Ernest C. Ortega, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (USPS Headquarters) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 3, 2001
01995243 (E.E.O.C. May. 3, 2001)

01995243

05-03-2001

Ernest C. Ortega, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (USPS Headquarters) Agency.


Ernest C. Ortega v. United States Postal Service

01995243

May 03, 2001

.

Ernest C. Ortega,

Complainant,

v.

William J. Henderson,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(USPS Headquarters)

Agency.

Appeal No. 01995243

Agency No. H0-0065-98

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title

VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

791 et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

Complainant alleged that he was discriminated against on the bases of his

disability (an unspecified mental condition), sex (male), national origin

(Hispanic), and in retaliation for prior EEO activity as an EEO counselor

and investigator. In its FAD, the agency stated that complainant raised

twenty-one (21) issues in his formal complaint. The Commission declines

to repeat all 21 herein, but will summarize them to the extent necessary

to resolve this appeal.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as an EEO Counselor/Investigator at the agency's Colorado/Wyoming District

Office. Believing he was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought

EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal complaint on October 6,

1998. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed

of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. By letter dated

May 6, 1999, complainant requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded, as to the matters identified as

issues 1-10, that complainant failed to timely contact the EEO counselor

within the prescribed 45-day time limit. As to the matters identified as

issues 11 and 12, the agency dismissed both for failure to state a claim.

With respect to the matters identified as issues 13-21, the agency reached

the merits of the claims, concluding that complainant failed to establish

a prima facie case of discrimination.

On appeal, complainant submitted no brief, only summarily stating in a

letter dated May 26, 1999 that he wished to file an appeal. The agency

responded to complainant's appeal, requesting that we affirm its FAD.

In so doing, the agency maintains that complainant's claims were

untimely, and that a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was provided

for management to return complainant's work to him for revisions, that

reason being numerous spelling and grammatical errors.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

First we will address the issue of fragmentation of the claims. Because

complainant is alleging that he was subjected to a continuing hostile

work environment, it is not appropriate to consider the claims separately

from one another. The agency addressed the issue of fragmentation in

its FAD, stating:

the complainant has presented a series of 10 isolated incidences

related to his inappropriate conduct and/or performance as EEO

Counselor/Investigator over a period of one year and two months.

He failed to establish the necessary nexus between the incident he

cited as Issue #1 (no longer being assigned certain cases) and the other

matters he cited in his complaint. Likewise, he failed to establish a

nexus between the matters related by him as ISSUES 1 - 10 and the other

timely matters he presented in the case at bar.

We disagree with the agency's conclusion that issues 1-10 are not related

to the remaining issues. Each of the identified issues alleges incidents

comprising the same claim of hostile work environment harassment.<2>

Instead of treating these events as incidents comprising the claim of

harassment, however, the agency analyzed them individually. Thus,

we find that the agency improperly treated the incidents raised in

complainant's complaint in a piecemeal manner. See Meaney v. Department

of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940169 (November 3, 1994) (an agency

should not ignore the "pattern aspect" of a complainant's claims and

define the issues in a piecemeal manner where an analogous theme unites

them). Consequently, when the incidents in the complaint are viewed

as an alleged pattern of discriminatory conduct, they state a claim of

harassment and the agency's dismissal of claims 1-10 for untimeliness

and 11-12 for failure to state a claim was improper.

The procedural dismissals notwithstanding, the agency conducted an

investigation. The record of investigation is sufficient as it stands

to review the entire complaint on the merits. Given that, we turn to

the issue of establishing a claim of harassment.

In order to prevail on a claim of harassment complainant must demonstrate,

inter alia, that: (1) he was subjected to harassment that was sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an

abusive or hostile environment; and (2) the harassment was based on his

membership in a protected class, i.e., based on an impermissible factor

such as his race, national origin, sex, age, disability or reprisal.

Valdez v. United States Postal Service, Appeal No. 01A00196 (May 11,

2000); Cromar v. Department of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 01951366

(January 23, 1998); see also Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC

Request No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997). In determining whether or not

a hostile work environment violative of Title VII has been created,

the Commission requires that �...the challenged conduct must not only

be sufficiently severe or pervasive objectively to offend a reasonable

person, but also must be subjectively perceived as abusive by the

[complainant].� Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems,

Inc. at 7, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994).

The Supreme Court has stated: �Conduct that is not severe or pervasive

enough to create an objectively hostile work environment - an environment

that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive - is beyond

Title VII's purview.� Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22

(1993). Additionally, the Commission has previously noted: �In defining

the hypothetical reasonable person, . . . the reasonable person standard

should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of

acceptable behavior.� Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems,

Inc. at 6, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994). In evaluating

whether the conduct at issue was sufficiently severe or pervasive to

constitute a hostile work environment, the Commission has noted that �[a]

'hostile environment' claim generally requires a showing of a pattern

of offensive conduct.� See EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of

Sexual Harassment, N-915-050, No. 137 (March 19, 1990).

Complainant alleges that between August of 1996 and October of 1997, he

was subjected to harassment from his supervisor (S). Complainant cites

incidents such as being admonished by S in a loud and threatening manner

on several occasions, being taken off of cases he was previously assigned

to investigate, being placed on a performance improvement plan, being

accused by S of improper behavior in carrying out his investigations,

being asked to continually revise his reports, and having his reports

changed or altered by other EEO employees at the direction of S without

complainant's knowledge or consent. Even assuming arguendo that these

events took place as complainant states and rose to the level of creating

an environment sufficiently severe or pervasive that a reasonable person

would find it hostile or abusive, complainant nonetheless has failed to

establish a discriminatory or retaliatory motive by a preponderance of

the evidence.

Specifically, there is no evidence that S behaved the way he allegedly

did because of complainant's sex, national origin or disability.<3>

Moreover, as to retaliation, complainant failed to establish that there

was a causal link between his protected activity, whether as an EEO

counselor/investigator or as a witness for three individuals who filed

sexual harassment claims against the agency, and the actions of S.

In reaching this conclusion, we note that complainant offered only

bare statements of events that transpired over the time in question.

These statements do not offer any evidence of a possible motive by

S, discriminatory or otherwise. The agency, however, does offer the

affidavit of S, which offers legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for

the actions taken by S. For example, with respect to the issue of being

taken off a case to which he had previously been assigned, S attests

that he did so to defuse a situation between the agency and complainant,

where complainant was perceived to be biased. In regard to the incidents

of returning complainant's reports for numerous revisions, the agency

points to the exhibits submitted by complainant for the instant appeal.

The agency contends that these exhibits contain numerous errors and

stand alone as evidence of why multiple revisions were required.

Further, complainant himself stated, and S restated, that other

counselor/investigators were often required to revise their reports.

Complainant has offered no evidence to rebut the statements by S,

and has offered no evidence that could support the contention that

any action taken by S was motivated by his sex, disability, national

origin or prior protected activity. Thus, complainant has failed to

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was subjected to

discriminatory harassment.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing analysis and after a careful review

of the record, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 03, 2001

__________________

Date

1 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment.

2 The Commission notes that complainant categorized four of his issues

as incidents of disparate treatment. We find that the issues are more

appropriately analyzed as part of complainant's harassment claim.

3 We note that in analyzing complainant's claim of disability-based

harassment, the FAD did not address the threshold issue of whether or

not complainant is an individual with a disability within the meaning

of the Rehabilitation Act. In deciding the instant appeal, we do not

reach the issue, because we find that even assuming arguendo complainant

is an individual with a disability, he has not demonstrated that, more

likely than not, the alleged harassment was motivated by his disability

or any other protected basis.