Ex Parte Carlson et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 23, 2015

12023023 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte RICHARD A. CARLSON and CYNTHIA L. CAFFREY ____________ Appeal 2012-012402 Application 12/023,023 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before JEAN R. HOMERE, CATHERINE SHIANG, and NORMAN H. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judges. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims 1–20. 1 We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellants identify Agilent Technologies, Inc. as the real party in interest. (App. Br. 3.) Appeal 2012-012402 Application 12/023,023 2 THE INVENTION The claims are directed to a quick-stop feature built into power systems to enable rapid deactivation of the power output. (Abstract.) Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A power system comprising: an interface for receiving a signal input; and a processor for deactivating a power output in response to the interface receiving the signal input, the deactivating occurring in an interval of time less than a delay time of a pre- programmed power output deactivation delay. The Examiner rejected claims 1–2, 4–6, 9–15, 17, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Homer et al. (US 7,551,428 B2; issued June 23, 2009). (Ans. 3–5.) The Examiner rejected claims 3, 7–8, 16, 18, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Homer and Juhasz et al. (US 4,307,455; issued Dec. 22, 1981). (Ans. 5–6.) ISSUES ON APPEAL Appellants’ Appeal Brief raises the following issues: 2 2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and the Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed Jun. 5, 2012), Reply Brief (filed Sep. 12, 2012), and the Answer (mailed Jul. 11, 2012) for the respective details. We have considered in this Decision only those arguments Appellants properly raised in the Brief. Any other arguments Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Brief, or which are made in a conclusory fashion, are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2012). Appeal 2012-012402 Application 12/023,023 3 First Issue: Whether Homer discloses the claim 1 limitation of “deactivating a power output . . . in an interval of time less than a delay time of a pre-programmed power output deactivation delay.” (App. Br. 5–9.) Second Issue: Whether the Examiner’s anticipation analysis of claim 11 was sufficiently articulated. (App. Br. 9–10.) ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’ arguments. We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Ans. 3–6); and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (Ans. 6–7), and concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. First Issue Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that Homer discloses the claim 1 limitation of “deactivating a power output . . . in an interval of time less than a delay time of a pre-programmed power output deactivation delay.” (App. Br. 5–9.) In particular, Appellants argue that Homer discloses “the immediate cut of power . . . to one or more components and . . . not a deactivation of the entire power system. . . .” (App. Br. 5.) Appellants also argue that the power cut-off “occurs through a button . . . and not through a processor.” (App. Br. 5–6.) In addition, Appellants argue that Homer does not disclose a system shutdown “in an interval of time less than a delay time of a pre-programmed power output deactivation delay.” (App. Br. 6.) Appeal 2012-012402 Application 12/023,023 4 However, we agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that the broadest reasonable construction of the claim does not require “deactivation of the entire power system” and therefore, the Examiner correctly found that Homer discloses this aspect of the claim limitation at issue. (Ans. 7.) In addition, we agree with the Examiner’s findings that Homer discloses that a processor “deactivat[es] a power output . . . in an interval of time less than a delay time of a pre-programmed power output deactivation delay.” In particular, Homer discloses: “The power shut-down may occur concurrently, or immediately after, or after a preset time delay, or after general completion of pending operations associated with the components . . . . As mentioned above, in some embodiments, the automatic trigger or button 12 may function with or without the component power controller 14 to immediately cut the power to the various components . . . without any considerable delay.” (Homer, col. 3, ll. 48–55.) Thus, Homer describes a “power controller 14” participates in “immediately cut[ting] the power.” We agree with the Examiner’s finding that this disclosure of a “power controller” satisfies the claim requirement of a “processor,” and furthermore we agree with the Examiner that “An immediate power shut-down is considered ‘an interval of time less than a delay time of a preprogrammed power output deactivation delay. ’” (Ans. 7.) Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Second Issue Appellants argue that the Examiner’s finding that Homer anticipated the subject matter of claim 11 was improper because it lacked specificity. (App. Br. 9–10.) We do not find this argument persuasive. Claim 11 is a Appeal 2012-012402 Application 12/023,023 5 method claim version of system claim 1, with substantively identical limitations. It was proper for the Examiner to analyze the two independent claims together, and we agree with the Examiner’s findings regarding anticipation of claim 11 for the same reasons as discussed above. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1 and 11. For the same reasons, we also sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) rejection of claims 2, 4–6, 9–10, 12–15, 17, and 19 over Homer, which rejection is not argued separately with particularity. (App. Br. 9–10.) In addition, we sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 3, 7– 8, 16, 18, and 20 over Homer and Juhasz, which rejection is not argued separately with particularity. (App. Br. 10.) DECISION The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv)(2012). AFFIRMED lv