Ex Parte Bennett

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 7, 2018

14282181 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
14/282,181 05/20/2014 James D. Bennett
34399 7590 11/09/2018
GARLICK & MARKISON
106 E. 6th Street, Suite 900
AUSTIN, TX 78701
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
PC01C2 1262
EXAMINER
RANKINS, WILLIAM E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3694
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/09/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
MMurdock@TEXASPATENTS.COM
bpierotti@texaspatents.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JAMES D. BENNETT
Appeal2017-008817 1
Application 14/2 82, 181 2
Technology Center 3600
Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, KENNETH G. SCHOPPER, and
MATTHEWS. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's final
rejection of claims 4--23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant's claims "relate[] generally to credit cards; and, more
particularly, to sales transactions conducted by point-of-sale devices"
(Spec. 1, 11. 13-14).
1 Our Decision references Appellant's Appeal Brief ("Br.," filed
October 3, 2016) and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed
November 21, 2016), and Final Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed
September 1, 2015).
2 Appellant identifies Enpulz, LLC as the real party in interest (Br. 2).
Appeal2017-008817
Application 14/282, 181
Claims 4 and 13 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 4,
reproduced below with minor formatting changes and added bracketed
notations, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
4. A proxy card management system for managing a first
card associated with a first monetary account and a second card
associated with a second monetary account in conjunction with
management of a proxy card having no direct monetary account
representation, the proxy card management system comprising:
[a] a processing infrastructure configured to implement a
proxy card setup system through which a proxy card holder
associates the proxy card with both the first card and the second
card, the processing infrastructure supporting at least one
transaction rule that includes allocating purchases between the
first monetary account and the second monetary account;
[b] the processing infrastructure configured to respond to
a merchant communication by delivering a first approval code,
the merchant communication identifying card data
corresponding to the proxy card and purchase related data that
includes a purchase amount; and
[ c] the processing infrastructure configured to respond to
receipt of a missing card indication that identifies the proxy card
by disassociating both the first card and the second card from the
proxy card without having to cancel either of the first card or the
second card.
REJECTIONS
Claims 4--12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
statutory subject matter.
Claims 4 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written
description requirement.
Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-
AIA), second paragraph, as being indefinite.
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Claims 4--23 are rejected on the ground of non-statutory obviousness-
type double patenting.
ANALYSIS
Non-statutory subject matter
Independent claim 4 and dependent claims 5-12
Appellant argues claims 4--12 as a group (see Br. 9-14). We select
independent claim 4 as representative. Claims 5-12 stand or fall with
independent claim 4. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework, set
forth previously in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78-79 (2012), "for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'!, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). The first step in that
analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts." Id. ( citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79)
( emphasis added). If so, the second step is to consider the elements of the
claims "individually and 'as an ordered combination'" to determine whether
the additional elements "'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-
eligible application." Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78-79).
In other words, the second step is to "search for an 'inventive
concept'-i.e., an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ ineligible concept] itself."' Id. ( alteration in original) ( quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). The Court acknowledged in Mayo, that "all
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
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nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas." Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We,
therefore, look to whether the claims focus on a specific means or method
that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or
effect that itself is the abstract idea, and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellant argues that the Examiner's rejection is in error because the
Examiner fails to follow the Office guidelines for setting forth a prima facie
case of subject matter ineligibility (see Br. 9--11 ). More particularly,
Appellant argues that the Examiner improperly characterizes the claims as
being "directed to the abstract idea of user management of multiple payment
card accounts and user deactivation of an electronic payment card" (Br. 11 ),
and "merely states his opinion as to the nature of present claims without
referring to case law precedent in order to identify abstract ideas by way of
comparison to concepts already found to be abstract" (Br. 11 ). Appellant's
arguments are not persuasive.
Here, in rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the
Examiner analyzes the claims using the Mayo/Alice two-step framework.
Specifically, the Examiner looks to the language of the claims and
determines that the claims are
directed to user management of multiple payment card accounts
as recited in claim [ 4] by " ... a proxy card holder associates the
proxy card with both the first card and the second card, . . .
supporting at least one transaction rule that includes allocating
purchases between the first monetary account and the second
monetary account;" which is a method of organizing human
activity and is similar to abstract ideas identified by the courts in
SmartGene ( comparing new and stored information and using
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rules to identify options) and Cyberfone ( using categories to
organize, store and transmit information[)].
(Final Act. 2-3). The Examiner cites judicial decisions and compares the
claim to ideas found to be abstract in those decisions (see Final Act. 2-3).
The Examiner further determines that the additional elements of the claims,
taken alone and as an ordered combination, do not ensure that the claims
amount to significantly more than the abstract idea (see Final Act. 3--4; see
also Ans. 2---6). The Examiner, thus, has clearly followed the guidelines. 3
In this regard, the Examiner has clearly articulated the reasons for the
rejection and has notified Appellant of the reasons for the rejection "together
with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the
propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application." 35 U.S.C.
§ 132. And we find that, in doing so, the Examiner set forth a prima facie
case of unpatentability. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Section 132
"is violated when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the
applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for
rejection."). Although Appellant cites to the Board decision Ex parte Renald
Poisson, Appeal 2012-011084 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2015), Appellant does not
direct attention to, nor do we find, any statement that requires the Examiner
to identify specific references or documentation to support a finding that a
claim is directed to an abstract idea. 4 We also note that Appellant's Appeal
3 We further note that the MPEP and guidelines are not legal requirements.
Cf In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("The MPEP and
Guidelines 'are not binding on this court"').
4 We would not be bound, in any event, by a non-precedential decision of
the Board.
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Brief does not identify any particular deficiency with the Examiner's
findings; it only asserts that "the Examiner merely states his opinion as to
the nature of present claims without referring to case law precedent in order
to identify abstract ideas by way of comparison to concepts already found to
be abstract" (see Br. 11 ).
Under the first step of the Mayol Alice framework, the Examiner
determines that the claims are directed to "user management of multiple
payment card accounts" (Final Act. 2; see also Ans. 2). Before determining
whether the claims at issue are directed to an abstract idea, we must first
determine what the claims are directed to.
The "directed to" inquiry ... cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products
and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon-after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 ("For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas."). Rather, the "directed to"
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of
the specification, based on whether "their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter." Internet Patents Corp. v.
Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see
Genetic Techs.Ltd. v.MerialL.L.C., [818F.3d 1369, 1375] (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (inquiring into "the focus of the claimed advance over
the prior art").
Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335.
The step-one analysis requires us to consider the claims "in their
entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to
excluded subject matter." Internet Patents Corp., 790 F.3d at 1346. The
question is whether the claims as a whole "focus on a specific means or
method that improves the relevant technology" or are "directed to a result or
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effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery." McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Here, the preamble of independent claim 4 provides for a system for
managing a proxy card configured to allow a proxy card holder to associate
the proxy card with both a first card and second card based on at least one
transaction rule, deliver information, e.g., approval code, proxy card
identifying data, purchase related data, and dissociate the underlying cards
from the proxy card based on receiving a missing card indication (see Br. 17
(Claims App.)). Other than "processing infrastructure" no other structure is
claimed. The Specification describes that "multi-source processing system
(MSPS) 113 facilitates financial transactions conducted from a point of sale
unit 109 that uses a proxy card 125 associated with a plurality of monetary
sources 117, 121 and 123" (Spec. 4:7-9) and "operates like a transaction
processing center" (id. 9: 19-20).
In that context, we agree with and find supported the Examiner's
determination that independent claim 4 is directed to "user management of
multiple payment card accounts" (Final Act. 2; see also Ans. 2). The
abstract idea here is similar to ones our reviewing courts have deemed
ineligible in Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (using a third party to mitigate
settlement risk), buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F. 3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (guaranteeing transactions), CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (verifying the
validity of credit card transactions over the Internet), and Smart Systems
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Authority, 873 F.3d 1364, 1371-72
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(Fed. Cir. 2017) (forming and collecting data for financial transactions in a
certain field).
Furthermore, as in Alice, we need not labor to delimit the precise
contours of the "abstract ideas" category in this case. It is enough to
recognize that there is no meaningful distinction in the level of abstraction
between the concept of an intermediated settlement in Alice and the concept
of "user management of multiple payment card accounts" (Final Act. 2; see
also Ans. 2). Both are squarely within the realm of "abstract ideas" as the
Court has used that term. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. Here, independent
claim 4, unlike the claims found non-abstract in prior cases, uses generic
computer technology (see, e.g., Spec. 4: 15-23, 5: 1---6, 5: 19-24, 8: 12-15,
9:10-11, 9:19-20) to associate card information, deliver information, and
dissociate card information, and does not recite an improvement to a
particular computer technology. See, e.g., McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314--15
( determining claims not abstract because they "focused on a specific
asserted improvement in computer animation"). Thus, independent claim 4
is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea.
We also find unpersuasive Appellant's argument that independent
claim 4 is patent-eligible because
it is directed to a proxy card management system that, by its very
nature, is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
networks - in particular, the problem of electronically servicing
a financial transaction by electronically dividing transactions
among differing monetary sources via supporting electronic
transactions.
(Br. 12-13 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245
(Fed. Cir. 2014)). In DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d
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1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the Federal Circuit determined that the claims
addressed the problem of retaining website visitors who, if adhering to the
routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be
transported instantly away from a host's website after clicking on an
advertisement and activating a hyperlink. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257.
The Federal Circuit, thus, held that the claims were directed to statutory
subject matter because they claim a solution "necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks." Id. In contrast, even if the problem is machine-
oriented, there is no indication here that the claimed invention requires
something other than the normal, conventional computer functionality found
in a "transaction processing center" (see Spec. 9: 19--20) to allow a user to
manage a proxy card (see e.g., Spec. 10:21-22 "the proxy card 125 provides
such mapping information to the POS device or an ATM machine it is
inserted in (or used with)."). We note that Appellant does not direct
attention to, and we do not see, where the Specification provides for an
improvement in the technology or technical functioning of the "processing
infrastructure."
Appellant argues that the current claims are not directed to an abstract
idea because they are similar to the claims in Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (see Br. 6). However, we find the
focus of independent claim 4 is not on any technological advancement, but
rather on the implementation of the abstract idea, "for which computers are
invoked merely as a tool." See Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1336.
In Enfzsh, the court explained, "the first step in the Alice inquiry ...
asks whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement
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in computer capabilities ... or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an
'abstract idea' for which computers are invoked merely as a tool." Id. at
1335-36. Here, we find the present claims are plainly of the second
category, and the "focus of the claims," is on "user management of multiple
payment card accounts" (Final Act. 2; see also Ans. 2). Thus, we find the
present claims are not similar to the "self-referential table" in Enfzsh, which
was a "specific improvement to the way computers operate" or the "specific
asserted improvement in computer animation, i.e., the automatic use of rules
of a particular type" held to be not abstract in McRO.
We also are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the claims
are not directed to an abstract idea because "the claims recite features that do
would [sic] not tie up every process for such an idea" (Br. 12). Although the
Supreme Court has described "the concern that drives this exclusionary
principle[, i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent eligible subject
matter,] as one of pre-emption" (Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354), characterizing
pre-emption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as
characterizing pre-emption as the sole test for patent eligibility. "The
Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis
for the judicial exceptions to patentability" and "[ f]or this reason, questions
on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the§ 101 analysis." Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354). Although "preemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility." Id.; cf OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362---63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("[T]hat the claims do not
preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the
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e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract."), cert denied, 136
S. Ct. 701 (2015).
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, we are not persuaded
by Appellant's argument that independent claim 4 recites significantly more
than this abstract idea because the claim requires "processing infrastructure
and operations supported thereby" (Br. 13). In this regard, Appellant does
not point to a particular portion of the Specification to show where the
Specification discloses any specialized computer hardware or other
"inventive" computer components that transforms the abstract idea into
patent-eligible subject matter. Nor does Appellant provide adequate
evidence or technical reasoning that the claims improve some existing
technological process or solves some technological problem in conventional
industry practice, such as in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). See
Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (finding that the "claims recit[ ed] a commonplace business method
aimed at processing business information despite being applied on a general
purpose computer"), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016); see also Alice,
134 S. Ct. at 2359.
Appellant argues that "the claims of the present application amount to
significantly more than an abstract idea" because they include "a specific
limitation other that what is well-understood, routine and conventional" (Br.
13). However, Appellant does not direct attention to, and we do not see,
where the claims or Specification provide such a limitation. Here, as the
Examiner points out, the processing infrastructure/management system
recited by independent claim 4 is comprised of "generic devices associated
with payment transactions such as a POS system and associated networks for
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communicating and processing transactions which are conventional and
routine" (Ans. 3). Thus, the individual functions of associating card
information, delivering information, and dissociating card information, as
recited by independent claim 4 do not supply an inventive concept because
they merely require the application of conventional, well-known analytical
steps. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir.
2014) ("[T]he claimed sequence of steps comprises only 'conventional steps,
specified at a high level of generality,' which is insufficient to supply an
'inventive concept."') (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357). There is no
indication in the record that any specialized computer hardware or other
non-generic computer components are required.
And, considered as an ordered combination, the computer components
of Appellant's independent claim 4 add nothing that is not already present
when the limitations are considered separately. Viewed as a whole,
Appellant's claims simply recite to the concept of "user management of
multiple payment card accounts" (Final Act. 2; see also Ans. 2) as
performed by generic "processing infrastructure" a general purpose
computer (see Ans. 5-6 (citing Figs. 1 and 2). The claims do not, for
example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do
they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field.
Instead, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than an
instruction to apply the abstract idea of "user management of multiple
payment card accounts" (Final Act. 2; see also Ans. 2), which under our
precedents, is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360.
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In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner's rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101 of independent claim 4, and claims 5-12, which falls with
independent claim 4.
Written Description
In rejecting claims 4 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), the Examiner
finds that there is no written description support in the Specification for
"disassociating the monetary accounts from the proxy card without
cancelling or closing the accounts" (Final Act. 8). The Examiner
acknowledges that the Specification "discloses deactivating or locking user
monetary accounts in the event of a lost proxy card," but finds the "claim
limitations are broader than the [S]pecification allows" (id.).
Appellant maintains that the rejection is improper, and asserts
[i]n particular, step 713 of FIG. 7 of the application as filed states
"MSPS sends message to all monetary sources through
sms/ email/ other messaging about the lost card." At pa[ge] 19,
lines 7-18, the deactivation process states that the proxy card is
temporarily or permanently locked to all relevant monetary
sources. This recitation implies that the monetary accounts are
not canceled or closed while the monetary accounts are locked
with respect to the proxy card.
(Br. 15).
Whether a Specification complies with the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is a question of fact and is
assessed on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v.
Paulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The disclosure, as
originally filed, need not literally describe the claimed subject matter (i.e.,
using the same terms or in haec verb a) in order to satisfy the written
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description requirement. But the Specification must convey with reasonable
clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date, Appellant was in
possession of the claimed invention. See id.
Here, the Specification discloses
[a]t block 713, after the authentication, the MSPS sends the
information regarding the accounts associated with the lost proxy
card that are to be temporarily or permanently locked to all
relevant monetary sources. The MSPS determines which of the
plurality of monetary sources to be targeted for such a message
based on a proxy card to monetary source identification mapping
that the MSPS maintains ( or has access to). The MSPS sends a
lost proxy card message to the targeted monetary sources using
one of an SMS message, an email, a lost card transaction
message, etc.
(Spec. 18: 15-21 ). Thus, we agree with Appellant that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would reasonably understand from the Specification, as
originally filed, that the Specification "implies that the monetary accounts
are not canceled or closed while the monetary accounts are locked with
respect to the proxy card" (Br. 15), and as such, provides support for the
argued limitation, as recited by independent claims 4 and 13, at the time the
application was filed.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 4 and
13 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
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Indefiniteness 5
Appellant does not challenge the Examiner's rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (see Final Act. 9). Therefore, the indefiniteness rejection
is summarily sustained.
Double Patenting
Appellant does not challenge the Examiner's double patenting
rejection (see Br. 86). Therefore, the double patenting rejection is summarily
sustained.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejection of claims 4--12 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 4 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)
is reversed.
The Examiner's rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) is
summarily affirmed.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 4--23 on the ground of non-
statutory obviousness-type double patenting is summarily affirmed.
5 We note that neither Appellant nor Examiner addresses the indefiniteness
rejection in the Appeal Brief or Answer. However, given there is no
indication in the Examiner's Answer that the Examiner intended to withdraw
the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) found on page 9 of the Final Action,
the rejection remains.
6 Appellant identifies improperly claims 4, 5, and 13-16 as being rejected.
We note, however, that claims 4--23 are rejected under this bases (see Final
Act. 4--8).
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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