Ex Parte Burman et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 28, 201913657221 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/657,221 10/22/2012 63710 7590 04/01/2019 INNOVATION DIVISION CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P. 110 EAST 59TH STREET (6TH FLOOR) NEW YORK, NY 10022 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Kevin Burman UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 06-2025-Cl 2046 EXAMINER MYHR, JUSTIN L ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3714 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/01/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patentdocketing@cantor.com lkorovich@cantor.com phowe@cantor.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KEVIN BURMAN and DEAN P. ALDERUCCI Appeal2017-005522 Application 13/657 ,221 Technology Center 3700 Before JOHN C. KERINS, BRANDON J. WARNER, and LISA M. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judges. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's rejection of claims 2-20 and 24. 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM. 1 CFPH, LLC ("Appellant''), the applicant as provided for under 37 C.F.R. § 1.46, is also identified as the real party in interest Appeal Br. 2. 2 Appeal is taken from the Final Office Action dated July 13, 2015. Appeal2017-005522 Application 13/657,221 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claims 13, 20, and 24 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 13, reproduced below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal. 13. A method for wireless gaming, comprising: providing, by a computing device, a wireless gaming terminal having a network interface operable to transmit and receive gaming information; determining, by the computing device, a location of the wireless gaming terminal; and interacting, by the computing device, with a user to implement a game, wherein game play of the game is dependent on the determined location; wherein the game receives the determined location as an input parameter, and alters a user interface for a predetermined game in response thereto. THE REJECTIONS I. Claims 2-9, 11, 13, 18-20, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I02(b) as anticipated by Amaitis (US 2005/0187020 Al; published Aug. 25, 2005). II. Claims 10 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Amaitis and Nguyen (US 2008/0076572 Al; published Mar. 27, 2008). III. Claims 14--17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over Amaitis and Nelson (US 2003/0148809 Al; published Aug. 7, 2003). IV. Claims 2-8, 11-19, and 24 stand rejected on the grounds of nonstatutory double patenting over claims 1-10 of U.S. Patent No. 8,292,741 B2. 2 Appeal2017-005522 Application 13/657,221 V. Claims 9, 10, and 20 stand rejected on the grounds of nonstatutory double patenting over claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,292,741 B2 in view of Nguyen. ANALYSIS Rejection I Independent claim 13 and claims 2-9, 11, 18, and 19 depending therefrom Regarding independent claim 13, the Examiner finds, inter alia, that Amaitis discloses that the game receives the determined location as an input parameter, and alters a user interface for a predetermined game in response thereto, as claimed, because, in Amaitis, "the gaming machine accepting location to enable a game would be the game accepting the input parameter since the use of the gaming device is claimed as the method of the game." Ans. 2-3; see also Final Act. 3 (citing Amaitis ,r,r 44, 49, 54--56, Fig. 6). In other words, the Examiner's position is that Amaitis' location "is part of determining if a game should be run, and that the acceptance or rejection determines the gameplay of the game by either allowing gameplay or disabling gameplay." Ans. 3. The Examiner further finds that Amaitis discloses "a method step of a graphic user interface for a game being enabled based on validation." Id. (citing Amaitis ,r 44). Appellant argues that the Examiner's finding lacks support. Appeal Br. 10 (citing Amaitis ,r,r 44, 49, 54--56, 70, 71, Fig. 6). In particular, Appellant submits that "permitting or disabling gaming is very different from a game using location as an 'input parameter o(the game" and that Amaitis fails to disclose that "any specific 'permitted game' uses a location of a wireless gaming terminal as an input parameter of that specific game" or 3 Appeal2017-005522 Application 13/657,221 that "any specific 'disabled game' receives any parameters whatsoever." Id. at 10-11. Appellant also argues that "the cited passages do not disclose any specific change or alteration of an existing user interface that is triggered by receiving a device location." Id. at 11. Amaitis discloses that "a location verification feature ... is operable to permit or disable gaming from a remote location." Amaitis ,r 44. Amaitis also discloses that depending on the location determination technology being used, the decision whether to permit or prohibit a gaming activity may be made at the gaming communication device, at the gaming server, or at any of the components of the telecommunication network being used to transmit information between the gaming communication device and the gaming server. Id. ,r 51 ( emphasis added). Amaitis further discloses that software is preferably loaded on a gaming communication device and is operable to receive input data for gaming. The input data may originate at associated gaming software resident on the gaming server .... The software on the device is operable to present a representation of a gaming environment. This can include, among other things, a representation of a table game such as a blackjack table or a slot machine. Id. ,r 53 ( emphasis added). Although Amaitis' disclosure of permitting or prohibiting gaming activities based on location discloses that "game play of the game is dependent on the determined location," as claimed (as set forth supra, emphasis added), we determine that Amaitis' disclosure of permitting or prohibiting gaming activities falls short of disclosing that the game ( or gaming software) receives the determined location as an input parameter, as claimed. 4 Appeal2017-005522 Application 13/657,221 Although the Examiner additionally finds, with respect to the independent claims, that "the combination of Nelson" 3 discloses "modifying a game beyond just allowing the game to be played," because Nelson "includes the steps of altering the way games are played including altering wagering rules and output (i.e.[,] sound, video, e[tc].) based on a determined location of a gaming machine," the Examiner fails to provide sufficient notice to Appellant that the anticipation rejection is being recast as an obviousness rejection pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Ans. 4 (emphasis added) (citing Nelson ,r,r 29, 46-47); see also Ans. 2 (indicating that any new ground of rejection will appear under the subheading "NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION"). Appellant does not respond to the Examiner's determination regarding Nelson. See Reply Br. 2. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent claim 13, and dependent claims 2-9, 11, 18, and 19, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Amaitis. Independent claim 20 The Examiner's findings with respect to independent claim 20, which recites in relevant part, "wherein the central server is configured to: receive 3 No inference should be drawn from our declination to exercise our discretion to enter a new ground of rejection of independent claim 13 (and/or independent claim 20\ under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a), as unpatentable over Amaitis and Nelson. Upon any further prosecution, we leave it up to the Examiner to evaluate claims 13 and 20 for patentabiHty under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), in view of the Examiner's reliance on Nelson, for example, for disclosing that location is an input parameter that alters at least one rule of a game, thus, potentially curing the deficiency in the Examiner's reliance on Amaitis alone. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 16 (Claims App.) (claim 14 recites, in relevant part, "wherein the game receives the determined location as an input parameter, and alters at least one nlle of a game in response thereto"). 5 Appeal2017-005522 Application 13/657,221 a determined respective location of a respective mobile terminal as an input parameter for a game associated with the respective mobile terminal" (Appeal Br. 17 (emphasis added)) are deficient for the same reasons stated supra with respect to claim 13. Final Act. 5. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Amaitis. Independent claim 24 Independent claim 24, which differs in scope from independent claims 13 and 20, recites in relevant part, "wherein, at a time when the game is being played ... , game play of the game is dependent on the determined location." Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Amaitis discloses that a location verification feature permits or disables gaming during a gaming session. Amaitis ,r 50 ("the gaming system may periodically update the location determination information ... during a gaming session, at pre-defined time intervals to ensure that movement of the gaming communication device to an unauthorized area is detected during play, and not just upon login or initial access"). Thus, a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's determination that Amaitis discloses that game play is dependent on (i.e., is permitted or prohibited based on) the determined location while the game is being played. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Amaitis. Rejection II The Examiner's reliance on Nguyen for disclosing "a virtual private network" and "a short range modulated magnetic field communication protocol" does not cure the deficiencies in the Examiner's reliance on 6 Appeal2017-005522 Application 13/657,221 Amaitis alone in the rejection of claim 13, as set forth supra. See Final Act. 8. Therefore, for the reasons set forth supra, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 10 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Amaitis and Nguyen. Rejection III Dependent claims 14-17 Claims 14--1 7, which depend from independent claim 13, recite, in relevant part, "wherein the game receives the determined location as an input parameter," and "in response thereto" ( claims 14--1 7): "alters at least one rule of a game" ( claim 14 ), "alters a wager of the game" ( claim 15), "alters a bet option of the game" ( claim 16), and "alters an ancillary incentive for playing the game." Appeal Br. 16 (Claims App.). The Examiner determines that Amaitis does not teach the method steps as recited in claims 14--17, and relies on Nelson for disclosing each of them. Final Act. 9-11 (citations omitted). The Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious to have combined the teachings of Amaitis with Nelson, since Amaitis is modifiable to include the teachings of Nelson wherein game rules and features are modified based on detected location in order to automatically meet desired game types that are determined to be desirable in certain locations or to meet gaming regulations for a set location. Final Act. 9-11 (citing Nelson ,r,r 3, 4, 47, 54 (for disclosing "various reasons for modifying games based on detected locations")). However, the Examiner's stated findings, on this record, with respect to Nelson, and in light of the Examiner's reasoning, do not address with particularity the deficiencies in the Examiner's reliance on Amaitis in the rejection of claim 13, as discussed supra. For example, the Examiner does not provide support 7 Appeal2017-005522 Application 13/657,221 for finding that Nelson discloses that the detected location is "an input parameter" of the game, or that the determined location alters a user interface for a predetermined game "in response" to the game receiving the determined location as an input parameter, as required by claim 13. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 14--17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Amaitis and Nelson. Re} ection IV Appellant does not present any substantive arguments for the patentability of claims 2-8, 11-19, and 24 in view of claims 1-10 of U.S. Patent No. 8,292,741 B2. Appeal Br. 13 (stating that "this rejection can be overcome by filing a proper Terminal Disclaimer"). Accordingly, we summarily affirm the Examiner's rejection on the grounds of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting. Rejection V In the Appeal Brief, Appellant does not present any substantive arguments for the patentability of claims 9, 10, and 20 in view of claim 1 of U.S. Patent 8,292,741 B2 and Nguyen, on the grounds ofnonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting. Appeal Br. 13 (stating that "this rejection can be overcome by filing a proper Terminal Disclaimer"). For the first time in the Reply Brief, Appellant asserts that, with respect to the later rejection, the rejection is "improper" because "[i]t is improper to cite both a reference patent and an unrelated secondary reference (Nguyen) in an obviousness-type double patenting rejection," and also that "a proper rejection on the grounds of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting requires a common inventor or owner or a joint research agreement linking 8 Appeal2017-005522 Application 13/657,221 the cited patent/application and the present application" and that "[t]here is no such link between the present application and Nguyen"). Reply Br. 4. Appellant has not provided good cause as to why the untimely arguments presented for the first time in the Reply Brief were not timely presented in the Appeal Brief, and therefore, Appellant's arguments are deemed waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.41(b)(2); Exparte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 14 73, 14 77 (BP AI 2010) (informative) ("Properly interpreted, the Rules do not require the Board to take up a belated argument that has not been addressed by the Examiner, absent a showing of good cause."). Notwithstanding, the Examiner may properly rely on a secondary reference, in combination with claim 1 ofU.S. Patent 8,292,741 B2 to establish a prima facie case of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting. Appellant does not identify any authority, nor are we aware of any, to support the contention that the Examiner's rejection is somehow "improper because [it] relies on a second reference." Reply Br. 4. The judicial doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting precludes an applicant from extending the term of protection for a patented invention by claiming an obvious variant of the patented invention in a subsequent patent application. See In re Longi, 759 F.2d 889, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also 'fv1PEP § 804 (discussing the obviousness analysis for nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting). Here, the Examiner's reliance on Nguyen as "evidence" of "well-kno\vn features" to render the claims not patentably distinct from claim 1 of U.S. Patent 8,292,741 establishes a prima facie case of obviousness-type double patenting, which Appellant fails to rebut Final Act. 15-16; Reply Br. 4. 9 Appeal2017-005522 Application 13/657,221 Accordingly, we summarily affirm the Examiner's rejection on the grounds of nonstatutory double patenting. DECISION The Examiner's rejection of claims 2-9, 11, 13, and 18-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Amaitis is REVERSED. The Examiner's rejection of claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Amaitis is AFFIRMED. The Examiner's rejection of claims 10 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Amaitis and Nguyen is REVERSED. The Examiner's rejection of claims 14--17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Amaitis and Nelson is REVERSED. The Examiner's rejection of claims 2-8, 11-19, and 24 on the grounds of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting over claims 1-10 of U.S. Patent No. 8,292,741 B2 is AFFIRMED. The Examiner's rejection of claims 9, 10, and 20 on the grounds of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting over claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,292,741 B2 in view ofNguyen is AFFIRMED. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation