Eastwood Nealley Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 1, 1968

169 N.L.R.B. 604 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

604 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Eastwood Nealley Company' and Robert Hearn and
Edward Worley and Local 999, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America.2 Case
22-RD-233
February 1, 1968
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF
ELECTION
By CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND ZAGORIA
Upon a decertification petition duly filed under
Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, a hearing was held before Hearing Of-
ficer James F. Brady. The Joint-Petitioners and the
Union filed briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the Hearing Officer's
rulings made at the hearing and finds that they are
free from prejudicial error. They are hereby af-
firmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, including the
briefs filed herein, the Board finds:
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act and it will effectuate the pol-
icies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.
2. The Joint-Petitioners, employees of the Em-
ployer, assert that the Union, which is the currently
recognized bargaining representative of the em-
ployees involved herein, is no longer their repre-
sentative as defined in Section 9(a) of the Act.
3. The Joint-Petitioners seek a decertification
election in a unit of the Employer's wire weavers
and apprentices at its Belleville, New Jersey, plant.
The Union and the Employer contend that a
memorandum of agreement, handwritten notes, and
their former contract, taken together, constitute a
contract which bars a present determination of
representatives. We find no merit in this contention.
The Employer and Union entered into a contract
covering the employees involved herein, effective
September 23, 1964. By its termination clause, it
was to remain in effect until September 23, 1967,
and "continue in full force and effect from year to
year thereafter unless written notice ... of a desire
to cancel or terminate the agreement is served by
either party upon the other at least sixty (60) days
prior to date of expiration."
On June 12, 1967, the Union wrote the Employer
stating that it wished "to sit down with the Com-
pany in view of amending the contract ... expiring
on September 23, 1967." Thereafter, the parties, en-
gaged in negotiations, which concluded at 4 a.m. on
September 23. The Union submitted into evidence
signed handwritten notes of these sessions. Later in
the day of September 23, the Union held a meeting
at which the Employer's contract proposals were
read to the employees, who voted to request the
Employer to negotiate further. Subsequently, the
Union requested the Employer to reopen negotia-
tions, but the Employer replied that it had made its
final offer.
On September 26, 1967, the parties signed a
memorandum of agreement, and the next day the
Joint-Petitioners filed their petition herein.
The memorandum of agreement does not on its
face expressly reaffirm or incorporate by reference
the handwritten notes of September 23 or the
1964-67 contract, or any portions thereof. It, there-
fore, cannot be considered as a part of any overall
collective-bargaining agreement incorporating the
three documents.3 Moreover, the memorandum
does not on its face purport to be, and there is no
contention that it is, in itself, a complete contract,
and it contains no expiration date.4 It, therefore,
can not by itself constitute a bar to the petition.
With respect to the handwritten notes, we find
that these notes, independently or in conjunction
with the other documents, may not serve as a bar.
Although the notes contain an expiration date,
signatures of the negotiators, and a statement that
they represent changes in the former contract, their
provisions are unintelligible, and we are therefore
unable to determine in what manner the former con-
tract was changed, and what terms and conditions
of employment were agreed to. For instance,
although the notes contain the phrases "disciplinary
procedure" and "severance pay," they do not con-
tain any terms relating to such procedure or pay;
and although they contain figures which seem to
represent wage rates, we are unable to determine
which of several different figures represent the
parties' final agreement. Appearing randomly in the
notes are symbols, phrases,-and crossed-out words.
Although the initials of the negotiators appear in
several places, it is impossible to determine to what,
if any, specific term the initials indicate agreement.
Accordingly, we are unable to find that the hand-
written notes, together with the old contract, con-
tain sufficiently specific terms and conditions of
employment to constitute a bar.5 As the notes alone
do not purport to be a complete collective-bargain-
The name of the Employer appears as amended at the hearing.
2 Local 999, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, hereinafter called the Union,
was permitted to intervene on the basis of its contract interest in the em-
ployees involved.
3 See Victor Manufacturing & Gasket Company, 133 NLRB 1283.
4 Pacific Coast Association of Pulp and Paper Manufacturers, 121
NLRB 990, 993.
5 Appalachian Shale Products Co., 121 N1L.RB 1160.
169 NLRB No. 95
EASTWOOD NEALLEY COMPANY 605
ing agreement, they cannot independently con-
stitute a contract bar.
As the petition was filed after the expiration of
the 1964-67 contract, that contract, alone, cannot
serve as a bar. We, therefore, find that the former
contract, handwritten notes, and memorandum,
considered together or separately, do not constitute
a bar to the decertification petition.6
Accordingly, we find that a question affecting
commerce exists concerning the representation of
employees of the Employer within the meaning of
Section 9(c)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The parties stipulated, and we find, that the
following employees constitute a unit appropriate
for collective-bargaining purposes within the mean-
ing of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All wire weavers and apprentices, excluding of-
fice clerical employees, professional employees,
salesmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the
Act and all other employees.
[Direction of Election 7 omitted from publica-
tion. )
In view of this finding , it is unnecessary to make any determination re-
garding the additional reasons asserted by the Joint-Petitioners for not
finding a contract bar in this case
9 An election eligibility list, containing the names and addresses of all
the eligible voters, must be filed by the Employer with the Regional
Director for Region 22 within 7 days after the date of this Decision and
Direction of Election. The Regional Director shall make the list available
to all parties to the election . No extension of time to file this list shall be
granted by the Regional Director except in extraordinary circumstances.
Failure to comply with this requirement shall be grounds for setting aside
the election whenever proper objections are filed. Excelsior Underwear
Inc., 156 NLRB 1236