Early Warning Services, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 20, 2020

15828075 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 20, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/828,075 11/30/2017 Laura E. Weinflash 90850-1066335
(000221US)
4425
127438 7590 08/20/2020
Early Warning Services, LLC - KTS
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
AUSTIN, JAMIE H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/20/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte LAURA E. WEINFLASH and LARRY W. SPOONER
____________

Appeal 2020-001027
Application 15/828,075
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, JOHN A. EVANS, and JOYCE CRAIG,
Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of Claims 1–20, all pending claims. Final Act. 1.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant states the real party in interest is Early Warning
Services, LLC. Appeal Br. 3.
2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief (filed July 29, 2019, “Appeal Br.”), the Reply Brief
(filed November 18, 2019, “Reply Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer (mailed
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Prior Appeals
In Appeal 2018-002311, the present Panel of the Board AFFIRMED
the rejection of all pending claims in Application 13/947,271, the parent of
the present application. See Appeal Br. 3.

Invention
The claims relate to a method of making check-risk decisions. See
Abstract. Claims 1 and 16 are independent. Appeal Br. 3. An
understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of Claim 1,
which is reproduced in Table I.

Rejection3
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
statutory subject matter without significantly more. Final Act. 11–16.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 1–20 in light of
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this
decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any

September 30, 2019, “Ans.”), the Final Action (mailed March 1, 2019,
“Final Act.”), and the Specification (filed November 30, 2017, “Spec.”) for
their respective details.
3 The present application was examined under the first inventor to file
provisions of the AIA. Final Act. 2.
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other arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in
the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We
are not persuaded that Appellant identifies reversible error. Upon
consideration of the arguments presented in the Appeal Brief and Reply
Brief, we agree with the Examiner that all the pending claims are
unpatentable. We consider Appellant’s arguments as they are presented in
the Appeal Brief and Reply Briefs.

CLAIMS 1–20: INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
Based upon our review of the record in light of recent Director Policy
Guidance with respect to patent-eligible subject matter rejections under 35
U.S.C. § 101, we affirm the rejection of Claims 1–20 for the specific reasons
discussed below.
Appellant argues all claims as a group in view of the limitations of
Claim 1. See Appeal Br. 7 (“Appellant submits that the focus of the claimed
invention is the specifically recited database structure involving two separate
databases for storing different kinds of data.”). Therefore, we decide the
appeal of the § 101 rejections with reference to Claim 1, and refer to the
rejected claims collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 provides that a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has
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long recognized, however, that § 101 implicitly excludes “[l]aws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from the realm of patent-eligible
subject matter, as monopolization of these “basic tools of scientific and
technological work” would stifle the very innovation that the patent system
aims to promote. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.66, 72–78 (2012); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 185 (1981). On January 7, 2019, the PTO issued revised guidance
on the application of § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (hereinafter “Revised Guidance”).
Under the mandatory Revised Guidance, we reconsider whether
Appellant’s claims recite:
1. any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human interactions such as a fundamental
economic practice, or mental processes), and
2. additional elements that integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c),
(e)–(h)).
Only if a claim, (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then reach the
issue of whether the claim:
3. adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
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(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
4. simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception.

1. Judicial Exceptions.
The Revised Guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts
identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract idea
exception includes the following groupings of subject matter, when recited
as such in a claim limitation(s) (that is, when recited on their own or per se):
(a) mathematical concepts,4 i.e., mathematical relationships, mathematical
formulas, equations,5 and mathematical calculations6; (b) certain methods of
organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices
(including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business
relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions

4 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“The concept of hedging . . .
reduced to a mathematical formula . . . is an unpatentable abstract idea.”).
5 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“A mathematical formula as such is not accorded
the protection of our patent laws”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594
(1978) (“[T]he discovery of [a mathematical formula] cannot support a
patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”).
6 SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(holding that claims to a “series of mathematical calculations based on
selected information” are directed to abstract ideas).
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between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions)7; and (c) mental processes8—concepts performed in the human
mind (including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).9
The preamble of Claim 1 recites “[a] multi-database system structure
for facilitating account verification through a member service,
comprising.”10 The further recitations are set forth in Table I and analyzed
for abstract ideas as set forth in the Revised Guidance.

7 Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20 (concluding that use of a third party to mediate
settlement risk is a “fundamental economic practice” and thus an abstract
idea); see Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.13 for a more extensive
listing of “certain methods of organizing human activity” that have been
found to be abstract ideas.
8 If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance
in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is
still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be
performed in the mind. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14; see
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps,
there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”).
9 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (“[M]ental processes[ ] and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work” (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972))).
10 Limitation identifiers, e.g., “[a]” added to facilitate discussion.
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Table I
Claim 1 Revised Guidance
[a] a first database system
maintained by the member service;

”Additional element. Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54

[b] a second database system
maintained by the member service;

Additional element. Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54
[c] a computer management system
at the member service for managing
data at the first and second database
systems and providing access to the
data at the first and second database
systems, the computer management
system including a processor and a
memory, the memory for storing
instructions executable by the
processor for:

Additional element. Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54
[d] receiving and storing, at the first
database system, status data relating
to accounts maintained by a
plurality of member institutions that
belong to the member service, the
status data received from the
member institutions, wherein the
member institutions are financial
institutions that belong to the
member service for assessing risk
that a transaction will not clear;
Insignificant extra-solution activity,
e.g., mere data gathering. Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31.

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[e] receiving and storing, at the
second database system, account
activity data relating to accounts of
a plurality of non-member
institutions that do not belong to the
member service, the account
activity data based on files from
banks of first deposit;
Insignificant extra-solution activity,
e.g., mere data gathering. Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31.

[f] filtering the activity data
received at the second database
system to remove activity data
relating to accounts maintained by
member institutions, and thereby
storing in the second database
system only data relating to
accounts of non-member institutions
that do not belong to the member
service;
Mental processes—concepts
performed in the human mind11
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion).12
[g] populating the second database
system with risk data reflecting the
likelihood that a transaction
conducted against a specific account
Mental processes—concepts
performed in the human mind

11 If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers
performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer
components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim
cannot practically be performed in the mind. See Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (‘‘[W]ith the
exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the
claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human,
mentally or with pen and paper.’’). Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 at
n.14.
12 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (‘‘‘[M]ental processes[ ] and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work’’’ (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67)). Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.15.
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will not clear, as determined by a
risk scoring model and based on the
account activity data stored at the
second database system;
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion).
[h] receiving, at the computer
management system, account data
relating to an account against which
a transaction is conducted;
Insignificant extra-solution activity,
e.g., mere data gathering. Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31.
[i] using the account data, at the
computer management system, to
determine if the transaction is
conducted against one of the
accounts of member institutions that
belong to the member service and to
determine if the transaction is
conducted against one of the
accounts of non-member institutions
that do not belong to the member
service;
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion).
[j] accessing the first database
system to retrieve data for accounts
of member institutions that belong
to the member service; and
Insignificant extra-solution activity,
e.g., mere data gathering. Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31.
[k] accessing the second database
system to retrieve data for accounts
of non-member institutions that do
not belong to the member service;
Insignificant extra-solution activity,
e.g., mere data gathering. Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31.
[l] wherein an inquiring institution
makes a risk decision for accounts
of member institutions based on
status data accessed from the first
database system and makes a risk
decision for accounts of non-
member institutions based on risk
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion).
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data accessed from the separate,
second database system.

In accordance with the Revised Guidance, we conclude limitations [f],
[g], [i] and [l] recite an abstract idea, i.e., “mental processes.”

Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
If the claims recite a patent-ineligible concept, as we conclude above,
we proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) wherein the “claims are
considered in their entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This test determines
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
For the reasons which follow, we conclude that Appellant’s claims do
not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
The Examiner finds the claims are directed to fundamental economic
practices and thus to “Certain Methods Of Organizing Human Activity.”
Final Act. 2–3. In Table I, above, we examine each limitation of Claim 1
and find, in accordance with the Examiner, that the claims are directed to
facilitating risk management (see limitations [f] and [g]) and find the method
can be substantially performed with paper and pencil (see limitations [i] and
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[l]). As mapped in the right column of Table One, supra, we conclude that
independent claim 1 recites several additional limitations that are extra-
solution activities the courts have determined to be insufficient to transform
judicially excepted subject matter into a patent-eligible application. See
MPEP § 2106.05(g); January 2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31.

Appellant contends “the proper test in this regard is to evaluate the
focus of the claimed advance over the prior art to determine the claim’s
character as a whole.” Appeal Br. 7. Appellant argues “the focus of the
claimed invention is the specifically recited database structure involving two
separate databases for storing different kinds of data.” Id. Appellant argues:
[T]he use of two different databases for storing two different
kinds of data provides technical advantages over prior database
systems by removing overlapping data in a databases and thus
efficiently and accurately managing the storing and retrieval of
relevant data, especially when data is quickly needed for
retrieval.
Appeal Br. 8 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 3, 6, 7, 42, and 73). Appellant argues
the claims “cannot be oversimplified ‘by looking at them generally and
failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims,’ and the
‘directed to’ inquiry must be done ‘without ignoring the requirements of the
individual steps.’” Appeal Br. 8 (quoting McRO, slip op. 21). As shown
above in Table I, our analysis, which accords with that of the Examiner, was
performed keeping in mind “the requirements of the individual steps.” Id.
Appellant further argues “performing the ‘directed to’ inquiry requires
analysis of the claims as a whole rather than on a piecemeal basis.” Id.
(quoting Enfish). The “as a whole” analysis asks whether further limitations
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integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)-(c) and (e)-(h).
For the reasons which follow, we conclude that Appellant’s claims do
not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. We address
these “practical application” MPEP sections seriatim:

MPEP § 2106.05(a) “Improvements to the Functioning of a
Computer or To Any Other Technology or Technical Field.”

“In determining patent eligibility, examiners should consider whether
the claim ‘purport(s) to improve the functioning of the computer itself’” or
“‘any other technology or technical field.’” MPEP § 2106.05(a).
With respect to technological improvements, Appellant contends:
[T]he focus of the claimed advance over the prior art is the
specifically recited database structure . . . with two databases
maintained by a member service, where data contributed to the
second (non-participant) database is filtered to remove activity
data relating to accounts of member institutions, so that second
database only stores data relating to accounts of non-member
institutions.
Appeal Br. 9. Appellant further argues “the Examiner is ignoring the
significant operational and functional features of the recited database
structure.” Reply Br. 3 (citing Appeal Br. 17).
Appellant’s contentions seem to imply the claimed databases function
in a manner other than selectively sorting data into a database. See. Reply
Br. 3–4.
Contrary to Appellant’s contentions, we find no “specially
programmed computer systems” to be recited in the claims. Nor do
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Appellant cites to the Specification for disclosure of such systems. Rather,
Appellant discloses the “hardware elements can include one or more
processors 110, including, without limitation, one or more general-purpose
processors.” Spec. ¶ 93.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, that “the invention does include
two databases as can be seen in at least the independent claims” however,
“the appellant is merely claiming the use of 2 databases to store data. That
data is then used by a human to make a risk decision based on the data.”
Ans. 4. Appellant argues:
[T]o the extent there is an abstract idea recited in the claims, the
claims integrate the abstract idea (such as the Examiner-
characterized abstract idea of “facilitating a check risk decision
for member and non-member institutions”) into a practical
application involving a specific database structure as described
above.
Reply Br. 2.
Appellant has not persuaded us that in improvement to a technology
follows from the use of first and second databases to store first and second
data. Nor do we find a technological improvement where a human consults
a first database to make a first decision and consults a second database to
make a second decision. We thus find the claims do not recite an
improvement to the functioning of a computer, or of any other technology.

MPEP § 2106.05(b) “Particular Machine.”
At the outset, we note that the Bilski machine-or-transformation test is
only applicable to the method (process) claims on appeal. This section of
the MPEP guides: “When determining . . . whether a claim recites
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significantly more than a judicial exception . . . , examiners should consider
whether the judicial exception is applied with, or by use of, a particular
machine.” See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (“[T]he machine-
or-transformation test is a useful an important clue, and investigative tool”
for determining whether a claim is patent eligible under § 101). MPEP
§ 2106.05(b).
MPEP § 2106.05(b) II provides further guidance regarding what
constitutes a particular machine:
[A]s described in MPEP §2106.05(f), additional elements that
invoke computers or other machinery merely as a tool to
perform an existing process will generally not amount to
significantly more than a judicial exception. See, e.g., Versata
Development Group v. SAP America, 793 F.3d 1306, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in order for a machine to add
significantly more, it must “play a significant part in permitting
the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely
as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be
achieved more quickly”).

In view of our discussion of MPEP § 2106.05(b) “Particular
Machine,” we find the claims on appeal are silent regarding specific
limitations directed to an improved computer system, processor, memory,
network, database, or Internet, nor do Appellant directs attention to such
specific limitations. “[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223; see also BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An abstract
idea on ‘an Internet computer network’ or on a generic computer is still an
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abstract idea”). Applying this reasoning here, we conclude Appellant’s
claims are not directed to a particular machine, but rather merely implement
an abstract idea using generic computer components. Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55 n.30. Thus, we conclude Appellant’s method claims fail to
satisfy the “tied to a particular machine” prong of the Bilski machine-or-
transformation test.
MPEP § 2106.05(c) “Particular Transformation.”
This section of the MPEP guides: “Another consideration when
determining whether a claim . . . recites significantly more . . . is whether the
claim effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing.” “[T]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a
different state or thing’ is the clue to patentability of a process claim that
does not include particular machines.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. at 658
(quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70).
The claims operate to select and analyze certain electronic data related
to the risk of check-fraud. The selection of electronic data is not a
“transformation or reduction of an article into a different state or thing
constituting patent-eligible subject matter[.]” See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,
962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). See also CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The mere
manipulation or reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy the
transformation prong.”). Applying this guidance here, we conclude
Appellant’s method claims fail to satisfy the transformation prong of the
Bilski machine-or-transformation test.

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MPEP § 2106.05(e) “Other Meaningful Limitations.

This section of the MPEP guides:

Diamond v. Diehr provides an example of a claim that recited
meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment.
450 U.S. 175 (1981). In Diehr, the claim was directed to the
use of the Arrhenius equation (an abstract idea or law of nature)
in an automated process for operating a rubber-molding press.
450 U.S. at 177-78. The Court evaluated additional elements
such as the steps of installing rubber in a press, closing the
mold, constantly measuring the temperature in the mold, and
automatically opening the press at the proper time, and found
them to be meaningful because they sufficiently limited the use
of the mathematical equation to the practical application of
molding rubber products. 450 U.S. at 184. In contrast, the
claims in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International did not
meaningfully limit the abstract idea of mitigating settlement
risk. 573 U.S. __,134 S. Ct. 2347, 110 USPQ2d 1976 (2014). In
particular, the Court concluded that the additional elements
such as the data processing system and communications
controllers recited in the system claims did not meaningfully
limit the abstract idea because they merely linked the use of the
abstract idea to a particular technological environment (i.e.,
“implementation via computers”) or were well-understood,
routine, conventional activity.
MPEP § 2106.05(e).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. Similarly as for Alice, we find
that “[t]aking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is ‘[p]urely conventional.’” Id. “In
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short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform
generic computer functions.” Id.
MPEP § 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception.
Appellant is not persuasive that the claims do any more than to invoke
generic computer components as a tool in which the computer instructions
apply the judicial exception.
MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity.
Limitation [d] recites:
[R]eceiving and storing, at the first database system, status data
relating to accounts maintained by a plurality of member
institutions that belong to the member service, the status data
received from the member institutions, wherein the member
institutions are financial institutions that belong to the member
service for assessing risk that a transaction will not clear.
Limitation [e] contains a commensurate recitation respecting the accounts of
non-member institutions. We find these limitations recite insignificant
extra-solution activity. Receiving and storing data is extra-solution activity.
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31; see, e.g., Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963
(en banc), aff’d sub nom, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological Environment.

[T]he Supreme Court has stated that, even if a claim does not
wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it still will not be limited
meaningfully if it contains only insignificant or token pre- or
post-solution activity—such as identifying a relevant audience,
a category of use, field of use, or technological environment.
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013). We
find the limitations relating to the “account activity data relating to accounts
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of a plurality of [member or] non-member institutions” are simply a field of
use that attempts to limit the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment.
We do not find Appellant’s argument to be persuasive because “[t]he
courts have also identified examples in which a judicial exception has not
been integrated into a practical application.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 55. The claims fail to recite a practical application where the
additional element does no more than generally link the use of a judicial
exception to a particular technological environment or field of use. Id. The
mere application of an abstract idea in a particular field is not sufficient to
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See id. at 55
n.32.
In view of the foregoing, we conclude the claims fails to integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application, but are “directed to” a judicial
exception.

3. Well-understood, routine, conventional.
Because the claims recite a judicial exception and do not integrate that
exception into a practical application, we must then reach the issue of
whether the claims add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception
that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. Revised
Guidance at 56.
The Examiner finds the “Appellant’s invention is merely storing and
filtering data for a user” and that the “machines recited in the claims perform
as commonly-understood and routinely expected in the art.” Ans. 4, 6. We
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find such “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional” limitations fail to
indicate the presence of an inventive concept.

4. Specified at a high level of generality.
It is indicative of the absence of an inventive concept where the
claims simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Limitation [d] recites “populating the second database system with
risk data reflecting the likelihood that a transaction conducted against a
specific account will not clear, as determined by a risk scoring model.”
However, neither the claimed “risk scoring model,” nor an algorithm by
which it might be determined, is specified. Rather, a non-specific model is
recited at a high level of generality.
We find the claimed “risk scoring model” limitation is specified at
such a high level of generality consistent with the absence of an inventive
concept. Therefore, we conclude that none of the claim limitations, viewed
“both individually and as an ordered combination,” amount to significantly
more than the judicial exception in order to sufficiently transform the nature
of the claims into patent-eligible subject matter. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79).
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of Claims 1–20
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Appeal 2020-001027
Application 15/828,075

20
DECISION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED