Ex Parte BANKOWSKI et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 19, 2018

14559582 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 19, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/559,582 12/03/2014 28395 7590 09/21/2018 BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L 1000 TOWN CENTER 22NDFLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Stefan BANKOWSKI UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 83474189 5632 EXAMINER P ALIW AL, YOGESH ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2435 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/21/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte STEP AN BANKOWSKI, MICHAEL RAYMOND WESTRA, DAVID CHASE MITCHELL, WLIUS MARCHWICKI, and ELIZABETH HALASH 1 Appeal2018---003868 Application 14/559,582 Technology Center 2400 Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1 and 3-21, which are all the pending claims (see Final Act. 1 and App. Br., Claims App'x). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b ). We AFFIRM. 1 The Appeal Brief identifies the Applicant, Ford Global Technologies, LLC as the real party in interest (i.e., the Appellant). App. Br. 1. Appeal2018---003868 Application 14/559,582 Introduction Appellant's disclosure and claimed invention "relate to control and monitoring of application permissions for vehicle applications." Spec. ,r 1. Claims 1 and 10 are illustrative of the claims on appeal, reproduced here with disputed limitations in italics: 1. A system comprising: a memory storing a local policy table; and a processor device of a vehicle configured to identify an application identifier of a mobile application registering from a mobile device paired with the vehicle and a mobile device identifier of the mobile device; query the local policy table for application permissions associated with the application identifier of the registering mobile application and the mobile device identifier, the application permissions defining which user interface features, vehicle information elements, and vehicle functions are accessible to the mobile application; and responsive to the registering, provide the mobile application with mobile device-specific vehicle access in accordance with the application permissions. 10. A system comprising: a mobile device, paired with a vehicle, configured to send, to the vehicle, an update received from a server and including a local policy table including application permissions specific to a unique identifier of the mobile device and defining which user interface features, information elements, and functions of the vehicle are accessible to a mobile application; and register the mobile application in accordance with the application permissions for the mobile device. App. Br., Claims App'x pp. A-1, A-2. 2 Appeal2018---003868 Application 14/559,582 Re} ections & References Claims 1, 3-15, and 19-21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103 as unpatentable over Esselink (US 2013/0031604 Al; Jan. 31, 2013) and Guba (US 2011/0009107 Al; Jan. 13, 2011). Final Act. 7-15. Claims 16-18 stand rejected underÂ§ 103 over Esselink, Guba, and Addepalli (US 8,848,608 Bl; Sept. 30, 2014). Final Act. 15-16. ANALYSIS The Board "reviews the obviousness rejection[s] for error based upon the issues identified by appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon," and treats arguments not made as waived. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 107 5 (BP AI 2010) (precedential) ( cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)); see also 37 C.F.R. Â§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellant's contentions of reversible error. We disagree with Appellant's conclusions. Instead, as consistent with our discussion below, we adopt the Examiner's findings and reasons as set forth in the Final Office Action from which this appeal is taken and as set forth in the Answer. We highlight the following for emphasis. Claim 1 In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner finds Esselink teaches a vehicle processor configured to "query a local policy table for application permissions associated with [an] application identifier of [a] registering mobile application," but that Esselink does not disclose querying the local policy table with a mobile device identifier. See Final Act. 7 ( citing Esselink 3 Appeal2018---003868 Application 14/559,582 ,r,r 53-54, 57, Fib. 2B). The Examiner then finds Guba discloses "a system in which a processor identifies a mobile device identifier of a mobile device and query policy table for application permissions associated with the mobile device identifier and providing a mobile application with mobile device-specific vehicle access." See Final Act. 8 (citing Guba ,r,r 7, 30, 70, 7 6, and 116). The Examiner concludes that the disputed requirement for a vehicle processor configured to "query the local policy table for application permissions associated with the application identifier of the registering mobile application and the mobile device identifier," as recited in claim 1, would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan from the combined teachings of Esselink and Guba. Id. (citing Guba ,r 70). Appellant argues the Examiner errs because "neither cited reference includes any disclosure or suggestion related to how 'a processor device of a vehicle' considers [an] 'application identifier' in combination with [a] 'mobile device identifier' with respect to vehicle permissions." App. Br. 6. Specifically, Appellant contends: the Guba reference relates to [a] policy "distributed to a plurality of mobile devices," not to policies distributed to vehicles themselves. . . . Thus, as Guba does not disclose distribution of [a] policy to vehicles, Guba cannot cure the deficiencies of Esselink relating to "a processor device of a vehicle" configured to "query the local policy table for application permissions associated with the application identifier of the registering mobile application and the mobile device identifier," as recited. App. Br. 6 (citing Guba ,r 30, claim 1). Appellant's argument does not persuade us of Examiner error. As the Examiner responds, and we agree, it is the combined teachings of Esselink and Guba that teach or suggest the disputed limitations. Ans. 3. 4 Appeal2018---003868 Application 14/559,582 We specifically disagree with Appellant that because "Guba does not disclose distribution of [a] policy to vehicles, Guba cannot cure the deficiencies of Esselink" (App. Br. 6). "The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,425 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted); see also In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) ("Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures."). As the Examiner responds, and we agree, the proposed combination of teachings from Esselink and Guba does "not chang[ e] the location of the local policy storage but [is] only relying on Guba to disclose device specific policy[,] and it is obvious when the teaching of device specific policies [as taught by Guba] are applied to the [ teachings of] Esselink, they will be stored and fetched by the mechanism already disclosed by the Esselink." Ans. 5. Appellant replies that "[t]here is no articulated reason why one would combine the references, nor evidentiary basis for that finding, nor satisfactory explanation for the motivation." Reply Br. 2. We disagree. We are mindful that "rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,418 (2007) ( quoting Kahn). "The pertinence of each reference, if not apparent, must be clearly explained." 37 C.F.R. Â§ 1.104(c)(2). 5 Appeal2018---003868 Application 14/559,582 Here, the Examiner specifically explains that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to modify Esselink with Guba to query the local policy table with both an application identifier and a mobile device identifier to provide [a] mobile application with mobile device-specific vehicle access as taught by Guba so that "the system allows an administrator to define customized policies for individuals or for larger groups of people ( e.g. all family members, all kids in the family, employees of a division, specific types of employees, or all employees of the company, and the like)." Final Act. 8 ( citing and quoting Guba ,r 70). We acknowledge that Guba differs from Esselink and Appellant's disclosed embodiments in that Guba does not disclose an application policy table in the vehicle. Nevertheless, Appellant does not persuade us the Examiner errs in finding Guba provides a motivation for incorporating its use of a mobile device identifier as a query parameter for determining application permissions into the design of Esselink, as discussed above. "As long as some motivation or suggestion to combine the references is provided by the prior art taken as a whole, the law does not require that the references be combined for the reasons contemplated by the inventor." In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Appellant has not asserted that the proposed modification would have been beyond the capabilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Absent such an assertion, we "take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ," and find a person of ordinary skill in the art would overcome those difficulties within their level of skill. KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); see also id. 6 Appeal2018---003868 Application 14/559,582 at 421 ("A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton."). Accordingly, we sustain theÂ§ 103 rejection of claim 1. We also, accordingly, sustain the rejection of its dependent claims 2-9 and 21, which Appellant does not argue separately. Claims 10 and 15 In the Answer, the Examiner notes "that claim 1 only recites 'a memory storing a local policy table' and does not establish which component of the system comprises a memory that stores a local policy table." Ans. 4. Appellant responds that this claim interpretation is inapplicable to claims 10 and 15, because those claims "specifically require the sending of the local policy table 'including application permissions specific to a unique identifier of the mobile device' to the vehicle." Reply Br. 3 (quoting claim 10 (claim 15 includes an analogous requirement)). Appellant contends this is an additional reason for why "Guba does not cure the acknowledged deficiencies of Esselink with respect to independent claims 10 and 15." Id. We agree with Appellant that claim 10 recites limitations that, unlike claim 1, specifically require a mobile device be configured to send a local policy table to the vehicle. We disagree, however, that this provides a basis for finding the Examiner errs in the rejection of claims 10 and 15. The Examiner relies on Esselink for teaching a mobile device configured to send the local policy table to the vehicle in the rejection of claim 10. See Final Act. 10 ( citing Esselink ,r,r 65---66). We agree with this finding. Esselink discloses that "[t]he wireless device [e.g., a mobile phone (see ,r 39)] will relay the application policy table to the VCS [ vehicle computing system] for 7 Appeal2018---003868 Application 14/559,582 further processing." See Esselink ,r 66 (reference numbers omitted). As discussed supra for claim 1, Appellant does not persuade us the Examiner errs in determining it would have been obvious to modify Esselink's local policy table to include the recited mobile device identifier. Accordingly, Appellant does not persuade us of error in the rejection of claim 10. Although we note the analogous recited requirements in claim 15 differ from those in claim 10, Appellant presents no specific argument beyond contending the Examiner errs similarly in its rejection and, accordingly, for the reasons discussed supra, Appellant also does not persuade us of error in the rejection of claim 15. Accordingly, we sustain theÂ§ 103 rejection of claims 10 and 15. We likewise sustain theÂ§ 103 rejections of their dependent claims 11-14 and 16-20, for which Appellant offers no substantive separate arguments. DECISION We affirm the 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103 rejections of claims 1 and 3-21. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. Â§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 8