Ex Parte Boyes et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 26, 2013

11388501 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 26, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/388,501 03/23/2006 J. Wesley Boyes JR. 8185P020 6966
76073 7590 06/26/2013
InfoPrint Solutions/ Blakely
1279 Oakmead Parkway
Sunnyvale, CA 94085-4040
EXAMINER
HANG, VU B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2671
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/26/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte J. WESLEY BOYES JR. and JASON JAMES GRAMS
____________

Appeal 2011-001010
Application 11/388,501
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER,
and DAVID C. McKONE, Administrative Patent Judges.

McKONE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection
of claims 1-20, which constitute all the claims pending in this application.
See App. Br. 3. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

Appeal 2011-001010
Application 11/388,501

2
THE INVENTION
Appellants’ invention relates to adjusting sleep timeouts in printers.
See Spec. ¶ 0001. Claim 1, which is illustrative of the invention, reads as
follows:
1. A method, comprising:
allocating a first time period at a printer
corresponding to a first period of a day;
allocating a second time period corresponding to a
second period of a day;
measuring usage at the printer during the first and
second periods of the day for a plurality of days;
setting a first sleep timeout period to occur during
the first time period based on a first measured usage at
the printer during the first period of the day; and
setting a second sleep timeout period to occur
during the second time period based on a second
measured usage at the printer during the second period of
the day.

THE REJECTION
Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Endo (US 6,493,100 B1; issued Dec. 10, 2002) and Menzl (US
7,437,578 B2; issued Oct. 14, 2008; filed July 13, 2005). See Ans. 3-7.

ANALYSIS
Appellants argue claims 1-20 together as a group. Therefore, we treat
claim 1 as representative.
The Examiner finds that Endo teaches allocating a time period at a
printer corresponding to a first period of a day, measuring usage at the
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Application 11/388,501

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printer during that period of the day, and setting a sleep timeout period based
on the measurement of usage at the printer. See Ans. 3. However, the
Examiner acknowledges that Endo does not teach doing these steps for a
first and a second period of a day. See id. The Examiner further finds that
Menzl teaches allocating first and second time periods for a day,
determining device usage for the first and second periods, and setting sleep
timeout periods for each respective period of the day based on respective
device usage measurements. See Ans. 3-4. The Examiner combines the
teachings of Endo and Menzl to arrive at claim 1. See Ans. 4.
Appellants contend that Menzl only teaches enabling a sleep function
during a first period of a day, while disabling it during a second period of the
day. See App. Br. 11-12. Appellants admit that Menzl teaches performing a
statistical evaluation for adjusting a sleep interval, but argue that Menzl does
not suggest performing such a statistical evaluation for multiple time periods
during a day. See App. Br. 11. From this reading of Menzl, Appellants
argue that Endo and Menzl fail to teach:
1) Measuring usage at a printer during the first and second
periods of the day. See App. Br. 11-12; and
2) Setting separate sleep time periods during first and
second periods of the day based on measured usages. See
App. Br. 12-13.
The Examiner responds by, inter alia, pointing to Menzl’s disclosure
that users can define multiple sleep periods for a day. See Ans. 8 (citing
Menzl, col. 2, l. 56-col. 3, l. 14). According to Menzl, at column 2, line 56,
a user can “select between several sleep timer strategies.” A strategy where
a sleep function is only enabled during the night is just one such strategy.
See col. 10, ll. 3-16. Indeed, Menzl makes clear that “[a]lthough FIG. 10
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Application 11/388,501

4
illustrates only two periods of the day, corresponding to two timer modes,
the sleep timer may be configured with additional time periods and
additional timer modes.” Menzl, col. 10, ll. 64-67. As the Examiner points
out, Menzl teaches that:
The operation of the sleep timer may be set to different modes
to be used during different periods of the day. The start points
and end points of such periods may be defined by a user. The
user may predefine the switching times between the predefined
periods of the day, define an individual sleep timer strategy for
each defined period of the day, and/or enable or disable the
automatic power state changing function for each defined
period of the day.
Menzl, col. 2, l. 66-col. 3, l. 6 (emphasis added).
In reply, Appellants argue that this disclosure notwithstanding, Menzl
does not teach “setting of a first sleep timeout period based on a first
measured usage during a first period of a day and a second sleep timeout
period based on a second measured usage during a second period of the
day.” Reply Br. 2-3. We disagree. As the Examiner finds, Menzl teaches
that setting a sleep timeout strategy includes setting a sleep timeout period
for a defined period of the day based on measured usage. See Ans. 3-4
(citing Menzl, col. 9, ll. 5-16; col. 10, ll. 40-51; Fig. 7). Thus, Menzl’s
disclosure of defining multiple strategies for multiple times of the day at
least suggests setting separate sleep timeout periods for two periods of a day
based on measured usages during each of those two periods. See Ans. 8.
See also Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A]n analysis of obviousness . . . may include
recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of
ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or
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Application 11/388,501

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expert opinion.”). We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
concluding that claim 1 is obvious.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 and claims 2-20 not
separately argued with particularity.

ORDER
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-20 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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