Ex Parte Angarita et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 19, 201714024369 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 19, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/024,369 09/11/2013 Roger Angarita G225.P16B42 5387 33356 7590 06/21/2017 SoCAL IP LAW GROUP LLP 310 N. WESTLAKE BLVD. STE 120 WESTLAKE VILLAGE, CA 91362 EXAMINER CHANNAVAJJALA, SRIRAMA T ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2157 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/21/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): USPTO@socalip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ROGER ANGARITA and SHAWN MCCREIGHT Appeal 2017-004778 Application 14/024,3691 Technology Center 2100 Before JAMES R. HUGHES, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and JOHN D. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—24, which constitute all the pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 The real party in interest is identified as Guidance Software, Inc. Br. 1. Appeal 2017-004778 Application 14/024,369 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ invention relates to processing a plurality of electronic items for review. Abstract; Spec. 4—6; Fig. 3A. Claim 1 is exemplary of the matter on appeal (disputed limitations emphasized): 1. A method for storing a plurality of electronic items, the method comprising: receiving, by a processing device comprising a processor and memory, the plurality of electronic items; for each item of the electronic items, each item being associated with an item identifier, segmenting, by the processing device each item into a plurality of segments, wherein each segment of the plurality of segments is a logical subunit of the item, and for each segment of the plurality of segments: hashing the segment to produce a segment hash value, wherein at least one segment of a first item of the electronic items has a same segment hash value as at least one segment of a second item of the electronic items; determining whether the segment hash value exists in a first table; in response to determining that the segment hash value does not exist in the first table, adding an entry to the first table, the entry associating the segment hash value with the segment; in response to determining that the segment hash value does not exist in the first table, refraining from adding the entry to the first table for maintaining the first table with unique segments stored therein', and adding an entry to a second table, the entry associating the item identifier with metadata related to the segment in the item, a segment position corresponding to a location of the segment in the item, and the segment hash value', and outputting, from the processing device, the first table and the second table. 2 Appeal 2017-004778 Application 14/024,369 Br. 10 (Claims Appendix). REJECTIONS2 Claims 1—3, 7, 8, 20, 23, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Beaman et al. (US 2010/0217953 Al; pub. Aug. 26, 2010) (“Beaman”) in view of Loeb (US 2007/0192564 Al; pub. Aug. 16,2007). Final Act. 15-22. Claims 4 and 5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Beaman, Loeb, and Salaka et al. (US 2012/0054135 Al; pub. Mar. 1, 2012) (“Salaka”). Final Act. 23-24. Claims 6 and 9—19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Beaman, Loeb, and Anbalagan et al. (US 2010/0054600 Al; pub. Mar. 4, 2010) (“Anbalagan”). Final Act. 25—31. Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Aiken (US 6,658,626 Bl; iss. Dec. 2, 2003) in view of Asikainen et al. (US 2011/0238679, pub. Sept. 29, 2011) (“Asikainen”). Final Act. 31-33. Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Aiken (US 6,658,626 Bl; iss. Dec. 2, 2003). Final Act. 34—35. ANALYSIS The § 103 rejection of claims 1—3, 7, 8, 20, 23, and 24 Appellants argue Beaman and Loeb do not teach the claim 1 limitation wherein each segment of the plurality of segments is a logical 235 U.S.C§§ 101 and 112 rejections are withdrawn. See Final Act. 53; Ans. 12. 3 Appeal 2017-004778 Application 14/024,369 subunit of the item. Br. 5. According to Appellants, the Examiner errs in finding Beaman teaches this limitation because the Beaman segments refer to portions of a hash table rather than a logical subunit of the item. Id. at 5— 6 (citing Beaman Figs. 3, 4, | 61; Abstr.). Appellants argue Beaman and Loeb do not teach the claim 1 limitation adding an entry to a second table, the entry associating the item identifier with metadata related to the segment in the item, a segment position corresponding to a location of the segment in the item, and the segment hash value. Id. at 6. According to Appellants, the Examiner errs in finding Beaman teaches this limitation because Beaman does not disclose a second hash table that includes entries associating the item ... Id. (citing Beaman || 46—54,161). Appellants argue Beaman’s “second table” merely receives entries flushed from a “first table” when the first table reaches a threshold load factor. Id. (citing Beaman | 55). Appellants further argue Beaman and Loeb do not teach the claim 1 limitation refraining from adding the entry to the first table for maintaining the first table with unique segments stored therein. Id. In particular, Appellants argue the Examiner acknowledges Beaman does not teach this limitation but errs in finding Loeb teaches this limitation because Loeb merely discloses a technique for handling collision between a value and a value already stored. Id. The Examiner finds Beaman teaches data objects assigned with a unique identifier. Ans. 3 (citing Beaman Fig. lb; 141 wherein data objects 10, 12, 14 are associated with unique identifier elements 11, 13, 15). The Examiner finds Beaman teaches data structure with logically divided 4 Appeal 2017-004778 Application 14/024,369 segments into subsegments. Id. (citing Figs. 3, 4; 161 wherein elements 31, 33,35 correspond to the logical subunit of the item). Regarding Appellants’ argument that Beaman’s segments refer to portions of a hash table rather than the logical subunit, the Examiner finds “Beaman not only supports memory data structure having hash table specifically defining ‘segments’ fig 3, elements 30, 32, 34, but also logically divided segments into sub-segments indexed for example fig 3, elements 31, 33,35.” Id. 3. The Examiner additionally finds Beaman’s teaching is identical to the Specification segment table 410 which stores a list of entries in the table 3 A and is part of the data structure. Id. at 3^4. (citing Spec. 1 59,11. 18-21; Figs. 3A, 4). The Examiner finds Loeb teaches, “in response to determining that the segment hash value does not exist in the first table, adding an entry to the first table, the entry associating the segment hash value with the segment.” Ans. 7 (citing Abstr. || 32, 46-48; Figs. 2—6). Regarding refraining from adding the entry, the Examiner finds the entries are further examined and in certain situations, e.g., to reduce collisions, are not added to the first table. Id. (citing | 56; see also 1 55). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments and agree, instead, with the Examiner’s findings. Regarding the term logical subunit, while not defined in the Specification, the term is used, for example, as “. . .each segment may correspond to a single sentence, a single line of text, a block of computer code, an image, a table, or other logical subunits of a larger item (emphasis added).” Spec. 1 52. Claim terms in a patent application are given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, 5 Appeal 2017-004778 Application 14/024,369 as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Appellants present no persuasive argument that the claim terms should be limited to exclude the combined teaching of the cited references and present no persuasive argument that the Examiner’s findings and claim interpretations are unreasonable or overbroad. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of independent claims 8 and 20 which Appellants argue include similar limitations as claim 1 and rely on the arguments presented for claim 1, supra. Br. 6—7. Regarding dependent claims 2, 3, 7, 23 and 24, Appellants rely on dependency and, therefore, we sustain the rejection of these claims. Id. at 7. The §103 rejection of claims 4—6 and 9—19 Regarding the rejection of dependent claims 4 and 5 over Beaman, Loeb, and Salaka, Appellants rely on dependency and that Salaka does not cure the deficiencies of Beaman and Loeb. Id. As discussed, supra, we find no deficiencies in Beaman and Loeb. See also Final Act. 23—24. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 4 and 5. Regarding the rejection of dependent claims 6 and 9-19 over Beaman, Loeb, and Anbalagan, Appellants rely on dependency and that Anbalagan does not cure the deficiencies of Beaman and Loeb. Id. As discussed, supra, we find no deficiencies in Beaman and Loeb. Appellants present a conclusory argument that Anbalagan “fails to disclose, teach or suggest the limitations of claims 6 and 9—19.” We are not persuaded by this argument. See also Final Act. 25—31. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 6 and 9-19. 6 Appeal 2017-004778 Application 14/024,369 The §103 rejection of claim 22 Appellants argue the Examiner errs in finding Aiken teaches the claim 22 limitation segmenting each [of] the plurality of items into a plurality of segments, wherein each segment of the plurality of segments is a logical subunit of the item, wherein the logical subunit is a paragraph, a sentence, of a line of text.'” Br. 8—9 (citing Aiken 16:60-17:7). According to Appellants, the cited portion of Aiken, reproduced below, does not support the Examiner’s finding because it teaches that the Aiken “content segments” are not a “logical subunit of the item” and Asikainen does not cure the deficiency: Frame 602 contains two overview bars 608 and 610. Each overview bar corresponds to a document and is identified by the location (e.g. path) and name of the document. Frame 604 contains the actual content of a Document A. Document A has numerous content segments (e.g. paragraphs in a written report, methods in a computer program, etc.). Frame 606 contains a Document B which was compared to Document A. Document B is also made up of numerous content segments. The content segments in both documents are shown to illustrate features of the user interface and do not necessarily represent logical "segments" of content when each document is viewed individually, (emphasis added). Id. at 7 (citing Aiken 16:60-17:7). The Examiner finds Aiken teaches comparing documents, wherein the documents are divided into multiple segments such as paragraphs that match with other segments. Ans. 13 (citing Aiken Abstr., Fig. 6, 16:62—67, 17:1— 17). The Examiner finds Aiken’s segments are logically formed as a paragraph, sentence, or text from the overall document. Id. While the Examiner does not expressly address Appellants’ cited portion of Aiken (i.e., “[t]he content segments in both documents are shown 7 Appeal 2017-004778 Application 14/024,369 to illustrate features of the user interface and do not necessarily represent logical ‘segments’ of content when each document is viewed individually (17:1—4)”), we find the Examiner has sufficiently shown that Aiken describes the disputed limitation. Moreover, Appellants’ cited portion of Aiken recites the terms “not necessarily” and, based on the record before us, we are not persuaded of Examiner error. Additionally, we note Appellants’ argument is conclusory and Appellants present no reply to rebut the Examiner’s findings We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments and agree, instead, with the Examiner’s findings. Appellants present no persuasive argument to limit the broad but reasonable interpretation of logical subunit to exclude the teaching of Aiken’s segments. In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256. In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claim 22. The § 102(a) rejection of claim 21 Appellants present the same arguments regarding the teaching of Aiken in the § 102(a) rejection of claim 21 as in the § 103 rejection of claim 22, supra, (the “content segments” of Aiken are not a “logical subunit of the item”). Br. 9—10. The Examiner makes similar findings regarding claim 21 and Aiken’s teaching as made for claim 22, supra. Ans. 16—17. While the Examiner does not expressly address Appellants’ cited portion of Aiken (i.e., “[t]he content segments in both documents are shown to illustrate features of the user interface and do not necessarily represent logical ‘segments’ of content when each document is viewed individually (17:1—4)”), we find the Examiner has sufficiently shown that Aiken describes the disputed limitation, as required for anticipation. A claim is anticipated only if each 8 Appeal 2017-004778 Application 14/024,369 and every element as set forth in the claims is found, either expressly or inherently described in a single prior art reference, and arranged as required by the claim. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Moreover, Appellants’ cited portion of Aiken recites the terms “not necessarily” and, based on the record before us, we are not persuaded of Examiner error. Additionally, we note Appellants’ argument is conclusory and Appellants present no reply to rebut the Examiner’s findings. In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claim 21. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—20 and 22—24 under 35U.S.C. § 103. We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation