Ex Parte Chen et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 31, 2017

13222033 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/222,033 08/31/2011 Liang Chen RPS920110042USNP(710.175) 4629
58127 7590 04/03/2017
FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC
409 BROAD STREET
PITTSBURGH, PA 15143
EXAMINER
DOAN, HUAN V
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2437
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/03/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LIANG CHEN, JOSHUA N. NOVAK,
ROD D. WALTERMANN, DAVID RIVERA, and JUN LI
Appeal 2017-001210
Application 13/222,033
Technology Center 2400
Before: JEAN R. HOMERE, DEBRA K. STEPHENS, and
JOHN A. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a Final Rejection of
claims 1—3, 5—13, and 15—21 (App. Br. 5). Claims 4 and 14 have been
canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
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Application 13/222,033
THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
According to Appellants, the claims are directed to an information
handling device and a method to permit execution of code of an application
on the information handling device upon a determination that the application
has system privileges the information handling device (Abstract). Claim 1,
reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. An information handling device comprising:
one or more processors;
a mobile operating system designating user and system
privileges;
a permission vector;
a memory in operative connection with the one or more
processors, the memory storing instructions executable by the
one or more processors to:
retrieve an application from a remote device, wherein the
application requires system privileges to the information
handling device for full installation;
install the application on the information handling device;
determine, using the permission vector operating on said
information handling device, whether the installed application
has system privileges via determining whether the installed
application contains one or more certificates that match one or
more device keys;
execute non-privileged code from the installed application
responsive to determining that the installed application has user
privileges and not system privileges; and
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execute privileged code from the installed application responsive
to determining that the application has system privileges.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Zuk et al.
Freund
Chatterjee et al.
Braams
US 2003/0154399 Al
US 2004/0199763 Al
US 2008/0148298 Al
US 2010/0058317 Al
Aug. 14, 2003
Oct. 7, 2004
June 19, 2008
Mar. 4, 2010
REJECTIONS1
Claims 1—3, 5—9, 11—13, and 15—21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Chatterjee, Freund, and Braams (Final
Act. 5-18).
Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Chatterjee, Braams, Freund, and Zuk (Final Act. 18).
ISSUES
35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 1—3, 5—9, 11—13, and 15—21
Appellants contend their invention as recited in claims 1—3, 5—9, 11—
13, and 15—21, is unpatentable over Chatterjee, Freund, and Braams (App.
Br. 15—19; Reply Br. 16—20).2 The issues presented by the arguments are:
1 The Examiner objects to claims 1—3, 5—10, 12, and 21 (Final Act. 4—5).
These objections are not before us (See MPEP §§ 706.01, 1201 (9th ed., Rev.
9, March 2014)).
2 Rather than repeat the arguments here, we refer to the Appeal Brief and
Reply Brief for the positions of Appellants and the Final Office Action and
Answer for the positions of the Examiner. Only those arguments actually
made by Appellants have been considered in this decision. Arguments that
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Application 13/222,033
Issue 1: Does the combination of Chatterjee, Freund, and Braams
teach or suggest “determine, using a permission vector operating on said
information handling device, whether the installed application has system
privileges via determining whether the installed application contains one or
more certificates that match one or more device keys,” as recited in claim 1?
Issue 2: Does the combination of Chatterjee, Freund, and Braams
teach or suggest “determining whether the installed application has user
privileges and not system privileges,” as recited in claim 1?
Issue 3: Did the Examiner improperly combine the teachings of
Chatterjee, Freund, and Braams?
ANALYSIS
Issue 1:
Appellants contend Chatterjee does not teach “determine, using a
permission vector operating on said information handling device, whether
the installed application has system privileges via determining whether the
installed application contains one or more certificates that match one or
more device keys,” as recited in claim 1 (App. Br. 15—16; Reply Br. 16—17).
According to Appellants, Chatterjee discloses an application runtime
environment (A.R.E.) that receives an individual function call from a
browser based application and determines whether to block or allow a
function based on digital signature information (App. Br. 15—16). Thus,
Appellants assert Chatterjee’s use of the manifest is not a determination as to
Appellants did not make in the Briefs have not been considered and are
deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2012).
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Application 13/222,033
whether an installed application has system or user privileges (App. Br. 16
(citing Chatterjee 145); Reply Br. 17).
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds Chatterjee teaches
determining based on a list of permitted function calls whether to block or
allow a function call to access the computing device’s system resources
controlled by the operating system (Ans. 5 (citing Chatterjee Tflf 31—34)).
We agree with the Examiner that Chatterjee teaches determining whether the
individual function call is permitted to access native functions and data of
the computing device which require system privileges to access and thus,
that Chatterjee teaches determining whether the application has system
privileges (Ans. 5).
Appellants next argue Chatterjee’s list of functions signed and
authorized, does not teach a permission vector because the signing file
contains information of functions the application will access to execute
(App. Br. 16). Appellants additionally contend the signed list in Chatterjee,
is connected to application’s requirements, not the system’s requirements
tied to the permission vector (Reply Br. 18). Appellants further contend
Braams’ public key distributed by a software provider does not teach the
recited permission vector (App. Br. 17—18).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. Initially, we note
Appellants have not defined explicitly the term “permission vector” in their
Specification. Appellants’ Specification describes anon-limiting example in
which the permission vector may comprise a software service interrupter,
which may, for example, conduct a permission check on the application to
determine its permission level (Spec. 123).
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We agree with the Examiner that Chatterjee computing device’s
A.R.E., not the list, makes the determination whether the application’s
function call has permission to access specific system resources (Ans. 5—6).
In particular, Chatterjee teaches the A.R.E. operating on the computer
system, checks the individual function call to restrict access (see Chatterjee
131). Contrary to Appellants’ argument (Reply Br. 18), Chatterjee teaches
the operating system regulates which functions on the computing system are
to be accessed based on its requirements, not the application’s requirements
(see Chatterjee 133; Ans. 6—7). Therefore, Chatterjee determines, using the
permission vector operating on the system, whether the installed application
has system privileges.
Appellants further argue none of the relied upon references teaches
“determining whether the installed application contains one or more
certificates that match one or more device keys,” as recited in claim 1 (App.
Br. 18). More specifically, Appellants assert Freund does not teach use of
certificates or device keys (App. Br. 18 (citing Freund 1 80). However, the
Examiner relies on Braams to teach the application’s digital signature is
verified with the application provider’s public key as the device key (Ans.
6—7 (citing Braams 1 6)). Braams teaches certification of a public key is
achieved by providing a set of certificates (Braams 1 6). Braams further
teaches that certificates are used to trace the signature on the software
module back to the certification authority (id.). Thus, Braams teaches
determining whether the software module contains certificates that match a
device key.
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Therefore, Appellants have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in
finding the combination of Chatterjee, Freund, and Braams teaches
“determine, using a permission vector operating on said information
handling device, whether the installed application has system privileges via
determining whether the installed application contains one or more
certificates that match one or more device keys,” as recited in claim 1.
Issue 2
Appellants argue the combination of Chatterjee, Freund, and Braams
fails to teach “determining whether the installed application has user
privileges and not system privileges,” as recited in claim 1 (App. Br. 18).
Appellants contend Freund teaches a user privilege level for controlling
incoming and outgoing communications made by an application (App. Br.
18 (citing Freund 1 80)). According to Appellants, system privileges refer to
root level privileges, superior to user privileges (Reply Br. 19). The
Examiner finds Freund teaches regulating software processes with user
privileges so as not to be permitted to access services reserved for software
processes with kernel-level privileges (Final Act. 8 (citing Freund 70,
73)). We agree with the Examiner because Freund specifies kernel-level
privileges provide greater access than user privileges (see Freund 70,
73)). Accordingly, Appellants have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in
finding the combination of Chatterjee, Freund, and Braams teaches
“determining whether the installed application has user privileges and not
system privileges,” as recited in claim 1.
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Issue 3:
Appellants further argue Chatterjee teaches web-hosted application
permissions are compared against a manifest which Appellants argue, are
“largely irrelevant” to the recited claim (App. Br. 15—16). According to
Appellants, the applications for which permissions are determined in
Chatterjee are web hosted (App. Br. 16). Appellants additionally argue
Braams teaches away because it requires successful verification before the
program is installed (App. Br. 18 (citing Braams 118)).
We interpret Appellants’ argument that the applications in Chatterjee
are installed on remote web servers, rather than on the computing device.
Appellants’ arguments that Chatterjee, being directed to a web-hosted
application, is a “wholly different application process” (App. Br. 16) are not
persuasive. The Examiner finds Chatterjee teaches that the application is
installed on the computing device (Ans. 5; see Chatterjee 131 (“[T]he
A.R.E. [] may receive an individual function call from a browser based
application [] running locally on a computing device”)). Thus, as set forth
above, we find Chatterjee teaches the application is installed on the
information handling device.
We additionally are not persuaded Braams teaches away (App. Br.
18). The Examiner relies on Braams to teach preloading the key and
software module to determine the authenticity of the key actually used to
sign the software module (Ans. 6—7 (citing Braams 1 6)) and not installing
the application. Thus, Appellants appear to be arguing the reference
individually while the Examiner is relying on the combination. Moreover,
Braams teaches verifying the software integrity before installing it on the
electronic device (see Braams Tflf 17—18). Appellants have not proffered
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Application 13/222,033
sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us Braams criticizes, discredits,
or otherwise discourages modifying Chatterjee, Freund, or a combination
thereof, to arrive at the recited invention; therefore, Appellants have not
persuaded us the Examiner improperly combined the teachings and
suggestions of Chatterjee, Freund, and Braams.
Summary
In light of these findings and conclusions, Appellants have not
persuaded us the combination of Chatterjee, Freund, and Braams fails to
teach, suggest, or otherwise render obvious the limitations as recited in claim
1, and claims 2, 3, 5—9, 11—13, and 15—21, not separately argued (App. Br.
19; Reply Br. 20).
35 U.S.C.§ 103(a): Claim 10
Appellants did not separately argue claim 10, instead relying on
arguments set forth with respect to claim 1 (App. Br. 19; Reply Br. 20). For
the reasons set forth above, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for
obviousness over Chatterjee, Braams, Freund, and Zuk.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—3, 5—9, 11—13, and 15—21 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Chatterjee, Freund, and
Braams is affirmed.
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The Examiner’s rejection of claims 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Chatterjee, Braams, Freund, and Zuk is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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