Ex Parte Bellanger et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 1, 201914242250 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 1, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/242,250 04/01/2014 72119 7590 03/05/2019 MARK D. SARALINO (SHARP) RENNER, OTTO, BOISSELLE & SKLAR, LLP 1621 EUCLID AVENUE 19THFLOOR CLEVELAND, OH 44115 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Mathieu Bellanger UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. SHRPP0201US 9154 EXAMINER TRINH, THANH TRUC ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1726 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/05/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipdocket@rennerotto.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MATHIEU BELLANGER, STEPHEN DAY, MATTHIAS KAUER, and SAMIR RIHANI Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 Technology Center 1700 Before DONNA M. PRAISS, DEBRA L. DENNETT, and LILAN REN, Administrative Patent Judges. REN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection2 of claims 1-9, 11-13, 16, and 19-25. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a photovoltaic energy harvesting device. Claims 1 and 22, reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A photovoltaic energy harvesting device comprising a single-junction photovoltaic cell, wherein the photovoltaic cell comprises: a light converting element made of a high band-gap III-V active material, and said active material has a direct band-gap in a range of 1.12 eV to 2.0 eV and is spectrally matched to an artificial ambient light source; a light receiving side that is free from front metal contact gridlines; and at least one discrete metal contact element placed on the light receiving side that realizes power extraction from the light converting element. 22. A photovoltaic energy harvesting device comprising a single-junction photovoltaic cell, wherein the photovoltaic cell comprises: a light converting element made of (Al)GalnP III-V active material spectrally matched to an artificial ambient light source, and said active material has a direct band-gap in a range of 1.12 eV to 2.0 eV, and 1 The real party in interest is identified as "Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha." Appeal Brief of August 29, 2017 ("Br."), 2. 2 Final Office Action of May 3, 2017 ("Final Act."). In this opinion, we also refer to the Examiner's Answer of January 9, 2018 ("Ans.") and the Reply Brief of March 5, 2018 ("Reply Br."). 2 Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 an area-normalised shunt resistance of said photovoltaic cell is not less than 500 k0cm2. Claims Appendix. REFERENCES The prior art references relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal are: Woolf Barnham Seel Gray us 4,773,945 US 2008/0230112 Al US 2010/0083998 Al US 2010/0089440 Al Sept. 27, 1988 Sept. 25, 2008 Apr. 8, 2010 Apr. 15, 2010 "PV Education (PVEducation.org Section 4.3 Resistive Effects, the Effect of Parasitic Resistances," available at http://www.pveducation.org/pvcdrom/ solar-cell-operation/effect-of- parasitic-resistances and http://www.pveducation.org/pvcdrom/ solar-cell- operation/ shunt-resistance (both last accessed 11/14/2015 as indicated in the Final Rejection) ("PV Education"). REJECTI0NS 3 Claims 1-3, 6-9, 11, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Seel in view of Woolf and, alternatively, over Seel in view of Woolf and Barnham. Final Act. 6, 21. Claims 12, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Seel in view of Woolf and, alternatively, in further view 3 Claims 4, 5, 13, 16, 20, 24, and 25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Seel in view of Woolf and in further view of respective additional references as well as Seel in view of Woolf and Barnham and in further view of respective additional references. Final Act. 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35. These claims are not argued separately and they stand or fall with their respective independent claims. See Br. 19-20; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)(20I3). 3 Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 of PV Education, and alternatively, over Seel in view of Woolf, Barnham, and PV Education. Final Act. 12, 27. Claim 23 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Seel in view of Woolf and, alternatively, over PV Education and in view of Gray, and, alternatively, over Seel, Woolf, and Barnham. Final Act. 17, 33. OPINION We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellants and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Cf Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 107 5 (BP AI 2010) (precedential) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("it has long been the Board's practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner's rejections")). After having considered the evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellants' contentions, we are not persuaded that Appellants identify reversible error, and we affirm the Examiner's § 103 rejections for the reasons expressed in the Final Office Action and the Answer. We add the following primarily for emphasis. Rejection of Claim 1 4 Appellants argue that the Examiner reversibly erred in rejecting claim 1 because the prior art does not teach or suggest a material that "is spectrally matched to an artificial ambient light source." Br. 5 ( emphasis omitted). 4 Appellants do not present separate arguments claims 2, 3, 6-9, 11, and 19 and they stand or fall with claim 1 for the rejection over Seel and Woolf as well as the rejection over Seel, Woolf, and Barnham. Br. 5-19 (arguing that the additional references do not teach the purported "deficiencies" asserted); see also 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(1)(iv)(2013). 4 Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 Appellants, however, do not address the Examiner's finding with regard to Bamham in support of the obviousness rejection. Compare id. at 5-8, with Final Act. 23 ( citing Bamham ,r 71 and finding that Bamham teaches the limitation at issue). An argument raised for the first time in a Reply Brief can be considered waived if Appellants do not explain why it could not have been raised previously. Ex parte Nakashima, 93 USPQ 2d. 1834 (BPAI 2010) (informative) ( explaining that arguments and evidence not timely presented in the principal Brief will not be considered when filed in a Reply Brief, absent a showing of good cause explaining why the argument could not have been presented in the Principal Brief); Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ 2d. 1473, 14 77 (BP AI 2010) (informative) ("Properly interpreted, the Rules do not require the Board to take up a belated argument that has not been addressed by the Examiner, absent a showing of good cause."). In this case, Appellants do not explain why their argument with regard to Bamham could not have been raised in the Principal Brief (see Reply Br. 2) - particularly in light of the fact that the Final Rejection specifically discusses the teachings of Bamham in support of the rejection. Final Act. 21, 23 ( citing Bamham ,r 71 and finding that Bamham teaches a material that is spectrally matched to an artificial ambient light source). "The reply brief is not an opportunity to make arguments that could have been made during prosecution, but were not. Nor is the reply brief an opportunity to make arguments that could have been made in the principal brief on appeal to rebut the Examiner's rejections, but were not." Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ 2d. at1477. The Examiner has not been afforded an opportunity to respond to the new argument Appellants raised in the Reply Brief regarding 5 Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 Bamham. We accordingly are not persuaded that reversible error has been identified in the Examiner's rejection based on Seel, Woolf, and Bamham. See Ex Parte Hindersinn, 177 USPQ 78, 80 (Bd. App. 1971); see also 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) (requiring that Appellant submits arguments in the Brief(s) specifying all of the errors made by the Examiner in the rejection). 5 Appellants next argue that the Examiner reversibly erred in finding that Seel teaches "a light receiving side that is free from front metal contact gridlines" as recited. Br. 8 ( emphasis omitted). Although Appellants recognize that the figure in Seel indeed shows such a component "free from front metal contact guidelines," Appellants assert that such feature "is merely an artefact of supplying simplified drawings, and not a positive teaching of Seel upon which one of ordinary skill in the art would rely as an enabling disclosure." Id. at 8-9, 11 (arguing that "work related to the Seel reference supports Applicant's position that the simplification of the Seel figure is not a positive teaching and does not enable one of ordinary skill in the art to eliminate the gridlines"), 13 ( arguing that a skilled artisan would not rely on Seel "as an enabling disclosure"). Whether Appellants have shown that Seel is not enabled, a reference need not be enabled to qualify as prior art for§ 103 purposes. "Under§ 103, however a reference need not be enabled; it qualifies as prior art, regardless, 5 Based on our affirmance of the rejection based on Seel, Woolf, and Bamham, we decline to reach Appellants' argument as moot - particularly the argument directed to whether "the Examiner has afforded this limitation [at issue] little or limited patentable weight, alleging that this feature is not structural and merely is an intended use as to the type of light to which the claimed devices are exposed." Br. 5; see also Final Act. 21-23 ( concluding that "should it not be taken" that the limitation at issue is an intended use, claim 1 is rejected based on Seel, Woolf, and Bamham). 6 Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 for whatever is disclosed therein." Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Appellants' arguments therefore do not identify reversible error in the Examiner's findings with regard to Seel. We sustain the rejection of claim 1 based on Seel, Woolf, and Bamham. Rejection of Claim 22 6 Appellants argue that the Examiner reversibly erred in rejecting claim 22 because the recited photovoltaic cell having "an area-normalised shunt resistance of said photovoltaic cell is not less than 500k0cm2" exhibits "an unexpected and enhanced result of permitting high performance across the range of ultra-low to ultra-high light levels." Br. 13, 14; Declaration of Mathieu Bellanger of February 8, 2016 ("First Deel.") ,r 14; Declaration of Mathieu Bellanger of December 15, 2016 ("Second Deel.") ,r 13. Appellants, asserting unexpected results as evidence of nonobviousness, have the burden of proving that the results are unexpected. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469-70 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Such burden requires Appellants to proffer factual evidence that actually shows unexpected results relative to the closest prior art, see In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and that is reasonably commensurate in scope with the protection sought by claim 22 on appeal. In re Grasselli, 713 F.2d 731, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 1035 (CCPA 1980); In re Hyson, 453 F.2d 764, 786 (CCPA 1972). "[I]t is not enough to show that results are obtained which differ from those 6 Appellants do not present separate arguments for claims 12 and 21, therefore, claims 12 and 21 stand or fall with claim 22 for this rejection. Br. 13-18; see also 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(1)(iv)(2013). 7 Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 obtained in the prior art: that difference must be shown to be an unexpected difference." In re Klosak, 455 F.2d 1077, 1080 (CCPA 1972). The extent of the showing relied upon by Appellants also must reasonably support the entire scope of the claims at issue. See In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Here, in support of the purported unexpected results, Appellants proffer Figure A showing certain "simulation results derived from Eqs. 12, 13, and 14 of the current application." Br. 14; First Deel. ,r 17. Neither Appellants nor Mr. Bellanger, however, explains why these results based on certain equations show unexpected high performance as compared to the closest prior art. Mr. Bellanger's statement that these equations provide that the area-normalized shunt parameter of a high band-gap III-V material such as (Al)GainP "becomes a critical parameter" (First Deel. ,r 16) does not explain why it supports the purported "unexpected and enhanced result of permitting high performance across the range of ultra-low to ultra-high light levels." Br. 13; First Deel. ,r 14; Second Deel. ,r 13. Mr. Bellanger's statement that Figure A shows "the claimed value of area-normalized shunt resistance is outside of the range typically encountered in convention devices" (First Deel. ,r 18) does not support the purported "unexpected and enhanced result of permitting high performance across the range of ultra-low to ultra-high light levels." Br. 13; First Deel. ,r 14; Second Deel. ,r 13. To the extent that Mr. Bellanger' s statement that "the claimed value of area-normalized shunt resistance is outside of the range typically encountered in convention devices" (First Deel. ,r 18) attempts to show that the recited shunt resistance is not taught in the prior art, "the discovery of a previously unappreciated property of a prior art composition, or of a 8 Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 scientific explanation for the prior art's functioning, does not render the old composition patentably new to the discoverer." Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Mr. Bellanger's statements regarding epitaxial growth and device processing do not structurally distinguish the apparatus claim. See First Deel. ,r 18. To the extent that Figure A is proffered to support the argument that the prior art reference "does not provide an enabling disclosure" (Br. 17; Second Deel. ,r 16 ("The statement in PVEducation.org., therefore, does not provide an enabling disclosure as to how one of ordinary skill in the art could achieve the claimed range of normalized shunt resistance in combination with an III-V semiconductor material.")), a reference need not be enabled to qualify as prior art for§ 103 purposes. Amgen, Inc., 314 F.3d at 1357. Mr. Bellanger also proffers Figure B and argues that unexpected results are shown in the "unexpected high impact of the design rules [] on the yield and performance of PVEH devices in low light level applications. First Deel. ,r 19. Mr. Bellanger provides that Figure B shows "dramatic" gains in performance "when using the design without gridlines and the shunt resistance" compared to what was deemed as "standard design." Id. ,r 20; Br. 16. "To be particularly probative, evidence of unexpected results must establish that there is a difference between the results obtained and those of the closest prior art, and that the difference would not have been expected by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention." Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 752 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014). "[B]y definition, any superior property must be unexpected to be considered 9 Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 evidence of non-obviousness. Thus, in order to properly evaluate whether a superior property was unexpected, the [fact-finder] should have considered what properties were expected." Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). "If an applicant demonstrates that an embodiment has an unexpected result and provides an adequate basis to support the conclusion that other embodiments falling within the claim will behave in the same manner, this will generally establish that the evidence is commensurate with [the] scope of the claims." In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In this case, neither Appellants nor Mr. Bellanger explains why such unspecified "standard design" is the closest prior art and what would have been expected from the closest prior art. Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1371 ("Here, Pfizer's evidence must fail because the record is devoid of any evidence of what the skilled artisan would have expected."). Neither Appellants nor Mr. Bellanger explains why the results in Figure B, based on 200 lux LED illumination, is commensurate in scope with claim 22 which is not limited to this particular condition. Neither Appellants nor Mr. Bellanger explains why the results in Figure B, comparing (Al)GainP solar cells, is commensurate in scope with the "(Al)GainP III-V" material recited in claim 22. Based on the foregoing, we are unpersuaded that the Examiner reversibly erred in evaluating the evidence in support of the unexpected results argument. Appellants also argue that the prior art solar cell is silicon-based, and the shunt resistance "is not simply interchangeable in the two types of devices to maintain comparable performance, and so one of ordinary skill in the art would not modify a material (III-V) low-level light harvesting device 10 Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 solely based on teachings pertaining to a silicon-based solar cell." Br. 17; Second Deel. ,r 17. Claim 22, however, does not require the recited cell to have a particular performance parameter. Furthermore, as the Examiner points out, the obviousness rejection is not solely based on PV Education but rather the combined teachings including those of Seel and Woolf. Ans. 12; see also In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Non- obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references. . . . [The reference] must be read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole."). We sustain the rejection of claim 22. Rejection of Claim 23 Under the heading "General Lack of Basis to Combine Secondary References," Appellants refer to the "rejection of claim 2" and argue that the Examiner reversibly erred in combining Gray with the other cited references. Br. 18. The record before us, however, shows that claim 2 is rejected based on Seel and Woolf (Final Act. 6, 8) and Seel, Woolf, and Bamham. Final Act. 21, 23. To the extent that Appellants attempt to argue that the Examiner reversibly erred in combining Gray with the other references in rejecting claim 23 (Final Act. 17 (rejecting claim 23 based on Seel, Woolf, and Gray), 33 (rejecting claim 23 based on Seel, Woolf, Bamham, and Gray)), we are unpersuaded by Appellants' argument. Appellants' argument that "Gray fails to teach that the sheet resistance of the InGaP emitter layer is an important or critical design parameter for a photovoltaic energy harvesting device as disclosed by applicants, or the preferred range of sheet resistance 11 Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 for such a device" (Br. 18) does not structurally distinguish the apparatus cited in claim 23 (reciting "wherein said active material comprises at least an emitter made of (Al)GalnP and a base material made of (Al)GalnP, a sheet resistance of said emitter being not more than 1000 0/D [sic.]"). As to the remaining argument directed to the general assertion that "[i]t is a very difficult task to identify and choose the best possible layer characteristics for a particular solar cell application from the huge number of possible combinations," Appellants generally refer to the prior art references cited the by Examiner but do not address the Examiner's specific rationale for each of the obviousness rejections. Compare Br. 19 (mentioning references Vinod, Anderson, and Iwazaki), with Final Act. 11, 14, 15, 18, 20, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35 (providing obviousness analyses including respective rationales to combine the references). We note that "familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle." KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). In this case, Appellants do not address the Examiner's specific "articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness," Id. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)), and no reversible error has been identified in these aspects of the obviousness analyses. DECISION The Examiner's decision is affirmed. 12 Appeal2018-004026 Application 14/242,250 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 13 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation