Early Warning Services, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 31, 2020

2020000740 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/949,416 11/23/2015 Ravi Loganathan 090850-003910US-0962393 4602
20350 7590 08/31/2020
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
CHEIN, ALLEN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3687
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RAVI LOGANATHAN, RONALD SCOTT ALCORN,
JIE HE, STEVE FLEMING, and JEFF PARENT
____________

Appeal 2020-000740
Application 14/949,416
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, JOHN A. EVANS, and CATHERINE
SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jurisdiction
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s non-final rejection of Claims 13 and 15–18, all pending claims.
Appeal Br. 3. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant states the real party in interest is Early
Warning Services, LLC. Appeal Br. 3.
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We AFFIRM.2
Summary of the Invention
The claims relate to a method of fraud detection. See Abstract.
Invention
Claim 13 is independent. Claims App. An understanding of the
invention can be derived from a reading of Claim 13, which is reproduced in
Table 1, infra.
References
Name Publication Number Date
Moorman US 2008/0086409 A1 Apr. 10, 2008
Hodgin US 2011/0191219 A1 Aug 4, 2011
Baker US 2011/0270744 A1 Nov. 3, 2011
Nigel Morris-Cotterill, “Think Again Money Laundering,”
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/19/think-again-money-laundering/
(“Morris”).
U.S. Bank Routing Number Database (5/9/2013),
https://web.archive.Org/web/20130509032229/http://data-lists.com/bank-
routing-number-database/ (“Routing Number Database”).

2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief (filed June 25, 2019, “Appeal Br.”), the Reply Brief
(filed November 4, 2019, “Reply Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer (mailed
September 5, 2019, “Ans.”), the Non-Final Action (mailed January 30, 2019,
“Non-Final Act.”), and the Specification (filed November 23, 2015, “Spec.”)
for their respective details.
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HSBC, “Drug Money and Terrorist Laundering,”
https://web.archive.org/web/20130313093741/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
HSBC (“HSBC”).

Rejections3
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis
13–184 101 Subject Matter Eligibility
Non-Final Act. 3–6.
13, 15–175 103(a),
Obviousness

Moorman, Morris, Routing
Number Database, Hodgin,
HSBC. Non-Final Act. 7–14.
18 103 Moorman, Morris, Routing
Number Database, Hodgin,
Baker. Non-Final Act. 14–15.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 13 and 15–18 in light of
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this
Decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any
other arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in
the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We
provide the following explanation to highlight and address specific

3 The Application was examined under the AIA first inventor to file
provisions. Non-Final Act. 2.
4 The header of the rejection refers to Claim 14 the merits of which we do
not reach as it was previously cancelled.
5 Claims 15 and 16 are not mentioned in the header of the rejection, but are
discussed in the body thereof.
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arguments and findings primarily for emphasis. We consider Appellant’s
arguments as they are presented in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief.
CLAIMS 13 AND 15–18: INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant argues the merits of the claims as a group with reference to
the limitations of Claim 13. Appeal Br. 4, 7. Therefore, we decide the
appeal of the § 101 rejection on the basis of illustrative Claim 13 and refer to
the rejected claims collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
We reviewed the record de novo. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Whether a claim is drawn
to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law that we review de novo.”).
Based upon our review of the record in light of recent policy guidance with
respect to patent-eligible subject matter rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101,6
we affirm the rejection of Claims 13 and 15–18 for the specific reasons
discussed below. Appellant argues: “the Office Action improperly
commingles the steps of the Alice analysis to arrive at its conclusion, and
uses incorrect standards for patent eligibility.” Appeal Br. 4. Our analysis,
below, based upon the cited Guidance, renders Appellant’s argument moot.
35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 provides that a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new

6 See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). “All USPTO personnel are, as a
matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.”
Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1 (October 2019 Update: Subject
Matter Eligibility) (hereinafter “October 2019 Update”).
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and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has
long recognized, however, that § 101 implicitly excludes “[l]aws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from the realm of patent-eligible
subject matter, as monopolization of these “basic tools of scientific and
technological work” would stifle the very innovation that the patent system
aims to promote. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–78 (2012); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185
(1981).
Under the mandatory Revised Guidance, we reconsider whether
Appellant’s claims recite:
1. any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas
(i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes), and
2. additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim, (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then reach the
issue of whether the claim:
3. adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
4. simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
A. Whether the claims recite a judicial exception
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The Revised Guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts
identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract-idea
exception includes the following groupings of subject matter:
(a) mathematical concepts,7 i.e., mathematical relationships, mathematical
formulas, equations,8 and mathematical calculations9; (b) certain methods of
organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices
(including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business
relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions)10; and (c) mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).11

7 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“The concept of hedging . . .
reduced to a mathematical formula . . . is an unpatentable abstract
idea . . . .”).
8 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“A mathematical formula as such is not accorded
the protection of our patent laws . . . .”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594
(1978) (“[T]he discovery of [a mathematical formula] cannot support a
patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”).
9 SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(holding that claims to a “series of mathematical calculations based on
selected information” are directed to abstract ideas).
10 Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20 (concluding that use of a third party to mediate
settlement risk is a “fundamental economic practice” and thus an abstract
idea); see Revised Guidance, at 52 n.13 for a more extensive listing of
“[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” that have been found to be
abstract ideas.
11 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (“[M]ental processes[] and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
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The preamble of independent Claim 13 recites: “A method,
comprising.” The limitations recited in the body of the claim are analyzed in
Table I against the categories of abstract ideas as set forth in the Revised
Guidance. As set forth in Table I below, we find limitations [b]–[i] of
independent Claim 1 recite abstract ideas, i.e., “mental processes.”
Table I
Claim 1 Revised Guidance
[a]12 maintaining one or more
computerized databases holding
records of check-based financial
transactions and other information;
An additional element that adds
insignificant extra-solution activity
to the judicial exception, i.e., mere
data-gathering. See 84 Fed. Reg. at
55.
[b] identifying from the one or more
computerized databases a number of
checks that have been drawn on
U.S. subsidiaries of international
financial institutions;
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion). See
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
[c] for each of the identified checks,
identifying the owner of the account
into which the check was deposited;
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion). See
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
[d] for each of a number of
identified account owners, counting
the number of the identified checks
deposited into one or more accounts
owned by the respective identified
owner; and
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion). See
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.

technological work.” (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972))).
12 Step designators, e.g., “[a],” were added to facilitate discussion.
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[e] producing a report of the
respective number of identified
checks deposited into one or more
accounts owned by the respective
identified owners;
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed with a pen and paper.
See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
[f] wherein identifying a number of
checks that have been drawn on
U.S. subsidiaries of international
financial institutions further
comprises, for each of a number of
checks being investigated:
identifying the check drawee
financial institution from a routing
number of a respective check;
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion). See
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
[g] looking up the name of the
drawee financial institution in the
one or more computerized
databases;
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion). See
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
[h] searching the name of the
drawee financial institution for one
or more keywords indicating that
the drawee financial institution is an
international financial institution;
and
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion). See
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
[i] identifying the respective check
as having been drawn on a U.S.
subsidiary of an international
financial institution based in part on
the results of the keyword search.
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion). See
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.

Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
If the claims recite a patent-ineligible concept, as we conclude above,
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we proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) wherein the “claims are
considered in their entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quotes and citation
omitted). This test determines whether the recited judicial exception is
integrated into a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying
whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the
judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the
exception into a practical application.
Appellant argues: “the Office Action appears to assume that only
hardware elements can restrict a claim to a practical application. This
position has no basis in law.” Appeal Br. 6. Appellant further argues: “the
Office Action improperly discounts the method steps in its analysis, and that
the method steps of claim 13 limit it to a practical application of any
purported abstract idea.” Id.
Our analysis considers each claimed element, separately in Table I,
above, and the claims, as a whole, below, thus, rendering Appellant’s
argument moot.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Appellant’s claims do
not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
MPEP § 2106.05(a) “Improvements to the Functioning of a
Computer or to Any Other Technology or Technical Field”
“In determining patent eligibility, examiners should consider whether
the claim ‘purport(s) to improve the functioning of the computer itself’ or
‘any other technology or technical field.’” MPEP § 2106.05(a).
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Appellant recognizes limitations that may constitute “significantly
more” include improvements to the functioning of a computer used to
implement the claimed invention.” See Appeal Br. 5. However, Appellant
fails to direct our attention to limitations that may improve the functioning
of the implementing computer, or to any other technology. For example,
Appellant discloses:
A computer system 101 is coupled to one or more databases
102. Databases 102 may be organized in any suitable manner.
For example, all of the stored information may be considered to
be one large database 102, or the information may be
considered to be organized into a number of specialized
databases.
Spec., ¶ 17.
Although we find the individual limitations [b]–[i] are directed to
mental processes, the claims as a whole are directed to “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity,” i.e., “commercial or legal interactions []
including . . . advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors;
business relations.” See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Because, as Appellant
discloses: [e]mbodiments of the invention provide methods and systems for
analyzing information about financial transactions involving certain kinds of
accounts. Such techniques may be helpful in uncovering fraud such as
money laundering.” Spec., ¶ 14. The FairWarning court13 also noted that
the claimed rules here were unlike those in McRO because they “are the
same questions (though perhaps phrased with different words) that humans
in analogous situations detecting fraud have asked for decades, if not
centuries.” 839 F.3d. at 1094–95.

13 FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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MPEP § 2106.05(b): Particular Machine
The Bilski machine-or-transformation test is only applicable to
method (process) claims. However, “[r]egardless of what statutory category
(‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,’ 35 U.S.C.
§ 101) a claim’s language is crafted to literally invoke, we look to the
underlying invention for patent-eligibility purposes.” CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here, Claim
13, the sole independent claim, claims a method. We therefore, analyze the
machine prong of the Bilski machine-or-transformation test.
Appellant discloses generic machines and software are suitable:
a computer system 900 such as may be used, in whole, in part,
or with various modifications, to provide the functions of the
system 100.
Spec., ¶ 101.
The computer system 900 may also comprise software
elements, shown as being located within a working memory
970, including an operating system 974 and/or other code 978.
Software code 978 may be used for implementing functions of
various elements of the architecture as described herein. For
example, software stored on and/or executed by a computer
system, such as system 900, can be used in implementing the
processes. . . .
Spec., ¶ 104.
We find no indication, nor does Appellant so direct our attention, that
the claimed invention relies on non-generic devices or non-generic software.
We, therefore, conclude Appellant’s claims fail to satisfy the machine prong
of the Bilski machine-or-transformation test.
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MPEP § 2106.05(c): Particular Transformation
This section of the MPEP guides: “Another consideration when
determining . . . whether a claim recites significantly more . . . is whether the
claim effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing.” “Transformation and reduction of an article to a
different state or thing is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that
does not include particular machines.” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 658 (quoting
Benson, 409 U.S. at 70).
The claims select and analyze certain electronic data. Specifically,
Claim 13 maintains a computerized database records of check-based
financial transactions and produces a report that identifies a number of
checks that have been drawn on U.S. subsidiaries of international financial
institutions. The selection and analysis of electronic data is not a
“transformation or reduction of an article into a different state or thing
constituting patent-eligible subject matter[.]” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375
(“The mere manipulation or reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy the
transformation prong.”). Applying this guidance here, we conclude
Appellant’s method claims fail to satisfy the transformation prong of the
Bilski machine-or-transformation test.
MPEP § 2106.05(e): Other Meaningful Limitations
This section of the MPEP guides:
Diamond v. Diehr provides an example of a claim that recited
meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment.
450 U.S. 175 . . . (1981). In Diehr, the claim was directed to
the use of the Arrhenius equation (an abstract idea or law of
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nature) in an automated process for operating a rubber-molding
press. 450 U.S. at 177-78 . . . . The Court evaluated additional
elements such as the steps of installing rubber in a press,
closing the mold, constantly measuring the temperature in the
mold, and automatically opening the press at the proper time,
and found them to be meaningful because they sufficiently
limited the use of the mathematical equation to the practical
application of molding rubber products. 450 U.S. at 184, 187
. . . . In contrast, the claims in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International did not meaningfully limit the abstract idea of
mitigating settlement risk. 573 U.S. . . . In particular, the Court
concluded that the additional elements such as the data
processing system and communications controllers recited in
the system claims did not meaningfully limit the abstract idea
because they merely linked the use of the abstract idea to a
particular technological environment (i.e., “implementation via
computers”) or were well-understood, routine, conventional
activity.
MPEP § 2106.05(e).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. Similarly as in Alice, we find
that “[t]aking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is ‘[p]urely conventional.’” 573 U.S. at
225 (citation omitted). “In short, each step does no more than require a
generic computer to perform generic computer functions.” Id.
We find that Appellant’s claims do not add meaningful limitations
beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment.
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MPEP § 2106.05(f): Mere Instructions to Apply an Exception
Appellant does not persuasively argue that their claims do any more
than to merely invoke generic computer components merely as a tool in
which the computer instructions apply the judicial exception.
MPEP § 2106.05(g): Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity
The claims acquire and display data, which are classic examples of
insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (en
banc), aff’d sub nom, Bilski, 561 U.S. 593.
MPEP § 2106.05(h): Field of Use and Technological
Environment
[T]he Supreme Court has stated that, even if a claim does not
wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it still will not be limited
meaningfully if it contains only insignificant or token pre- or
post-solution activity—such as identifying a relevant audience,
a category of use, field of use, or technological environment.
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
We find the claimed data-manipulation is simply a field of use that
attempts to limit the abstract idea to a particular technological environment.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments because the mere application
of an abstract idea in a particular field is not sufficient to integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.32.
In view of the foregoing, we conclude the claims are “directed to” a judicial
exception.
B. Well-understood, routine, conventional
Because the claims recite a judicial exception and do not integrate that
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exception into a practical application, we must then reach the issue of
whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception
that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56. As discussed above, the written description describes the
claimed computer system consistent with its being “well-understood,
routine, [and] conventional.”
C. Specified at a high level of generality
It is indicative of the absence of an inventive concept where the
claims simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The claims fail to recite any specific steps of an algorithm, nor does
Appellant cite any Specification disclosure for the required specificity.
We find the limitations are specified at such a high level of generality
consistent with the absence of an inventive concept. Considering the claim
limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing to the abstract idea that
is not already present when the limitations are considered separately. See
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79. The ordered combination of limitations amounts to
nothing more than certain mental processes implemented with generic
computer components that operate “in a conventional way.” See also Alice,
573 U.S. at 225–26. Therefore, we conclude that none of the claim
limitations, viewed “both individually and as an ordered combination,”
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in order to
sufficiently transform the nature of the claims into patent-eligible subject
matter. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79).
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In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of Claims 13 and
15–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
CLAIMS 13 AND 15–17: OBVIOUSNESS OVER MOORMAN, MORRIS,
ROUTING NUMBER DATABASE, HODGIN, AND HSBC.
Claim 13, the sole independent claim, recites, inter alia, “identifying
from the one or more computerized databases a number of checks that have
been drawn on U.S. subsidiaries of international financial institutions.”
The Examiner finds Moorman teaches a portion of this limitation, i.e.,
“identifying from the one or more computerized databases a number of
checks that have been drawn.” Non-Final Act. 8. The Examiner finds
Moorman does not teach the remainder of the limitation, i.e., “on U.S.
subsidiaries of international financial institutions,” but cites Morris for this
portion of the claimed limitation. Non-Final Act. 9 (citing Morris, 1) (“And
the globalization of financial-services companies means that money placed
in a bank branch in a less regulated jurisdiction is easily transferred
internally within the organization to a branch in a more regulated
jurisdiction.”). The Examiner further finds Morris discloses “a U.S. Senate
subcommittee report found that several major U.S. banks . . . had not paid
sufficient attention to correspondent accounts held by foreign banks that
were linked to money laundering, tax evasion, and fraud.” Id.
Appellant argues Moorman is concerned with outgoing checks, but
analyze the source of any checks. Appeal Br. 9. Appellant further argues
whereas Morris discloses corresponding accounts are linked to money
laundering, Morris fails to teach any analysis of where the money comes
from. Id.; see Reply Br. 4.
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The Examiner finds all the steps of Moorman and Morris relate to
money laundering. Ans. 7.
We agree with Appellant that whereas Moorman and Morris each
relates to money laundering, the cited portions of the prior art fail to teach
the disputed limitation of the method. In view of the foregoing, we decline
to sustain the rejection of Claims 13 and 15–17.
CLAIM 18: OBVIOUSNESS OVER MOORMAN, MORRIS,
ROUTING NUMBER DATABASE, HODGIN, BAKER.
The Examiner does not apply Baker to teach the disputed limitation.
See Ans. 7–10. In view of the foregoing, we decline to sustain the rejection
of Claim 18.

DECISION SUMMARY

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
13, 15–18 101 Eligibility 13, 15–18
13, 15–17 103 Moorman, Morris,
Routing Number
Database, Hodgin,
HSBC
13, 15–17
18 103 Moorman, Morris,
Routing Number
Database, Hodgin,
Baker.
18
Overall
Outcome
13, 15–18

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED