Essex, International, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 24, 1975

221 N.L.R.B. 742 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

742 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Controls Division/Lexington, Ohio Plant, a Division
of Essex , International, Inc. and Alice Ewers. Case
8-CA-8924
November 24, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND PENELLO
On July 16, 1975, Administrative Law Judge Jerry
B. Stone issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations, Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Controls Divi-
sion/Lexington, Ohio Plant, a Division of Essex
International, Inc., Lexington, Ohio, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order.
1 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F2d 362 (CA 3, 1951) We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JERRY B. STONE, Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, was heard pursuant to due
notice on May 8, 1975, at Galion, Ohio.
The charge was filed on February 6, 1975. The complaint
in this matter was issued on March 26, 1975. The issues
concern whether Respondent discharged certain Data
Processing Section employees who refused to perform
production line work of the nature ordinarily performed by
Respondent's production -and maintenance employees who
were engaged in a lawful strike, and which work such data
processing employees were not ordinarily required to
perform, and whether such conduct of Respondent
constituted the discharge of employees for engaging in
protected, concerted activities in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate
in the proceeding. Briefs have been filed by the General
Counsel and Respondent and have been considered. ,
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
The facts herein are based on the pleadings and
admissions therein.
Controls Division/Lexington, Ohio Plant, a Division of
Essex International, Inc., , Respondent, is now, and has
been at all times material herein, a Michigan corporation
engaged in the manufacture of thermostatic control devices
for appliances. It operates a plant in Lexington, Ohio,
which is the only facility involved herein. Annually, in the
course and conduct of its business, it ships goods valued in
excess of $50,000 from its Lexington, Ohio, facility directly
to points located outside the State of Ohio.
As conceded by Respondent and based on the foregoing,
it is concluded and found that Respondent is, and has been
at all times material herein, an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The International Union of Electrical , Radio and
Machine Workers , AFL-CIO, and Its Local 708, each is
now, and has been at all times material herein, and
collectively constitute a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Preliminary Issues
Supervisory Status 1
At all times material herein, the following named persons
occupied the positions set forth opposite their respective
names at Respondent's Lexington, Ohio, facility, and have
been, and are now, agents of Respondent, acting on its
behalf, and are supervisors within the meaning of Section
2(11) of the Act:
Charles Jacobson Accounting Manager
Robert Heckathorn Data Processing Supervisor
Richard Greene Plant Superintendent
1 The facts are based on the pleadings and admissions therein.
221 NLRB No. 126
CONTROLS DIVISION/LEXINGTON 743
B. The Data Processing Employees2
At all times material herein, up to and including
February 3, 1975, Alice Ewers, Jean Keesee, Shirley
Kilgore, and Linda McPhern were employed by Respon-
dent in its data processing section. Such named employees
were the only employees in said section. The immediate
supervisor of said employees was Robert Heckathorn.
Although Heckathorn was a supervisor within the meaning
of Section 2(11) of the Act, he did not possess the authority
to hire and fire. Above Heckathorn in the line of command
was Charles Jacobson, accounting manager. Jacobson, as
the need might be, exercised the authority to hire and fire
employees in the data processing unit.
Normally employees in the data processing unit, as
regards problems, had access first to Heckathorn, then to
Jacobson, and then to Plant Manager Killion.
The employees in the data processing section (Ewers,
Keesee , Kilgore, and McPhern) were not ordinarily, in the
course of their regular, duties as data processing employees,
required to perform work which was normally assigned to
the production and maintenance employees. The said data
processing employees are not and never have been
represented by any labor organization.
C. Events of January 31, 1975
As of January 31, 1975, Respondent expected that there
would be a strike called by the Union for Respondent's
employees. On January 31, 1975, Plant Manager Killion
spoke to a group of employees, adverted to the expected
strike , and expressed Respondent's intentions to operate
during the strike. Killion told the employees, including
most of the data processing employees, that during the
strike they would be asked to perform tasks and duties they
had not performed before and which they probably would
never be asked to do again.3
McPhern,, a data processing employee, was working on
the second shift on January 31, 1975. McPhern was not
present when Killion spoke to the employees as described
above. However, before leaving work, McPhern had a
conversation with Supervisor Heckathorn. Later, at a
supermarket, Heckathorn and McPhern spoke to each
other again . On both occasions, Supervisor Heckathorn
informed McPhern that there had been a management
meeting and that Killion had said that anyone who refused
to go out in the factory and work would be fired 4
D. The Status of the Unions,5 the Labor Dispute,
and the Strike
The International Union of Electrical , Radio and
Machine Workers , AFL-CIO, and its Local 705 constitute
2 The facts are based on a composite of the undisputed credited
testimony of witnesses and stipulations of the parties
3 The facts are not in dispute and are based on a composite of the
credited aspects of the testimony of Ewers,,Kilgore, Keesee, and Killion.
4 The facts are based on McPhern's credited testimony.
5 The facts are not in real dispute and are based on the pleadings and
admissions therein and the uncontradicted evidence
6 The strike very well may have continued until the time of the hearing in
this matter No facts were presented in such regard, however Respondent
admits the establishment and maintenance of a picket line but denies that
the Unions established and maintained a lawful picket line at Respondent's
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all
production and maintenance employees employed at
Respondent's Lexington, Ohio, facility.
Commencing on or about February 1, 1975, and
continuing to the date of the complaint (March 26, 1975)
herein, the aforesaid Unions were engaged in a labor
dispute with Respondent, and as a consequence thereof,
the Unions have engaged in a protected economic strike
against Respondent, and have established and continuous-
ly maintained a lawful picket line at Respondent's
Lexington, Ohio, facility.6
E. Events of February 3, 1975; Credibility
There are some credibility disputes between the testimo-
ny of the witnesses to the events of February 3, 1975. Such
disputes arise between the testimony of General Counsel's
witnesses (Ewers, Keesee, Kilgore, and McPhern) and the
Respondent's witnesses (Greene; Heckathorn, and Jacob-
son) and the effect of Corcoran's testimony. I found the
General Counsel's witnesses (Ewers, Keesee, Kilgore, and
McPhern) all to appear to be testifying as to the main
events in a frank, forthright, and truthful manner. On the
other hand, Respondent's witnesses Heckathorn, Jacobson,
and Corcoran were unimpressive. At the hearing, General
Counsel's witnesses and Heckathorn testified to the effect
that early on February 3, 1975, in answer to an inquiry by
Plant, Superintendent Greene as -to availability, of employ-
ees for assignment elsewhere, Heckathorn told Greene that
he had no one available, that he had work, for his
employees for 2 days. However, Heckathorn admitted that
he had made a statement in a prehearing affidavit given an
NLRB agent to a contrary effect, to wit: "I did not tell him
I had no one available at that time" or "that I had enough
work for one girl that day." Heckathorn testified that he
"assumed" such statement was correct when he signed the
affidavit. Under the circumstances, it is clear that Hecka-
thorn was impeached by his prehearing statement. Jacob-
son's testimony was presented in a general and somewhat
ambiguous manner. Corcoran testified with respect to her
duties in assigning work during the strike. Corcoran
appeared confused as to her understanding of very simple
questions. She did not appear to be a reliable witness at all.
Greene's demeanor was neither impressive nor unimpres-
sive.
Despite the credibility disputes presented, the facts are
clear and not disputed that Ewers, Keesee, Kilgore, and
McPhern decided concertedly on February 3, 1975, that
they were not going to perform production work and take
the jobs of striking employees. The facts are 'further clear
and not in dispute that Ewers, Keesee, Kilgore, and
McPhern told Supervisor Heckathorn of their decision not
Lexington, Ohio, facility The parties also stipulated that the Unions could
have lawfully established and maintained a lawful picket line. It is clear,
therefore, that the Unions established and maintained a picket line and that
some employees crossed, the picket line without the occurrence of any
untoward action. There is no contention that the Umon was prevented by
contract or law from establishing or maintaining such picket line Nor is
there evidence of violence on the picket line or any evidence to reflect
unlawfulness of said picket line Under the circumstances, the facts warrant
a finding that the Unions have established and maintained a lawful picket
line at Respondent's premises
744 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to perform production work and take the jobs of striking
employees . Considering the demeanor of the witnesses, the
observations above, and the logical consistency of the
evidence presented by the General Counsel's witnesses
with the undisputed facts as compared to logical inconsis-
tency of the testimonial version of Respondent's witnesses
inconsistent with the General Counsel 's witnesses and the
undisputed facts, I credit the testimony of the General
Counsel's witnesses (Keesee, Kilgore, Ewers, and
McPhern) over the testimony of Respondent's witnesses
Greene, Heckathorn, and Jacobson where in conflict
except as indicated later herein.
Events circa 8:30 a.m ., February 3, 19757
On the morning of February 3, 1975, the data processing
employees (Ewers, Keesee, Kilgore, and McPhern) crossed
the picket line established by the Unions , and reported to
work to their regular jobs.
Later, around 8:30, Plant Superintendent Greene ap-
proached data processing Supervisor Heckathorn and
inquired in effect as to whether Heckathorn or any of his
employees were available for work in the plant on the
production line, if so, the ones available should report to
Mary Jo Corcoran.
Heckathorn told Plant Superintendent Greene that none
of his employees were available , that he had work for the
employees for a couple of days.
After hearing the above conversation between Plant
Superintendent Greene and Supervisor Heckathorn, em-
ployees Ewers, Keesee, Kilgore, and McPhern met together
and concertedly decided that they would not work on the
production line, that they did not want to take production
employees ' places while they were on strike.
In the meantime, Supervisor Heckathorn had left and
then returned to the room where Ewers , Keesee, Kilgore,
and McPhern worked . Ewers told Supervisor Heckathorn
that the girls had something to tell him , that all the girls felt
that they did not want to work out in the factory and take
the strikers ' jobs away from them. Supervisor Heckathorn
told the employees in effect that they would be automat-
ically off the payroll if they refused to do production work.
Events circa 9:30 a.m.
Either before or around 9:30 a.m., Heckathorn became
aware of a defective door on the machine used by Ewers .8
Supervisor Heckathorn told Ewers to report to Supervisor
Corcoran for assignment. Ewers refused to do so .9
7 The facts are based upon the credited aspects of the testimony of
Ewers, Keesee, Kilgore, McPhem, Greene, and Heckathorn. The testimony
of Greene and Heckathorn inconsistent with the facts found is discredited
for the reasons set forth in the section on credibility
8 The machine would run, but there is a question as to whether it would
print properly because of the defective door It is clear that the machine was
serviced and repaired shortly after the employees involved herein left the
plant . The question is whether Heckathorn should be believed as to his
decision to have the machine repaired or not. I am persuaded that the
machine problem was legitimate and credit Heckathorn's testimony relating
thereto. Although Ewers appeared to be a truthful witness in most respects,
I found her to be evasive and partisan in her testimony concerning the
machine . The other employee witnesses were not in a position to know
whether the machine was defective or not I discredit the testimony of
witnesses inconsistent with the facts found
9 Since Corcoran was a regular production line supervisor, it is clear that
Heckathorn reported the details to Jacobson and the fact
that Ewers had refused to go to Corcoran for assignment to
work. Jacobson told Heckathorn to go back and again
instruct Ewers to report to Corcoran for assignment.10
In the meantime, Ewers told her fellow employees that
Heckathorn was going to ask her to go out on the
production line and work.I I
Heckathorn returned a few minutes later. Heckathorn
then pointed his finger at Ewers. Heckathorn told Ewers
that she was going to have to go out in the,factory and
work. Ewers , asked Supervisor Heckathorn why he was
singling her out, why he was jumping the gun. Ewers told
Heckathorn that she had work in do.12 Heckathorn told
Ewers that she made the most money and had factory
experience. Ewers told Heckathorn that she was not going
out to do factory work. Ewers asked Heckathorn why he
did not go out into the factory and_ work., Heckathorn
replied that he had work to do, that he was a supervisor.
Ewers again told Heckathorn that she was not going out
into the factory to work. Heckathorn told Ewers that as far
as he was concerned, she was fired, that she was
automatically off the payroll as of then. Heckathorn told
Ewers that the best thing for her to do was to talk to
Jacobson, the accounting manager.
Ewers, Keesee, Kilgore, and McPhern went to see
Accounting Manager Jacobson. Ewers told Jacobson that
Heckathorn had told her that she had to go out to the
factory and work, that he had jumped the gun, that she had
work to do. Ewers asked Jacobson if she were fired if she
refused to go out in the factory to work. Jacobson told
Ewers that Heckathorn was her, supervisor, that Hecka-
thorn told her what to do. Ewersasked if she refused to go
out in the factory and work, would she be fired? Jacobson
told her that she would be dismissed, that she would
automatically be off the payroll. Ewers asked if this meant
that she was fired. Jacobson told Ewers that was the way it
was, she was fired as of then.13 Ewers told Jacobson'that
the other girls felt that they did not want to go out in the
factory and work. Jacobson told the employees in effect
that Respondent wanted to keep the plant 'open, that
Respondent expected cooperation, that this attitude placed
a serious question on the loyalty of people, that they had to
decide on their sympathies, that it was their choice to leave
and to go with the strikers, or work, or quit, that if they did
not accept other assignments they would be terminated.
Ewers, Keesee, Kilgore, and McPhern returned to their
work station, got their belongings and left. Before leaving,
Ewers told Supervisor Heckathorn that she guessed she
Ewers reasonably would believe she was being assigned to production work
I am also persuaded that Ewers would have complained to Heckathorn
about being assigned to production work. All of the events involved herein
occurred within a short period of time I am persuaded that the other
employees were not aware of Heckathorn's first conversation with Ewers
about reporting to Corcoran
is I credit Jacobson's and Heckathorn's testimony to the facts, as
indicated
11 I am persuaded that Ewers made such remarks after Heckathorn's
original attempt to get her to go to Corcoran for other assignments
12 The overall facts reveal that Ewers considered the machine, though
defective, to be workable.
13 Considering what Heckathorn had told Ewers about being off the
payroll, I find it logical and clear that Ewers would seek a clear statement of
whether she had been fired or not
CONTROLS DIVISION/LEXINGTON
was fired. The other employees told Heckathorn that they
were quitting.14 Heckathorn told the employees that he
thought they were foolish to walk out without having been
assigned a production job or being asked to leave the
department.
Contentions and Conclusions
The General Counsel contends that Respondent dis-
charged data processing employees Ewers, Keesee, Kil-
gore, and McPhern on February 3, 1975, because they
concertedly refused to engage in production type work, the
work normally performed by strikers, which work was not
normally performed by such data processing employees.
Respondent contends that the said data processing
employees voluntarily quit their employment.
The overall facts and contentions clearly reveal that
Ewers was discharged and that Respondent has deemed
the other employees as "quits." 15
Considering all of the facts, I am persuaded and
conclude and find that Respondent discharged employees
Ewers, Keesee, Kilgore, and McPhern, on February 3,
1975, because said employees refused to perform struck
work, production work, which was not their regular or
normal work assignments.
Board and court law reveals that the answer to the
question involved, herein requires a balancing of the
conflicting rights of the employer to carry on his business
during the course of an economic strike and the rights of
employees outside the striking unit to refrain from
performing the strikers' work. The Employer can insist that
the employees outside the staking unit perform struck
work or, on the other hand, become in effect strikers. The
Employer, however, cannot terminate such employees for
the exercise of their right to refrain from performing the
strikers' work.
As regards the discharge of Ewers, the facts are clear that
Ewers and the other employees had concertedly decided
not to perform the strikers' work and had communicated
the same to Supervisor Heckathorn. At the time of Ewers'
conversation with Jacobson when she was discharged, it is
clear that Jacobson was aware that the problem was
because Ewers was refusing to perform struck work.
Contentions of Respondent's officials, Heckathorn and
Jacobson, that the work assignments were not specific as
regards struck work does not hold water. Nothing that
Ewers or the other employees had said to either Heckat-
horn or Jacobson revealed any reluctance to perform any
work other than the struck work. I am persuaded that
Respondent clearly knew that the employees were willing
to perform other work except for the struck work. It is clear
then that the discharge of Ewers was because she refused to
perform struck work which was not her regular or normal
work assignment. Under such circumstances, it is clear and
I conclude and find that the discharge of Ewers on
14 1 discredit the testimonial denials of Keesee, Kilgore, and McPhern
that they told Heckathorn they were quitting. Considering the logical
consistency of all the facts, I credit Heckathorn's testimony to the effect that
the three employees told him that they were quitting.
15 Supervisor Jacobson told the employees in effect that they must
decide whether to'leave,'quit, or be willing to perform production type work
subject to discharge if they didn't. Supervisor Heckathorn testified that
745
February 3, 1975, constituted conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.16
Further, I would note that even under the facts
contended for by Respondent, its conduct would be
violative. Thus, the facts would clearly reveal that
employees Ewers, Keesee, Kilgore, and McPhern were
acting in concert in their refusal to perform work other
than their normal duties. Such concerted action is
protected conduct within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Respondent could insist that such employees
become strikers. Terminating such employees for their
protected concerted activities, however, would constitute a
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
As to the question of whether Respondent in effect
discharged Kilgore, Keesee, and McPhern, the facts clearly
reveal that Respondent's action of discharging Ewers was
done in the presence of such employees, and the message
was clear that Respondent had discharged Ewers because
of her refusal to perform struck work. The facts are also
clear that Jacobson intended to force Kilgore, Keesee, and
McPhern to make their decision at that time as to whether
to forego their statutory right to refrain from performing
struck work and to work or to quit. Kilgore, Keesee, and
McPhern had a statutory right to refrain from performing
struck work. They also had a statutory right to refrain from
allying themselves with the union strikers and to act only in
concert with themselves. Respondent, as indicated, could
insist that the employees perform struck work or go on
strike. Respondent, however, could not terminate such
employees for refusing to perform struck work. If the work
available and planned for Kilgore , Keesee , and McPhern
were of the nonstruck work type, Respondent had no right
to insist that the employees go on strike or otherwise agree
to work under conditions wherein if they refused to
perform struck work, they would be discharged. To do so
clearly interferedwith the employees' right to engage in or
refrain from engaging in concerted or union activity. This
is so because the employees had the right to refuse to
perform struck work, to act in concert with themselves, and
to refuse to act in concert with the union strikers. The
employees had the concerted right to refuse to take sides in
the labor dispute.
If the work available and planned for Kilgore, Keesee,
and McPhern were of the struck work type, it is clear that
Respondent's insistence on a decision , coupled with the
demonstrated discharge of Ewers and its , expressed
intention to discharge such employees if they, refused to
perform struck work, reveals that Respondent intended the
termination of the employees one way or the other.
Considering Respondent's knowledge of the employees'
concerted decision to refuse to perform struck work, the
fact that the employees had crossed the picket line to
report to work that day and had only expressed a decision
not to perform struck work, Respondent had every reason
to believe that the employees would quit, and no reason to
Keesee, Kilgore, and McPhern told him they had quit Respondent's
position at the hearing was that the employees were "voluntary quits"
Respondent's brief asserts in effect that the employees assumed the status of
strikers . Considering all of the foregoing, I reject Respondent 's assertion in
its brief
16 Valmac Industries, Inc, 217 NLRB No. 103 ( 1975), and cases cited
therein.
746 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
believe that the employees would want to become strikers
as part of the union strike. Rather, Respondent was on
notice that the data processing employees' concerted
interest was in avoiding the taking of sides. Under such
circumstances, the facts reveal that Respondent intended
to force employees Kilgore, Keesee, and McPhern to quit
work or to forego their statutory right to refuse to perform
struck work. A forced "quit" is tantamount to a discharge.
The employees had no realistic choice consistent with their
statutory rights. Considering all of this, the effect of
Jacobson's message and action was a discharge of
employees Keesee, Kilgore, and McPhern. Such conduct is
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is so concluded
and found.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
2. The International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, and its Local 708, each is,
and has been at all times material herein, and collectively
constitute, a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Alice Ewers, Jean Keesee, Shirley
Kilgore, and Linda McPhern because they engaged in
protected concerted activities, Respondent has interfered
with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed in Section 7 ofthe Act, and thereby
has engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's opera-
tions described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It having been found that Respondent discharged Alice
Ewers, Jean Keesee, Shirley Kilgore, and Linda McPhern
in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, the recommended
Order will provide that Respondent offer each reinstate-
ment to her job, and make each whole for loss of earnings
within the meaning and in accord with the Board's
decisions in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289
(1950); Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962),
except as specifically modified by the wording of such
recommended Order.
Because of the character of the unfair labor practices
herein found, the recommended Order will provide that
Respondent cease and desist from in any other manner
interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon
the entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Controls Division/Lexington, Ohio Plant, a Division
of Essex International, Inc., Respondent, is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
17 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
ORDER 17
Respondent, Controls Division/Lexington, Ohio, plant,
a Division of Essex International, Inc., its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from: -
(a) Discharging, or otherwise discriminating against
employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or
any term or condition of employment because of their
engaging in protected concerted activities.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act except to the extent -that such
rights may be affected by lawful agreements in accord with
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Alice Ewers, Jean Keesee, Shirley Kilgore,
and Linda McPhern immediate and full reinstatement to
her former position or, if such position no longer exists, to
a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or other rights previously enjoyed, and make each
whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the
discrimination against her in the manner described above
in the section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this recommended Order.
(c) Post at Respondent's plant at Lexington, Ohio, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 18 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 8, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representatives, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by Respondent for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
es In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
CONTROLS DIVISION/LEXINGTON 747
mg all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL offer to Alice Ewers, Jean Keesee, Shirley
previously enjoyed, and make each whole for any loss
of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against
her.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against employees in regard to hire or tenure of
employment, or any term or condition of employment
because of their protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner"interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act except to the
extent that such rights may be affected by lawful
agreements in accordance with Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
Kilgore, and Linda McPhern immediate and full CONTROLS-
reinstatement to her former position or,' if such position DIVISION/LEXINGTON, OHIO
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, PLANT, A DIVISION OF
without prejudice to her seniority or other rights EssEx INTERNATIONAL, INC.