Eugene A. Fusz

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 19, 2019

14224909 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/224,909 03/25/2014 Eugene A. Fusz 29022-18 3905
76656 7590 12/19/2019
Patent Docket Department
Armstrong Teasdale LLP
7700 Forsyth Boulevard
Suite 1800
St. Louis, MO 63105
EXAMINER
MILLER, BRITTNEY N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3684
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/19/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USpatents@armstrongteasdale.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte EUGENE A. FUSZ
________________

Appeal 2018-007368
Application 14/224,909
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, JASON V. MORGAN, and
JAMES B. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–6, 8–11, 13–16, 18, and 19. Claims
2, 7, 12, and 17 are canceled. Amend. 2 (Mar. 31, 2017); Amend. 5 (May 1,
2017); Amend 4, 6 (Sept. 14, 2017). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as
ConsumerCartel, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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Summary of the Disclosure
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to “providing pricing
information for ordering a vehicle” by: (1) “receiving . . . pricing
information including an identification of the vehicle and a price at which a
vehicle dealership offers to order and deliver the vehicle”; (2) “receiving . . .
a pricing request including the identification of the vehicle”; and (3)
“transmitting the price for the vehicle . . . while withholding an identity of
the vehicle dealership.” Abstract.
Representative claim (disputed limitations emphasized)
1. A method for ordering a vehicle, the method is performed by
a local client computing device and a server computing device
coupled to an internet computer network, said server computing
device including a processor in communication with a memory,
the method comprising:
receiving, by the server computing device, from a client
computing device associated with a consumer, a price request
including an identification of a vehicle;
prior to receiving the price request, receiving, from a plurality
of computer devices associated with a plurality of vehicle
dealerships, a plurality of selling bids, wherein each selling bid
of the plurality of selling bids is based on a vehicle dealership
corresponding to the selling bid ordering the vehicle associated
with the price request from a vehicle manufacturer, and wherein
each selling bid includes a price for ordering and delivering the
vehicle;
prior to receiving the price request, storing, in the memory, the
plurality of selling bids;
subsequent to receiving the price request, comparing, by the
server computing device, the plurality of selling bids to
determine a value of a lowest bid;
transmitting, to the client computing device associated with the
consumer, the value of the lowest bid of the plurality of selling
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bids while withholding data related to an identity of the vehicle
dealership associated with the lowest bid;
receiving, from the client computing device associated with the
consumer, an indication that the consumer wishes to purchase
the vehicle based on the lowest bid; and
releasing, to the client computing device associated with the
consumer, data related to the identity of the vehicle dealership
associated with the lowest bid and facilitating a sale of the
vehicle upon submission of payment information by the
consumer to the server computing device.
The Examiner’s Rejections2 and Cited References
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3–6, 8–11, 13–16, 18, and 19 under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 4–8.
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 11, 13, 14, 16, and 19 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Inghelbrecht et
al. (US 2013/0311319 A1; published Nov. 21, 2013) (“Inghelbrecht”),
Kinney (US 2012/0265634 A1; published Oct. 18, 2012), and Seergy et al.
(US 2012/0109770 A1; published May 3, 2012) (“Seergy”). Final Act. 8–17.
The Examiner rejects claims 5 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Inghelbrecht, Kinney, Seergy,
and Finseth (US 2013/0290127 A1; published Oct. 31, 2013). Final Act. 17–
18.
The Examiner rejects claims 8, 10, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Inghelbrecht, Kinney, Seergy,
and Van Wie et al. (US 2013/0080336 A1; published Mar. 28, 2013) (“Van
Wie”). Final Act. 18–21.

2 The Examiner withdraws a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). Ans. 4; see
also Final Act. 2–4.
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The Examiner rejects claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over the combined teachings of Inghelbrecht, Kinney, Seergy, and Anabtawi
et al. (US 2003/0046179 A1; published Mar. 6, 2003) (“Anabtawi”). Final
Act. 21–22.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
To be statutorily patentable, the subject matter of an invention must be
a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or [a] new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. There are
implicit exceptions to the categories of patentable subject matter identified
in 35 U.S.C. § 101, including: (1) laws of nature; (2) natural phenomena;
and (3) abstract ideas. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014). The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a framework for
distinguishing patents with claims directed to these implicit exceptions
“from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Id. at
217 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66 (2012)). The evaluation follows a two-part analysis: (1) determine
whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract
idea; and (2) if so, then determine whether any element, or combination of
elements, in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to
significantly more than the patent-ineligible concept itself. See id. at 217–18.
“[A]ll inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 71. We “‘must be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims’ by looking
at them generally and failing to account for the specific requirements of the
claims.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313
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(Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litigation, 823
F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) recently published
revised guidance on the application of the two-part analysis. USPTO, 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(January 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”); see also USPTO, October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (Oct. 17, 2019). Under
that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (see id. at 54 (step 2A, prong
one)); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see id. at 54–55 (step 2A,
prong two); MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
Patent Ineligibility
Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong One
In rejecting claim 1 as directed to non-statutory subject matter, the
Examiner determines that the claim is directed to certain methods of
organizing human activity in the form of commercial interactions (e.g., sales
activities), and, thus, to an abstract idea. See Final Act. 5–6 (citing, e.g.,
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); see also
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52.
Appellant argues the Examiner oversimplifies claim 1 in a manner
“that is ‘untethered from the language of the claims.’” Appeal Br. 7 (citing
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see
also Reply Br. 1–2. The Examiner’s characterization of claim 1, however, is
properly grounded in the claim recitations of: (1) “receiving . . . a price
request [from a consumer] including an identification of a vehicle”;
(2) “receiving . . . a plurality of selling bids”; (3) “comparing . . . the
plurality of selling bids to determine a value of a lowest bid”;
(4) “transmitting . . . the value of the lowest bid of the plurality of selling
bids while withholding data related to an identity of the vehicle dealership
associated with the lowest bid”; (5) “receiving . . . an indication that the
consumer wishes to purchase the vehicle based on the lowest bid”; and
(6) “releasing . . . data related to the identity of the vehicle dealership
associated with the lowest bid and facilitating a sale of the vehicle upon
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submission of payment information by the consumer.” See also Final Act. 5;
Ans. 4. In other words, claim 1 recites facilitating the sale of a vehicle from
one of a plurality of sellers to a consumer by: (1) the sellers providing prices
for the vehicle to an intermediary; (2) the intermediary providing the lowest
price to the consumer; (3) the consumer providing payment information to
the intermediary; and (4) the intermediary informing the consumer which
seller offered to sell the vehicle at the lowest price.
Because claim 1 recites facilitating the sale of a vehicle (albeit
through use of an intermediary that controls the flow of information), we
agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites certain methods of organizing
human activity in the form of commercial interactions (e.g., sales activities),
and, therefore, claim 1 recites an abstract idea. See Final Act. 5–6.
Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong Two
Appellant argues that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea
because “the relevant technology improves the operation of a computer by
providing a method for analyzing massive amounts of potential offer data for
a specific model of vehicle within a specific geographic area.” Appeal Br. 8.
Appellant also argues the method of claim 1 provides for a “technical
improvement [by] applying stored rules in a unique and specific manner to
analyze massive amounts of potential offer data for a specific model of
vehicle within a specific geographic area.” Id. at 9; see also Reply Br. 3.
Thus, Appellant contends claim 1 represents “the concrete application of
specific and unique processes for applying specific rules” and “cannot be
said to be directed to the abstract ideas cited in the Final Office Action.”
Appeal Br. 10; see also id. at 12 (“the specific arrangement and distribution
of functionality provided in [claim 1] facilitates [a] practical application”).
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Appellant’s arguments are not commensurate with the scope of claim
1, which is not limited to applications that involve “massive amounts of
potential offer data” and which does not include recitations directed to “a
specific geographic area.” The Specification itself discloses applying the
claimed process with only a trivial amount of offer data. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 23
(“in some implementations, server system 122 receives pricing information
from only one vehicle dealership . . . or more than two vehicle dealerships”).
Furthermore, the method of claim 1 does not improve computer
capabilities, but instead merely invokes computers as a tool. See Enfish, 822
F.3d at 1335–36; Recent Guidance, 84 Fed Reg. 55. In particular, claim 1
does not have limited rules structured to reflect a specific implementation
that a human acting as a vehicle sales intermediary would have been
unlikely to utilize. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316 (citing Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 595–96 (2013)); see also
Ans. 4–6. Appellant contends, in the context of arguing claim 1 does not
preempt3 an abstract idea, “there is no indication in the prior art that the
ordered combination of rules in Claim 1 are what ‘any [vehicle shopper]
engaged in the search for [specific vehicle at the lowest price] would likely
have utilized.’” Appeal Br. 14 (quoting McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316)

3 We do not address Appellant’s arguments regarding preemption in detail
because if a claim proves to be unpatentable as a result of the two-part
analysis (i.e., steps 2A (prongs one and two) and 2B), no additional
determination regarding preemption is necessary. “While preemption may
signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption
does not demonstrate patent eligibility,” as “questions on preemption are
inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
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(alterations in Appeal Brief). But the method of claim 1 describes a process
that would be performed by an intermediary, not by a consumer.
Appellant also argues that claim 1 differs from “previously attempts
[that] included invoice prices and additional fees” because the claimed
method “describes a system for analyzing each offer to determine the actual
price to determine the lowest price for the specific vehicle that the user
requested.” Appeal Br. 9–10; see also Reply Br. 5. But the claim merely
recites “comparing . . . the plurality of selling bids to determine a value of a
lowest bid.” That is, the claimed analysis (i.e., “comparing”) encompasses
the trivial operation of finding the smallest value in a set of values. See also
Spec. ¶¶ 23, 42. The claim also recites that “each selling bid includes a price
for ordering and delivering the vehicle.” But requiring that received price
information be inclusive of fees required to fulfill a request to order and
deliver a vehicle does not improve the capabilities of a computer or require
analysis that differs from what a human would have likely used to determine
the “actual price” represented by an offer (e.g., adding a base price, taxes,
fees, delivery costs, etc.).
The claim further recites that the use of “a server computing device,”
“a client computing device associated with a consumer,” and “a plurality of
computer devices associated with a plurality of vehicle dealerships,” along
with components such as “an internet computer network” and “a processor
in communication with a memory.” Such recitations, however, do “no more
than generally link the use of a judicial exception to a particular
technological environment.” Recent Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55.
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For these reasons, we determine that the additional recitations of
claim 1, individually or as an ordered combination, integrate the underlying
abstract idea into a patent-eligible practical application.
Revised Guidance Step 2B
The Examiner further determines that claim 1 does not have additional
recitations that add anything significantly more than the underlying abstract
idea. See Final Act. 6. In particular, the Examiner determines that:
each of the functions performed by the [recited] machinery are
well-understood, routine, and conventional (i.e., performing
repetitive calculations, receiving, processing, and storing data,
electronically scanning or extracting data from a physical
document, electronic recordkeeping, automating mental tasks,
and receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the
Internet to gather data (see July 2015 Update: Section IV)).
Id. at 6–7. The Examiner further determines that “[e]ven when considered as
an ordered combination, the computer components of the instant claims add
nothing that is not already present when they are considered individually.”
Id. at 7.
Appellant contends that the method of claim 1 differs from “prior art
methods [that] operated on dealership provided information that could
include a variety of different prices, which are only available at or from the
dealership.” Appeal Br. 11–12. Appellant contends that the claimed method
“re-locate[s] the function of evaluating prices away from the dealership level
and to an independent server, with unique access to user information and
desires and dealership information.” Id. at 12. Thus, Appellant contends that
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“just as in BASCOM[4], [claim 1] includes the use of elements at a unique
location that provides an advantage over prior art.” Id. That is, Appellant
contends “the ordered combination of claim limitations in [claim 1] are
significantly more than [the] alleged abstract idea and provide an inventive
concept analogous to the inventive concept deemed patent eligible in
BASCOM.” Id.
Appellant’s reliance on BASCOM is unpersuasive. In BASCOM, the
Federal Circuit distinguished between merely reciting “the abstract idea of
filtering content along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet, or
to perform it on a set of generic computer components” and claims that
recite “a specific, discrete implementation of the abstract idea of filtering
content” in determining a claim was patent-eligible when it recited a design
that provided “a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering such
content . . . [that] were either susceptible to hacking and dependent on local
hardware and software, or confined to an inflexible one-size-fits-all
scheme.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. Appellants do not show, and we
cannot find, any comparable technical improvement in claim 1, even when
the additional recitations are considered in combination.
Appellant also contends the Examiner erroneously failed to proffer
“evidence that the limitations of [claim 1] were well-understood, routine or
conventional.” Reply Br. 4 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2018)). The Examiner correctly determines, however, that claim 1
recites generic computer technologies. Final Act. 7; Ans. 5–7. Moreover, the
Specification discloses the relevant technologies in broad, generic terms.

4 BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
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See, e.g., Spec. Figs. 2–5, ¶¶ 25–40, 52–55. As such, evidence of record
shows that claim 1 “simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative that an inventive
concept [is] not . . . present.” Recent Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of
claim 1, and of claims 3–6, 8–11, 13–16, 18, and 19, which Appellant does
not separately with persuasive specificity.
Obviousness
In rejecting claim 1 as obvious, the Examiner finds that Inghelbrecht
teaches or suggests: (1) receiving from a client computing device associated
with a consumer, a price request including an identification of a vehicle
(Final Act. 9 (citing Inghelbrecht ¶¶ 57, 81–83, 162, Figs. 1, 12A)); (2) prior
to receiving the price request, receiving a plurality of selling bids (id. (citing
Inghelbrecht ¶¶ 39–40, 42–43, 48, 67, 99, Fig. 7A)); (3) prior to receiving
the price request, storing, in the memory, the plurality of selling bids (id.
(citing Inghelbrecht ¶¶ 43, 99, Fig. 7A)); (4) subsequent to receiving the
price request, comparing the plurality of selling bids to determine a value of
a lowest bid (id. at 10 (citing Inghelbrecht ¶¶ 35, 57, 59, 69)); and
(5) transmitting the value of the lowest bid of the plurality of selling bids (id.
(citing Inghelbrecht ¶¶ 35, 59)). The Examiner relies on Kinney to teach or
suggest withholding data related to an identity of the vehicle dealership
associated with the lowest bid. Id. at 11 (citing Kinney ¶¶ 14, 36, 39–42, 84,
86, 89, Fig. 2). And the Examiner relies on Seergy to teach or suggest
wherein each selling bid includes a price for ordering and delivering the
vehicle. Id. at 13–14 (citing Seergy ¶¶ 4, 38, 44, 56, claim 1).
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Appellant contends the Examiner erred because:
Inghelbrecht does not describe or suggest receiving a price
request, receiving and storing a plurality of bids from a plurality
of vehicle dealerships, where each of the plurality of bids
includes a price to order and deliver a vehicle. Also Inghelbrecht
does not describe or suggest subsequent to receiving the price
request for a vehicle from a consumer, comparing the plurality
of selling bids to determine the a value of a lowest bid and
transmit the value of the lowest bid to a requesting consumer.
Appeal Br. 14.
Appellant’s contention is unpersuasive to the extent that it attacks
Inghelbrecht individually rather than in combination with Seergy, which the
Examiner relies on with respect to each bid including the price to order and
deliver a vehicle. See Final Act. 13–14; Ans. 9. Moreover, Appellant’s
conclusory assertions fail to distinguish the disputed claim recitations from
Inghelbrecht’s teachings directed to: “a user . . . specify[ing] a vehicle
configuration” to “be presented to the user” including “upfront pricing
information” (i.e., receiving a price request identifying a vehicle)
(Inghelbrecht ¶ 57); obtaining and storing “dealer upfront pricing” (i.e.,
receiving and storing a plurality of selling bids) (id. ¶ 42); and presenting to
a user the lowest upfront price offered by one of the dealers (i.e., comparing
bids and transmitting the lowest bid) (id. ¶ 59).
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in relying on the combined
teachings and suggestions of Inghelbrecht and Kinney because: (1)
Appellant characterizes the claimed storage of seller bids as a reverse
auction (Appeal Br. 15 (citing Spec. ¶ 22)) and (2) Appellant submits
“Kinney explicitly teaches away from reverse auctions as a means of online
purchases of vehicles by stating ‘. . . it has now been determined that buyer-
driven, online purchasing of vehicles, as opposed to auctions or reverse-
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auctions, may be more efficient use of time and may lead to a more
enjoyable purchasing experience for both buyers and sellers’” (id. (citing
Kinney ¶ 80)). See also Reply Br. 5–6.
Appellant’s contention is unpersuasive because, whether the claimed
invention is the type of reverse auction Kinney discusses, Kinney fails to
criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage withholding data related to an
identity of the vehicle dealership associated with the lowest bid in reverse
auctions. See Kinney ¶ 80; see also Ans. 9. Instead, Kinney broadly
discloses keeping “[t]he binding of specific buyers and sellers . . .
‘anonymous’ until the ‘ready to buy the car’ state of [the] buying process is
achieved” (Kinney ¶ 14) without limiting the type of sales processes in
which such anonymization is applicable (i.e., without teaching away from
keeping sellers anonymous in a reverse auction). The passage cited by
Appellant fails to suggest that withholding data related to an identity of the
vehicle dealership associated with the lowest bid (at least until the buyer is
ready to make the purchase) would be unlikely to be productive in the result
of facilitating a vehicle sale. See In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir.
1994). Moreover, Kinney at most teaches that “buyer-driven, online
purchasing of vehicles” is a better alternative to “auctions or reverse-
auctions” because of how enjoyable the experience is for buyers and sellers.
Kinney ¶ 80. But this does not teach away from reverse auctions because
“the fact that there may be reasons a skilled artisan would prefer one
[alternative] over the other does not amount to a teaching away from the
lesser preferred but still workable option.” Bayer Pharma AG v. Watson
Labs., Inc., 874 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also DePuy Spine,
Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
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2009) (“[a] reference does not teach away . . . if it merely expresses a
general preference for an alternative invention”).
Appellant also contends that, in contrast with the method of claim 1,
Seergy describes communicating with the manufacturer to
determine whether a vehicle is available. In the present
invention, the manufacturer is not a part of the sequence. More
specifically, Seergy does not describe or suggest prior to
receiving a price request, receiving and storing a plurality of bids
from a plurality of vehicle dealerships, where each of the
plurality of bids includes a price to order and deliver a vehicle.
Also Seergy does not describe or suggest subsequent to receiving
the price request for a vehicle from a consumer, comparing the
plurality of selling bids to determine the . . . value of a lowest bid
and transmit the value of the lowest bid to a requesting consumer.
Appeal Br. 16.
Appellant’s contention is unpersuasive to the extent that it attacks
Seergy individually rather than in combination with Inghelbrecht, which the
Examiner relies on with respect to most of the disputed recitations. See Final
Act. 9–10; Ans. 9. The Examiner properly relies on Seergy, which discloses
a dealer that “engages in inventoryless [sic] bidding by providing a bid on
[an] automobile when the . . . automobile is at least one of yet to be
manufactured and in the inventory of another entity” (Seergy claim 1) to
teach or suggest selling bids that include a price for ordering and delivering
the vehicle (see Final Act. 13–14). Moreover, the open-ended method of
claim 1 does not preclude communications with a manufacturer from being
part of the process. Dependent claim 6, which recites use of “a manufacturer
suggested retail price . . . for a vehicle,” makes clear that the process can
include communications with a manufacturer.
For these reasons, we agree with the Examiner that the combined
teachings of Inghelbrecht, Kinney, and Seergy teach or suggest the disputed
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recitations of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 rejection of claim 1, and the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejections of
claims 3–6, 8–11, 13–16, 18, 19, which Appellant does not argue separately.
See Appeal Br. 16.
CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–6, 8–11,
13–16, 18, 19
101 Eligibility 1, 3–6, 8–
11, 13–16,
18, 19

1, 3, 4, 6, 11,
13, 14, 16, 19
103 Inghelbrecht,
Kinney, Seergy
1, 3, 4, 6,
11, 13, 14,
16, 19

5, 15 103 Inghelbrecht,
Kinney, Seergy,
Finseth
5, 15
8, 10, 18 103 Inghelbrecht,
Kinney, Seergy,
Van Wie
8, 10, 18
9 103 Inghelbrecht,
Kinney, Seergy,
Anabtawi
9
Overall Outcome 1, 3–6, 8–
11, 13–16,
18, 19

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED