Ex Parte Bush et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 25, 2019

15092216 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
15/092,216 04/06/2016
42982 7590 04/29/2019
Rockwell Automation, Inc./FY
Attention: Linda H. Kasulke E-7Fl 9
1201 South Second Street
Milwaukee, WI 53204
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Michael A. Bush
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
2012P-030-US 1-CONl 1066
EXAMINER
REV AK, CHRISTOPHER A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2431
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/29/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
howell@fyiplaw.com
docket@fyiplaw.com
raintellectualproperty@ra.rockwell.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MICHAEL A. BUSH, ROBERT A. BRANDT,
RONALD E. BLISS, and MICHAEL B. MILLER
Appeal2018-006866 1
Application 15/092,216
Technology Center 2400
Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 Rockwell Automation Technologies, Inc., as the parent company of the
assignee of this application, is identified as the real party in interest. App.
Br. 2.
Appeal2018-006866
Application 15/092,216
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
The Application is directed to providing "security for interface
devices of an automation control and monitoring system" in which a "role-
based security solution is provided that includes a guest user account."
Spec. ,r 9. Claims 1-20 are pending; claims 1, 12, and 18 are independent.
See App. Br. 18-21. Claim 1 is reproduced below for reference (with added
emphasis and bracketed lettering for the process steps):
1. An automation control system, comprising:
an interface device configured to enable a user to monitor,
control, or monitor and control processes of the automation
control system:
a display of the interface device, wherein the interface
device and display are configured to present a graphical-user-
interface that enables the user to monitor, control, or monitor and
control the processes of the automation control system;
a processor of the interface device configured to:
[a] render a plurality of interface screens to the
display;
[b] determine a set of access rights of a protected
interface screen of the plurality of interface screens, at least one
object of the protected interface screen, or both;
[ c] wherein the set of access rights are inherited
from access rights associated with a one or more of the plurality
of interface screens, a folder containing the protected interface
screen, or both; and
[ d] provide access, via the protected interface
screen, to monitor, control, or monitor and control the processes
based upon the set of access rights.
References and Re} ections
Claims 1-20 stand rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double
patenting in view of US Patent No. 9,323,245 B2. Final Act. 9
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Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Finney (US 2008/0162930 Al; July 3, 2008) and Norring
(US 8,219,919 B2; July 10, 2012). Final Act. 10.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants'
arguments. Arguments Appellants could have made but chose not to make
are deemed waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). Other than with
respect to claims 6 and 1 7, we adopt the Examiner's findings and
conclusions as our own to the extent consistent with our analysis herein, and
we add the following discussion primarily for emphasis.
A. Double Patenting
Appellants do not dispute the double patenting rejection. See App.
Br. 5-17; Ans. 4. 2 We, therefore, summarily affirm the rejection. See Hyatt
v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("When the appellant fails to
contest a ground of rejection to the Board, ... the Board may treat any
argument with respect to that ground of rejection as waived.").
B. Claim Construction
Claim 1 recites various clauses connected by an "or" term; these
clauses, thus, are interpreted as disjunctive, as the terms therein are
presented in the alternative. See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) ("[The] disclosure of two-digit remediation anticipates the Brown
two-digit rededication. By claiming his invention in the alternative,
2 Herein, we refer to the Examiner's Answer mailed May 1, 2018.
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Dr. Brown has presented a claim for which infringement would lie whether
or not there were also offset of three-digit or four-digit year dates."); cf
SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 886 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) ("the patentee used the term 'and' to separate the categories of
criteria, which connotes a conjunctive list").
Particularly, limitations [b] and [ c] of claim 1 have the following
form: [ verb clause] [ element one], [ element two], [ element three, which is
"or both"]. Each of these limitations requires the application of the verb
clause to only one of the three listed elements. Any other construction
would impermissibly read the term "or both" out of the claim. See In re
Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970) ("All words in a claim must be
considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art.").
Based upon this construction, limitations [b] and [ c] would read on art
that merely discloses, in relevant part, the following elements:
[b] determine a set of access rights of a protected interface
screen of the plurality of interface screens;
[ c] wherein the set of access rights are inherited from access
rights associated with a one or more [ interface screens] 3 of the
plurality of interface screens.
Furthermore, claim 1 recites two sets of access rights: a determined
set of access rights for the "protected interface screen," and an associated set
of access rights for "a one or more [interface screens] of the plurality of
interface screens." The claim recites, in limitation [d], that the determined
access rights are inherited from the associated access rights. Such
3 Claim 1 only recites a single "plurality of interface screens," therefore we
construe the limitation "a one or more" as applying to the interface screens
within the plurality. We do not reach the issue of whether "a one or more"
should be read as "one or more."
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Application 15/092,216
inheritance can be "some or all," so that the determined access rights-upon
inheriting all the rights-will be the same as the associated access rights.
Spec. ,r 47; see also Spec. ,r,r 9, 21, 65. As such, claim 1 requires only one
unique set of access rights.
C. Obviousness
Appellants argue claims 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, and 15 separately. See App.
Br. 10-16. We discuss each of these claims in tum.
Independent Claim 1
Appellants contend the Examiner errs by rejecting claim 1 in view of
Finney and Norring:
There is no suggestion in N orring or Finney of [ 1] "a set of access
rights of a protected interface screen of the plurality of interface
screens, at least one object of the protected interface screen, or
both," let alone [2] inheritance of these set of access rights "from
access rights associated with a one or more of the plurality of
interface screens, a folder containing the protected interface
screen, or both," as recited by the current claims.
App. Br. 9.
Regarding the first disputed limitation ( claim 1 limitation [b ]),
Appellants argue "at best, Finney discloses determination of security settings
of an IED [ (Intelligent Electronic Device)] that may impact whether a
password prompt is provided for certain IED actions performed on the
screen, while providing access rights to the screen without regard to the
security settings." App. Br. 8. Appellants assert Finney, thus, "appears to
provide unfettered access to screens and their objects," which "is not
analogous to" limitation [b]. Id.
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We are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding limitation [b] of
claim 1 is taught or suggested by Finney' s disclosure that "[p ]ermissions are
assigned to the user of the IED [that] dictate what types of actions may be
performed through the interface that is associated with their account."
Advisory Act. 3 (citing Finney ,r 37). Finney determines access rights
because Finney uses a security file to determine "the user's identity, role,
and associated permissions" based on a user's login credentials. Finney
,r 4 7. These access rights are of a "protected screen of the plurality of
interface screens, [or] at least one object of the protected interface screen,"
as claimed, because Finney's IED consolidates multiple control functions to
manage multiple pieces of equipment, and the user can be "restricted (via a
role-based access system and method) to only the hardware/software of the
IED that performs the functions the user is authorized to service." Finney
,r 12; see also Finney Tables 2--4. Accordingly, Finney teaches or suggests
limitation [b] of claim 1. 4
Regarding the second disputed limitation ( claim 1 limitation [ c ]),
Appellants argue "Norring, at best, disclose[s] independent 'Entity
Relationship Objects 302' that define relationships between objects, such
that access rights of one object may be inherited by another." App. Br. 9.
4 Finney's disclosure that "!ED-related screens and/or commands may be
navigated without password prompts" further teaches or suggests
limitation [b]. Finney ,r 61. Finney's initial lack of a password requirement
is an "access right" that is tantamount to Appellants' "guest user account,"
which may be automatically "logged in upon power up or initialization."
Spec. ,r 9; see also Spec. ,r 48. Finney discloses other screens or objects of
the IED will require a different set of access rights. See Finney ,r 61 ("When
an action defined in Table 2 is attempted and Security has been enabled in
the IED 100 then the IED 100 will require a password before the action is
processed.").
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Appellants assert, therefore, "[i]nstead of inheriting access rights for
interface screens, based upon access rights associated with other interface
screens and/or a folder containing the protected interface screen," as
claimed, "Norring allows 'entity objects' to inherit from other 'entity
objects,"' and "Finney, at best, is related to permissions for an IED." Id.
We are not persuaded the Examiner erred in determining the
combination of Finney and N orring teaches or suggests limitation [ c]. See
Final Act. 10; Ans. 9--10. Particularly, the Examiner finds, and we agree,
"[t]he teachings ofNorring et al. are relied upon for the inheriting of access
rights," and Finney teaches access rights are associated with particular
screens using a "(role based access) computer program that is particular for a
specified role (protected access via the presented interface screen for that
particular role)." Final Act. 3; Norring 6:25-34; Finney ,r,r 37, 47, 54.
Appellants argue each reference separately, but do not show the combination
of cited references fail to teach or suggest the requirements of limitation [ c]
of claim 1. See App. Br. 8-10; Ans. 9 ("the rejection[ is] based on [a]
combination[] of references").
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent
claim 1.
Dependent Claim 4
"Claim 4 recites, inter alia, 'the access rights are inherited from a
higher-level interface page relative to the protected inteiface screen,"' and
Appellants argue "the cited portion of Finney merely relates to generating
user roles from basic permissions, which is wholly different tha[ n] the
current claim recitations." App. Br. 10. Appellants contend, "at best,
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Finney discloses higher level access roles (e.g., an administrator vs. a user
role), not a 'higher-level interface page relative to the protected interface
screen,' as recited by the claim," because "[ r Joles and pages are not
analogous." Id.
Appellants do not persuasively show the Examiner errs in determining
one of ordinary skill would apply Finney's higher level access teachings to
the interface pages of the combination of cited references. See Ans. 1 O;
Finney ,r,r 12, 43, 47, 57; Norring 6:25-34, 53-7:6.
Separately, Appellants do not identify, nor do we find, a definition or
limiting description of the recited "a higher-level interface page" in the
Specification. Rather, the term "higher-level" appears to be able to be
interpreted as at least referring to a page that has its rights inherited by
another page. See, e.g., Spec. ,r 45 ("These access rights may be inherited
from other, higher-level, interface screens or folders containing the interface
screens."). This is no different than the Examiner's mapping of the
limitation to the combined teachings of the cited references. See Ans. 10.
Thus, we do not find the Examiner errs in determining the interface screen
providing the access rights for inheritance, as taught or suggested by the
combination of Finney and Norring, is a "a higher-level interface page
relative to the protected interface screen" within the meaning of the claim.
See Final Act. 11.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent
claim 4.
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Dependent Claim 5
"Claim 5 recites, inter alia, 'the set of access rights comprise access
rights of the at least one object of the protected inteiface screen, inherited
from access rights of the protected inteiface screen,"' and Appellants argue
the Examiner errs in finding these limitations obvious in view of the
teachings of Finney and Norring:
[N]either reference provides any indication of a relationship
between "at least one object of the protected interface screen"
and "the protected interface screen," let alone suggest access
rights for the protected interface screen/objects of the protected
interface screen or that objects could inherit access "from access
rights of the protected interface screen."
App. Br. 12.
We are not persuaded the Examiner errs for the reasons discussed
above with respect to independent claim 1. Particularly, Norring teaches
inheritance of access rights, and Finney's permissions for different roles
teaches access rights for objects and screens of an interface. See Final
Act. 5; Norring 1:34--35, 6:25-34; Finney ,r,r 12, 54, 61, Tables 1--4.
Finney's permissions allow different roles to have access to different objects
and screens. See Finney ,r 54. Appellants do not provide substantive
argument or evidence to show error in relying on the combination of
references to teach or suggest the claim limitations. See Final Act. 12.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent
claim 5.
Dependent Claim 6
Appellants argue the Examiner's rejection of claim 6 is in error,
because "[ c ]laim 6 recites, inter alia, ... 'wherein the set of access rights are
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inherited only when the inherit access choice is selected,"' and "there is no
disclosure of the recited features found anywhere in the cited art." App.
Br. 12-13 (emphasis added).
We are persuaded the Examiner errs. In rejecting dependent claim 6,
the Examiner presents no findings, citations to a reference, or reasons for
modifying the cited references, with respect to the "wherein ... only" clause
of claim 6. See Final Act 5, 12; Advisory Act. 5; Ans. 12. Thus, we agree
with Appellants that the Examiner has not presented a prima facie case of
obviousness. See KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)
("[R ]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere
conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning
with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness").
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent
claim 6, or dependent claim 17, which recites similar limitations.
Dependent Claim 8
"Claim 8 recites, inter alia, 'the access rights are inherited from a
security properties screen that provides security settings at a root screen of
the plurality of interface screens"" and Appellants argue "the cited portion
of Finney merely relates to generating user roles from basic permissions,
which is wholly different tha[ n] the current claim recitations." App. Br. 14.
Appellants contend that in the cited references, "[ t ]here is no discussion of
inheritance from a root screen of the plurality of interface screens." Id.
Appellants do not persuasively show the Examiner errs in determining
one of ordinary skill would apply Norring's inheritance teachings to
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Finney's security property screen that provides security settings at a root
screen, as claimed. See Ans. 13; Norring 6:25-34, 53-7:6; Finney ,r,r 12, 54,
57, 61. Particularly, Appellants do not identify, nor do we find, a definition
or description of the recited "root screen" in the Specification. Thus, we do
not find the Examiner errs in determining the role based access computer
program of Finney teaches or suggests the claimed security properties screen
that provides security settings at a root screen of the plurality of interface
screens. See Final Act. 12-13; Finney ,r 54 ("After the user name is entered,
a list of basic permissions, permission groups, and existing roles is
displayed. The administrator may assign any or all of the items from this list
to the new role.").
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent
claim 8.
Dependent Claim 11
"Claim 11 recites, inter alia, 'the security properties screen comprises
a reset button that, when actuated, resets the user roles to an inherit access
choice,"' and Appellants argue "[ t ]here is no discussion of resetting user
roles, let alone resetting them to inherit access found in these portions or any
other portions of Finney." App. Br. 15.
We are not persuaded the Examiner errs. The Examiner finds "Finney
et al discloses wherein the security properties screen comprises a modifying
( equated to a reset option) button that, when actuated, modifies (resets) the
user roles to an access choice." Ans. 13; Final Act. 6; Finney ,r 48.
Appellants do not challenge the Examiner's finding that Finney's modifying
step teaches or suggests the recited reset functionality. See Reply Br. 6.
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Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent
claim 11.
Dependent Claim 15
"Claim 15 recites, inter alia, 'inherit the access rights from a folder
containing the protected interface screen,"' and Appellants argue "neither of
[the cited] references even once discusses the folder containing the protected
interface screen, let alone access rights of the folder that may be inherited by
the protected interface screen." App. Br. 16.
We agree with Appellants that the Examiner's reliance on inherency
for the "folder" recitation is in error, as there is no indication a folder
structure is required in either Finney or Norring. See App. Br. 16-17; see
also Reply Br. 4 ("[T]here is nothing inherent about the program being
stored in a folder structure. For example, the access rights could be stored in
random access memory, etc.").
The Examiner, however, alternatively finds one of ordinary skill
would have modified the combined teachings of Finney and Norring to
organize the protected interface screen in a folder, because "[ f]olders [were]
known to one of ordinary skill in the art as a way of organizing computer
files and data." Ans. 14. We find the Examiner's determination to be
reasonable. "A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton" (KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
421 (2007)), whose "inferences and creative steps" we may consider (id. at
418). Further, the Examiner effectively has taken Official Notice for the
claimed folder structures, which Appellants have not adequately traversed.
See Ans. 14--15; Reply Br. 6-7; MPEP 2144.03.
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Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent
claim 15.
CONCLUSION
We summarily affirm the Examiner's double patenting rejection of
claims 1-2 0.
We affirm the Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent
claim 1 and dependent claims 4, 5, 8, 11, and 15. See App. Br. 5-17.
Appellants advance no further argument on claims 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 12-14, 16,
and 18-20. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner's obviousness rejection of
these claims for the same reasons discussed above.
We do not affirm the Examiner's obviousness rejection of dependent
claims 6 and 1 7.
DECISION
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-20 is affirmed.
The Examiner's decision is affirmed because we have affirmed at
least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal. See
37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(a)(l). See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(a)(l).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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