Ex Parte Arunachalam et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 11, 2018

13923508 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 11, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 13/923,508 06/21/2013 Ravi S. Arunachalam 30449 7590 10/15/2018 SCHMEISER, OLSEN & WATTS 22 CENTURY HILL DRIVE SUITE 302 LATHAM, NY 12110 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. IN920120 l 83US 1 1038 EXAMINER ROSTAMI, MOHAMMAD S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2154 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/15/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): 30449@IPLA WUSA.COM PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RA VI S. ARUNACHALAM, NA VJOT S. BHOGAL, and CHAND AN MUKHERJEE 1 Appeal2017-002994 Application 13/923,508 Technology Center 2100 Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, HUNG H. BUI, and JOHN F. HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judges. THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134(a) of the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-3, 5-11, 13-19, and 21-24, all the pending claims in the present application. Claims 4, 12, 20, and 25-27 are canceled (see Claims App. Br. 1). We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b ). We REVERSE. 1 Appellants name International Business Machines Corporation as the real party in interest (App. Br. 1 ). Appeal2017-002994 Application 13/923,508 The present invention relates generally to verifying compliance of a land parcel to an approved usage (see Spec., Abstract). Claim 1 is illustrative: 1. A computer implemented method for verifying compliance of a land parcel to an approved usage, said method compnsmg: monitoring, by a processor of a computing system, one or more updatable sources of information to detect availability of new information with respect to the land parcel; processing, by the processor, the new information to determine (i) location information indicating where the parcel is located and (ii) current usage of the land parcel; querying, by the processor, a database storing location information, on land parcels, including approved usage information to determine an approved usage, by a local Government body, of the land parcel; comparing, by the processor, the current usage and the approved usage of the land parcel; and generating, by the processor from a result of said comparing, a numerical compliance score indicative of an extent of deviation of the current usage to the approved usage of the land parcel. Appellants appeal the following rejections: Claims 1-3, 5-11, 13-19, and 21-24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Pearcy (US 2012/0066187 Al, Mar. 15, 2012) and Wenzlau (US 7,873,524 B2, Jan. 18, 2011). We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). 2 Appeal2017-002994 Application 13/923,508 ANALYSIS Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that Pearcy and Wenzlau collectively teaches or suggests both current usage of the land parcel and approved usage information, as set forth in claim 1? Appellants contend that paragraph [59] of Pearcy does not disclose "determining a usage of the land parcel but rather disclose[ s] determining a usage of the parcel data 300 stored in the common format database" (App. Br. 11 ). Appellants further contend that in Pearcy "a query for property access legal information is a query pertaining to access of the land parcel and is not a query for how the land parcel may be used" (Reply Br. 7). We agree with Appellants. Here, the Examiner finds that Pearcy discloses that "data viewable in the parcel inventory may include parcel data 3 00 that can be purchased or leased ... website addresses ... , property access legal information, [] contact info ... [ and] data useful for performing flood zone determinations" (Ans. 7). The Examiner interprets "the legal information about the parcel to be [whether] there are any discrepancies with the parcel, for example land being approved or rejected for certain usage" (id. at 8). Although the Examiner is correct that Pearcy refers to "property access legal information" (see Pearcy ,r 138), we agree with Appellants that such information emphasizes "access" rights to the property or property data, as opposed to current and/or approved "usage" of the property. For example, Pearcy discloses "data viewable in the parcel inventory may include parcel data 300 that can be purchased or leased. . .. [also] websites addresses for parcel viewing ... property access legal information, and contact info ... [also] data useful for performing flood zone 3 Appeal2017-002994 Application 13/923,508 determinations" (i-f 138). Pearcy discloses that "[t]he combined data in the common format database 125 may be accessed by different entities for different reasons. For example, a bank may access the combined data to determine a flood zone type for a parcel of land ( e.g., to determine whether to extend a loan for its purchase)" (i-f 59). In other words, Pearcy teaches an inventory of data that shows, inter alia, property access legal information and gives exemplary reasons for accessing the combined data. The Examiner has not sufficiently shown that the disclosed "property access legal information" of Pearcy suggests current and/or approved usage of the land parcel. Because the Examiner has not sufficiently shown that Pearcy discloses usage of the land parcel, neither current nor approved, we are constrained by the record to agree with Appellants that the comparison in Pearcy is "not comparison of the current usage and the approved usage of the land parcel" (see App. Br. 13). Thus, for at least the reasons noted supra, we disagree with the Examiner's finding that Pearcy's "property access legal information" teaches current usage of the land parcel, as recited in each of the independent claims 1, 9, and 1 7. We note the Examiner has not relied on Wenzlau to teach this feature. Since we agree with at least one of the arguments advanced by Appellants, we need not reach the merits of Appellants' other arguments. Accordingly, on the record before us, we do not sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claims 1-3, 5-11, 13- 19, and 21-24. 4 Appeal2017-002994 Application 13/923,508 DECISI0N2 The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-3, 5-11, 13-19, and 21-24 is reversed. REVERSED 2 In the event of further prosecution, we leave it to the Examiner to consider if the computer readable storage device claim, claim 17, should also be rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. We note that the ordinary and customary meaning of "computer readable storage device" to a person of ordinary skill in the art is broad enough to encompass both non-transitory and transitory media. Signals are not patentable eligible subject matter under Â§ 101. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See also MPEP Â§ 2106(!) (8th ed. Rev. 9 Aug. 2012) and Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857 (PT AB 2013) (precedential ). 5