Ex Parte Cooley et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 14, 2019

14499446 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 14, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 14/499,446 09/29/2014 23342 7590 02/19/2019 KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTONLLP Mailstop: 22 - IP Docketing 1100 Peachtree Street Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309 Adriane Dian Cooley UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 08530/908286 9876 EXAMINER RILEY, JONATHAN G ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3724 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/19/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ADRIANE DIAN COOLEY, BENJAMIN WORTH COBLE, and KEVIN C. Y. CHANG Appeal2018-006707 1 Application 14/499,4462 Technology Center 3700 Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, KENNETH G. SCHOPPER and ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SCHOPPER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134 from the rejection of claims 1-28. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b ). We REVERSE. 1 Our decision references the Appeal Brief ("Appeal Br.," filed Jan. 24, 2018), the Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed June 15, 2018), the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed Apr. 20, 2018), and the Final Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed Mar. 14, 2017). 2 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Lowe's Companies. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal2018-006707 Application 14/499,446 BACKGROUND According to Appellants, the disclosure relates "generally to push- stick storage systems and methods for storing push-sticks that can be used with various types of saws." Spec. ,r 1. CLAIMS Claims 1, 7, 14, 21, and 28 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is illustrative of the appealed claims and recites: 1. A push-stick storage system for use with a saw, compnsmg: (a) a rip fence comprising upright side walls that define a slot therebetween for receiving a push-stick, (b) a stop positioned at a first position within the slot, and ( c) a retainer positioned at a second position within the slot. Appeal Br. 15. REJECTIONS 1. The Examiner rejects claims 1, 5-11, 13-18, 20-25, 27, and 28 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 102(a)(l) as anticipated by Pech. 3 2. The Examiner rejects claims 2, 3, 12, 19, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103 as unpatentable over Pech in view of Stavin. 4 3. The Examiner rejects claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Pech. 3 Pech, DE 544013, pub. Feb. 12, 1932. 4 Stavin et al., US 5,018,773, iss. May 28, 1991. 2 Appeal2018-006707 Application 14/499,446 DISCUSSION Anticipation As discussed below, we are persuaded by Appellants' argument that Pech does not disclose a rip fence as required by each of the independent claims. In rejecting each of the independent claims, the Examiner finds that Pech discloses a rip fence 3. See Final Act. 2, 3, 5, 7, 9. Further, in the Answer, the Examiner finds that, "under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a rip fence is a fence that is used with a saw to cut work pieces with the grain. So long as the fence is capable of cutting workpieces with the grain, or along the grain, it is considered a rip fence." Ans. 3. We find that the Examiner's interpretation of this claim limitation is unreasonably broad and inconsistent with the Specification. During examination, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, and the language should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. Here, we find that the Specification provides a definition of a rip fence, i.e. "a guide that runs generally parallel to the cutting plane of a saw blade." Spec. ,r 3. This definition is consistent with how the term is used throughout the Specification and is consistent with how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand this term, as explained by Appellants. See Appeal Br. 6-8; see also Reply Br. 4--7. Thus, we determine that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term requires a structure that is a guide running generally parallel to the cutting plane of a saw. As can be plainly seen in Figure 1 in Pech, element 3 does not generally run parallel to the cutting plane of the saw 4, and thus, we agree with Appellants that element 3 3 Appeal2018-006707 Application 14/499,446 is not a rip fence under the broadest reasonable interpretation of that limitation, as discussed above. Based on the foregoing, we are persuaded of error in the rejection of each of the independent claims. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 1, 7, 14, 21, and 28. We also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 5, 6, 8-11, 13, 15-18, 20, 22-25, and 27 for the same reasons. Obviousness The rejections of claims 2--4, 12, 19, and 26 do not rectify the deficiency in the rejection of the independent claims discussed above. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we also do not sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 2--4, 12, 19, and 26. CONCLUSION We REVERSE the rejections of claims 1-28. REVERSED 4