Ex Parte Andersson et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 9, 201511944773 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 9, 2015) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/944,773 11/26/2007 Lennart Andersson 4015-5923 / P24073-US2 6118 24112 7590 03/09/2015 COATS & BENNETT, PLLC 1400 Crescent Green, Suite 300 Cary, NC 27518 EXAMINER WONG, XAVIER S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2413 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/09/2015 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte LENNART ANDERSSON and ANDRES REIAL ____________ Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 1 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before STEPHEN C. SIU, DENISE M. POTHIER, and IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges. SIU, Administrative Patent Judge DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1, 3–8, 11–13, 15–17, 19–22, and 25. Claims 2, 9, 14, 18, and 23 have been cancelled. See Response to Office Action, dated June 30, 2010. The Examiner objects to claims 10 and 24, which are not subject to appeal. Final Rej. 17. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). The disclosed invention relates generally to message detection. Spec. ¶ 2. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (App. Br. 2). Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 2 Independent claim 1 reads as follows: 1. A method for detecting a control channel message in a communication receiver, the method comprising: decoding messages transmitted over a plurality of shared control channels; determining at least one likelihood metric for each of the decoded messages; selecting a best candidate from the decoded messages, based on the likelihood metrics; generating one or more additional candidate messages in addition to the decoded messages; calculating additional likelihood metrics corresponding to the additional candidate messages; and comparing the at least one likelihood metric for the best candidate to the corresponding likelihood metrics for the decoded messages other than the best candidate and to the additional likelihood metrics to determine whether the best candidate is a valid message. The Examiner relies on the following references: Loeliger US 2003/0026359 A1 Feb. 6, 2003 Hutchins US 6,526,104 B1 Feb. 25, 2003 Hegde US 2004/0264555 A1 Dec. 30, 2004 Magee US 2005/0169399 A1 Aug. 4, 2005 Tanrikulu US 2005/0286654 A1 Dec. 29, 2005 Kim US 2006/0205357 A1 Sept. 14, 2006 Bernadac US 7,392,459 B2 June 24, 2008 Gutcher US 2008/0247493 A1 Oct. 9, 2008 Garrett US 7,609,777 B2 Oct. 27, 2009 Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 3 Appellants appeal the Examiner’s rejections as follows: 1) Claims 1, 4, 5, 15–17, 20, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Tanrikulu and Garrett. App. Br. 6. 2 2) Claims 3 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, and Bernadac. App. Br. 6. 3) Claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, and Gutcher. App. Br. 6. 4) Claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, Gutcher, and Loeliger. App. Br. 6. 5) Claims 8 and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, and Hegde. App. Br. 6. 6) Claims 11 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, and Kim. App. Br. 7. 3 7) Claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, Kim, and Magee. App. Br. 7. 8) Claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, and Loeliger. App. Br. 7. 2 The Examiner indicates that claims 2, 9, 18, and 23 are rejected. However, these claims have been cancelled. See Response to Office Action, dated June 30, 2010. Thus, claims 2, 9, 18, and 23 are not subject to appeal. 3 The Examiner indicates that claim 14 is rejected. However, claim 14 has been cancelled. See Response to Office Action, dated June 30, 2010. Thus, claim 14 is not subject to appeal. Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 4 PRINCIPLES OF LAW The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, and (3) the level of skill in the art. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17– 18 (1966). “The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). ANALYSIS Claims 1, 4, 5, 15–17, 20, and 25 Claim 1 recites decoding messages. Appellants argue that Garrett discloses “symbols” but fails to disclose “messages,” as recited in claim 1. See, e.g., App. Br. 10–11. Garrett discloses that “[i]t is well known in communication theory that when a signal . . . is transmitted . . . the resulting symbol” is received and that a symbol “represents . . . bits of information.” Garrett 2:58–63. Hence, Garrett discloses that a “symbol” is a transmitted signal of “bits of information.” Appellants do not explain sufficiently a difference between the information (or symbol) of Garrett and a “message,” which one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood to include “information.” Therefore, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument. In any event, as Appellants acknowledge, Tanrikulu discloses “messages.” See, e.g., App. Br. 11. Thus, even if Appellants’ contention that Garrett fails to disclose a “message” is correct, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 5 argument that the combination of Tanrikulu and Garrett, as opposed to Garrett alone, fails to disclose or suggest “messages.” Appellants also argue that Garrett fails to disclose or suggest “mak[ing] any decision, i.e., does not ‘detect’ or ‘decode’ the received symbol, until after all of the candidate symbols have been generated” and that “Garrett’s ‘additional candidate symbols’ are not ‘in addition to the decoded messages’” because Garrett “does not disclose first producing decoded messages at all” and “[w]hen Garett generates ‘additional candidate symbols,’ there are no decoded messages and there are no decoded symbols.” App. Br. 12 and 13. Hence, Appellants argue that Garrett fails to disclose or suggest detecting or decoding received symbols prior to generating all of the candidate symbols. Claim 1 recites generating one or more additional candidate messages in addition to the decoded messages. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument at least because Appellants do not demonstrate sufficiently that claim 1 requires a specific temporal relationship between decoding symbols and generating all of the candidate symbols. Even if claim 1 required decoding messages prior to generating all of the candidate messages, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. Garrett discloses, for example, “a receiver that receives symbols (i.e., information) and decodes the receive[d] symbols” in which an “Hx unit can generate . . . a special portion of all the possible symbol candidates by multiplying certain individual information patterns . . . to the channel matrix.” Garrett 4:55–56 and 5:5–8. Subsequently, “at least one LLR unit is Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 6 able to generate the remainder of the possible candidates by performing a conversion operation on the currently generated symbol candidates.” Id. at 5:27–29. In other words, Garrett discloses generating “additional candidate messages” (e.g., the remainder of the possible candidates) that are “in addition to the decoded messages” because one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that generation of possible candidates that are “the remainder” of possible candidates would be those possible candidates that are not the possible candidates already in existence. Such possible candidates (i.e., “the remainder”) that are distinct from the possible candidates already in existence would be “in addition” to those possible candidates already in existence. In addition, we note that Tanrikulu confirms that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the practice of generating one or more additional candidate messages in addition to the decoded messages, as recited in claim 1. For example, Tanrikulu discloses that, in addition to a “detecting step” in which a “greatest global confidence information [and] second greatest global confidence information” are obtained, a “validating phase” is performed that “comprises re-encoding and re-masking the decoded data of the . . . detected channel.” Tanrikulu ¶¶ 8 and 9. In other words, Tanrikulu also discloses decoding messages and generating one or more additional candidate messages (e.g., re-encoding and re-masking the decoded data”) in addition to the decoded messages (i.e., the re-encoded and re-masked data being distinct from – and “in addition to” – the previously decoded data). Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 7 Appellants argue that it would not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined the teachings of Tanrikulu and Garrett because, according to Appellants, “Garrett and Tanrikulu are fundamentally incompatible . . . because they address completely different problems” and because there is no showing “that Garrett’s techniques for generating an exhaustive set of symbols . . . can be applied to generating additional candidate messages [of Tanrikulu].” App. Br. 13 and 15. In other words, Appellants argue that there is no showing that the Garrett reference may be incorporated into the Tanrikulu reference. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument at least because “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). In any event, as previously discussed, both Tanrikulu and Garrett disclose similar systems of decoding data on multiple channels and determining the “best candidate.” See, e.g., Tanrikulu ¶¶ 41, 43, and 45; Garrett, 3:11–13, 4:55–56, 5:22–23, and 27–29. Appellants do not provide a sufficient showing that the similar systems of Tanrikulu and Garrett somehow would be incompatible. For example, based on the cited references, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined the known function of receiving multiple channels of data, determining a best candidate (e.g., by calculating global confidence information) from candidate messages, and generating additional candidate Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 8 messages, such as re-encoding and re-masking decoded data in a validating phase (the system of Tanrikulu), with the known function of receiving multiple channels of data (e.g., symbols or “information”), determining a best candidate (e.g., based on a cost function analysis) and generating additional candidates, such as the “remainder” of the possible candidates (the system of Garrett) to achieve the predictable result of a system of Tanrikulu and/or Garrett that receives information on multiple channels, determines a best candidate, and generates additional messages or symbols (e.g., “information”). “The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Claim 5 recites selecting one or more frequently used messages for use as additional candidate messages. Appellants argue that Tanrikulu discloses “four messages [that] are decoded . . . and the best one is chosen” but fails to disclose or suggest that “the remaining ones of the four messages are . . . the ‘additional candidate messages’ of the claims.” App. Br. 16–17. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments for at least the reasons set forth by the Examiner. See, e.g., Ans. 7. For example, Tanrikulu discloses “decod[ing] data received on . . . control channels” and, when “decoding is done, . . . a global confidence information is calculated.” Tanrikulu ¶¶ 38 and 43. Subsequently, “additional candidate messages” are generated (e.g., the “two best channels detected” are selected and are “convolutionally re- encoded . . . punctured and scrambled with the UE mask” – Tanrikulu ¶¶ 46 Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 9 and 54). Appellants do not explain persuasively a difference between the additional candidate message of Tanrikulu and the additional candidate messages as recited in claim 5, for example. Appellants also argue that Tanrikulu fails to disclose that the “second best channel” is “the other most frequently used channel.” App. Br. 16–17. Claim 5 recites selecting one or more frequently used messages for use as additional candidate messages. Appellants do not demonstrate sufficiently that claim 5 also recites “the other most frequently used channel.” Rather, claim 5 merely recites selecting a frequently used message. As the Examiner explains Tanrikulu discloses selecting messages (e.g., “a selection of the two calculated greatest sums of LLRs” – Tanrikulu ¶ 45). Appellants do not demonstrate or assert that the use of the selected message in Tanrikulu is not “frequent.” Indeed, the selected message of Tanrikulu is, in fact, used thus demonstrating the frequency of use of the message. Claim 15 recites selectively decoding a traffic channel using decoding parameters determined from the best candidate or blind decoding one or more traffic channels based on whether the best candidate is a valid message. Claim 25 recites a similar feature. Appellants argue that Tanrikulu fails to disclose or suggest “two different techniques that are selectively applied, based on whether the best candidate is a valid message.” App. Br. 17. Appellants provide the same arguments in support of claims 16 and 25. The Examiner finds that Tanrikulu discloses this feature. Ans. 8 (citing Tanrikulu, ¶¶ 12 and 41). As the Examiner indicates, Tanrikulu Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 10 discloses different decoding methods such as “searching the most likely sequence of symbols . . . and look[ing] for [the] mostly likely sequence” or an alternate “blind detection” in which “the maximum-cumulated state metric . . . is used as reliability of the decoded result.” Tanrikulu ¶ 12; see also Tanrikulu ¶ 41. Appellants do not explain sufficiently a difference between Tanrikulu and decoding a traffic channel using decoding parameters determined from the best candidate or blind decoding one or more traffic channels based on whether the best candidate is a valid message. The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 15 and 25 and dependent claim 16 not separately argued from claim 15. Claims 4, 17, and 20 were not separately argued. Claim 17 recites similar subject to that disputed above in connection with claim 1. We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting these claims for the above reasons. Claims 3 and 19 Claim 3 recites randomly selecting the one or more additional candidate messages from a set of possible messages. Appellants argue that Bernadac discloses “a tie-breaking procedure for selecting a most likely decoding result” but fails to disclose or suggest “randomly selecting one or more additional messages.” App. Br. 18. Appellants provide the same arguments in support of claim 19. The Examiner finds that Bernadac discloses random selection of messages. Ans. 9 (citing Bernadac 6:46–49 and 53–54, abstract). We note that Bernadac discloses “randomly picking a Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 11 sequence from among all the multiple sequences,” as the Examiner indicates. Bernadac 6:46–47. Appellants do not explain sufficiently a difference between Bernadac’s explicit disclosure of randomly selecting a sequence and randomly selecting a message, as recited in claims 3 and 19. The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 3 and 19. Claim 6 Claim 6 recites determining one or more next-most-likely decoding results corresponding to one or more of the decoded messages. Appellants argue that Gutcher discloses only “intermediate state transitions in a Viterbi decoder” but fails to disclose or suggest decoding results. App. Br. 18–19. The Examiner finds that Gutcher discloses this feature. Ans. 9 (citing Gutcher ¶ 33). We agree with the Examiner. Gutcher discloses, for example, a “decoder” that “finds the minimum value to compute the next state metric of the most likely next state and of the next most likely next state.” One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that results from a “decoder” (as taught by Gutcher by computation) would be a “decoding result.” Appellants do not demonstrate persuasively that the result from the “decoder” of Gutcher would somehow differ from a “decoding” result. The Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 6. Claims 7 and 21 Claim 7 recites perturbing an information bit sequence corresponding to one of the decoded messages to recover potential lost paths in a reduced- Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 12 trellis Viterbi decoder. Appellants argue that Loeliger fails to disclose or suggest this feature because “it is far from common knowledge that Loeliger’s specific techniques could be applied to a reduced-trellis algorithm.” App. Br. 19–20. Appellants provide similar arguments in support of claim 21. App. Br. 22. We disagree with Appellants for at least the reasons set forth by the Examiner. Ans. 10. For example, the Examiner finds that Loeliger discloses a “Viterbi-decodable, concatenated encoding mechanism” with “functionality of trellis-coded encoding/decoding mechanisms that have been and are currently employed . . . .” Ans. 10 (citing Loeliger ¶35). Hence, contrary to Appellants’ assertion, Loeliger discloses techniques that are applied to “trellis-coded encoding/decoding mechanisms.” Appellants do not point out sufficient differences between Loeliger, for example, and the features recited in claim 7. The Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 7 or claim 21. Claims 8 and 22 Claim 8 recites eliminating decoded messages or additional candidate messages having impossible information bit sequences. Appellants argue that Hegde fails to disclose or suggest eliminating decoded messages or additional candidate message having impossible information bit sequences but instead discloses “possible paths.” App. Br. 20. Appellants provide the same arguments in support of claim 22. We disagree with Appellants for at least the reasons set forth by the Examiner. Ans. 11 and 19 (citing Hegde ¶ 72, Abstract). The Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 8 or 22. Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 13 Claims 11 and 13 Claim 11 recites comparing the correlation value for the best candidate to an average of the correlation values for the messages other than the best candidate. Appellants argue that Kim fails to disclose or suggest “the comparison of one value to an average of other comparable values.” App. Br. 21. Appellants provide the same arguments in support of claims 12 and 13. App. Br. 21. We disagree with Appellants for at least the reasons set forth by the Examiner. For example, the Examiner finds that Kim discloses a “correlation value” and “average of the correlation values” while Tanrikulu and Garrett disclose “comparison” with a “best candidate.” Ans. 19–20 (citing Kim ¶ 69 and 73). Also, although Appellants argue that Kim fails to disclose the disputed claim limitation of claim 11, Appellants do not explain persuasively how the combination of Tanrikulu, Garrett, and Kim, for example, also fails to disclose or suggest claim 11. Appellants do not provide additional arguments in support of claim 13, which depends from claim 11. The Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 11 or claim 13. The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 4, 5, 15–17, 20, and 25 as unpatentable over Tanrikulu and Garrett; claims 3 and 19 as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, and Bernadac; claim 6 as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, and Gutcher; claim 7 as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, Gutcher, and Loeliger; claims 8 and 22 as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, and Hegde; claims 11 and 13 as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, and Kim; claim 12 as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Appeal 2012-012537 Application 11/944,773 14 Garrett, Kim, and Magee; and claim 21 as unpatentable over Tanrikulu, Garrett, and Loeliger. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–8, 11–13, 15–17, 19–22, and 25. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED kme Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation