Ex Parte Bhosle et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 21, 2017

13411150 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 21, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/411,150 03/02/2012 Amit Bhosle 170107-1120 7547
71247 7590 03/23/2017
Client 170101 c/o
THOMAS HORSTEMEYER, LLP
400 INTERSTATE NORTH PARKWAY SE
SUITE 1500
ATLANTA, GA 30339
EXAMINER
LY, TOAN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2887
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/23/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uspatents @ tkhr.com
docketing @ thomashorstemeyer. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte AMIT BHOSLE, AMMAR CHINO Y,
MICHAEL DONIKIAN, and ASHISH AGRAWAL
Appeal 2015-007939
Application 13/411,150
Technology Center 2800
Before GEORGE C. BEST, N. WHITNEY WILSON, and
JEFFREY R. SNAY, Administrative Patent Judges.
SNAY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
Appellants2 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1—14, 17—19, and 26—33. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 We refer to the Specification (“Spec.”) filed March 2, 2012; Final Office
Action (“Final Act.”) dated Sep. 12, 2014; Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App.
Br.”) dated Feb. 12, 2015; Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) dated July 2, 2015;
and Appellants’ Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) dated Aug. 31, 2015.
2 Appellants identify Amazon Technologies, Inc. as the real party in interest.
App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2015-007939
Application 13/411,150
BACKGROUND
The subject matter on appeal relates to “a payment card that is
programmable by a user in order to access one or more accounts from
multiple financial institutions and/or other institutions.” Spec. 2. Claims 1
and 9 are reproduced below from the Claims Appendix of the Appeal Brief:
1. A non-transitory computer-readable medium embodying
a program executable in a computing device implemented on a
payment card, the program comprising:
code that facilitates an automatic selection of one of a
plurality of transaction accounts in the payment card based at
least in part on current time information received from an
internal time clock in the payment card, wherein the internal
time clock is in communication with a processor circuit of the
payment card; and
code that directs a dynamic account mechanism located
in the payment card to embody data associated with the selected
one of the plurality of transaction accounts.
9. A payment card, comprising:
a dynamic magnetic strip;
a processor circuit;
an accelerometer in communication with the processor
circuit; and
an account selection application executed by the
processor circuit, the account selection application comprising:
logic that detects, using information received from the
accelerometer, that the payment card was tapped on an edge;
logic that automatically selects one of a plurality of
transaction accounts in the payment card in response to
determining that the payment card was tapped on the edge; and
logic that directs the dynamic magnetic strip to embody a
code associated with the selected one of the plurality of
transaction accounts that has been selected.
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Appeal 2015-007939
Application 13/411,150
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1—5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Cok,3 Phillips,4 and Mullen.5
II. Claims 6—8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Cok, Phillips, Mullen, and Doman.6
III. Claims 9, 12—14, 19, 26—28, 31, and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Cok and Kohno.7
IV. Claims 10, 11, 17, 18, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Cok, Kohno, Phillips, and Mullen.
V. Claims 29 and 30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Cok, Kohno, Norman,8 and Mullen.
VI. Claim 33 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Cok, Phillips, Mullen, and Kohno.
DISCUSSION
I
With regard to Rejection I, Appellants argue the rejected claims as a
group. App. Br. 5—11. In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv), we
select claim 1 as representative, and decide the appeal based on the
representative claim alone.
3 US 2006/0131393 Al, published June 22, 2006 (“Cok”).
4 US 2012/0310760 Al, published Dec. 6, 2012 (“Phillips”).
5 US 2008/0029607 Al, published Feb. 7, 2008 (“Mullen”).
6 US 2009/0272797 Al, published Nov. 5, 2009 (“Doman”).
7 US 8,643,475 Bl, issued Feb. 4, 2014 (“Kohno”).
8 US 2008/0229411 Al, published Sep. 18, 2008 (“Norman”).
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Application 13/411,150
Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s finding that Cok discloses a
multi-role transaction card that includes code which “facilitates an automatic
selection of one of a plurality of transaction accounts” based on “input
information.” Compare Final Act. 2 with App. Br. 5—11; Reply Br. 4—7.
Input information for use in performing the desired account selection may be
provided by various sensors, such as light sensors, position sensors,
accelerometers, and “other sensors known in the art that can be used to
detect conditions . . . relevant to a user.” Cok 140. However, “Cok does
not explicitly disclose selection based at least in part on current time
information received from an internal clock in the payment card.” Final Act.
3. For that, the Examiner finds that Phillips discloses automatic transaction
account selection, in a mobile telephone, based on user-defined criteria,
including time of day. Id. at 3, 6. “For example, a mobile telephone user
can designate payment card account ‘X’ for use on weekdays between the
hours of 8 am and 10 am . . . and can designate payment card account ‘Y’
for use on weekdays from 11 am to 2 pm . . . Phillips 151. The Examiner
further finds that Mullen teaches use of an internal clock for providing a
timing signal in connection with a dynamic credit card. Final Act. 6—7.
Appellants argue that Mullen’s dynamic credit card involves
periodically changing a credit card number associated with a single account,
and therefore does not teach selecting one of a plurality of different
transaction accounts. App. Br. 5—6; Reply Br. 5—6. This argument is not
persuasive. The Examiner relies on Cok and Phillips as evidence of
automatic selection from a plurality of different accounts. Final Act. 7. The
fact that Mullen is concerned with a single transaction account does not
negate Mullen’s conceptual teaching of using an internal timing mechanism
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Appeal 2015-007939
Application 13/411,150
for time-based operations in a transaction card. Nor does it refute the
Examiner’s finding that one of ordinary skill would have had a reason to
employ an internal clock mechanism to accomplish time-based account
selection in Cok’s transaction card. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425
(CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is . . . what the combined teachings
of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the
art.”).
Appellants’ contention that Phillips is non-analogous art, App. Br. 7—
8, also is not persuasive. A reference is considered analogous art if it is
“reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the invention was
involved.” In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA 1979). Appellants do
not identify in the Appeal Brief the particular problem with which their
invention was involved. However, to the extent that the problem addressed
by Appellants’ invention can be considered permitting automated account
selection from different transaction accounts, that particular problem is
expressly involved in Phillips. See, e.g., Phillips at Abstract (“Methods,
apparatus and systems are described for the automatic selection of a payment
card account for use in a purchase transaction by a payment-enabled mobile
device.”).
Appellants characterize the Examiner’s Rejection I as “piecemeal
reconstruction in which the elements of the prior art are cited and taken out
of context. . . .” App. Br. 9. However, Appellants do not identify any
particular aspect of the Examiner’s reasoning that is taken out of context or
otherwise inconsistent with the full teachings of the references. As such,
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Application 13/411,150
Appellants’ argument does not reveal any reversible error on the part of the
Examiner.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain Rejection I.
II, IV, and V
With regard to Rejections II, IV, and V, Appellants solely rely on the
same arguments presented in connection with Rejection I. App. Br. 11—12,
25—30. Because Appellants’ arguments against Rejection I are not
persuasive, we also sustain Rejections II, IV, and V.
Ill
With regard to Rejection III, Appellants argue the rejected claims as a
group. App. Br. 12—24.9 In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv), we
select claim 9 as representative, and decide the appeal based on the
representative claim alone.
Appellants principally argue that Kohno does not teach using
accelerometer readings to “automatically select[] one of a plurality of
transaction accounts in the payment card in response to determining that the
payment card was tapped on the edge.” App. Br. 12—13. Rather, Appellants
contend, Kohno teaches use of an accelerometer to detect “simple activity
recognition techniques”—so-called “secret handshakes”—to unlock or
activate a contactless transaction card. Id. at 13. The Examiner finds, and
Appellants do not dispute, that Cok discloses automatic selection of one of a
9 Although Appellants group claims 19, 26—28, 31, and 32 under a separate
heading, App. Br. 18, they repeat the same arguments presented for claims 9
and 12—14. Compare App. Br. 12—18 with id. at 18—24.
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Application 13/411,150
plurality of transaction accounts based on input information from an
accelerometer. Final Act. 10—11. See also Cok 140 (“Sensors 35 can
include . . . accelerometers . . . that can be used ... as an input signal from
which controller 14 can determine which transaction partner transaction
card 8 is being used.”). Cok does not specify any particular action to be
detected by the disclosed accelerometer, and one skilled in the art would,
therefore, look to known techniques for using an accelerometer. The fact
that Kohno applies the accelerometer-detected tapping action to unlock a
card does not refute the Examiner’s finding that Kohno teaches that “it is
possible to passively and transparently capture the physical information
describing these movements,” Final Act. 11, such that one skilled in the art
would have recognized Kohno’s accelerometer-detected tapping action as
suitable for providing Cok’s accelerometer-detected input signal for account
selection. Appellants’ further argument that Kohno fails to teach
accelerometer information related to tapping a card’s edge is not supported
by the evidence of record. See Kohno col. 6,11. 35—48 (disclosing that
detectable card movements include “tap[ping] the tag or card”).
Appellants also argue that the combination of Cok and Kohno is
improper because it “changes the principal [of] operation of Kohno.'1'’ App.
Br. 15—16. However, as noted, the Examiner’s obviousness determination is
based on modification of Cok’s payment card and method, by configuring
Cok’s accelerometer to detect a tapping gesture. Appellants do not identify
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Application 13/411,150
any change to the principal of operation of Kohno’s device that would be
germane to the Examiner’s obviousness rationale.
On this record, we are persuaded that a preponderance of the evidence
supports the Examiner’s obviousness determination set forth in Rejection III,
which we sustain.
VI
Appellants present the same arguments against Rejections VI as are
presented against Rejection III. We therefore sustain Rejections VI for the
reasons given above in connection with Rejection III.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—14, 17—19, and 26—33 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136.
AFFIRMED
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