and/or other interactive or passive
content. In addition, the RIA typically includes program code to
instruct a playback routine (referred to as a ‘RIA player’) how to
display and progress through the content within the RIA. For
example, Adobe® Flash™ is one type of RIA player, while the
open-source Gnash software is another type of RIA player.”
Spec. 18 (emphasis added).
Appellant’s Figure 3 is reproduced below:
300
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301
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Computer
Processor
Memory
I Rk;; i internet
| Application
Acoetesrsiteti
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Routine
310
-4-""™ 330
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331
320
Appellant’s Figure 3 shows a computer system for accelerated playback of
rich internet applications (RIAs).
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Application 13/482,429
As shown in Figure 3, the computer system 301 is provided with a
rich internet application (RIA) 330 and an accelerated playback routine 331
configured to execute RIA 330 at an accelerated rate without regards to the
RIA’s native frame rate and to parse the frames at RIA 330 at an accelerated
rate. Spec. 19, 31 (emphasis added). “[B]y bypassing the native frame
rate, the accelerated playback routine [331] may be able to parse and output
each frame at a higher rate, potentially allowing a search engine, or other
program, to analyze the contents of the RIA more quickly than by analyzing
the RIA at its native frame rate.” Spec. ^[31 (emphasis added).
Claims 1,9, 16, and 18 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the
claimed invention, as reproduced below with disputed limitations in italics:
1. A method comprising:
determining a frame rate associated with a rich internet
application, the rich internet application comprising a plurality
of frames;
determining at least one timing signal to be generated by
the rich internet application;
determining at least one frame of the plurality offrames at
which the at least one timing signal would be output at the frame
rate;
generating each of the plurality of frames of the rich
internet application at a rate greater than the frame rate;
outputting the at least one timing signal when the at least
one frame associated with the timing signal is generated; and
after generating each frame:
parsing the generated frame to identify at least one
text field associated with the generated frame, and
responsive to identifying the at least one text field,
extracting text from the identified at least one text field;
and
categorizing the extracted text for searching.
App. Br. 16 (Claims App’x).
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Appeal 2017-003106
Application 13/482,429
Examiner’s Rejection and References
(1) Claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, and 18-20 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Jewsbury et al. (US
2007/0006079 Al; published Jan. 4, 2007), Janakiraman et al. (US
7,360,149 B2; issued Apr. 15, 2008), and Agnihotri et al. (US 6,614,930 Bl;
issued Sep. 2, 2003). Final Act. 3-8.
(2) Claims 4, 5, 11, and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Jewsbury, Janakiraman, Agnihotri, and Knight
(US 7,216,299 B2; issued May 8, 2007). Final Act. 9-11.
(3) Claims 8, 15, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Jewsbury, Janakiraman, Agnihotri, and Hayosh et
al. (US 8,621,338 B2; issued Dec. 31, 2013). Final Act. 11-12.
Issues on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments, the dispositive issues on appeal are:
(1) whether Jewsbury teaches several limitations recited in independent
claims 1,9, 16, and 18; (2) whether the Examiner has articulated sufficient
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the combination of
Jewsbury, Janakiraman, and Agnihotri, as required by KSR v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); and (3) whether the Examiner has engaged in
impermissible hindsight reconstruction to support the combination of
Jewsbury, Janakiraman, and Agnihotri. App. Br. 6-13; Reply Br. 1-7.
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Application 13/482,429
ANALYSIS
With respect to independent claims 1,9, 16, and 18, the Examiner
finds Jewsbury teaches Appellant’s claimed method of determining a frame
rate associated with a rich internet application (RIA) and at least one timing
signal to be generated by the RIA. Final Act. 3 (citing Jewsbury ^ 8,
28^40, 57, 66-73). The Examiner also finds Jewsbury teaches the following
disputed limitations:
[1] “determining at least one frame of the plurality of
frames at which the at least one timing signal would be output at
the frame rate” in the form of a number of frames produced at a
predetermined play speed (i.e., frame rate) to produce a timing
signal at a frame rate as disclosed by Jewsbury 40, 67-70;
[2] “generating each of the plurality of frames of the
rich internet application at a rate greater than the frame rate” in
the form those frames generated at a rate greater than the frame
rate when the user changes a play speed (i.e., fast-forward or
increase) as disclosed by Jewsbury ^ 67-70; and
[3] “outputting the at least one timing signal when the
at least one frame associated with the timing signal is generated”
as disclosed by Jewsbury 67-70, 84.
Final Act. 3-5 (citing Jewsbury 40, 67-70, 84).
Once the “at least one frame associated with the timing signal is
generated [at a rate greater than the original frame rate],” the Examiner relies
on (1) Janakiraman for teaching “parsing the generated frame to identify at
least one text field associated with the generated frame, and . . . extracting
text from the identified at least one text field”; and (2) Agnihotri for teaching
“categorizing the extracted text for searching” in order to support the
conclusion of obviousness, i.e., enable the user to have the opportunity to
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Application 13/482,429
read textual information from the video frames as suggested by Janakiraman
and to extract and classify text in the video streams to enhance search
capabilities as suggested by Agnihotri. Final Act. 4 (citing Janakiraman
5:2-28, 62-67, 6:1-5, 33^11; Agnihotri 4:5-15, 5:36-55, 6:65-67, 7:1-25).
Appellant contends Jewsbury does not teach the disputed limitations:
(1) “determining at least one frame of the plurality of frames at which the at
least one timing signal would be output at the frame rate”; (2) “generating
each of the plurality of frames of the rich internet application at a rate
greater than the frame rate”; and (3) “outputting the at least one timing
signal when the at least one frame associated with the timing signal is
generated” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 9, 16, and 18.
App. Br. 7-9; Reply Br. 2-6. In particular, Appellant argues Jewsbury’s
timing signals are equal to the frame rates, “cannot be adjusted” and are not
“associated with, or otherwise generated to correspond to, a particular
frame” and, as such, “an increase in the rate at which the frames are
generated will increase the frame rate, such that the rate cannot be ‘a rate
greater than the frame rate.” App. Br. 8-9.
Appellant also contends the Examiner’s combination of Jewsbury and
Janakiraman lacks articulated reasoning because the Examiner’s “rationale
does not explain why the cited disclosures would be combined into an
invention in which a plurality of frames of a rich internet application are
generated at a rate greater than a frame rate, as required by claims 1,9, 16,
and 18.” App. Br. 10-12; Reply Br. 6-7. Lastly, Appellant argues the
Examiner has engaged in impermissible hindsight reconstruction to support
the combination of Jewsbury and Janakiraman. App. Br. 12-13.
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Application 13/482,429
We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive. Instead, we find
the Examiner has provided a comprehensive response to Appellant’s
arguments supported by a preponderance of evidence. Ans. 13-22. As
such, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and explanations provided therein.
Id. At the outset, we note claim terms are given their broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the Specification. In re Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning,
as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of
the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
Appellant’s Specification describes the disputed limitations in the
context of determining “at least one frame associated with [a] timing signal”
and then processing those frames at different rates and/or in different order.
Spec 42^45. For example, in one example embodiment, these frames can
be generated at an accelerated rate (for example, double the frame rate) and
a timing signal can be outputted in order to correlate with the accelerated
frame; however, these steps “need not be performed in the order specified.”
Spec T| 45, 48-50.
Based on Appellant’s Specification, the Examiner has broadly
interpreted the disputed limitations of Appellant’s claims 1,9, 16, and 18 as
encompassing (1) Jewsbury’s determining frames produced at a timing
signal at a predetermined frame rate (Ans. 15 (citing Jewsbury 40,
67-70)); and (2) Jewsbury’s increasing the rate of timing signal to accelerate
the frame rate (e.g., fast-forward) (Ans. 16-17 at (citing Jewsbury ^ 67-
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Application 13/482,429
70)). We find the Examiner’s interpretation reasonable and consistent with
the broad description of Appellant’s Specification.
In the reply, Appellant further argues: (1) Jewsbury’s “timing signal”
and “frame rate” are interchangeable, whereas Appellant’s claimed “frame
rates and timing signals are different elements” (Reply Br. 2); and (2)
“Jewsbury does not disclose that the continuous timing signal 401 is
adjustable” and “[Jewsbury’s] disclosure of fast-forwarding features in
Jewsbury paragraph [0084], as cited by the Examiner (see Answer, p. 17),
does not indicate that the continuous timing signal 401 is adjustable.” Reply
Br. 5-6. We disagree. Jewsbury describes that timing signal 407, which
represents the frame rate, can be adjusted, i.e., reduced or increased based on
a playback speed input. Jewsbury ]fl[ 69-70.
With respect to Appellant’s remaining arguments, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner failed to articulate a sufficient rationale for
combining Jewsbury and Janakiraman. See In re Cree, 818 F.3d 694, 702,
n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Appellant’s hindsight argument is of no moment where
the Examiner provides a sufficient, non-hindsight reason to combine the
references). In particular, we agree with the Examiner that Jewsbury teaches
playback of a video content by an accelerated rate, Janakiraman teaches
extracting text from video frames and, as such, “[t]he combination would
enable the system to detect the video content by increasing the frame rate at
a faster rate or to speed up enough in order to extract textual information
from the video frames as [suggested by] Janakiraman.” Ans. 19 (citing
Janakiraman 5:14-16).
Moreover, Appellant has not presented evidence sufficient to show
that combining the prior art was “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of
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Application 13/482,429
ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior
art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-19). Nor has Appellant presented
evidence that any of their incorporations of known limitations yielded more
than expected results.
Based on this record, we are not persuaded of Examiner error.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claims 1,9, 16, and 18, as well as their respective dependent
claims 3-8, 10-15, 17, 19, and 20, which Appellant does not argue
separately. App. Br. 14.
CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellant has not demonstrated
the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1 and 3-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1 and
3-20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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