Ex Parte Adelman et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 16, 201411330772 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 16, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte WARREN ADELMAN and WAYNE THAYER ____________________ Appeal 2012-002212 Application 11/330,772 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-25. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM and enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).1 1 Our decision will refer to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed June 7, 2011) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed October 4, 2011), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed August 11, 2011). Appeal 2012-002212 Application 11/330,772 2 THE CLAIMED INVENTION Appellants’ claimed invention “relates to methods for providing a secure certificate, such as a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) certificate, which cover two or more domain names having different top level domains” (Spec., ¶ 3). Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A method, comprising the steps of: a Facilitator’s Computer Network registering a plurality of domain names for a Subscriber; the Facilitator’s Computer Network receiving a request from the Subscriber for a secure certificate covering at least two of the plurality of domain names, wherein at least two of the at least two of the plurality of domain names have different top level domains; and the Facilitator’s Computer Network creating, signing, and issuing the secure certificate, wherein the at least two of the plurality of domain names are listed on the secure certificate. THE REJECTION The following rejection is before us for review:2 Claims 1-25 are rejected under 35 USC § 103(a) as unpatentable over Trilli (US 2003/0028762 A1, pub. Feb. 6, 2003), Fellman (US 7,305,394 B2, iss. Dec. 4, 2007), and Christensen (US 2002/0169842 A1, pub. Nov. 14, 2002). 2 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Trilli and Fellman (Ans. 4). Appeal 2012-002212 Application 11/330,772 3 ANALYSIS Appellants argue independent claims 1, 5, 10, 15, and 21 as a group (App. Br. 5-15 and Reply Br. 2-5). We select claim 1 as representative. Claims 5, 10, 15, and 21 stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2011). Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because the combination of Trilli, Fellman, and Christensen fails to disclose or suggest a secure certificate covering multiple domain names having different top level domains where the multiple domain names are explicitly listed on the secure certificate, i.e., “a secure certificate covering at least two . . . domain names, wherein at least two . . . domain names have different top level domains; and . . . wherein the at least two . . . domain names are listed on the secure certificate,” as recited in claim 1 (App. Br. 5-15 and Reply Br. 2-5). Appellants’ argument is not persuasive because the limitation of claim 1 that Appellants argue is not disclosed in the prior art does not affect the manner in which the claimed method is performed. The registration process itself, including the steps of creating, signing, and issuing the secure certificate, is performed in the same way regardless of whether the secure certificate is being issued for domain names A and B or some other domain names, e.g., B and C. The argued limitation, i.e., “wherein the at least two of the plurality of domain names are listed on the secure certificate,” also merely describes the informational content of the secure certificate, and is not positively recited as altering or otherwise affecting the method steps. As such, it constitutes non-functional descriptive material that may not be relied Appeal 2012-002212 Application 11/330,772 4 on to distinguish over the prior art for purposes of patentability.3 See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004); cf. In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (when descriptive material is not functionally related to the substrate, the descriptive material will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability). Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 5, 10, 15, and 21, which stand or fall with claim 1. Claims 2-4, 6-9, 11-14, 16-20, and 22-25 depend from independent claims 1, 5, 10, 15, and 21, respectively. Appellants do not present any arguments for the separate patentability of these dependent claims except to assert that the claims are allowable based on their dependence on independent claims 1, 5, 10, 15, and 21 (App. Br. 16). 3 We agree with the Examiner that the remaining limitations of claim 1 are disclosed by the combination of Trilli and Fellman, as set forth at pages 5-7 of the Answer. Trilli discloses a shared hosting computer network in which a server computer hosts a plurality of entity websites; a trusted third party issues a SSL certificate to the owner/operator of the server computer, e.g., an Internet service provider (“ISP”), and the certificate is shared with the multiple entity websites through the use of tokens. Trilli describes that the ISP purchases a number of tokens from the trusted third party based on the number of entity websites that the ISP believes will want to purchase individualized authenticity certifications. After passing certain authenticity checks, an entity purchasing one or more tokens from the ISP has its website(s) associated with, i.e., covered by, the SSL certificate. See, e.g., Trilli, ¶¶ 4, 22, 35, 37, 39, 40, 43, and 44. Trilli does not explicitly disclose that the domain names have different top level domains but Fellman discloses this feature. See, e.g., Fellman, Abstract. Appeal 2012-002212 Application 11/330,772 5 We are not persuaded, for the reasons outlined above, that the Examiner erred in rejecting the independent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 2-4, 6-9, 11-14, 16-20, and 22-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Because our rationale differs from that set forth by the Examiner, we denominate this a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed. Insofar as our rationale differs from that set forth by the Examiner, we denominate this a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION. 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection . . . shall not be considered final for judicial review.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that the Appellants, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the Examiner. (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). Appeal 2012-002212 Application 11/330,772 6 AFFIRMED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) mls Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation