E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Feb 20, 2014

05-CA-101359 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 20, 2014)

JD(ATL)–07–14
Richmond, VA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
ATLANTA BRANCH OFFICE
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS
AND COMPANY
and Case 05–CA–101359
AMPTHILL RAYON WORKERS, INC.,
LOCAL 992, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF DU PONT
WORKERS
Timothy P. Bearese, Esq. and Patrick J. Cullen, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Christopher M. Michalik, Esq. and Summer Speight, Esq.,
(McGuireWoods, LLP) of Richmond, Virginia,
for the Respondent.
Kenneth Henley, Esq., of Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
DONNA N. DAWSON, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Richmond,
Virginia, on September 25, 2013. The Charging Party, Ampthill Rayon Workers, Inc.,
International Brotherhood of DuPont Workers (the Union) filed a charge in this matter on March
26, 2013, and a complaint was issued on June 27, 2013. The complaint alleges that since March
14, 2013, E.I. DuPont de Nemours Company (the Respondent) has violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by failing and refusing to provide and failing
and refusing to timely provide information requested by the Union in connection with a
grievance.1 The Respondent filed its timely answer, generally denying any and all unlawful

1 At trial, I granted (without objection) the General Counsel’s motion to amend the par. 8 of the complaint to
add: “[I]n the alternative, the Respondent has unreasonably and unlawfully delayed in furnishing the
requested information to the Union or provided incomplete response to the Union’s request for
information,” in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) and (5). (Tr. 152–153).
JD(ATL)–07–14
2
conduct. The Respondent’s affirmative defense that the National Labor Relations Board (the
NLRB) and its agents lack jurisdiction to pursue this case will be addressed later in this decision.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel2 and the Respondent, I make the 5
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. Jurisdiction10
The Respondent, a Delaware corporation, has been engaged in the manufacture of
synthetic fibers and related products at its Richmond, Virginia facility, where it annually sells
and ships products, goods, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside
the State of Virginia. The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in 15
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
20
A. The Parties
This dispute involves the Respondent’s DuPont Spruance Plant (Spruance facility) in
Richmond, Virginia, where it manufactures three of its major products, including Tyvek, Nomex,
and Kevlar, across separate operations called, “areas.” Each of these areas has its own 25
administration and unit/area manager who report directly to the plant manager, Joseph
Internicola (Internicola). Bruce Harris (Harris) testified on behalf of the Respondent, and at all
times material, has been the labor relations manager and the Respondent’s representative for all
matters dealing with the Union. The Respondent’s counsel is Christopher Michalik, Esq.
(Michalik). 30
The Respondent and the Union have a longstanding collective-bargaining relationship at
the Spruance Plant (since about 1947), with the most recent collective-bargaining agreement (the
Agreement) effective from September 1, 2012 until September 1, 2015. For all relevant time
periods, the Union has been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of a unit 35
comprised of “production, maintenance, service and Plant technical hourly wage roll employees
. . .” (U. Exh. 1). 3 Donny Irvin (Irvin), who testified on behalf of the General Counsel has been
the chairperson of the Union’s grievance committee for many years. He and the Union’s
counsel, Kenneth Henley, Esq. (Henley), represented the Union in matters relevant to this case.
40
As stipulated by the parties, these individuals are their supervisors and/or agents for all
times material within the meaning of Section 2(11) and (13) of the Act. (Jt. Exh. 1.)

2
For brevity purposes, counsel for the General Counsel will be referred to as the “General Counsel.”
3 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for Transcript; “GC Exh.” for General Counsel
Exhibit; “R. Exh. for Respondent Exhibit; U. Exh. for Union Exhibit; “Jt. Exh. for Joint Exhibit; “GC Br.”
for General Counsel’s Brief; and “R Br.” for Respondent’s Brief.
JD(ATL)–07–14
3
B. Site Administration Manual Policies
In addition to the Agreement, the parties have bargained and agreed to policies and
standards, included in the various sections of the Respondent’s Site Administration Manual 5
(SAM). The SAM D-5 sets forth the reasons for which bargaining unit employees would be
subject to discharge, and provides in relevant part:
 Failure to meet standards of performance on a continuing and satisfactory
basis can subject an employee to discharge. This includes unsatisfactory 10
performance and/or unsatisfactory attendance due to unexcused absences.
Unsatisfactory fitness can subject an employee to discontinuance.
 An act of serious misconduct can subject an employee to discharge. This
is an action that is a flagrant violation of Plant rules, policies, or 15
unacceptable conduct which includes, but is not limited to, the following:
. . . .
Flagrant safety violation- a violation (either deliberate or an
error) of a safety rule, procedure, or safety judgment that
could (or did) result in serious injury. Examples of this 20
action might be (but are not limited to) violation of the
Lockout Procedure, violation of the Tank and Vessel Entry
Procedure, or a rule violation that seriously jeopardizes a
person’s safety and health.
. . . .25
Sleeping- the act of sleeping during work time either on the
job assignment or away from it. Casual dozing during
work time is also not allowed and, if observed, will be
handled as a performance/safety problem through use of the
Development Procedure. Repeat violations of this standard 30
(casual dozing) could eventually result in discharge through
continued unsatisfactory performance.
(R. Exh. 1).
The development procedure (similar to progressive discipline) for bargaining unit 35
employees is set forth in the Respondent’s SAM D-7, and reads in pertinent part:
Depending upon the severity of the violation or mistake, an employee may be
taken to any step in the Development Procedure, or a recommendation may be
made for immediate discharge. Violations or mistakes of a lesser nature should 40
be processed through the following steps: INFORMAL REPRIMAND, SPECIAL
CONTACT, PRE-PROBLEM CONTACT, PROBLEM CONTACT, AND
DISCHARGE.
JD(ATL)–07–14
4
(R. Exh. 2.) The problem contact, similar to a probationary period, is the employee’s last
opportunity to prove or correct his/her performance problem. When an employee’s performance
does not improve, the last step, suspension with intent to discharge, is proposed. An employee
could be referred for discharge without the benefit of the development procedure when the 5
individual has committed an act of serious misconduct.
The SAM D-7 development procedure and the SAM D-5 are not applicable to exempt
employees such as supervisors. However, there is no dispute that the Spruance Plant supervisors
must still adhere to all of the Respondent’s safety polices and standards of conduct which are 10
described in the SAM D-5. This includes the more serious acts of misconduct set forth in the
SAM D-5 (e.g., flagrant safety and sleeping violations). (Tr. 20–21, 120–121.) Harris initially
testified that the Respondent does not have any disciplinary procedures (written or otherwise) for
its supervisors, but instead metes out discipline to them on a case by case basis. He finally
acknowledged, however, that supervisors can be subject to various types of discipline such as 15
warnings, suspension, discharge and monetary sanctions, depending on the seriousness of the
conduct, past discipline, work history, and seniority.
C. The Respondent’s Site Review Process And Safety Procedures
20
The Respondent utilizes an investigative process, called a site review, to investigate
incidents of serious safety and misconduct violations; it is undisputed that not only bargaining
unit employees, but also supervisors, are sent for site review when they engage in these types of
violations. This process culminates in a site review report presented to a site review team
comprised of the plant manager and his administrative staff. The site review team makes the 25
determination to either discharge or otherwise discipline the employees sent for site review.4
The Union is not involved in the site review process, nor is it privy to the discussions that take
place during the presentation meeting.
In the last few years, all violations or errors involving the Respondent’s “Tag, Lock, 30
Clear, and Try” (TLCT) safety policy/procedure (referred to in the SAM D-5 as the “Lockout
Procedure”) have been presented for site review. This TLCT procedure is required of all
employees, unit and supervisors alike, and is a step in the operation of most or all machinery at
the Spruance Plant. Regarding the TLCT safety violations, area management also prepares
Serious Site Incident (SI) reports for each violation, which are publicized via computer for 35
everyone in the Spruance Plant to see. Irvin testified that the Union learns of these incidents
through witnesses, affected unit employees, SI reports; and/or from supervisors who discuss
them in beginning of shift meetings (referred to as “rackup” meetings). (Tr. 23–26.)
D. Discharge of James Lewis40
In December 2012, the Respondent verbally discharged unit employee, James Lewis
(Lewis), a windup operator in the Tyvek area, based on a site review presentation (also referred
to as site review report) and recommendation to “[s]uspend with intent to discharge.” The
Respondent typically does not issue written termination notices. On December 17, 2012 (prior to 45

4 Irvin testified that unit member site reviews result in either a discharge or “problem write-up.” (Tr. 63.)
JD(ATL)–07–14
5
his discharge), the Respondent prepared a summary/report of its reasons for terminating Lewis,
entitled, “Site Review Presentation.” According to this report, the SAM “D-5 Discharge
Reasons” listed under “Policy/Procedure Violated” were:
 Failure to meet standards of performance on a continuing and satisfactory 5
basis can subject an employee to discharge. This includes unsatisfactory
performance and/or unsatisfactory attendance due to unexcused absences.
Unsatisfactory fitness can subject an employee to discontinuance.
 Operator failed to properly follow SP-2316- Line 2 Windup Operation10
 Sleeping- the act of sleeping during work time either on the job assignment or
away from it. Casual dozing during work time is also not allowed and, if
observed, will be handled as a performance/safety problem through use of the
Development Procedure. Repeat violations of this standard (casual dozing) 15
could eventually result in discharge through continued unsatisfactory
performance.
(Jt. Exh. 1-A, p. 2.) These reasons were taken verbatim from the SAM D-5 discussed above.
The “SP-2316- Line 2 Windup Operation” refers to the standard practice/procedure for operating 20
the equipment used in the operation, a part of which is the “Roll Doffing Cycle.” The Site
Review Presentation includes a detailed description, with illustration, of the steps involved in the
roll doffing cycle, including the TLCT or lockout procedure required towards the end of the
cycle. It also includes a chronology of the incident leading to Lewis’ discharge and an overview
of Lewis’ 2012 work performance (consisting of a summary of his development/discipline 25
progression from April 2012 to the problem stage in November 2012 and an unsatisfactory
performance rating in October 2012). (Tr. 30–31; Jt. Exh. 1-A.)
There is no dispute regarding the incident leading to Lewis’ site review. In summary,
after Lewis successfully completed an 8-hour shift on December 9, 2012, he volunteered to work 30
an additional 8 hours on the next shift. During this second shift, he fell asleep several times.
The second time that he fell asleep, he was awakened by a series of bells, and prematurely
engaged what is called a hot knife, which fired into a full mill roll of product (Tyvek) too soon.
This error caused the machine to go into “sheet break,” or rather, to continue to make sheet (or
product) and create wasted product.5 Although Lewis did not recall, the report states that 35
managers and employees observed him falling asleep again, in a chair, while other employees
attempted to salvage the product. (Tr. 76, 102–106; Jt. Exh. 1-A, pp. 8–9.)
There is, however, some relevant dispute as to the reasons for Lewis’ discharge. Irvin
testified that the site review report was not clear as to the reasons for Lewis’ termination, as it 40
contained multiple violations, including TLCT and other serious or flagrant safety

5 Normally, the operator makes sure the roll is full and ready to “doff off,” which is to oversee the process in
which the full mill roll and an empty core/roll rotate 180 degrees, so that they in effect switch sides. It is
after this rotation is complete that a hot knife fires into a sheet completing the transfer (the sheet is blown
onto the empty core/roll). Then, operator must perform the TLCT or lock out procedure. (Tr. 102–105; Jt.
Exh. 1-A.)
JD(ATL)–07–14
6
policy/procedure violations. He also testified that management never told the Union or Lewis
the reason or real reason for termination. (Tr. 32, 75–76, 86.) Harris, on the other hand, testified
that the Respondent’s performance-based reasons for discharging Lewis were made clear in the
site review report, and were two-fold: (1) he had already progressed all the way through the
development procedure to the problem phase, and “did not respond appropriately to regain 5
satisfactory performance,” and (2) he had a “culminating event,” sleeping, “and that’s when we
decided to terminate him.” (Tr. 129–130.) He asserted that Lewis was not discharged for
violating any of the flagrant, serious or other safety procedures, including the TLCT policy, and
that the Union had not raised these safety issues in the step three grievance meeting.
10
I find that Irvin’s assertion that he and the Union never knew the reasons or real reason
why Lewis was terminated is clearly inconsistent with the site review report, if not somewhat
disingenuous. Based on my review of this report, and no other evidence to the contrary, I find
the Respondent accepted the area’s recommendation to terminate Lewis because of his continued
progressive discipline and the final sleeping incident (causing the sheet break error). (Tr. 106–15
107, 110; Jt. Exh. 1-A.) The second page of the report sets forth two main “Discharge Reasons,”
as set forth above. As shown, Lewis’ failure to follow the SP-2316- Line 2 Windup Procedure is
a sub-bullet/paragraph underneath the primary reason for discharge- “[f]ailure to meet standards
of performance on a continuing and satisfactory basis can subject an employee to discharge . . .
[including] unsatisfactory performance and/or unsatisfactory attendance . . .” Thus, the failure 20
to properly follow the standard procedure for the windup operation is cited as a continued
performance reason. The second discharge reason, also taken verbatim from the SAM D-5, is
“[s]leeping.” Even though the sleeping violation states that, “[c]asual dozing…if observed, will
be handled as a performance [or] safety problem through use of the Development Procedure,” a
review of the site review report in its entirety supports the Respondent’s view, and Harris’ 25
testimony, regarding the reasons for termination. This is quite evident by the inclusion of Lewis’
progressive discipline/development through the problem stage.
I credit Harris’ testimony that in the past, when an employee has been disciplined for a
flagrant safety or TLCT violation, it is specifically referenced as such, along with that portion of 30
the SAM D-5.6 Irvin did not refute this point. Here, the site review does not include or even
reference a flagrant or other safety violation, or TLCT infraction, as a reason for termination.
The background description of the TLCT/lock out procedure as one of the steps in the doffing
cycle, and the undisputed testimony that the overall standard practice/procedure for the windup
operation implicitly involves safety, does not support Irvin’s testimony (or Union’s belief) that a 35
safety violation was a basis for Lewis’ discharge. Harris’ testimony is consistent with the
chronology of events in the site review, showing that Lewis had not even reached the
TLCT/lockout requirement stage of the doffing cycle when he prematurely initiated the hot knife
and sheet break. (R. Exh. 1, Jt. Exh. 1-A, pp. 4–9.) Moreover, the formal grievance reflects that
the Union was fully aware that Lewis was in the problem stage at the time of the site review, and 40
had been discharged for sleeping. The grievance only references Lewis’ falling asleep on the job
and progressive discipline to the problem stage. It does not mention safety violations or reflect

6
Although I found Harris to be somewhat evasive when he testified about the Company’s practices (or lack
thereof) for supervisory discipline, and disagreed with his opinion that falling asleep at or near moving
machinery would not pose a safety threat, his testimony regarding the Company’s reasons for termination
are overwhelmingly supported by the evidence.
JD(ATL)–07–14
7
any confusion it may have had about the reasons for Lewis’ discharge. (Jt. Exh. 1-B.)
Accordingly, I find the Respondent terminated him because of his continued performance
problems and the sleeping incident which caused the sheet break, and not because of safety
concerns.
5
E. Lewis Discharge Grievance and the Union’s Initial February 27 Information Request
On January 8, 2013, the Union filed a formal grievance over Lewis’ discharge. Plant
Manager Internicola denied the grievance on January 11. On January 28, Grievance Chairman
Irvin notified the Respondent’s labor relations manager, Harris, that the Union intended to 10
arbitrate Lewis’ grievance. At the time of trial, Lewis’ discharge had not gone to arbitration, as
Irvin contended that the Union needed the information requested to help determine whether or
not to arbitrate (Jt. Exhs. 1-B to 1-D).
On February 27, the Union’s counsel, Henley, sent the Respondent’s counsel, Michalik, 15
an email requesting information “necessary for the Union to prepare for and present its case” in
the discharge of Lewis. Although the Union requested 11 sets of documents in its request, the
parties agree that only the requests reflected in paragraphs 6, 7, and 11 are at issue in this case.
These requests read as follows:
20
6. Beginning on January 1, 2002 and continuing to December 31, 2012, for each
employee who engaged in conduct considered by the Respondent to be a flagrant
safety violation or a violation of the sleeping policy, provide the name of the
employee, the date of the conduct, the nature of the conduct, the discipline
administered and the employee’s disciplinary status at the time of the discipline[.]25
7. Provide all information that was considered by the Respondent in making its
decision to discharge Mr. James Lewis that concerns how other employees were
treated in terms of discipline who engaged in flagrant safety violations or sleeping
violations.30
11. All documents relating to the safety violations, including site incident reports,
site reviews, and other like investigative and/or disciplinary records, committed
by the following supervisors: Lauren Ramos, Steve Sharwisky, Jim Davenport,
Kevin Saunders, and Keith Estes. These actions were committed sometime in 35
2012 or 2013.
a. Also provide the discipline, if any, and the written record of such,
administered to each of these supervisors for the actions in question.
40
b. Also provide the written policy from the SAMS Manual regarding
TLCT’s that [were] in effect from 1/1/12 through the present. If there is a
separate policy regarding TLCT’s that you allege applies to supervision during
that time period, please provide a copy of that policy and the date (including the
written record) of when it [went] into effect.45
JD(ATL)–07–14
8
Henley also asked that the information be provided by March 14, 2013, and that Michalik not
hesitate to contact him if he had any questions regarding the request. (Jt. Exh. 1-E.)
F. Henley’s March 7, 8, and 15 Emails to Michalik and Michalik’s March 18 Response
5
On March 7, via email to Michalik, Henley stated that since he had not heard back from
him (Michalik) regarding the Union’s settlement offer, he was renewing his request for
information previously sent on February 27. He also asked when he could expect to hear back
regarding the requested information. (Jt. Exh. 1-H.) On March 8, Michalik acknowledged
receipt of Henley’s March 7 email, but did not indicate when the Respondent would provide 10
responses to the information request. On March 15, Henley sent another email to Michalik
stating that while he understood the parties were discussing a possible resolution of the “James
Lewis matter,” he still expected him to provide the information requested on February 27, or he
would file a charge with the NLRB. On Monday, March 18, Michalik responded that he
understood the Respondent either had already provided information, or would be doing so on 15
March 18. (Jt. Exh. 1-H.)
G. The Respondent’s March 14 Response to the Union’s Information Request and Henley’s
March 20 Email to Michalik Explaining Relevance
20
In the meantime, on March 14, Labor Relations Manager Harris provided Grievance
Committee Chairperson Irvin, with the Respondent’s written responses (in red type next to each
par.) along with some documentation. Next to paragraphs 6 and 7, the Respondent wrote “TBD”
(to be determined). Next to paragraph 11, the Respondent wrote “Irrelevant.” It is undisputed
that Harris told Irvin that he was still gathering information regarding paragraphs 6 and 7, and 25
“that it was awful broad.” Regarding paragraph 11, Irvin testified that Harris told him, “you’re
not going to get the information, you don’t represent exempts.” Irvin testified that he responded,
“. . . it’s a comparison case; I need to see D-5. . . D-5 is very broad7; I need to find out how these
managers were treated in their site review,” in comparison to Lewis. He said that Harris told him
“[w]e’re not going to give you any information . . . we’re not going to tell you how we treat the 30
managers,” to which Irvin replied that he needed to see their site reviews so he could see “. . .
how—why their violation was less severe than Mr. Lewis’ violation . . . so could you give me
the information minus the discipline?” Harris said that the Respondent would not furnish any
supervisor records. (Tr. 46, 59.) Harris did not contradict Irvin’s version of this discussion.
35
After Henley reviewed the responses provided to Irvin, he notified Michalik by email on
March 20 that the Union disagreed with the Respondent’s position that the information relating
to certain supervisors in paragraph 11 was irrelevant. He explained that since the Respondent
acknowledged that,
40
. . . supervisors are subject to the same safety rules as employees, particularly with
regard to the serious safety violations the named supervisors in paragraph 11 are
believed to have committed . . . how the Respondent treated these employees as a

7
Here, “D-5” refers to the SAM D-5 discussed above.
JD(ATL)–07–14
9
result of those violations relates directly to how the Respondent should have
treated James Lewis.
Henley advised that the Union was still entitled to the information requested. (Jt. Exh. 1-H.)
5
H. The Respondent’s Updated March 28 Response to the Union’s Information Request and
Henley’s April 5 Email to Michalik Explaining Relevance
On March 28, Harris met and provided Irvin with updated responses to paragraphs 6, 7,
and 11. The Respondent amended its response to paragraph 6 to: “Mr. Lewis was progressed 10
through each step of the disciplinary/development policy for a variety of unacceptable
performance concerns. Comparison cases include anyone who has been involved in or put
through progressive discipline steps.” The Respondent’s amended response to paragraph 7 was,
“See response to Number 6.” It did not, however, provide any documentation responsive to
paragraphs 6 and 7. Irvin testified that upon receipt of the updated responses, he told Harris that, 15
“ . . . this is ridiculous . . . we have always gotten comparison cases in the past…you keep a
spreadsheet,” and that Harris replied, “ . . . that’s what you’ve got; that’s what I’m giving you.”
He explained that the Respondent had long maintained a spreadsheet/grid listing all discharge
and problem stage cases, the discipline status, and the reason for discipline/discharge, and had
provided the Union with this information in other grievance cases. Irvin stated that he told 20
Harris that in connection to paragraph 7, he needed to find out “what the Respondent compared
Mr. Lewis to, since [he] personally knew that they had never fired anybody for sleeping.” (Tr.
47–48, 51; Jt. Exh. 1-G.)
The Respondent expanded its previous answer to paragraph 11 to: “(Irrelevant—The 25
exempt employees listed are not part of the bargaining unit, therefore, the union does [not]
represent these employees and the case of relevancy has not been made convincingly by the
union.).” Irvin verbally reiterated that he needed the documents because these managers had
engaged in “D-5 violations,” as had Lewis. He contended that Harris asked why he (Irvin) was
bothering with the arbitration since Lewis was not a “model employee.” Irvin replied that he had 30
a duty to fairly represent Lewis, and that it was not clear in the site review “of what he was
discharged for.” (Tr. 52). Harris did not deny these March 28 discussions with Irvin concerning
paragraphs 6, 7, and 11.
On April 5, Henley emailed Michalik, renewing the Union’s request for documentation 35
responsive to paragraphs 6, 7, and 11 and explaining why they were relevant. Regarding
paragraph 7, Irvin stated that the answer was “non-responsive,” and that “[s]uch consideration of
specific comparison cases . . . is required by the Respondent’s own written procedures for
making the decision to discharge and has been a matter for which evidence has been presented
by both the Respondent and the Union in past arbitration cases.” He also asked Michalik to let 40
him know if there was no information responsive to paragraph 7. He provided a similar
explanation for paragraph 6, asking that the Respondent furnish the information even if it had not
been in Lewis’ case. Henley stated that the requests in paragraph 11 were relevant to compare
how the supervisors, who were subject to the same safety rules as unit employees, had been
treated for committing safety violations similar to the one allegedly committed by Lewis. (Jt. 45
Exh. 1-I.)
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I. The Respondent’s September 23 Response to the Union’s February 27 Request
The Respondent did not provide any additional responses or information until September
23, when Harris left a package of documents for Irvin, generally marked as responses to requests 5
6 and 7. (Tr. 53.) This package included four site reviews; however, Irvin testified that this was
not a complete response in that the Union had requested “all” comparison cases from 2002
through 2013. Irvin asserted that he knew there were many more cases which were potentially
responsive to the paragraphs 6 and 7 because he had processed all of the proposed discharge
cases in the last 5 years. I credit Irvin’s testimony in this regard. Although Harris established his 10
own search criteria as described below, he did not refute Irvin’s estimate of the number of cases
processed, or otherwise claim that the four site reviews were completely responsive to the
requests. (Tr. 54, 57.)
Instead, Harris testified that he found the four comparative site reviews submitted in 15
response to paragraphs 6 and 7 by searching his site review files from 2008 to the present for “all
cases of either progressive discipline, which a unit employee was progressed all the way through
every step of the development procedure [from the pre-problem stage through discharge], or in
the case of where a unit employee was taken for site review for sleeping.” He did not include
cases resulting in settlements, and excluded incidents which did not result in a site review or a 20
lesser form of discipline. Although he recalled telling Irvin these requests were too broad,
neither he nor Michalik requested that the Union narrow the scope or timeframe as he (Harris)
had sometimes done in the past. (Tr. 45.) He also confirmed that the Union never agreed to
limit the scope or timeframe of the information requests, and that he gave the Union what “[he]
thought was relevant.” 8 (Tr. 126–128, 138–140.) 25
Irvin testified that paragraphs 6 and 7 pertained to “very relevant” comparative
information that the Respondent typically provided, and was actually supposed to consider
before discharging anyone. He claimed this information would assist the Union in determining
whether to “arbitrate or not.” It is undisputed that the Respondent never asked for any 30
clarification, indicated any confusion or requested any extended period of time regarding these
requests.
Regarding paragraph 11, Irvin testified that pursuant to the site review, Lewis “was
discharged for violating the standard practice procedure, which involved safety implications35
. . . [t]here’s one set of safety standards for the whole plant site, and we knew that these
managers had . . . recently violated the TLCT policy” which could lead to a SAM D-5 discharge.
He asserted that the Union had attempted to limit their information request to what they
considered to be serious safety or sleeping policy violations which might result in a SAM D-5
automatic discharge. (Tr. 62.) He further testified that in late July or August of 2012, the 40
supervisors named in paragraph 11 had engaged in “strike preparation training,” performing the

8 Irvin initially testified that he believed that the attorneys for the parties may have discussed narrowing the
time frame for the requested information from 10 to 5 years, but there is no evidence in the record that any
such discussions or agreements between the parties’ counsel took place. In addition, Irvin later admitted
that he might have been confusing conversations between the parties’ counsel in this case with another
case. (Tr. 45, 55, 58) .
JD(ATL)–07–14
11
same work as unit employees, i.e., operating the same machinery pursuant to the “exact standard
practices.” He learned the names of these supervisors from unit employees who had actually
witnessed their TLCT violations (e.g., failing to lock equipment), and obtained additional
information through SI reports and shift “rackup” meetings. He knew these supervisors had not
been terminated since they continued to work at the Spruance Plant. (Tr. 35–39, 40–42, 82.) 5
Harris did not attempt to search any files for supervisors. Harris maintained this information was
not relevant to a unit employee’s grievance, but acknowledged that some managers had
performed unit work for strike preparation sometime in the summer of 2012. He said they were
not disciplined to his knowledge, but did not deny that they were sent for site review for
violating the TLCT policy (Tr. 132). 10
III. Discussion And Analysis9
A. Legal Standards
15
It is well established that an employer has a statutory obligation to provide requested
information to a union that is potentially relevant in fulfilling the union’s responsibility as the
employees’ bargaining representative, including its responsibilities regarding the processing of
grievances and arbitrations. NLRB v. Truitt, Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v. Acme
Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–436, 438 (1967). Generally, information concerning wages, 20
hours, and terms and conditions of employment for unit employees is presumptively relevant to
the union’s role as exclusive collective-bargaining representative, and must be provided. See
Southern California Gas Co., 344 NLRB 231, 235 (2005); Curtis-Wright Corp., 145 NLRB 152
(1963), enfd. 347 F. 2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965). Presumptively relevant information sought by a union
also includes information regarding discipline of bargaining unit employees. Dish Network 25
Service Corp., 339 NLRB 1126, 1134 (2003) (citing Booth Newspapers, Inc., 331 NLRB 296,
299–300 (2000).
By contrast, requests for information concerning employees outside the bargaining unit,
such as supervisors, are not presumptively relevant. Thus, the union bears the burden of 30
establishing relevance. United States Testing, 324 NLRB 854, 859 (1997), enfd. 160 F.3d 14
(D.C. Cir. 1998); Reiss Viking, 312 NLRB 622, 625 (1993); Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp.,
315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994); Associated General Contractors, 242 NLRB 891, 894 (1979), enfd.
633 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1980). A union must offer “more than mere suspicion for it to be
entitled to the information.” See Sheraton Hartfort Hotel, 289 NLRB 463, 464 (1988). 35

9 In its answer, the Company raised the affirmative defense that the Board, the Regional Director, and the
administrative law judge lacked the authority to proceed in this case because the Board lacked a quorum
required by the NLRA. The Board has acknowledged the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit’s conclusion that the President’s recess appointments to the Board were not valid. See
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (petition for certiorari filed April 25, 2013).
However, the Board has noted that same Court’s acknowledgement that its decision was in conflict with
rulings of at least three other courts of appeals. See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied 544 U.S 942 (2005); U. S. v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Allocco, 305 F.2d
704 (2d Cir. 1962). In addition, the Board has determined that while the question regarding the validity of
the recess appointments remains in litigation, and is pending a definitive resolution, it will continue to
fulfill its responsibilities under the Act. See Bloomingdale, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 113 (2013); ORNI 8, LLC,
359 NLRB No. 87 (2013). Accordingly, I reject this affirmative defense.
JD(ATL)–07–14
12
However, the “[t]he Board uses a broad, discovery-type standard in determining relevance in
information requests.” Shoppers Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB at 259; NLRB v. Acme Industrial
Co., supra at 437; United States Testing, supra; Postal Service, 310 NLRB 391, 394 (1993). In
this regard, the Board does not rule on the merits, and the union is not required to demonstrate
that information is accurate, not hearsay, or even, ultimately reliable. Postal Service, 337 NLRB 5
820, 822 (2002). Therefore, the information requested must have some bearing on the issue
between the parties, but does not have to be dispositive. Disneyland Park, 350 NLRB 1256,
1257 (2007); Postal Service, supra. When information about supervisory personnel is requested,
a union must communicate the reason for the relevance of that information to the employer,
unless the relevancy is apparent. Disneyland Park, supra. 10
An unreasonable delay in furnishing such information is as much of a violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as a refusal to provide the information. Monmouth Care Center, 354
NLRB 11, 51 (2009), reaffirmed and incorporated by reference, 356 NLRB No. 29 (2010), enfd.
672 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2012). It is well established that the duty to furnish requested 15
information cannot be defined in terms of a per se rule. Good Life Beverage Co., 312 NLRB
1060, 1062 fn. 9 (1993). Rather, what is required is a reasonable good-faith effort to respond to
the request “as promptly as circumstances allow.” Id. See also Woodland Clinic, 331 NLRB
735, 737 (2000). In evaluating the promptness of an employer’s response, the Board considers
the complexity and extent of the information sought, its availability, and the difficulty in 20
retrieving the information. West Penn Power Co., 339 NLRB 585, 587 (2003), citing Samaritan
Medical Center, 319 NLRB 392, 398 (1995), enfd. in relevant part 394 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 2005).
B. Respondent Violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act in Failing to Provide Complete
Information Responsive to Paragraphs 6 and 7 25
I find that the information sought by the Union in paragraphs 6 and 7 involving
disciplinary records for bargaining unit employees was in furtherance of its representative role in
the grievance of Lewis, and was therefore presumptively relevant to its legal responsibilities
associated with that role. See Postal Service, 332 NLRB at 635. The Union has no burden to 30
show relevance, and the Respondent has an obligation to provide complete responses to
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Union’s February 27 requests. The Union requested information
regarding other bargaining unit employees who, from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2012,
had engaged in conduct considered to be a flagrant safety policy or sleeping policy violation.
Paragraph 6 also requested the nature of the conduct, the discipline administered and the 35
employee’s disciplinary status. On March 28, the Respondent noted since Lewis had been
“progressed through each step of the disciplinary/developmental policy for a variety of
unacceptable performance concerns,” comparison cases included those in which a unit employee
had “been involved in” or “put through progressive discipline steps.” (Jt. Exh. 1-G). I find that
the Respondent’s definition of what should be relevant would include (and should have included) 40
the information about bargaining unit employees which the Union requested in paragraphs 6 and
7. When the Respondent finally provided the four site review packages on September 23, they
were not fully responsive to the Union’s requests. In fact, Harris’ testimony reflects that he
further limited the Respondent’s responses from cases in which unit employees had been
“involved in or [emphasis added] put through progressive discipline steps,” to just those cases in 45
which employees had progressed through every stage of the process (pre-problem to discharge)
JD(ATL)–07–14
13
and/or had been taken to site review for sleeping. There is no evidence in the verbal exchanges
between Irvin and Harris, or the email exchanges between the parties’ attorneys, that the
Respondent ever expressed any misunderstanding about, or requested clarification of or raised
objections to, the scope of the requests or relevancy of flagrant safety violations.
5
The Respondent now argues that the Union’s requests in paragraphs 6 and 7 are overly
broad and not reasonably necessary to process Lewis’ arbitration because Lewis was not
terminated for violating any flagrant or other safety procedures. I do not accept these arguments
regarding bargaining unit employees. First, I agree with the General Counsel that these
objections are untimely, given that the Respondent had not, in the seven months between the 10
initial request and the trial, raised them or requested that the Union narrow the scope or time
frame for its requests. It is well settled that an employer has an obligation to seek clarification of
an ambiguous or overbroad request. Keauhou Beach Hotel, 298 NLRB 702, 702 (1990).
Further, to the extent that the Respondent never voiced these objections prior to the trial, they
were not timely raised so as to allow the Union an opportunity to modify its requests or seek the 15
information through other documents. See Pulaski Construction Co., 345 NLRB 931, 937–938
(2005) (the respondent had the obligation to raise and discuss with the union any arguments that
a request was burdensome or raised confidentiality concerns).
In its brief, the Respondent has relied on Equitable Gas Co., 227 NLRB 800, 802 (1977) 20
and Pfizer, Inc., 268 NLRB 916, 919 (1984), to show lack of relevance. I find this reliance is
misplaced. In Equitable Gas Co., supra, the Board found the Union was not entitled to absentee
records for all bargaining unit employees because they were totally unrelated to its representative
role. The grievant’s suspension in that case was based on “willful misconduct” in calling in sick
after being denied vacation leave, and not because of his absenteeism record. Further, the Board 25
in that case allowed the rather broad request for absentee records of unit employees in another
grievance about chronic absenteeism. Here, Lewis was terminated for his progression through
the development stages and falling asleep while performing his job. The Respondent admits in
this case that it considers prior discipline of bargaining unit employees who commit acts of
serious misconduct, and the Union explained that it needed these records to compare cases of 30
other bargaining unit employees. In Pfizer, Inc., supra, the question before the Board was
whether information requested of employees in another bargaining unit was relevant, and thus
the union had a greater relevance burden than in this case. Nevertheless, this case turned on an
information request related to bargaining unit employees, who worked side by side, under the
same broad rules of conduct and progressive discipline, regardless of which union represented 35
them. In addition, the Respondent here, unlike the employers in Equitable Gas Co., supra, and
Pfizer, Inc., supra, never raised this objection to the Union.
Moreover, for the reasons stated above, I find the Respondent should have provided the
requested information for the time period requested. Consequently, I find the Respondent40
violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act when it failed to provide full, complete responses to
the presumptively relevant requests for information in 6 and 7.
JD(ATL)–07–14
14
C. The Respondent Violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act in its Unreasonably Delay
In Providing Information Responsive To Paragraphs 6 & 7
I find the Respondent’s delay of almost seven months in providing documentation 5
responding to the Union’s inquiry in paragraphs 6, 7 is an independent violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. As stated, an employer is required to furnish relevant information,
requested by a Union, in a timely fashion. Overnight Transportation Co., 330 NLRB 1275
(2000); Monmouth Care Center, supra at 354. In the instant case, the Respondent failed to
provide any explanation or argument to justify an almost seven month delay, as discussed above. 10
Harris did testify that he did not search for any documents before 2008 because “he ran out of
time,” but there is no evidence whatsoever to support his claim. He had almost seven months,
and never once actually requested an extension of time. (Tr. 140.) In fact, the Respondent
never requested any kind of accommodation or narrowing of the scope of the request. The
burden of formulating a reasonable accommodation is on the employer. United States Testing 15
Co. v. NLRB, supra at 21. As discussed above, on May 28, the Respondent only provided its
determination of what a relevant response would be; it failed to provide any documentation.
Finally, after almost seven months, the Respondent provided incomplete/insufficient responses.
In this regard, the Board has found delays of 5 weeks and 2 months to be excessive. See Postal
Service, 308 NLRB 547, 550 (1992), Postal Service, 310 NLRB 530, 536 (1993). And, as the 20
General Counsel points out, the delay in this case far exceeds the one-month delay that the Board
found reasonable in Woodland Clinic, 331 NLRB 735, 737 (2000). Furthermore, I reject the
Respondent’s argument that the Union suffered no harm from delay because of its own delay in
filing the grievance and arbitration notice.
25
D. The Respondent Violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act in Failing to Provide and
Delaying Providing Information Responsive to Paragraph 11(b)
The first sentence in paragraph 11(b) requested the written policy from the SAMS
Manual “regarding TLCT’s that [were] in effect from 1/1/12 through the present.” The Union 30
also asked the Respondent to provide any separate policy, if any, regarding TLCT’s that applies
to supervision during that time period, which will be addressed below. The first part of
paragraph 11(b) pertains to the SAMS Manual policies governing bargaining unit employees,
and is presumptively relevant. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Respondent provided
the requested information responsive to this request, denied having it or requested clarification so 35
as to allow the Union an opportunity to modify its request. Therefore, for the same reasons set
forth in sections B and C of this decision, I find the Respondent violated the Act when it failed to
respond to paragraph 11 (b) relating to unit members.
E. The Respondent Did Not Violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act When it Failed 40
to Provide Information relating to Supervisors in Paragraph 11
The General Counsel asserts that the Union ‘s request for information about supervisor
discipline and violation of safety policies is relevant because Lewis was terminated for violating
the same safety policies as those violated by the named supervisors, particularly the TLCT 45
JD(ATL)–07–14
15
policy. The Respondent argues that such information is not relevant because the Union does not
represent supervisors, and further, because Lewis was not discharged for violating any safety
policies. I have already decided that the General Counsel has failed to show that Lewis was
terminated for safety violations. My finding (as to why Lewis was discharged) is especially
germane to the Union’s burden to establish the relevancy of supervisory information requests. 5
As set forth above, the Union has a burden to show relevancy in this case. Further, the
Board has consistently held that an employer has an obligation to provide information regarding
disparate treatment between unit employees and supervisory personnel when the union has
shown that the two groups were subject to a common rule or prohibition and has shown a 10
reasonable belief of the disparate treatment based on objective evidence. Postal Service, 332
NLRB 635, 635 (2000). The Board has also rejected arguments by employers that supervisory
disciplinary information is generally irrelevant because supervisors and unit employees are not
subject to the same disciplinary criteria. See Postal Service, 289 NLRB 942, supra.
15
The General Counsel relies on several cases to show that the Union has established the
relevance of information concerning the Respondent’s supervisors who violated its safety policy.
However, these cases are easily distinguishable in that they required a showing that the
supervisors violated the same or common rule as the unit employees. In Postal Service, 289
NLRB 942, 934 (1988), the Board concluded that the Union was entitled to disciplinary records 20
of supervisors who had violated the same gambling prohibition which applied equally to
supervisors and unit employees. Similarly, in Postal Service, 332 NLRB 635, supra, the Board
held that the Union established relevance of information requests pertaining to a supervisor’s
discipline under an attendance policy applicable to supervisors and unit employees. In E.I. du
Pont & Co., 346 NLRB 553, 553 (2006), the Board found that the union’s information request 25
regarding supervisor discipline was relevant where the supervisor, involved in an altercation with
the unit employee, was subjected to an investigation pursuant to the employer’s “People
Treatment” policy because the policy applied to both supervisors and unit employees. Id at 583.
See also Postal Service, 309 NLRB 309, 312 (1992) (relevancy found where supervisor and
employee violated the “same” falsification of documents prohibitions applicable to both); Postal 30
Service, 332 NLRB 635 at 646 (relevancy found where a supervisor violated the same attendance
policies applicable to unit and supervisory personnel). The common thread in these cases was
that the supervisors and unit employees were not only subject to a common rule or prohibition,
but that the unit employees were actually disciplined for violating the same or common rule as
the supervisors. Even if the Union in this case shows sufficient objective evidence that the 35
named supervisors possibly violated the TLCT safety policy or other flagrant safety policies
applicable to supervisors and unit members at the Spruance Plant (and were not disciplined or
terminated), it has not shown that Lewis was discharged for violating a safety policy, including
the TLCT procedure.10 It is not enough that the named supervisors violated (or may have
violated) one of Respondent’s policies applicable to both supervisors and bargaining unit 40
employees, nor is it enough that Lewis violated a policy or procedure which tangentially

10 It is not relevant at this point, but I will note that the Union’s belief (contrary to the Company’s argument)
that the named supervisors in par. 11 had violated the TLCT/lock out policy was supported by undisputed
objective evidence (contrary to the Company’s argument) that unit employees had witnessed the
supervisor’s alleged misconduct. See Postal Service, 332 NLRB 635, supra (where this type of objective,
hearsay evidence was sufficient).
JD(ATL)–07–14
16
involved safety. Therefore, the General Counsel has failed to establish that the Union’s requests
for information regarding supervisors in paragraph 11 were relevant (i.e., that Lewis and the
named supervisors engaged in similar conduct in violation of the same or common
rule/prohibition).
5
Consequently, I find that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) when it
refused to provide information pertaining to the supervisors in response to paragraph 11 of the
Union’s February 27, 2013 requests, and recommend that the complaint charges relating to this
allegation be dismissed.
10
Since the General Counsel has not met the relevancy standard required for supervisory
information requests, it is unnecessary to address other arguments presented by the Respondent
regarding its refusal to provide documents pertaining to supervisors.
Conclusions of Law15
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 20
3. The Respondent has committed an unfair labor practice in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to fully furnish the relevant information to the
Union in its February 27, 2013 information requests, paragraphs 6 and 7 and part of paragraph
11(b) pertaining to the SAM D-5 for bargaining unit employees.25
4. The Respondent has committed an unfair labor practice in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by delaying and refusing to promptly provide the relevant information
to the Union in its February 27, 2013 request for information, paragraphs 6 and 7 and part of
paragraph 11(b) pertaining to the SAM D-5 for bargaining unit employees. 30
5. The Respondent has not committed an unfair labor practice in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to furnish information requested by the
Union in its February 27, 2013 request for information, paragraph 11 pertaining to supervisory
personnel. 35
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate 40
the policies of the Act. In particular, I recommend that Respondent shall cease and desist from
refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with the Ampthill Rayon Workers Union, Inc.,
Local 992, International Brotherhood of Dupont Workers (Union) by refusing to provide the
information it needs to represent unit employees. Additionally I recommend that the Respondent
immediately supply the Union with all information requested in the Unions information requests 45
dated February 27, paragraphs 6, 7 and 11(b) pertaining to bargaining unit employees and which
JD(ATL)–07–14
17
is necessary for the Union to perform its responsibilities as the bargaining representative for unit
employees.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended115
ORDER
The Respondent, E.I. du Pont De Nemours and Company, Richmond, Virginia, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 10
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with Ampthill Rayon
Workers Union, Inc., Local 992, International Brotherhood of Dupont Workers (the Union) by 15
refusing to provide the presumptively relevant information it needs to represent bargaining unit
employees.
(b) Refusing to furnish the information to the Union of all of the information
in the Union’s February 27 requests, paragraphs 6, 7 and 11 (b) pertaining to bargaining unit 20
employees.
(c) Refusing to promptly and without delay to furnish all of the information in
the Union’s February 27 requests, paragraphs 6, 7, and 11 (b) pertaining to bargaining unit
employees. 25
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the 30
Act.
(a) Promptly furnish the Union with the full information it requested on
February 27, 2013 in paragraphs 6, 7, and 11(b) pertaining only to bargaining unit employees.
35
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of the Administrative Law Judge’s Order, what steps have been taken to comply with
the Order.

11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(ATL)–07–14
18
(c) Within 14 days after service by Region 5, post at the Spruance Plant in
Richmond, Virginia, a copy of the attached notice marked “Appendix.” 12 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 5, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily 5
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these 10
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
February 27, 2013.
15
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director
a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges 20
violations of the Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, DC February 20, 2014
25
_________________________________
Donna N. Dawson
Administrative Law Judge30

12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading
“Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.”
JD(ATL)–07–14
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Ampthill Rayon Workers, Inc., Local 992,
International Brotherhood of Dupont Workers by refusing to furnish it or delaying in furnishing
it with information it requests such as that contained in its February requests, paragraphs 6, 7 and
11 (b), pertaining to bargaining unit employees, about the termination of James Lewis.
WE WILL furnish Ampthill Rayon Workers, Inc., Local 992, International Brotherhood Of
Dupont Workers with the information it requested in paragraphs 6, 7, and 11 (b) of its February
27, 2013 request pertaining to bargaining unit employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated_________________________ By______________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
Bank of America Center, Tower II; 100 S. Charles St., Ste. 600; Baltimore, MD 21201
(410) 962-2822, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE THIS NOTICE MUST
REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING
THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (410-962-2864).