Ex Parte Bush et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardApr 25, 201915092216 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 15/092,216 04/06/2016 42982 7590 04/29/2019 Rockwell Automation, Inc./FY Attention: Linda H. Kasulke E-7Fl 9 1201 South Second Street Milwaukee, WI 53204 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Michael A. Bush UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 2012P-030-US 1-CONl 1066 EXAMINER REV AK, CHRISTOPHER A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2431 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/29/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): howell@fyiplaw.com docket@fyiplaw.com raintellectualproperty@ra.rockwell.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MICHAEL A. BUSH, ROBERT A. BRANDT, RONALD E. BLISS, and MICHAEL B. MILLER Appeal2018-006866 1 Application 15/092,216 Technology Center 2400 Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, ADAM J. PYONIN, and NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM. 1 Rockwell Automation Technologies, Inc., as the parent company of the assignee of this application, is identified as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal2018-006866 Application 15/092,216 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction The Application is directed to providing "security for interface devices of an automation control and monitoring system" in which a "role- based security solution is provided that includes a guest user account." Spec. ,r 9. Claims 1-20 are pending; claims 1, 12, and 18 are independent. See App. Br. 18-21. Claim 1 is reproduced below for reference (with added emphasis and bracketed lettering for the process steps): 1. An automation control system, comprising: an interface device configured to enable a user to monitor, control, or monitor and control processes of the automation control system: a display of the interface device, wherein the interface device and display are configured to present a graphical-user- interface that enables the user to monitor, control, or monitor and control the processes of the automation control system; a processor of the interface device configured to: [a] render a plurality of interface screens to the display; [b] determine a set of access rights of a protected interface screen of the plurality of interface screens, at least one object of the protected interface screen, or both; [ c] wherein the set of access rights are inherited from access rights associated with a one or more of the plurality of interface screens, a folder containing the protected interface screen, or both; and [ d] provide access, via the protected interface screen, to monitor, control, or monitor and control the processes based upon the set of access rights. References and Re} ections Claims 1-20 stand rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting in view of US Patent No. 9,323,245 B2. Final Act. 9 2 Appeal2018-006866 Application 15/092,216 Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being unpatentable over Finney (US 2008/0162930 Al; July 3, 2008) and Norring (US 8,219,919 B2; July 10, 2012). Final Act. 10. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants' arguments. Arguments Appellants could have made but chose not to make are deemed waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). Other than with respect to claims 6 and 1 7, we adopt the Examiner's findings and conclusions as our own to the extent consistent with our analysis herein, and we add the following discussion primarily for emphasis. A. Double Patenting Appellants do not dispute the double patenting rejection. See App. Br. 5-17; Ans. 4. 2 We, therefore, summarily affirm the rejection. See Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("When the appellant fails to contest a ground of rejection to the Board, ... the Board may treat any argument with respect to that ground of rejection as waived."). B. Claim Construction Claim 1 recites various clauses connected by an "or" term; these clauses, thus, are interpreted as disjunctive, as the terms therein are presented in the alternative. See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[The] disclosure of two-digit remediation anticipates the Brown two-digit rededication. By claiming his invention in the alternative, 2 Herein, we refer to the Examiner's Answer mailed May 1, 2018. 3 Appeal2018-006866 Application 15/092,216 Dr. Brown has presented a claim for which infringement would lie whether or not there were also offset of three-digit or four-digit year dates."); cf SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 886 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("the patentee used the term 'and' to separate the categories of criteria, which connotes a conjunctive list"). Particularly, limitations [b] and [ c] of claim 1 have the following form: [ verb clause] [ element one], [ element two], [ element three, which is "or both"]. Each of these limitations requires the application of the verb clause to only one of the three listed elements. Any other construction would impermissibly read the term "or both" out of the claim. See In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970) ("All words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art."). Based upon this construction, limitations [b] and [ c] would read on art that merely discloses, in relevant part, the following elements: [b] determine a set of access rights of a protected interface screen of the plurality of interface screens; [ c] wherein the set of access rights are inherited from access rights associated with a one or more [ interface screens] 3 of the plurality of interface screens. Furthermore, claim 1 recites two sets of access rights: a determined set of access rights for the "protected interface screen," and an associated set of access rights for "a one or more [interface screens] of the plurality of interface screens." The claim recites, in limitation [d], that the determined access rights are inherited from the associated access rights. Such 3 Claim 1 only recites a single "plurality of interface screens," therefore we construe the limitation "a one or more" as applying to the interface screens within the plurality. We do not reach the issue of whether "a one or more" should be read as "one or more." 4 Appeal2018-006866 Application 15/092,216 inheritance can be "some or all," so that the determined access rights-upon inheriting all the rights-will be the same as the associated access rights. Spec. ,r 47; see also Spec. ,r,r 9, 21, 65. As such, claim 1 requires only one unique set of access rights. C. Obviousness Appellants argue claims 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, and 15 separately. See App. Br. 10-16. We discuss each of these claims in tum. Independent Claim 1 Appellants contend the Examiner errs by rejecting claim 1 in view of Finney and Norring: There is no suggestion in N orring or Finney of [ 1] "a set of access rights of a protected interface screen of the plurality of interface screens, at least one object of the protected interface screen, or both," let alone [2] inheritance of these set of access rights "from access rights associated with a one or more of the plurality of interface screens, a folder containing the protected interface screen, or both," as recited by the current claims. App. Br. 9. Regarding the first disputed limitation ( claim 1 limitation [b ]), Appellants argue "at best, Finney discloses determination of security settings of an IED [ (Intelligent Electronic Device)] that may impact whether a password prompt is provided for certain IED actions performed on the screen, while providing access rights to the screen without regard to the security settings." App. Br. 8. Appellants assert Finney, thus, "appears to provide unfettered access to screens and their objects," which "is not analogous to" limitation [b]. Id. 5 Appeal2018-006866 Application 15/092,216 We are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding limitation [b] of claim 1 is taught or suggested by Finney' s disclosure that "[p ]ermissions are assigned to the user of the IED [that] dictate what types of actions may be performed through the interface that is associated with their account." Advisory Act. 3 (citing Finney ,r 37). Finney determines access rights because Finney uses a security file to determine "the user's identity, role, and associated permissions" based on a user's login credentials. Finney ,r 4 7. These access rights are of a "protected screen of the plurality of interface screens, [or] at least one object of the protected interface screen," as claimed, because Finney's IED consolidates multiple control functions to manage multiple pieces of equipment, and the user can be "restricted (via a role-based access system and method) to only the hardware/software of the IED that performs the functions the user is authorized to service." Finney ,r 12; see also Finney Tables 2--4. Accordingly, Finney teaches or suggests limitation [b] of claim 1. 4 Regarding the second disputed limitation ( claim 1 limitation [ c ]), Appellants argue "Norring, at best, disclose[s] independent 'Entity Relationship Objects 302' that define relationships between objects, such that access rights of one object may be inherited by another." App. Br. 9. 4 Finney's disclosure that "!ED-related screens and/or commands may be navigated without password prompts" further teaches or suggests limitation [b]. Finney ,r 61. Finney's initial lack of a password requirement is an "access right" that is tantamount to Appellants' "guest user account," which may be automatically "logged in upon power up or initialization." Spec. ,r 9; see also Spec. ,r 48. Finney discloses other screens or objects of the IED will require a different set of access rights. See Finney ,r 61 ("When an action defined in Table 2 is attempted and Security has been enabled in the IED 100 then the IED 100 will require a password before the action is processed."). 6 Appeal2018-006866 Application 15/092,216 Appellants assert, therefore, "[i]nstead of inheriting access rights for interface screens, based upon access rights associated with other interface screens and/or a folder containing the protected interface screen," as claimed, "Norring allows 'entity objects' to inherit from other 'entity objects,"' and "Finney, at best, is related to permissions for an IED." Id. We are not persuaded the Examiner erred in determining the combination of Finney and N orring teaches or suggests limitation [ c]. See Final Act. 10; Ans. 9--10. Particularly, the Examiner finds, and we agree, "[t]he teachings ofNorring et al. are relied upon for the inheriting of access rights," and Finney teaches access rights are associated with particular screens using a "(role based access) computer program that is particular for a specified role (protected access via the presented interface screen for that particular role)." Final Act. 3; Norring 6:25-34; Finney ,r,r 37, 47, 54. Appellants argue each reference separately, but do not show the combination of cited references fail to teach or suggest the requirements of limitation [ c] of claim 1. See App. Br. 8-10; Ans. 9 ("the rejection[ is] based on [a] combination[] of references"). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent claim 1. Dependent Claim 4 "Claim 4 recites, inter alia, 'the access rights are inherited from a higher-level interface page relative to the protected inteiface screen,"' and Appellants argue "the cited portion of Finney merely relates to generating user roles from basic permissions, which is wholly different tha[ n] the current claim recitations." App. Br. 10. Appellants contend, "at best, 7 Appeal2018-006866 Application 15/092,216 Finney discloses higher level access roles (e.g., an administrator vs. a user role), not a 'higher-level interface page relative to the protected interface screen,' as recited by the claim," because "[ r Joles and pages are not analogous." Id. Appellants do not persuasively show the Examiner errs in determining one of ordinary skill would apply Finney's higher level access teachings to the interface pages of the combination of cited references. See Ans. 1 O; Finney ,r,r 12, 43, 47, 57; Norring 6:25-34, 53-7:6. Separately, Appellants do not identify, nor do we find, a definition or limiting description of the recited "a higher-level interface page" in the Specification. Rather, the term "higher-level" appears to be able to be interpreted as at least referring to a page that has its rights inherited by another page. See, e.g., Spec. ,r 45 ("These access rights may be inherited from other, higher-level, interface screens or folders containing the interface screens."). This is no different than the Examiner's mapping of the limitation to the combined teachings of the cited references. See Ans. 10. Thus, we do not find the Examiner errs in determining the interface screen providing the access rights for inheritance, as taught or suggested by the combination of Finney and Norring, is a "a higher-level interface page relative to the protected interface screen" within the meaning of the claim. See Final Act. 11. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent claim 4. 8 Appeal2018-006866 Application 15/092,216 Dependent Claim 5 "Claim 5 recites, inter alia, 'the set of access rights comprise access rights of the at least one object of the protected inteiface screen, inherited from access rights of the protected inteiface screen,"' and Appellants argue the Examiner errs in finding these limitations obvious in view of the teachings of Finney and Norring: [N]either reference provides any indication of a relationship between "at least one object of the protected interface screen" and "the protected interface screen," let alone suggest access rights for the protected interface screen/objects of the protected interface screen or that objects could inherit access "from access rights of the protected interface screen." App. Br. 12. We are not persuaded the Examiner errs for the reasons discussed above with respect to independent claim 1. Particularly, Norring teaches inheritance of access rights, and Finney's permissions for different roles teaches access rights for objects and screens of an interface. See Final Act. 5; Norring 1:34--35, 6:25-34; Finney ,r,r 12, 54, 61, Tables 1--4. Finney's permissions allow different roles to have access to different objects and screens. See Finney ,r 54. Appellants do not provide substantive argument or evidence to show error in relying on the combination of references to teach or suggest the claim limitations. See Final Act. 12. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent claim 5. Dependent Claim 6 Appellants argue the Examiner's rejection of claim 6 is in error, because "[ c ]laim 6 recites, inter alia, ... 'wherein the set of access rights are 9 Appeal2018-006866 Application 15/092,216 inherited only when the inherit access choice is selected,"' and "there is no disclosure of the recited features found anywhere in the cited art." App. Br. 12-13 (emphasis added). We are persuaded the Examiner errs. In rejecting dependent claim 6, the Examiner presents no findings, citations to a reference, or reasons for modifying the cited references, with respect to the "wherein ... only" clause of claim 6. See Final Act 5, 12; Advisory Act. 5; Ans. 12. Thus, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner has not presented a prima facie case of obviousness. See KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) ("[R ]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness"). Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent claim 6, or dependent claim 17, which recites similar limitations. Dependent Claim 8 "Claim 8 recites, inter alia, 'the access rights are inherited from a security properties screen that provides security settings at a root screen of the plurality of interface screens"" and Appellants argue "the cited portion of Finney merely relates to generating user roles from basic permissions, which is wholly different tha[ n] the current claim recitations." App. Br. 14. Appellants contend that in the cited references, "[ t ]here is no discussion of inheritance from a root screen of the plurality of interface screens." Id. Appellants do not persuasively show the Examiner errs in determining one of ordinary skill would apply Norring's inheritance teachings to 10 Appeal2018-006866 Application 15/092,216 Finney's security property screen that provides security settings at a root screen, as claimed. See Ans. 13; Norring 6:25-34, 53-7:6; Finney ,r,r 12, 54, 57, 61. Particularly, Appellants do not identify, nor do we find, a definition or description of the recited "root screen" in the Specification. Thus, we do not find the Examiner errs in determining the role based access computer program of Finney teaches or suggests the claimed security properties screen that provides security settings at a root screen of the plurality of interface screens. See Final Act. 12-13; Finney ,r 54 ("After the user name is entered, a list of basic permissions, permission groups, and existing roles is displayed. The administrator may assign any or all of the items from this list to the new role."). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent claim 8. Dependent Claim 11 "Claim 11 recites, inter alia, 'the security properties screen comprises a reset button that, when actuated, resets the user roles to an inherit access choice,"' and Appellants argue "[ t ]here is no discussion of resetting user roles, let alone resetting them to inherit access found in these portions or any other portions of Finney." App. Br. 15. We are not persuaded the Examiner errs. The Examiner finds "Finney et al discloses wherein the security properties screen comprises a modifying ( equated to a reset option) button that, when actuated, modifies (resets) the user roles to an access choice." Ans. 13; Final Act. 6; Finney ,r 48. Appellants do not challenge the Examiner's finding that Finney's modifying step teaches or suggests the recited reset functionality. See Reply Br. 6. 11 Appeal2018-006866 Application 15/092,216 Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent claim 11. Dependent Claim 15 "Claim 15 recites, inter alia, 'inherit the access rights from a folder containing the protected interface screen,"' and Appellants argue "neither of [the cited] references even once discusses the folder containing the protected interface screen, let alone access rights of the folder that may be inherited by the protected interface screen." App. Br. 16. We agree with Appellants that the Examiner's reliance on inherency for the "folder" recitation is in error, as there is no indication a folder structure is required in either Finney or Norring. See App. Br. 16-17; see also Reply Br. 4 ("[T]here is nothing inherent about the program being stored in a folder structure. For example, the access rights could be stored in random access memory, etc."). The Examiner, however, alternatively finds one of ordinary skill would have modified the combined teachings of Finney and Norring to organize the protected interface screen in a folder, because "[ f]olders [were] known to one of ordinary skill in the art as a way of organizing computer files and data." Ans. 14. We find the Examiner's determination to be reasonable. "A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton" (KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)), whose "inferences and creative steps" we may consider (id. at 418). Further, the Examiner effectively has taken Official Notice for the claimed folder structures, which Appellants have not adequately traversed. See Ans. 14--15; Reply Br. 6-7; MPEP 2144.03. 12 Appeal2018-006866 Application 15/092,216 Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent claim 15. CONCLUSION We summarily affirm the Examiner's double patenting rejection of claims 1-2 0. We affirm the Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent claim 1 and dependent claims 4, 5, 8, 11, and 15. See App. Br. 5-17. Appellants advance no further argument on claims 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 12-14, 16, and 18-20. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner's obviousness rejection of these claims for the same reasons discussed above. We do not affirm the Examiner's obviousness rejection of dependent claims 6 and 1 7. DECISION The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-20 is affirmed. The Examiner's decision is affirmed because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(a)(l). See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(a)(l). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 13 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation