Ex Parte BETTIOS et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 21, 2018

13563591 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 21, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/563,591 07/31/2012 CHRISTOS BETTIOS
30764 7590 08/23/2018
SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
650 Town Center Drive, 4th Floor
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
26SR-170352 9275
EXAMINER
POLLOCK, GREGORY A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3695
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/23/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
DOCKETING@SHEPPARDMULLIN.COM
SheppardMullin_Pair@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHRISTOS BETTIOS, LAURA ANNE ROEDEL,
PATRICK EDWARD MCLAUGHLIN, and
ROBERT ANTHONY CAMEROTA
Appeal2017-004277
Application 13/563,591
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
ERIC S. FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judges.
COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 36-45, 47-56, 60, and 61. Claims 1-35, 46, and 57-59 are cancelled.
We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is First American
Financial Corporation, which is the assignee of the present application.
App. Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants' invention generally relates to "loan analysis and, more
particularly, relate to systems and methods for analyzing the acquisition of
loans, such as in an investment context." (Spec. ,r 1 ).
Exemplary Claim
3 6. A system, comprising:
a display;
a processor;
a non-transitory computer readable medium operatively
coupled to the processor and comprising executable
instructions, the executable instructions being executable by the
processor to evaluate a loan for transfer from a lender to an
investor by causing the system to:
receive through a web-based portal a loan closing dataset
corresponding to the loan for transfer evaluation;
determine a plurality of rules to be applied to the loan for
transfer evaluation, wherein the rules to be applied are
determined by providing a web-based graphical user interface
( GUI) to the lender or the investor for selecting the rules to be
applied, and wherein each of the plurality of rules tests a
corresponding investment risk based on the loan closing
dataset;
apply each rule to the loan transfer evaluation to calculate
a score for each investment risk based on the loan closing
dataset;
determine a risk level for each investment risk based on
the investment risk's calculated score; and
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display on the display:
a summary of results of the loan transfer evaluation;
characteristics of the evaluated loan, the characteristics
comprising at least one of a transaction type, a loan type, a
conformity of the loan, a government program
relating to the loan, an investor program relating to the loan, an
occupancy type of the loan, a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, or
number units of real estate relating to the loan; and
each of the determined risk levels, wherein the displayed
risk levels are representative of an overall risk associated with
the loan.
App. Br. 32, Claims appendix.
Rejection
Claims 36-45, 47-56, 60, and 61 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3.
Issue on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 36-45, 47-56, 60, and 61
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter?
ANALYSIS
We have considered all of Appellants' arguments and any evidence
presented. To the extent Appellants have not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). We highlight and address specific findings
and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below.
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Mayo/Alice Analysis under 35 USC§ 101
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof." The Supreme Court has "long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Ass 'nfor
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework previously
set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 82-84 (2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
The first step in that analysis is to determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts, such as an
abstract idea. Abstract ideas may include, but are not limited to,
fundamental economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, an
idea of itself, and mathematical formulas or relationships. Id. at 2355-57.
If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the inquiry
ends. See Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed.
Cir. 2017).
Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step in which the
elements of the claims are considered "individually and 'as an ordered
combination' to determine whether the additional elements 'transform the
nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). We consider the question of
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whether the claims are directed to a specific improvement in the capabilities
of the computing devices, or, instead, "a process that qualifies as an 'abstract
idea' for which computers are invoked merely as a tool." Enfzsh, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
We, therefore, decide under step two whether the claims: (a) set forth
an inventive concept that provides a specific means or method that improves
the relevant technology, or (b) are directed to a result or effect that itself is
the abstract idea, in which the claims merely invoke generic processes and
machinery. See Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1336.
The Examiner's Rejection under 35 US.C. § 101
Regarding the first step of the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner
essentially recites the language of independent claim 36, and concludes that
claims 36-45, 47-56, 60, and 61 are directed to an abstract idea, because the
claimed:
idea is similar to the basic concept of manipulating information
using mathematical relationships, comparing new and stored
information and using rules to identify options, using categories
to organize, store, and transmit information, and/or the creation
of a contractual relationship ( a loan) which [are] fundamental
economic practices[,] all of which have been found by the
courts to be an abstract idea. The dependent claims and other
claim sets contain additional functional limits directed toward
their functional objectives[,] but do not render the concepts in
the identified judicial exception any less abstract.
Final Act. 4 ( emphasis added). 2
2 "Patent eligibility under§ 101 presents an issue of law .... " Accenture
Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
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Regarding the second step of the Mayo/Alice analysis, the
Examiner finds the claims do not include additional elements that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception:
The claims require the additional limitations of a computer with
a processor and a tangible, non-transitory memory and the
internet (web). These generic computer components are
claimed to perform their basic functions of storing, retrieving,
processing, displaying (using a GUI), and transmitting data
though the program that enables the execution of the abstract
idea(s). The recitation of the computer limitations amounts to
mere instruction[s] to implement the abstract idea on a
computer. Therefore, when considered separately and in
combination, the computer components at each step of the
process perform purely generic computer functions. As such,
there is no inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed
subject matter into a patent-eligible application. The claims do
not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself
and are, therefore, not patent eligible.
Final Act. 5 ( emphasis added).
For the aforementioned reasons, the Examiner concludes that all
claims 36-45, 47-56, 60, and 61 on appeal are not patent-eligible under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
Mayo/Alice Analysis -Step 1
Regarding Alice Step 1, Appellants contend "the claims are not
directed to an abstract idea." App. Br. 21. Appellants note:
Id.
[The] Examiner alleges that the claims are directed to the
abstract idea of "analyzing loan acquisitions" and that they do
no more than employ mathematical relationships to manipulate
existing information and/or create contractual relationships.
(Final Action, pp. 3-4.) Applicant disagrees and notes that
Examiner's analysis is erroneous under the law.
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In support, Appellants argue, inter alia:
claim 36 recites a system including various hardware
components ( display, processor and non-transitory computer-
readable medium) in combination with software that
provides a user interface for evaluating a loan for transfer from
a lender to an investor. The user interface accomplishes this
objective, in part, by "receiv[ing] through a web-based portal a
loan closing dataset", determining the rules to be applied by
"providing a web-based graphical user interface (GUI) to the
lender or investor for selecting the rules to be applied"; and
"display[ing] on the display: a summary of results ...
characteristics of the evaluated loan ... ; and each of the
determined risk levels."
Thus, the claims are not merely directed to the abstract
idea of "analyzing loan acquisitions." Moreover, the claims do
not merely "employ mathematical relationships to
manipulate existing information" and "create contractual
relationships." This is not a concept similar to those found by
the courts to be abstract, such as a fundamental economic
practice, a method of organizing human activity, an idea itself
(standing alone), or a mathematical relationship.
App. Br. 22-23.
In response, the Examiner further explains the basis for the rejection:
Pages 3-5 of the Final Rejection filed 10/23/2015 clearly
identify those claim limits which are directed toward abstract
ideas and then address all remaining claim limits ( step 2A of
the Subject Matter Eligibility Test). Each of the identified
abstract ideas have been found by the courts to be abstract ideas
and are precedential. ... The claims require the additional
limitations of a computer with a processor and a tangible, non-
transitory memory and display. These generic computer
components are claimed to perform their basic functions of
storing, retrieving, processing and displaying data though the
program that enables the execution of the abstract idea(s).
Ans. 10.
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The Examiner additionally finds: "The display, processor and non-
transitory computer-readable medium perform their routine and
convention[al]functions. In the present set of claims, there is no technical
improvement or improvement to the underlying apparatus. As such, the
present set of claims are not patent eligible." Ans. 11. 3
We note independent claims 36 and 47 both perform the function of
receiving through a web-based portal a loan closing dataset corresponding
to the loan for transfer evaluation. Our reviewing court has concluded that
abstract ideas include the concepts of collecting data, recognizing certain
data within the collected data set, and storing the data in memory. Content
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago
Transit Authority, 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding "claims
directed to the collection, storage, and recognition of data are directed to an
abstract idea."). Moreover, our reviewing court recently has concluded that
acts of parsing, comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas.
Berkheimerv. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Both independent claims 36 and 47 also determine a plurality of rules
to be applied to the loan for transfer evaluation that are used to determine a
risk level for each investment risk based on the investment risk's calculated
score. However, the collection of information and analysis of information
3 The patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact. Mortg.
Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). In particular, "[ t ]he question of whether a claim element or
combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a
skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact." Berkheimer, 881
F.3d at 1368.
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( e.g., recognizing certain data within the dataset) are also abstract ideas.
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
Regarding the claimed rules, in the Reply Brief, Appellants cite
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2016), and argue:
Here, like the claims in McRO, the claimed steps are not
carried out in such a way that they could be manually
performed by a human. Rather, the claims recite "determine a
plurality of rules to be applied to the loan for transfer
evaluation, wherein the rules to be applied are determined by
providing a web-based graphical user interface ( GUI) to the
lender or the investor for selecting the rules to be applied, and
wherein each of the plurality of rules tests a corresponding
investment risk based on the loan closing dataset." While these
rules may be embodied in computer software that is processed
by a computer, it is the incorporation of these claimed rules
that improve the existing technological process of software-
based evaluation of loan transfers in such a way that cannot be
manually peiformed by a human.
Reply Br. 7-8 ( emphasis added).
However, we find the rules here are not analogous to the lip animation
rules considered by the court in McRO, which guides: "[t]he abstract idea
exception prevents patenting a result where 'it matters not by what process
or machinery the result is accomplished."' McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312 (quoting
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1854)) (emphasis added). Here,
Appellants claims are directed to, inter alia, the result of displaying "risk
levels [that] are representative of an overall risk associated with the loan."
Claims 3 6 and 4 7.
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Appellants additionally argue the "Examiner's Answer also fails to
consider the recent BASCOM Federal Circuit decision, which establishes
that an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-
generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces." Reply Br. 9.
However, we emphasize that BASCOM also guides: "[a]n abstract
idea on 'an Internet computer network' or on a generic computer is still an
abstract idea." BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Both independent claims 36 and 47 further display on a display of the
computer system: ( 1) a summary of results of the loan transfer evaluation,
(2) the characteristics of the evaluated loan, and (3) "each of the determined
risk levels, wherein the displayed risk levels are representative of an overall
risk associated with the loan."
Similarly, "collecting, displaying, and manipulating data" is an
abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850
F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. Investpic, LLC,
890 F.3d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ("merely presenting the results of
abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information ... is abstract as
an ancillary part of such collection and analysis") ( quotations omitted).
Applying this guidance here, we agree with the Examiner (Final Act.
4) that Appellants' claimed system, which evaluates a loan for transfer from
a lender to an investor by determining a plurality of rules to be applied to
the loan for transfer evaluation, is directed to a fundamental economic
practice, i.e., an abstract idea. See independent claims 3 6 and 4 7.
Moreover, but for the recitation of a generic processor, display, and
non-transitory computer-readable medium (independent claim 36), and/or
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computer program product and computer system (independent claim 47), we
find the recited functions could be performed as mental steps, or with the aid
of pen and paper. See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d
1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("While the Supreme Court has altered the
§ 101 analysis since CyberSource in cases like Mayo and Alice, we continue
to 'treat[] analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds,
or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental
processes within the abstract-idea category."') (quoting Elec. Power Grp.,
830 F.3d at 1354); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson").
"[M]erely selecting information, by content or source, for collection
[ and] analysis ... does nothing significant to differentiate a process from
ordinary mental processes." Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355. Receiving and
analyzing (or identifying data), by itself, does not transform an otherwise-
abstract process or system of information collection and analysis. See id.
Like the claims at issue in Electric Power, we find Appellants' claims
36-45, 47-56, 60, and 61 do not invoke "any assertedly inventive
programing" or an "arguably inventive set of components or methods." Id.
The Supreme Court additionally guides that contractual relations
constitute "a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of
commerce." Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); see also Alice, 134
S. Ct. at 2356, 2357, as cited in buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d
1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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Applying this guidance here, we observe dependent claims 41 and 52
are directed to the informational content of a loan closing dataset,
comprising at least one of: "the loan borrower's information, the principal
amount of the loan, title information corresponding to real estate subject to
the loan, or a commission paid at settlement of the loan." We find a loan
closing is a contractual relationship between the seller and the buyer which
is "a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of
commerce." Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611.
Appellants further urge the pending claims are not of a scope to
preempt an abstract idea. App. Br. 23. However, our reviewing court
provides applicable guidance: "[ w ]hile preemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722
F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("[T]he Supreme Court has stated that,
even if a claim does not wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it still will not be
limited meaningfully if it contains only insignificant or token pre- or post-
solution activity-such as identifying a relevant audience, a category of use,
field of use, or technological environment.") (Citations omitted), vacated
and remanded, WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870
(2014) (remanding for consideration in light of Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347).
Therefore, we are not persuaded by Appellants' argument regarding the
absence of complete preemption. App. Br. 23.
For at least these reasons, we conclude claims 36-45, 47-56, 60, and
61 are directed to the abstract idea of a fundamental economic practice that
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could additionally be performed as mental steps, albeit with the aid of pen
and paper.
Mayo/Alice Analysis - Step 2
Because we conclude the claims are directed to an abstract idea for
essentially the same reasons articulated by the Examiner (Final Act. 8; Ans.
7-15), we tum to the second part of the Alice/Mayo analysis. We analyze
the claims to determine if there are additional limitations that individually,
or as an ordered combination, ensure the claims amount to "significantly
more" than the abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357.
Regarding Alice Step 2, Appellants address the purported inventive
concept of the claims:
even assuming, arguendo, that the pending claims were
directed to an abstract idea, the pending claims disclose subject
matter that 1) improves a technology/technical field; 2) adds a
specific limitation other than what is routine in the field; and 3)
and does not merely link the use of an abstract idea to a
particular environment.
App. Br. 27 (emphasis added).
In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue the "Examiner has not shown
that the claims parallel a concept found to be abstract by the courts" (Reply
Br. 4) ( emphasis omitted), and "the withdrawal of all prior art rejections in
[the] Examiner's Answer show[s] that [the] Examiner is unable to show that
the claims recite well-understood, routine, or conventional activities." Reply
Br. 6.
Regarding Appellants' former argument (Reply Br. 4), the Examiner
cited various cases in support, including inter alia, the: "prohibition against
patenting abstract ideas 'cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the
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use of the formula to a particular technological environment' or adding
'insignificant postsolution activity.' Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 610-11
(2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981))." See
Ans. 11 ( emphasis added).
Regarding Appellants' latter argument (Reply Br. 6), we note the
Examiner has withdrawn the previous rejection over the cited prior art. Ans.
3-9. However, the Supreme Court guides: "[t]he 'novelty' of any element
or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-89
( emphasis added). Our reviewing court further emphasizes that "[ e ]ligibility
and novelty are separate inquiries." Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable
Commc 'ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Affinity
Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that "even assuming" that a particular claimed feature was novel
does not "avoid the problem of abstractness").
Therefore, we find Appellants' latter argument (Reply Br. 6) is not
persuasive.
The "machine-or-transformation " (Mo T) test
Appellants further urge: "The claims satisfy the machine-or-
transformation test," citing Bilski v. Kappas, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
App. Br. 29 ( emphasis omitted). In support, Appellants contend:
The present claims require transforming a loan closing
dataset, or characteristics into a unique score that has never
been provided from this data before. As a result, the data about
the loans must be fundamentally altered such that information
that never existed before about the loan now exists that would
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be particularly useful to persons evaluating the loan for
acquisition.
App. Br. 30.
Contrary to the Examiner's unequivocal statement in the Answer (14)
that the machine-or-transformation test "is not the test for patent eligibility,"
the Federal Circuit guides in Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715-16, that the
"machine-or-transformation" (MoT) test, as outlined in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), can provide a "useful clue" in the second step of
the Alice framework.
Under Bilski 's MoT test, a claimed process can be patent-eligible
under§ 101 if:
( 1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus; or
(2) the process transforms a particular article into a different state or
thing. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954 (citing Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70
(1972)).
However, we find the machine-or-transformation test is inapplicable
here, because none of Appellants' claims on appeal are method (i.e.,
process) claims. Moreover, we find Appellants claims 36-45, 47-56, 60,
and 61 are neither sufficiently tied to a particular machine or apparatus, 4 nor
involved in any type of transformation of any particular (physical) article.
4 See Accenture, 728 F.3d at 1344--45 (claims reciting "generalized software
components arranged to implement an abstract concept [ of generating
insurance-policy-related tasks based on rules to be completed upon the
occurrence of an event] on a computer" not patent eligible); and
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[s]imply
adding a 'computer aided' limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept,
without more, is insufficient to render [a] claim patent eligible" (internal
citation omitted)).
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Regarding any argued purported transformation of a "loan closing
dataset" (App. Br. 30), we do not find Appellants' independent claims 36
and 4 7 to be similar to the type of data transformation considered by the
court in the case of In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (CCPA 1982), in which the
court found claims directed to a process for graphically displaying X-ray
data were patent-eligible, because the X-ray data was representative of
physical and tangible objects such as bones, organs and body tissues.
Here, Appellants' claimed "loan closing dataset" ( claims 3 6, 4 7) is not
representative of any physical article. See also Arrhythmia Research
Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (in
which the Federal Circuit found claims directed to apparatus and process of
analyzing electrocardiographic signals as patent-eligible because these
electrical signals were physical and transformed to monitor heart activity of
a patient).
Moreover, Appellants have not shown that the claims before us on
appeal are directed to a particular machine. Instead, Appellants' claims
include a generic display and processor. Our reviewing court has
"repeatedly held that such invocations of computers and networks that are
not even arguably inventive are 'insufficient to pass the test of an inventive
concept in the application' of an abstract idea." Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d
at 1355 (internal citations omitted); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 850
F .3 d at 1341 ("Rather, the claims recite both a generic computer element-a
processor-and a series of generic computer 'components' that merely
restate their individual functions . . . . That is to say, they merely describe
the functions of the abstract idea itself, without particularity. This is simply
not enough under step two.").
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Because we find none of Appellants' claims are directed to an
improvement in the recited processor or display (independent claim 36), or
computer system (independent claim 47), we conclude that none of the claim
limitations, viewed both individually and as an ordered combination, amount
to significantly more than the judicial exception in order to sufficiently
transform the nature of the claims into patent-eligible subject matter.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude, under the Mayo/Alice analyses,
that each of Appellants' claims 36-45, 47-56, 60, and 61, considered as a
whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea (under step one), and
under step two, does not recite something "significantly more" to transform
the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the
Examiner's rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 36-45, 47-56, 60, and
61, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. 5
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 36-45, 47-56, 60, and 61
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
5 To the extent Appellants have not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 36-45, 47-56, 60,
and 61 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a )(1 )(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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