Ex Parte Aikio et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 16, 2016

13125450 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/125,450 04/21/2011
466 7590
YOUNG & THOMPSON
209 Madison Street
Suite 500
Alexandria, VA 22314
11/18/2016
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Janne Aikio
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
3502-1503 5026
EXAMINER
TRUONG, NGUYEN H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2622
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/18/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
DocketingDept@young-thompson.com
yandtpair@firs ttofile. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JANNE AIKIO and ANTTI KERANEN
Appeal2015-004641
Application 13/125,450
Technology Center 2600
Before MATTHEW R. CLEMENTS, KAMRAN JIV ANI, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
JIVANI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner's final decisions rejecting claims 1-20, which are all the claims
pending in the present application. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Appellants identify Teknologian Tutkimuskeskus VTT as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 1.
Appeal2015-004641
Application 13/125,450
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The present application relates to touchscreen arrangements using
total internal reflection (TIR) phenomenon. Spec. 1 :6-8.
Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. An arrangement for a touchscreen, comprising:
-a substrate, said substrate comprising support
electronics;
-a plurality of emitters and detectors arranged on
said substrate in contact with the support electronics, for
emitting and detecting light, respectively; and
-a lightguide arranged onto the substrate such that
said emitters and detectors, and optionally at least part of
said support electronics, are substantially embedded in the
lightguide material, properties of the lightguide including
the refractive index of the lightguide material being
selected and the emitters and detectors being configured
so as to enable, when in use, total internal reflection
propagation of light within the lightguide between the
emitters and detectors and recognition of a touch on the
basis of a drop in the total internal reflection performance
as determined from the detected light,
wherein touch is detected based on a drop of
captured light intensity at a detector such that the
arrangement enables recognizing the touch from frustrated
total internal reflection-induced drop in a light intensity
level and/ or distribution as captured by one or more
detectors in contrast to an adaptively determined basic
reception level during a total internal reflection condition.
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Application 13/125,450
The Rejections
Claims 1, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) over Crockett (US 2006/0114237 Al; published June 1, 2006),
Eliasson (US 2008/0007541 Al; published Jan. 10, 2008), and Eikman (US
2006/0227120 Al; published Oct. 12, 2006). Final Act. 3-8.
Claims 2 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Crockett, Eliasson, Eikman, and Joshi (US 2009/0032300 Al; published
Feb. 5, 2009). Final Act. 8-9.
Claims 3 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Crockett,
Eliasson, Eikman, and Hong (US 2004/0095336 Al; published May 20,
2004). Final Act. 9-10.
Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Crockett,
Eliasson, Eikman, and Chiu (US 2005/0162404 Al; published July 28,
2005). Final Act. 10-11.
Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Crockett,
Eliasson, Eikman, and Izadi (US 2009/0128499 Al; published May 21,
2009). Final Act. 11-12.
Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Crockett,
Eliasson, Eikman, and Cho (US 2008/0030484 Al; published Feb. 7, 2008).
Final Act. 12-13.
Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Crockett,
Eliasson, Eikman, and Fujioka (US 2002/0033805 Al; published Mar. 21,
2002). Final Act. 13-14.
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Application 13/125,450
Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Crockett,
Eliasson, Eikman, Joshi, and Thelemann (US 2009/0218725 Al; published
Sept. 3, 2009). Final Act. 14--15.
Claims 15, 17, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Crockett, Eliasson, Eikman, and Gandhi (US 2009/0085894 Al; published
Apr. 2, 2009). Final Act. 15-16.
Claim 18 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Crockett,
Eliasson, Eikman, Gandhi, and Izadi. Final Act. 16-17.
ANALYSIS
Appellants argue the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 because: (i)
the applied art fails to teach or suggest the claimed adaptively determined
basic reception level; (ii) Crockett is "ultimately silent on true FTIR induced
drop detection;" (iii) Crocket and Eliasson "teach away from each other;"
and (iv) the Examiner uses impermissible hindsight reconstruction. App. Br.
5-14, 16-172; Reply Br. 3-7. We are not persuaded by Appellants'
arguments, and address each argument in tum below.
First, as a matter of claim construction, we find the Specification does
not define the limitation "adaptively determined basic reception level." We
apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim terms, consistent with
the Specification, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.
In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
2 Although this argument is listed under the heading "4.10 Tenth Ground,"
we interpret Appellants' argument that "a plethora of references were used
to reject all the aspects of the present invention" (App. Br. 16) as applying to
all of the claims rejected by the Examiner.
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Application 13/125,450
(citations omitted). Where, as here, the Specification does not explicitly
define a term, the term should be given its ordinary meaning. In re Zietz,
893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
The Examiner construes the phrase "adaptively determined basic
reception level" as "comparing the detected light intensity at light detectors
with an adaptive value (i.e., not a fixed value) so as to determine whether a
touch occurs on an optical touch panel." Ans. 2. Appellants do not dispute
this construction, but instead want us to recognize that "[t]here is a
determination step involved." Reply Br. 3. We agree with Appellants that
the claim language requires the level must be "adaptively determined," but
we disagree that a determination step is recited in claim 1, which we observe
recites an arrangement (i.e. a system), not a method. In light of these
determinations, we construe the phrase "adaptively determined basic
reception level" as encompassing a level, used as a basis for comparison of
other levels, that is selected and can be altered.
The Examiner finds Eikman's disclosure of setting a threshold to
which a candidate signal is compared, and alternatively of detecting an
ambient light level to which a candidate signal is compared, meets the
claimed "adaptively determined basic reception level." See Final Act. 6;
Ans. 2-3. Applying the construction set forth herein, we agree with the
Examiner. At least detecting an ambient light value teaches or, at minimum,
suggests, an "adaptively determined basic reception level," because, as the
Examiner recognizes, the ambient light level may change over time and thus
the detected level of ambient light would necessarily be adaptively
determined. See Ans. 2-3.
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Application 13/125,450
Second, Appellants contend Crockett is "ultimately silent on true
FTIR induced drop detection" because its "examples only seem to concern a
change in the light reflection direction caused by the touch." App. Br. 8.
We are not persuaded by this argument because it is neither responsive to the
Examiner's rejection nor commensurate with the claim language. Claim 1
does not recite "true FTIR" nor does the Specification describe "true FTIR."
Rather, claim 1 recites "recognizing the touch from frustrated total internal
reflection-induced drop in a light intensity level." Appellants' own
argument recognizes that Crockett teaches recognizing "a change in light
reflection caused by a touch." Id. (citing Crocket, Fig. 3B, 154'). One need
look no further than Crockett's title for confirmation that Crocket teaches
FTIR induced drop detection: Method and System for Providing Frustrated
Total Internal Reflection Touch Interface. Crocket, Title; see also Ans. 4
(citing Crocket i-f 7).
Third, Appellants contend Crockett and Eliasson teach away from
each other because a touch in Crockett "reduces the amount of light reaching
the detectors" whereas a touch in Eliasson "increases the amount of light at
the detectors." App. Br. 8-9; Reply Br. 4--5. Relatedly, Appellants contend,
adapting Eliasson "to the present invention, which increases light reaching
the detector, to the present invention, which has a drop in light intensity of
the detector, changes the principle of operation of the reference and makes is
unsuitable for its intended purpose." App. Br. 12.
Appellants' argument is misguided. Eliasson and Crockett both teach
recognizing changes in the amount of light reaching the detectors. "The test
for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
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Application 13/125,450
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference .... Rather,
the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." In re Keller, 642 F. 2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981); accord In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the references be
physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review.")
Contrary to Appellants' argument, the Examiner does not seek either to
adapt Eliasson "to the present invention" or to bodily incorporate Eliasson
into Crockett. Instead, with regard to claim 1, the Examiner's combination
proposes taking specific teachings from Eliasson and combining them with
particular teachings from Crockett and Eikman. Final. Act. 3---6. The
Examiner specifically relies on Eliasson for its teachings of a substrate and
lightguide, not for the claimed drop detection. Id. Moreover, we note
Appellants do not proffer persuasive evidence that the Examiner's
combination would have been "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of
ordinary skill in the art." Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485
F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Fourth, we are not persuaded by Appellants' assertion that "a plethora
of references" necessarily evinces the impermissible use of hindsight. App.
Br. 16-1 7. Citing a large number of references does not negate the
obviousness of the combination when the prior art uses the various elements
for the same purposes as they are used by appellants, making the claimed
invention as a whole obvious in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 103. In re Gorman,
933 F.2d 982, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Aprimafacie case of obviousness
requires "some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
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support the legal conclusion of obviousness." In re Kahn, 441F.3d977, 988
(Fed. Cir. 2006). For each rejection, the Examiner makes explicit findings
with respect to why it would have been obvious to combine the references
relied upon. See, e.g., Final Act. 18-19 (explicitly finding reasons why the
combination of Crocket, Eliasson, Eikman, Gandhi, and Izadi would have
been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time). We are
persuaded by the Examiner's reasoning and, therefore, find the Examiner's
proposed combinations are proper because the resulting systems are not
"more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions." KSRint'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417
(2007).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of claim 1. Appellants advance no further arguments regarding claims 2-20.
App. Br. 14--18. Accordingly, we also sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) rejections of claims 2-20.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decisions rejecting claims 1-20 as obvious.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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