Ex Parte Acres

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 29, 2016

12486640 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/486,640 06/17/2009
114773 7590 03/31/2016
Marger Johnson - PILCO
888 SW 5th A venue, Suite 1050
Portland, OR 97204
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
John F. Acres
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
1351-0081 5576
EXAMINER
KIM,KEVINY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3716
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/31/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docketing@techlaw.com
alan.mccollom@acres4.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN F. ACRES
Appeal2014-003098
Application 12/486,640
Technology Center 3700
Before NEALE. ABRAMS, LISA M. GUIJT and PAUL J. KORNICZKY,
Administrative Patent Judges.
ABRAMS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
John F. Acres (Appellant) seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134
from the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1--4 and 6--48. We have
jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
Appeal2014-003098
Application 12/486,640
THE INVENTION
The claimed invention is directed to a method of operating a plurality
of interconnected gaming devices, and a computer program product adapted
to implement such a method.
Claims 1 and 35, reproduced below, are illustrative of the subject
matter on appeal.
1. A method of operating a plurality of electronic gaming devices
interconnected via a network, the method comprising:
permitting at least one player to play one of the electronic
gaming devices;
tracking game outcomes;
storing the tracked outcomes at a storage device located on
the network;
determining if any awards associated with the game
outcomes are less than a predefined criterion; and
sending a pay command over the network to the player's
electronic gaming device if the game awards are less than the
predefined criterion.
35. A computer program product, comprising a non-transitory
computer-usable medium having a computer readable program
code embodied therein, said computer readable program code
adapted to be executed to implement a method of operating a
plurality of electronic gaming devices interconnected via a
network, said method comprising:
permitting a player to play one of the electronic gaming
devices;
tracking game outcomes;
storing the tracked outcomes at a storage device located on
the network;
determining if the game outcomes are less than a
predefined criterion; and
sending a pay command over the network to the player's
electronic gaming device if the game outcomes are less than the
predefined criterion.
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Appeal2014-003098
Application 12/486,640
THE PRIOR ART
The Examiner relied upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Boushy
Walker
Kelly
Taylor
Walker (2)
Anderson
Okada
us 6,003,013
US 2001/0012797 Al
US 6,293,865 Bl
US 2002/0132660 Al
US 2003/0003983 Al
US 2006/0199934 Al
US 2008/0064475 Al
THE REJECTIONS
Dec. 14, 1999
Aug. 9, 2001
Sept. 25, 2001
Sept. 19, 2002
Jan.2,2003
Sept. 7, 2006
Mar. 18, 2008
Claims 18, 21, 29, 32, 33, 47 and 48 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Walker.
The following rejections stand under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a):
Claims 1, 2, 6-8, 14--17 and 34--46 on the basis of Walker and Okada.
Claim 3 on the basis of Walker, Okada and Walker (2).
Claim 30 on the basis of Walker and Walker (2).
Claim 4 on the basis of Walker, Okada and Kelly.
Claim 31 on the basis of Walker and Kelly.
Claims 9 and 10 on the basis of Walker, Okada and Taylor.
Claims 19, 20, 22 and 23 on the basis of Walker and Taylor.
Claims 11-13 on the basis of Walker, Okada and Anderson.
Claims 24--28 on the basis of Walker and Anderson.
Claims 16 and 17 on the basis of Walker, Okada and Boushy.
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Appeal2014-003098
Application 12/486,640
OPINION
Claims 18, 21, 29, 32, 33, 47 and 48
Anticipation - Walker
Appellant challenged this rejection by focusing on the limitations in
claim 18 regarding "losing experience" and by espousing that there is a
difference between an "insurance payout" and "awarding" a credit,
considered in the context of the claim. Appellant argues:
Walker teaches insurance payouts that are purchased before the
player begins a gaming session and that transfer the risk of a
gambling loss in exchange for an upfront insurance premium
payment. Appellant's independent claim 18 recites a method of
operating networked gaming devices that awards the player a
credit that is usable to play at least one additional game if the
player has had outcomes of played games that meet a losing
experience. The definition of a losing experience can be
predetermined or can fluctuate at the discretion of the operator of
the gaming devices. In contrast, an insurance payout is
predetermined and cannot change after the player begins playing
the gaming session. The insurance payout is a risk management
choice made by the player and the decision to award a credit to a
player after a series of losing outcomes is a discretionary action
taken by the operator of the gaming devices to boost the spirits
of a player who has experienced losing outcomes. Therefore, the
insurance payouts taught by Walker are not the same as the
credits awarded to a player, as recited in Appellant's independent
claim 18 and its dependent claims.
Br. 17.
The Examiner's response is that:
Paragraph [0049] of Walker clearly states that a player may be
entitled to an insurance payment if the player's losses for the
covered session exceeds $500. This is a losing experience, and
regardless of [A ]ppellant's perceived differences in what defines
a losing experience, the examiner notes that the claim only states
a "losing experience," and thus, a player losing more than $500
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Appeal2014-003098
Application 12/486,640
is considered such a losing experience, as the player has lost $500
or more. In response, as disclosed in paragraph [0052], the
player is awarded with any one of a fixed dollar amount, a
fraction of all losses above the loss limit, or a number of free
plays on the machine. Dollar amounts and returned losses are all
credit that is usable to play an additional game. Free games are
also additional games.
Ans. 21-22.
Walker explains in paragraph 49 that "[f]or example, an insurance
policy with a stated loss limit of five hundred dollars provides a payment to
the player if his losses for the covered gambling session exceed five hundred
dollars." From our perspective, the loss exceeding $500 in a game
constitutes a "losing experience" for the player, and the payment then
provided, albeit as a result of an insurance policy purchased by the player,
nevertheless constitutes an "awarding" to the player of a "credit," as
required by the claim, for the language of the claim does not preclude such
an interpretation. We are not persuaded otherwise by Appellant's arguments
on this issue. Therefore, the rejection of independent claim 18 is sustained.
Because Appellant has chosen not to argue the separate patentability of
claims 21, 29, 32, 33, 47 and 48, which depend from claim 18 and also were
included in this rejection (see Br. 17), the like rejection of these claims also
is sustained.
In addition, Appellant has grouped independent claim 3 6 with claim
18 without separate argument (id. at 18), and therefore the rejection of this
claim also is sustained. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2012).
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Appeal2014-003098
Application 12/486,640
Claims 1, 2, 6-8, 14-17 and 34-46
Obviousness - Walker and Okada
The Examiner acknowledges that the Walker system is directed
toward tracking the player's total loss amount, rather than determining if any
awards associated with the game outcomes are less than a predefined
criterion, as is required by Appellant's claim 1. Final Act. 5. However,
according to the Examiner,
Okada teaches a gaming system with an insurance policy which,
when enabled by the player, keeps track of a number of games
played by the player without the player acquiring a
predetermined amount of credits (par. [0108], i.e. a predefined
criterion). As shown in fig. 7, the example given shows a limit
of 1000 games counted, with the payout being 360 credits. If the
player does not acquire the predefined amount of credits (in this
case, 180 credits), the player is compensated with 3 60 credits.
Thus, the award amount is tracked, and if the amount does not
reach a predefined criterion, insurance is paid out.
Id. at 5---6. The Examiner then concludes that it would have been obvious to
utilize the insurance system of Okada with the Walker game in order to
provide an insurance function that compensates players who fail to achieve
the predefined criterion of credits, while preventing players who surpass this
criterion from benefiting from the insurance, the motivation being
"incentivizing both casino and players into using insurance." Id. at 6.
Appellant argues that the combined teachings of Walker and Okada
fail to render the subject matter of claim 1 obvious because an insurance
payout is not an "award" within the concept of the language of the claim, in
that "[a]wards are given to players independent of whether insurance was
additionally purchased or given to the player before the gaming session
began." Br. 15. Appellant also asserts that "Appellant's claimed method
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Appeal2014-003098
Application 12/486,640
determines if the given awards, not the losses that generate owed insurance
payouts, are less than a predefined criterion," whereas "[i]n contrast, the
Walker and Okada system insurance payouts focus on the owed loss aspects
of the player's gaming sessions." Id. at 16.
In response, the Examiner points out that "Okada explicitly notes in
paragraphs [0013] and [0022] that 'the insurance mode provides an
award.' Furthermore, Merriam-Webster defines 'award' as 'to give (a
reward or prize) to someone or something."' Ans. 19. The Examiner
further explains that
Okada discloses in paragraph [O 108] when a game count reaches
a predetermined number (the player's gaming session), and the
player has not acquired a predetermined amount of credits (180
credits in the example given), the gaming machine transits to the
cashback mode. Thus, the player is allowed to play the game in
an insurance mode that provides an insurance function whereby,
in a case where the player does not win a predetermined amount
of credits or a bonus game over a long period of time, the player
is compensated for all of or a part of the lost credits.
Therefore, contrary to [A ]ppellant's arguments, Okada is
determining if the given awards, not the losses, are less than a
predefined criterion. In figures 9-12 of Okada, a detailed outline
shows the manner in which Okada functions.
Id. at 19.
In our determination that the subject matter recited in Appellant's
claim 18 was anticipated by Walker, we found payment by virtue of an
insurance policy to be an "award" within the scope of the claim language.
We find the same to be true with regard to Appellant's claim 1. This claim
requires that the "tracked outcomes" of a player's games be stored, and that
a determination be made if" any awards associated with the game outcomes
are less than a predetermined criterion" and, if so, that a pay command be
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Appeal2014-003098
Application 12/486,640
sent to the player's gaming device if "the game awards are less than the
predetermined criterion" (emphasis added in both). The claim therefore
does not, in our opinion, preclude consideration of "awards" to which a
player would be entitled by virtue of the purchase of an insurance policy
related to the playing of the game. This being the case, although we have
carefully considered all of the arguments presented by Appellant with regard
to claim 1, we are not persuaded that the analysis and the conclusions set
forth by the Examiner are in error. Therefore, a prima facie case of
obviousness has been established with regard to the subject matter recited in
claim 1, 1 and the rejection is sustained. Appellant has chosen not to argue
the separate patentability of dependent claims 2, 6-8, 14--17 and 34--46,
which were included in this rejection (Br. 16), and therefore the rejection of
those claims also is sustained.
In addition, Appellant has grouped independent claim 3 5 with claim 1
without separate argument (id. at 17-18), and therefore the rejection of this
claim also is sustained. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2012).
With regard to independent claim 37, Appellant argues only that
neither Walker nor Okada "teach awards, as claimed." Id. at 18-19. We
determined that such is not the case. Supra at 5 and 7. The rejection of
claim 3 7 is sustained.
1 A prima facie case of obviousness is established when the teachings from
the prior art itself would appear to have established the claimed subject
matter to a person of ordinary skill in the art. In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048,
1051(CCPA1976).
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Appeal2014-003098
Application 12/486,640
Claim 3
Obviousness- Walker, Okada and Walker (2)
Claim 30
Obviousness - Walker and Walker (2)
Claim 4
Obviousness - Walker, Okada and Kelly
Claim 31
Obviousness- Walker and Kelly
Claims 9 and 10
Obviousness - Walker, Okada and Taylor
Claims 19, 20, 22 and 23
Obviousness- Walker and Taylor
Claims 11-13
Obviousness - Walker, Okada and Anderson
Claims 24-28
Obviousness- Walker and Anderson
Claims 16 and 17
Obviousness - Walker, Okada and Boushy
Although in the foregoing nine rejections dependent claims have been
separately rejected by the Examiner, Appellant has chosen not to provide
arguments directed to the rejections, but to group the claims with
independent claims 1 and 18, from which they depend. See Br. 16 and 1 7.
The rejections of independent claims 1and18 having been sustained, these
nine rejections also are sustained.
DECISION
All of the rejections are sustained.
The decision of the Examiner is affirmed.
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Appeal2014-003098
Application 12/486,640
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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