Ex Parte Andrews

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 26, 2019

14195892 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 26, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/195,892 03/04/2014
92269 7590 04/30/2019
Global Intellectual Property Agency, LLC
P.O. Box 382
Swedesboro, NJ 08085
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Errol Andrews
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
EA218183 4103
EXAMINER
ZIMMERMAN, GLENN D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2875
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/30/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
info@globalipa.com
notifications@globalipa.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ERROL ANDREWS
Appeal2018-001826
Application 14/195,892
Technology Center 2800
Before BEYERL YA. FRANKLIN, DONNA M. PRAISS, and
JEFFREY R. SNAY, Administrative Patent Judges.
PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Non-Final rejection
of claims 1-17. Non-Final Act. 2-13; Br. 8-10. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
The subject matter of this appeal relates to vehicle emergency lighting
for alerting oncoming vehicles to the presence of a disable vehicle and also
for providing sufficient light to repair and inspect a disabled vehicle.
1 In explaining our Decision, we make reference to the Specification filed
March 4, 2014 ("Spec."), the Non-Final Office Action dated July 2, 2015
("Non-Final Act."), the Appeal Brief filed February 3, 2017 ("Br."), and the
Examiner's Answer dated May 17, 2017 ("Ans.").
Appeal2018-001826
Application 14/195,892
Spec. ,r,r 1--4. According to the Specification, a plurality of clusters of LEDs
are connected to one another by a control circuit which includes a power
adapter suited to be plugged into a power outlet on the dashboard of a
vehicle or they may be powered by an external battery or other power
source. Id. ,r,r 4, 33, 35. Claim 1 is illustrative (emphasis added):
1. A vehicle hazard light strip comprising:
a power adapter adapted to connect to an electrical
power outlet in a vehicle;
at least one cluster of LEDs wherein said at least one
cluster comprises a plurality of individual LEDs;
a control circuit electrically connecting said power
adapter and said at least one cluster of LEDs;
a support on which said at least one cluster of LEDs and
said control circuit are disposed.
Br. 14 (Claims Appendix).
The Examiner maintains and Appellant2 appeals the rejections of
claims 1-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combination of
Lee3 and Bamhouse4 alone and further in view of secondary references.
Ans. 2--4; Br. 8-10.
OPINION
After review of the arguments and evidence presented by both
Appellant and the Examiner, we affirm the stated rejections.
Appellant argues the subject matter of claims 1-17 as a group.
Br. 11-13. In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv), and in the
2 Errol Andrews is identified in the Brief as the real party in interest. Br. 3.
3 US 2007/0182677 Al, published Aug. 9, 2007.
4 US 2007/0089338 Al, published Apr. 26, 2007.
2
Appeal2018-001826
Application 14/195,892
absence of arguments directed to the subsidiary rejections, claims 2-17 will
stand or fall together with claim 1.
In the Appeal Brief, Appellant argues that the combination of Lee and
Barnhouse is improper because the Examiner's reasoning is conclusory and
circular. Br. 12. According to Appellant, modifying Lee with a power
adapter on the basis that a power adapter would allow Lee to be plugged in
is conclusory and circular reasoning "because it simply describes the results
of the proposed combination, rather than articulating a distinct reason for
making the proposed combination separate from the inherent benefits of the
combination." Id. Appellant contends that the Examiner's question "how
would one power the device if there wasn't an electrical power outlet in the
vehicle?" indicates the Examiner's obviousness determination is based on
hindsight because the Examiner failed to support a motivation to combine
from the prior art itself. Id.
We are not persuaded of reversible in the rejection of claim 1 over the
combination of Lee and Barnhouse for the reasons stated by the Examiner in
the Non-Final Action and the Answer. We add the following primarily for
emphasis. The Examiner finds that Lee discloses a bendable LED display
for automotive applications using a control circuit to produce a variety of
lighting effects, including dimming. Ans. 4--5. The Examiner's findings are
supported by the record. Lee ,r,r 1, 18, 19, 55, 57, 69, 70. Appellant does
not dispute the Examiner's finding that Lee requires a configuration for
powering the display device. Ans. 5. This finding of the Examiner is
supported by Barnhouse, which discloses that a vehicular lighting device
needs to have a power source. Ans. 5; Barnhouse ,r 1 7. The Examiner also
finds that Barnhouse discloses multiple configurations for powering a light
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Appeal2018-001826
Application 14/195,892
source mounted to a transportation vehicle including a battery, a 12-volt
adaptor such as a vehicle cigarette lighter, or a solar cell. Id. Because
Barnhouse shows that a person having ordinary skill in the art before the
effective date of the claimed invention would have had knowledge of
providing a power source to a vehicular lighting device as well as the
various configurations for providing a power source to a vehicular lighting
device, combining the teachings of Barnhouse with those of Lee is not based
on impermissible hindsight. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395,
(CCP A 1971) (holding hindsight reasoning that takes into account only
knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time
the claimed invention was made rather than knowledge gleaned only from an
applicant's disclosure is proper).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Examiner's rejection of
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We also affirm the rejections of claims 2-17
for the same reasons.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-17 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(v).
AFFIRMED
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