Ex Parte Bhaowal et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 29, 2019

13452193 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/452, 193 04/20/2012
51206 7590 04/02/2019
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP/Oracle
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Mayukh Bhaowal
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
088325-0829256(120600US) 8459
EXAMINER
CRAWLEY, TALIAF
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3687
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/02/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
oraclepatentmail@kilpatricktownsend.com
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MA YUKH BHAOWAL, SUMAN GURA, MICHAEL L. WEBB,
SHIBHU NAMBIAR, LEE-RIAN QUEK, and ANGELA XIAN
Appeal2018-001025
Application 13/452, 193 1
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN A. EV ANS, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and JOYCE CRAIG
Administrative Patent Judges.
SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final2 Rejection of claims 1-20, which constitute all pending claims. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
1 The real party in interest is identified as interest is Oracle International
Corporation. App. Br. 3.
2 The Examiner states that "the rejection of independent Claims 1, 10, and
16 and dependent claims 2 - 9, 11-15, and 17-20 as ineligible subject matter
under 35 [U.S.C. §] 101 is maintained and hereby made final." See page 8
of Office Action, dated 11/17/2016, hereinafter "Final Action."
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Application 13/452,193
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention relates to calculating accounting encumbrance
adjustments for a purchase order associated with a first allocation of a
budget, the method. Abstract; Spec. ,r,r 3 7--49, Fig. 3. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal (emphasis added):
1. A method of calculating accounting encumbrance adjustments
for a purchase order associated with a first allocation of a budget, the
method comprising:
determining, using a purchasing system, that the purchase
order has been final closed, wherein:
the purchase order represents an ongoing contractual
obligation to receive goods/services from a supplier;
the final closure terminates the ongoing contractual
obligation to receive the goods/services from the supplier;
the final closure liquidates any remaining funds that were
allocated in a budgetary system for the ongoing contractual
obligation to receive the goods/services from the supplier; and
the final closure prevents additional processing of
invoices associated with the purchase order by an invoice
processing system;
receiving, using the purchasing system, a request to reopen the
purchase order, wherein:
the request is associated with an additional cost
representing funds needed to reestablish the receiving of the
goods/services from the supplier; and
reopening the purchase order changes a status indicator
of the purchase order from closed to open and allows
downstream processing associated with the purchase order to be
reinstated;
receiving, from a budgetary control system, a determination as
to whether a second portion of the budget can be allocated, wherein
the second portion of the budget corresponds to the additional cost;
and
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in response to a determination that the second portion of the
budget can be allocated:
causing, using the purchasing system, the second portion
of the budget to be allocated;
reopening, using the purchasing system, the purchase
order; and
sending, using the purchasing system, an indication to
the invoice processing system that the purchase order is
reopened such that the invoice processing system will be
allowed to process invoices associated with the receiving of the
goods/services from the supplier as specified by the purchase
order.
App. Br. 13-14. Claims Appendix.
THE REJECTION
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed
invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2-5.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
There are, however, three judicially created exceptions to the broad
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: "[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
Banklnt'l, 573 U.S. 208,216 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012).
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to."
See Alice, at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.").
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical
formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and mental
processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as "molding rubber products" (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
( 1981) ); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 184 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267---68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191-192
("We view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding
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rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.").
Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking
patent protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the
protection of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented
by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment." Id. ( citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.").
If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive
concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application." Alice, at 221 ( quotation marks omitted). "A claim that
recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to ensure 'that the
[claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [ abstract
idea]."' Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic
computer implementation[] fail[ s] to transform that abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention." Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO's January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 ("Memorandum").
Under that guidance, we first determine whether the claim recites:
( 1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
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human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
"well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Memorandum.
ANALYSIS
The Examiner rejected claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because
the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract
idea) without "significantly more." Final Act. 8. According to the Examiner
Claim(s) 1-20 is/are directed to systems and methods for calculating
accounting encumbrance adjustments for a purchase order associated
with a first allocation of a budget, which is considered an abstract idea.
The claim(s) do not include additional elements that are sufficient to
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the
generically recited computer elements (e.g.[,] a purchasing system, a
budgetary control system, etc.) do not add a meaningful limitation to
the abstract idea and the function(s) performed by such generic
computer elements would be routine, conventional, and well-
understood to one of ordinary skill in the computer arts.
Id.
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In the abstract idea analysis, the Examiner identifies abstract concepts
in claim 1 :
Limitation 1 - determining that the purchase order has been
finally closed;
Limitation 2 - receiving a request to reopen the purchase order;
Limitation 3 - receiving a determination as to whether a second
portion of the budget can be allocated;
Limitation 4 - causing the second portion of the budget to be
allocated;
Limitation 5 - reopening the purchase order; and
Limitation 6 - sending an indication to the invoice processing
system that the purchase order is reopened.
Id. at 8-9.
The Examiner refers to identified court cases which are asserted to be
similar to the recited limitations and determines the abstract idea constitutes
a fundamental economic practice, certain methods of organizing human
activity. Id. at 9-10 (citing cases including Bilski; buySAFE, Inc. v. Google,
Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014); and others).
The Examiner then performs an analysis to determine if the claim
includes significantly more (inventive concept) than the underlying abstract
idea. Id. at 11-12. The Examiner finds the generically recited computer
elements perform functions that would be routine, conventional, and well
understood to one of ordinary skill in the art and, therefore, there is no
inventive concept in the claims. Id. at 11. The Examiner refers to the
following computer functions as well-understood, routine, and conventional
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functions when claimed in a merely generic manner: performing repetitive
calculations, receiving, processing, and storing data,
electronically scanning or extracting data from a physical document,
electronic recordkeeping, automating mental tasks, and receiving or
transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data. Id.
( citing July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility-available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-qrs.pdf).
The Examiner refers to the generic computer elements in the claim as
Generic Computer Element 1 - a purchase system determining the
purchase order has been final closed, receiving a request to reopen the
purchase order, causing the second portion of the budget to be allocated,
reopening the purchase order, and sending an indication that the
purchase order is reopened;
Generic Computer Element 2 - a budgetary control system sending a
determination as to whether a second portion of the budget can be
allocated; and
Generic Computer Element 3 - an invoice processing system
processing invoices associated with receiving of the goods/services
from the supplier as specified by the purchase order.
Id. at 11-12
Appellants argue the Examiner errs in concluding the claims are
directed to abstract ideas of fundamental economic practice or organizing
human activity, and, assuming the claims are directed to an abstract idea, the
Examiner errs in concluding the claims do not amount to significantly more
than the abstract idea. App. Br. 4--21. According to Appellants, it is unclear
what the Examiner alleges the claims are "directed to" and there is no
element by element comparison between the claims and the claims of court
cases cited by the Examiner. Id. at 5---6. Appellants argue that "[t]o identify
the idea of the claims - new communication routes between computer
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systems to detect closed purchase orders and coordinate the operations of
these systems - the Office must point to similar claims that a court has
identified as being abstract" and this has not been done. Id. at 6. According
to Appellants, digital communications between different computer systems
is not similar to any of the exemplary "fundamental economic practices"
described by any court to date and, for example, computer system
communication is not remotely related to mitigating settlement risk,
hedging, using advertising as an exchange or currency, and so forth. Id. at 7.
Appellants argue the claims amount to significantly more than the
alleged abstract idea because the claims allow new computing functions to
operate:
Thus, the purchasing system did not need to communicate an approval
from the budgetary control system. Reopening a final closed purchase
order used to be impossible without going through the requisition
system because a communicative link for receiving a new approval
transmission did not exist between the budgetary control system and
the purchasing system. A communicative link for this particular type
of data that connected the purchasing system to the invoice processing
system ( e.g., in an accounts payable department) also did not exist. The
claimed invention solves these problems by establishing
communicative links between these computer systems for transmitting
the data required in order to reopen the purchase order. For example,
Applicant's FIG. 3 illustrates existing connections from the purchasing
system (330) using solid lines, and illustrates the new communicative
links established by the claims using dashed lines.
Id. at 9.
Appellants argue claim 1 is directed to the realm of computer
networks, and claims a system that gives instructions to use a new network
connection between the purchasing system and the budget control system, a
network connection that didn't exist in the prior art. Id. at 9 (citing DDR
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Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
According to Appellants, the new communicative links represent a
technology solution that allows the computer systems to perform functions
that were previously impossible, thus representing a technological
innovation. Id.
Appellants additionally argue the claims do not preempt any abstract
idea, and the rejection of dependent claims 2-9. 11-15, and 17-20 should be
withdrawn because the rejection is conclusory, without evidence or
argument. Id. at 9-11.
In the Answer, the Examiner determines that the pending claims relate
to agreements between people or performance of a financial transaction such
as hedging, and this has been found to be a fundamental economic practice
and/or certain method of organizing human activity. Ans. 3--4 (citing see
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611)). Regarding the "significantly more" inquiry, the
Examiner finds "[t]he courts have recognized that receiving, processing, and
storing data, electronic recordkeeping, and receiving or transmitting data
over a network, e.g.[,] using the internet to gather data are computer
functions that are well understood, routine, and conventional activities when
claimed in a merely generic manner." Id. at 5. The Examiner finds the
pending claims do not require any specialized hardware and common
computer elements, such as a computer, comprising a memory and a
processor have been recognized as generic computer technology by the
Supreme Court in Alice. Id. (citing Spec. ff 23-25; Alice, at 219-20).
Regarding Appellants' assertion that the claimed invention seeks to
solve problems within the technology, the Examiner finds that the problems
addressed by the claimed invention are considered to be economic problems,
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and fail to overcome the current rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
patent ineligible subject matter. Id. at 6.
In Reply, Appellants reiterate that the claims are directed to the
communication between three different computer systems and the
information transmitted there between, not simply the reopening of the
purchase order. Reply Br. 2. Appellants argue they demonstrated that the
claims provide a technological solution that has not been rebutted by the
Examiner. Id. at 3 (See App. Br. 7-9).
As discussed below, we are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments.
Applying the current Guidelines (Memorandum), we agree with the
Examiner that claim 1 recites a "fundamental economic practice." See Final
Act 2-3; Ans. 3--4; 84 Fed. Reg. 50 at I(a), III.
In particular, we refer to the claim limitations that recite a method of
calculating accounting encumbrance adjustments for a purchase order
associated with a first allocation of a budget comprising (1) determining that
the purchase order has been final closed; (2) receiving a request to reopen
the purchase order; (3) receiving a determination as to whether a second
portion of the budget can be allocated; ( 4) causing the second portion of the
budget to be allocated; ( 5) reopening the purchase order; and ( 6) sending an
indication to the invoice processing system that the purchase order is
reopened. See Final Act. 7. These limitations, under their broadest
reasonable interpretation, recite managing a purchase order that is subject to
a budget because the limitations recite operations that would ordinarily take
place in managing a purchase order subject to a budget.
For example, "determining that the purchase order has been finally
closed," as recited in limitation (1) is an activity which would take place
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whenever one is pursuing a follow-on purchase order. Similarly, limitations
(2) receiving a request to reopen the purchase order, (3) receiving a
determination as to whether a second portion of the budget can be allocated,
and ( 4) causing the second portion of the budget to be allocated, are
activities that would take place in response to pursuing the follow-on
purchase order. Finally, to execute the purchase order, limitations (5)
reopening the purchase order and ( 6) sending an indication to the invoice
processing system that the purchase order is reopened, would take place.
A purchase order involves a purchase, which is an economic act and
involves products ordinarily sold in the stream of commerce 3• Thus, like the
concept of intermediated settlement in Alice, and the concept of hedging in
Bilski, the concept of managing a car recited in Appellants' claims "is a
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce."
Alice, at 219 ( citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,
we conclude the claims recite a fundamental economic practice, which is
one of certain methods of organizing human activity, and thus an abstract
idea.
Next, we consider whether the claim includes additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. To determine
whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, we
identify whether there are "any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception(s)" and evaluate those elements to determine
whether they integrate the judicial exception into a recognized practical
application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54--55 (emphasis added); see also Manual of
3 The Specification describes, for example, purchasing a copier and copier
supplies. Spec. ,r,r 37--49.
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Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h) (9th ed. Rev.
08.2017, Jan. 2018).
Here, we find the additional limitations do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claims do not
recite: (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other
technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) use a "particular
machine" to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b) );
(iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state (see
MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e)). See also 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Here, although the claim does include additional elements, such as a
purchasing system, a budgetary system, and an invoice processing system,
these are insufficient to constitute integration into a practical application
because these elements are recited at high level of generality and the claim
simply applies the judicial exception using "systems." In particular, the
additional elements do not constitute a particular machine, but, even
assuming the "systems" represent a generically recited computer (i.e.,
generic computer components) to perform the abstract idea, that is
insufficient. See 84 Fed. Reg. 50 at III A(2); MPEP § 2106.05(b); Eibel
Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 64---65 (1923);
MPEP § 2106.05(±); Alice, at 222-26; Benson, 409 U.S. 63; Credit
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Similarly, although Appellants argue the "idea of the claims" is "new
communication routes between computer systems to detect closed purchase
orders and coordinate the operations of these systems," claim I merely
recites a purchasing system, a budgetary system, and an invoice processing
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system. See App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 9. The communication paths are
similarly recited at high level of generality such as "receiving" and
"sending."
Therefore, under the Memorandum, claim 1 is directed to an abstract
idea, and we proceed to analyze the claim under Alice, step 2. As discussed
above, in the Alice, step 2 inquiry, we determine whether there is an
inventive concept that renders the abstract idea patent eligible.
We note the introduction of a "processor of a computer system" into
the claims to implement an abstract idea is not a patentable application of the
abstract idea. Alice, at 222-23. The computer implementation, assuming
the claimed "systems" constitute computers, here is purely conventional and
performs basic functions. See id. at 224--225. Appellants do not adequately
show how the claimed steps are done technically such that they cannot be
done manually or that they are not routine and conventional functions of a
generic computer. See Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F .3d
1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("the limitations of claim 17 involve arranging a
hierarchy of organizational and product groups, storing pricing information,
retrieving applicable pricing information, sorting pricing information,
eliminating less restrictive pricing information, and determining the price.
All of these limitations are well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry."). See Spec. ,r,r 53-63, Figs. 9, 10.
We find no element or combination of elements recited in Appellants'
claim 1 that contains any "inventive concept" or adds anything "significantly
more" to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application.
Alice, at 221. As discussed supra, we are not persuaded the added computer
elements or communications transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible
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invention. As our reviewing court has observed, "after Alice, there can
remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make
an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible." DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256
(citing Alice, at 223).
Appellants' reliance on DDR is misplaced as the recited claims do not
improve the computer or underlying technology. In DDR, the claims at
issue involved, inter alia, "web page[] displays [with] at least one active link
associated with a commerce object associated with a buying opportunity of a
selected one of a plurality of merchants" ( claim 1 of US 7,818,399). The
Federal Circuit found the claims in DDR to be patent-eligible under step two
of the Mayo/Alice test because "the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in
computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in
the realm of computer networks." DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit found the claims addressed the "challenge
of retaining control over the attention of the customer in the context of the
Internet." Id. at 1258. To the contrary, Appellants' claims merely use the
internet to automate a process that would otherwise be performed manually.
The rejected claims are dissimilar to DDR's web page with an active link,
and the Specification does not support the view that the computer related
claim elements are unconventional. See Spec. ,r,r 22-32, 82.
We note the patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of
fact. Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In particular, "[t]he question of whether a claim
element or combination of elements is well-understood, routine and
conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact."
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Here, the
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systems and communication elements are set forth at a high level of
generality, as discussed supra, and the record sufficiently establishes that
these elements and the combination are well-understood, routine and
conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field.
Appellants contend the claims do not seek to preempt or monopolize a
fundamental economic practice. App. Br. 9--10. Although preemption may
denote patent ineligibility, its absence does not demonstrate patent
eligibility. See FairWarning, IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering a patent-ineligible concept,
preemption concerns "are fully addressed and made moot" by an analysis
under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 and
independent claims 10 and 16 as these claims recite similar limitations4 to
claim 1.
Regarding dependent claims 2-9, 11-15, and 17-20, the Examiner's
finding are adequate and reasonable, and are not specifically argued by
Appellants. See Final Act. 7-8; App. Br. 10-11; Reply Br. 4. Therefore, we
sustain the rejection of claims 2-9, 11-15, and 17-20.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
4 Appellants state "[b ]ecause the recitations of claims 1, 10, and 16 are
substantially similar, only the limitations of claim 1 will be discussed
below." App. Br. 4.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a )(1 )(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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