Ex Parte ChippingDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 23, 201713153619 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/153,619 06/06/2011 Phillip John Chipping 26613-3004USC1 9422 128128 7590 03/27/2017 Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C. Intellectual Property Law Group 3301 North Thanksgiving Way, Suite 400 Lehi, UT 84043 EXAMINER REYNOLDS, STEVEN ALAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3788 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/27/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipmail@djplaw.com ckoy@djplaw.com jpitt@djplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte PHILLIP JOHN CHIPPING Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 Technology Center 3700 Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, WILLIAM A. CAPP, and FREDERICK C. LANEY, Administrative Patent Judges. CAPP, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 1—32 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 THE INVENTION Appellant’s invention is a protective coating for an electronic device. Spec. 12. Claim 15, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal. 15. A protective cover for an electronic device, comprising: a body cover including members that, throughout their entireties, are substantially transparent, including: a planar front member shaped to cover and conform to a shape of a front surface of the electronic device, including a screen viewable from the front surface; and a planar rear member shaped to cover and conform to a shape of a rear surface of the electronic device, the planar rear member being entirely separate from the planar front member. REJECTIONS The following grounds of rejection are before us for review: 1. Claims 1—32 on grounds of nonstatutory double patenting as unpatentable over claims 1—37 of Chipping (US 7,957,524 B2, iss. June 7, 2011). 2. Claims 1—32 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Antonini (US 2006/0154029 Al, pub. July 13, 2006) and Blackburn (US 2005/0022924 Al, pub. Feb. 3, 2005). 3. Claims 1—20 and 23—32 over Chang (US 2005/0047589 Al, pub. Mar. 3, 2005) and Antonini. OPINION Double Patenting The Examiner rejects claims 1—32 on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting over claims 1—37 of US 7,957,524 to Chipping. Final 2 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 Action 2—3. The Examiner considers new claims 1,15, 23, 27, and 30 to be broader than the previously patented subject matter. Id. at 3. Appellant does not challenge the double patenting grounds of rejection in the Appeal Brief. However, in a Response to Final Office Action, Appellant states that claims 1—32 are still subject to amendment in a manner that could obviate the obviousness-type double patent rejection. See Sept. 5, 2014, Response After Final (hereinafter the “Response After Final”). Appellant next states that a terminal disclaimer will not be filed in the application until all other issues have been resolved. Id. In view of the foregoing, Appellant has not apprised us of error and we sustain the double patenting rejection of claim 1—32.1 Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Graham Factors and Secondary Considerations A patent is invalid for obviousness “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103. Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual findings: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the claims and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective indicia of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17—18 (1966). We must consider all 1 See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1205.02, 9th ed., Rev. Nov. 2015 (“If a ground of rejection stated by the examiner is not addressed in the appellant’s brief, appellant has waived any challenge to that ground of rejection and the Board may summarily sustain it, unless the examiner subsequently withdrew the rejection in the examiner’s answer.”). 3 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 four Graham factors prior to reaching a conclusion regarding obviousness. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended—Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1076-77 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Evidence showing objective indicia of nonobviousness constitutes “independent evidence of nonobviousness.” Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Pressure Prods. Med. Supplies, Inc. v. Greatbatch Ltd., 599 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Evidence of secondary considerations of non-obviousness, when present, must always be considered en route to a determination of obviousness. Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1075—76; Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538—39 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Whether before the Board or a court, consideration of objective indicia is part of the whole obviousness analysis, not just an afterthought. See Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Evidence of secondary considerations “may often be the most probative and cogent evidence of nonobviousness in the record.” Ortho McNeil Pharm. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Such evidence can establish that “an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. MaerskDrilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Stratoflex, at 1538). Consequently, fact finders must withhold judgment on an obviousness challenge until it considers all relevant evidence, including that relating to the objective considerations. Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1079. In an appropriate case, evidence of secondary considerations of non obviousness may not be sufficient to overcome strong evidence of 4 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 obviousness. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In particular, where a claimed invention represents no more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to established functions, evidence of secondary indicia are frequently deemed inadequate to establish non-obviousness. See Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps South, LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1344 (Fed.Cir. 2013) citing Western Union Co. v. MoneyGram Payment Sys., Inc., 626 F.3d 1361, 1373 (Fed.Cir. 2010) (“weak secondary considerations generally do not overcome a strong prima facie case of obviousness”). Moreover, “[f]or objective evidence of secondary considerations to be accorded substantial weight, its proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2010), quoting Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Where the offered secondary consideration actually results from something other than what is both claimed and novel in the claim, there is no nexus to the merits of the claimed invention. Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2011) (“If commercial success is due to an element in the prior art, no nexus exists.”); Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[I]f the feature that creates the commercial success was known in the prior art, the success is not pertinent.”) There is a presumption of nexus for objective considerations when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product “is the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent.” WBIP, LLCv. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the proffered secondary 5 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 considerations are attributable to extraneous factors such as unclaimed features. Id. With the foregoing legal principles in mind, we turn to analysis of the evidence presented by the Examiner and the Appellant. Unpatentability of Claims 1—32 Over Antonini and Blackburn Appellant argues claims 1—32 as a group. Appeal Br. 7—10. We select claim 15 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2016). The Examiner finds that Antonini discloses the claimed invention except for having front and rear members with cuts, apertures or curved edges to cover two or more surfaces of a cell phone. Final Action 6. The Examiner relies on Blackburn as disclosing a plurality of separate planar members for application to a cell phone. Id. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify Antonini’s cover to have front and rear skins to cover the parts of an electronic device as taught by Blackburn. Id. According to the Examiner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have done this to protect exposed surfaces of the electronic device. Id. In traversing the rejection, Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s findings with respect to the first three Graham factors, nor does Appellant challenge the Examiner’s underlying rationale for modifying Antonini with the teachings of Blackburn. Appeal Br. 7-10. Instead, Appellant relies solely on evidence of secondary considerations of non obviousness. Id. Appellant’s evidence consists of declaration testimony from the inventor, Mr. Chipping. Id., Chipping Dec. Appellant argues that Mr. Chipping’s testimony evidences long-felt, but unsolved needs, commercial success, and copying by others. Id. at 10. 6 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 The Chipping Declaration was filed in connection with the Response After Final. Appellant thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal initiating the instant appeal to the Board. See Notice of Appeal, Sep. 15, 2014. On September 15, 2014, the PTO issued an Advisory Action in which the PTO checked box 10 indicating that the affidavit will not be entered. In the same Advisory Action, the PTO checked box 11 indicating that the affidavit is entered.2 In the accompanying continuation sheet, the PTO indicated that Mr. Chipping’s Declaration testimony fails to overcome the applied rejection because there is no nexus between the affidavit testimony and invention as presently claimed. Id. ft further explains that commercial success is attributed to claims that are not the same as those currently pending. Id. The Chipping Declaration is captioned in Application No. 11/681,665 and is dated April 27, 2010. Id. at 23. Application No. 11/681,665 issued as US 7,957,524 B2 on June 7, 2011. In contrast, the instant application on appeal was filed on June 6, 2011. The ‘524 Patent underwent reexamination in case number 95,000,649, which resulted in issuance of a Reexamination Certificate on Sept. 4, 2013. See US 7,957,524 Cl (hereinafter the “Reexam Certificate”). The Reexam Certificate indicates that claims 1—10, 30, 35, and 36 of US 7,957,524 B2 are cancelled and that claims 11, 12, 21, 24, 25, 32, and 37 are determined to be patentable as amended. Id. Claims 13—20, 22, 23, 26—29, 31, 33 and 34, which depend from an amended claim, are determined to be patentable. Id. 2 Inasmuch as the Examiner addressed the merits of the Chipping Declaration in the Answer, we will treat the declaration as having been entered. 7 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 Mr. dripping’s Declaration recites the text of four claims as being independent claims at the time of his declaration. Chipping Dec. 12 (then pending claims 1, 29, 30, and 39). A review of the Reexamination Certificate reveals that all four of those claims are cancelled or have subsequently been amended. See Reexam Cert. In the Appeal Brief, Appellant argues that: Paragraph 8 of Mr. Chipping’s Declaration indicates that, at that time, he was offering products that included two films: one film that was transparent throughout for covering a first surface of an electronic device, including a screen on the first surface; and another, separate film for covering and conforming to (i.e., “lay[ing] flat against”) a second surface of the electronic device. See also, paragraphs 8-12. In addition, Mr. Chipping's Declaration repeatedly notes that the films of these protective covers were transparent throughout (paragraphs 11,21 and 24). When the foregoing is viewed in connection with the currently pending claims of the '619 Application, it is apparent that the statements and evidence that have been provided by way of Mr. Chipping's Declaration apply to the subject matter recited by the current version of each of independent claims 1, 15, 23, 27 and 30 of the '619 Application. Appeal Br. 8 (emphasis added). In other words, Appellant asserts that the subject matter of, for example, currently pending claim 15 is shown to be patentable by Mr. Chipping’s declaration testimony that, at the time that it was given, related to different claims that have either been cancelled or amended. Mr. Chipping testifies that his father-in-law owned a business that covered the front of cars with a transparent plastic film to protect the cars’ finish. Chipping Dec. 14. He further testifies that the type of film used had been developed by the military to protect the leading edge of helicopter blades. Id. 14. Mr. Chipping advertised early versions of his commercial 8 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 product by stating that: “This REALLY TOUGH plastic film was developed to protect helicopter blades.” Id. 117. He further testifies that the type of material used was such that it caused scratches on the face of an old surface to become “imperceptible.” Id. f 4. A news release quoted in Mr. Chipping’s Declaration describes the product as “seemingly indestructible.” Id. 121. Another news release relates that it is extremely hard to poke a ballpoint pen through the product. Id. 122. Appellant argues that “secondary consideration of non-obviousness, along with the other “Graham factors,” are the controlling inquiries in any obviousness analysis.” Appeal Br. 5. However, to put things in the proper perspective, it is well settled that “[although secondary considerations must be taken into account, they do not necessarily control the obviousness conclusion.” Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 L.3d 1348, 1372 (Led. Cir. 2007). In response, the Examiner points out that the grounds of rejection recited by Appellant in the Appeal Brief differ from the grounds of rejection recited in the final Action. Ans. 2.3 The Examiner then observes that Mr. 3 Under Heading “V” in the Appeal Brief, Appellant states: The Board is respectfully asked to review the following issues in this appeal: (A) The allowability of claims 1-20 and 23-32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for reciting subject matter which is patentable over the subject matter taught and/or suggested by U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2005/0047589 of Chang ("Chang"), in view of teachings from U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2002/0036228 of Reese et al. ("Reese"); and (B) The allowability of claims 1-32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for being drawn to subject matter that is patentable over 9 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 Chipping’s Declaration testimony relates to the subject matter of claims 1, 29, 30, and 39 from another, albeit related, application. Id. The Examiner concludes that the declaration does not relate to the present claim set. Id. The Examiner further explains that the declaration fails to overcome the applied rejections because there is no nexus between the declaration and the presently claimed invention. Id. at 2—3. Finally, the Examiner notes that Appellant’s argument of commercial success is related to claims that are not the same as those currently pending. Id. at 3. In Reply, Appellant argues that Mr. Chipping’s Declaration testimony, while admittedly submitted in another application, is equally applicable to the claims that are currently pending. Reply Br. 7. Appellant argues that Mr. Chipping’s Declaration testimony is sufficient to establish each of the following three secondary considerations of nonobviousness: (1) copying by others; (2) long-felt but unsolved needs; and (3) commercial success. Appeal Br. 10, Reply Br. 9. Copying A party may prove copying by showing that an accused copier had access to the patented product combined with substantial similarity to the patented product. Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Copying requires evidence of efforts to replicate a specific product. Tokai, 632 F.3d at 1370. A showing of copying is only equivocal evidence of non-obviousness in the absence of more compelling objective indicia of the teachings of U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2005/0022924 of Blackburn ("Blackburn"). Appeal Br. 3. 10 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 other second considerations. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In the instant case, Mr. Chipping testifies that “numerous competitors sprang up, attempting to copy the invisibleSHIELD product.” Chipping Dec. 133. However, apart from Mr. Chipping relating vague and unsubstantiated allegations, there is no persuasive evidence in his declaration that any competitor made a deliberate effort to replicate Appellant’s commercial product. Furthermore, Mr. Chipping provides no analysis that any alleged copy actually practices the claim of any particular patent or patent application. Thus, we find that Appellant’s evidence of copying is entitled to very little weight in a patentability analysis. Long-felt, Unmet Need “Evidence of a long-felt but unresolved need can weigh in favor of the non-obviousness of an invention because it is reasonable to infer the need would not have persisted had the solution been obvious.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 839 F.3d 1034, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2016) Establishing long-felt need requires objective evidence that an art- recognized problem existed in the art for a long period of time without solution. Newell Companies, Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “[L]ong-felt need is analyzed as of the date of an articulated identified problem and evidence of efforts to solve that problem.” Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Establishing long-felt need also requires objective evidence that the invention satisfies the long-felt need. In re Cavanagh, 436 F.2d 491,496 (CCPA 1971). 11 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 Appellant argues that Mr. Chipping’s Declaration demonstrates that there was a long-felt, but unmet need for the types of protective covers and protected electronic devices recited by the claims on appeal. Appeal Br. 8. Appellant argues that customers who saw Mr. Chipping’s protective covers in use “immediately recognized that a long-felt need had finally been met.” Id. at 9 (citing || 21—29 of Chipping Dec.). We have reviewed paragraphs 21—29 of Mr. Chipping’s Declaration and are not persuaded that they establish that an art-recognized problem existed in the art for a long period of time without a solution. Newell, 864 F.2d at 768. In particular, Mr. Chipping’s testimony does not establish any date or other time reference regarding when the alleged problem that was purportedly solved by his invention became recognized in the art. Mr. Chipping’s declaration does not offer any testimony as to efforts by others, over time, to solve the problem. At best, the testimony supports an initially favorable reaction to Mr. Chipping’s new product launch. However, it does not support a finding that a problem existed for a “long period of time” without a solution. Id. Thus, we determine that Appellant’s evidence of long-felt, unmet need is entitled to little weight in a patentability analysis. Commercial Success Commercial success of a product embodying an invention tends to show nonobviousness when “the commercial success ... results from the claimed invention” and is “due to the merits of the claimed invention beyond what was readily available in the prior art.” J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1997). “When a patentee can demonstrate commercial success, usually shown by significant sales in a 12 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 relevant market, and that the successful product is the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent, it is presumed that the commercial success is due to the patented invention.” Id. However, information solely on numbers of units sold is insufficient to establish commercial success. See In re Baxter TravenolLabs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Moreover, evidence of commercial success is only significant if there is a nexus between the claimed invention and the commercial success. Ormco, 463 F.3d at 1311- 12. Mr. Chipping’s testimony recites the text of four pending claims from a previous patent application. Chipping Dec. 12. He then testifies that he conceived of coverings “described by these claims.” Id. 13. Each of the claims recites a first film covering a first surface of a device and a second film covering a second surface of the device. Id. 12. However, Mr. Chipping later indicates that his reported sales figures cover both full-body protectors and screen-only protectors. Id. 130. From the record before us, we are unable to determine whether “screen-only” protectors practice any of the claims recited by Mr. Chipping in paragraph 2 of the declaration. There is no clear and unequivocal testimony in the declaration that provides a detailed description of all of the products that are included in Appellant’s claim of commercial success. Mr. Chipping’s testimony that the commercial products described in the declaration practiced certain pending claims from a related patent application are conclusory at best. Id. 134. In the absence of more detailed descriptions of the products that purportedly achieved commercial success at the time of the related application, it is difficult for us to extrapolate from Mr. Chipping’s testimony in a related case regarding 13 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 different claims to reach a factual determination that those commercial products practiced the invention as currently claimed in the instant appeal. Here, the evidence of commercial success is not persuasive. Appellant reports raw sales figures for a narrow window of time on or about 2006. Chipping Dec. 132. There is no corresponding disclosure of the relevant market size or the degree of Appellant’s market penetration into that market. Furthermore, Appellant’s sales data does not segregate sales of “full-body” protectors from sales of “screen-only” protectors. Chipping Dec. 16, 30 (“this amount includes both full-body and screen-only protectors”). Claim 15 of the instant application, however, claims both a front member and a separate rear member. Claims App. Thus, it is not clear to us how much of Appellant’s commercial sales involved sales of “screen- only” protectors that are not within the scope of claim 15. We are, moreover, not persuaded that Appellant has successfully rebutted the Examiner’s finding that there is no nexus between the alleged commercial success and the subject matter of the claims. Ans. 3. Claim 15 of the instant application and the claims recited in the Chipping Declaration, are merely directed to transparent or substantially transparent films. However, Mr. Chipping’s Declaration testimony touts specific features related to the performance of the product that are not claimed. Chipping Dec. 14 (protects automotive finishes), 1 4 (protects helicopter blades), 117 (“really tough”); 121 (seemingly indestructible), 22 (cannot penetrate with a pen), 14 (renders scratches on old surface “imperceptible”). Appellant’s Specification touts that the protective cover does not “bunch or wrinkle.” 14 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 Spec. 125. The product lies flat against electronic device in a manner that is substantially free of air bubbles. Id. 126. A presumption of nexus may be rebutted by evidence that the proffered secondary considerations are attributable to unclaimed features. WBIP, 829 F.3d at 1329. Here, Appellant’s own evidence strongly suggests that the commercial success of the product, if any, may be attributable not to the fact that it is transparent and enables viewing of a screen, but that the product exhibits particular physical and performance properties that are not claimed.4 In summary, in view of Appellant’s lack of market share evidence together with evidence of record regarding unclaimed features relating to the physical properties and performance of the product, we find that Appellant’s evidence of commercial success is entitled to very little weight. Weighing the evidence as a whole, including the evidence of secondary considerations of non-obvious, we determine that the Examiner’s findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and that the Examiner’s legal conclusion of unpatentability is well founded. Accordingly, we sustain the unpatentability rejection of claims 1—32 over Antonini and Blackburn. 4 Claims 12 and 16 of the instant application have limitations directed to a specified hardness and tensile strength. Claims App. However, Mr. Chipping’s declaration testimony does not indicate that the products about which he testified exhibited such features. In any event, Appellant does not argue for the separate patentability of claims 12 and 16. 15 Appeal 2015-005510 Application 13/153,619 Unpatentability of Claims 1—20 and 23—32 over Chang and Antonini. The Examiner finds that Chang discloses the claimed invention except for being substantially transparent. Final Action 5. The Examiner relies on Antonini as disclosing a transparent skin for handheld devices. Id. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify Chang’s cover to be substantially transparent. Id. According to the Examiner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have done this so that the cover does not detract from features of the mobile device. Id. In traversing the rejection, Appellant relies on the same arguments and evidence concerning secondary considerations that we considered and found unpersuasive with respect to the grounds of rejection over Antonini and Blackburn and which we find equally unpersuasive here. Weighing the evidence as a whole, including the evidence of secondary considerations of non-obviousness, we determine that the Examiner’s findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and that the Examiner’s legal conclusion of unpatentability is well founded. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 1—20 and 23—32 over Change and Antonini. DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1—32 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 16 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation