Dust-Tex Service, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 29, 1974

214 N.L.R.B. 398 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

398 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Dust-Tex Service , Inc. and Construction , Building
Material , Ice and Coal, Laundry , Dry Cleaning and
Industrial Laundry and Dry Cleaning Drivers, Help-
ers, Warehousemen, Yardmen and Allied Workers,
Local Union No . 682, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America . Case 14-CA-7738
October 29, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND
PENELLO
On June 25 , 1974, Administrative Law Judge Ber-
nard Ness issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter , the General Counsel filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief , and Respondent filed
cross -exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings , findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge , except
as modified herein ,' and to adopt his recommended
Order , as modified.
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusions that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act by effectuating its proposed
changes in the employees ' wage structure without
bargaining to impasse with the Union , by negotiating
1 The Respondent and the General Counsel have excepted to certain
credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's
established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolu-
tions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the
relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard
Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3,
1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for revers-
ing his findings
Respondent contends that its action with respect to employees Behrens,
Dreyfus , and Walker on December 1, 1973, constituted a lawful preimpasse
lockout and was not , therefore , violative of Sec 8 (a)(3) and (1) of the Act
We find this contention without merit It is clear from the record and from
the Administrative Law Judge ' s Decision that Respondent discharged Beh-
rens , Dreyfus, and Walker because they exercised their protected right to
refuse to accept changes in their conditions of employment to which their
collective-bargaining representative had not acquiesced Accordingly, we
cannot agree with Respondent that by not permitting the three men to work
it was merely taking lawful economic action in support of its bargaining
position
2
The General Counsel has excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's
failure to order Respondent to bargain with the Union , upon request, with
respect to the wages , hours , and working conditions of the employees in the
unit We agree with the General Counsel that , inasmuch as the Union re-
mains the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the appro-
priate unit , Respondent is under a continuing obligation to bargain with the
Union We shall modify the recommended Order accordingly
terms or conditions of employment directly with em-
ployees, and by threatening employees with termina-
tion if they refused to accept the proposed changes.
We further agree that the discharges of employees
Behrens, Dreyfus, and Walker violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
We also agree with the Administrative Law
Judge's findings that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by the conduct described in his
Decision. In addition, we find, contrary to the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge, that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) by the following conduct. In Septem-
ber 1973, Respondent's general manager, Catalano,
told employee Dreyfus that Respondent's president,
Matthey, "would like to get out of the Union," and
in October Catalano said to Dreyfus that "Matthey
wanted out of the union and he wanted [the employ-
ees] as independent contractors." We find, as con-
tended by the General Counsel, that these statements
by an agent of Respondent, in the context of
Respondent's subsequent unfair labor practices di-
rected towards getting rid of the Union, were an at-
tempt to solicit the employees to abandon the Union.
Accordingly, we find that Catalano's above remarks
constituted a separate violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
ADDITIONAL CONCLUSION OF LAW
We adopt the Conclusions of Law of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge but make an additional conclu-
sion. Insert the following as paragraph 7 and renum-
ber the remaining paragraphs accordingly:
"7. By soliciting employees to abandon the Union
as their collective-bargaining representative, the Re-
spondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced
its employees in the exercise of their protected rights
and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified
herein, and hereby orders that Respondent, Dust-
Tex Service, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order, as modi-
fied below:
1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(b) and relet-
ter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
"(b) Soliciting employees to abandon the Union
as their collective-bargaining representative."
214 NLRB No. 60
DUST-TEX SERVICE, INC.
2. Substitute, for the first word in paragraph 2(a),
the word "Reinstate."
3. Insert the following as paragraph 2(d) and relet-
ter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
"(d) Bargain in good faith, upon request, with the
Union as the exclusive representative of the employ-
ees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, concerning
wages, hours, and other terms or conditions of em-
ployment, and embody in a signed agreement any
understanding reached."
4. Substitute the attached notice for the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's notice.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Construction, Building Material, Ice and Coal,
Laundry, Dry Cleaning and Industrial Laundry
and Dry Cleaning Drivers, Helpers, Warehouse-
men, Yardmen and Allied Workers, Local
Union No. 682, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, by changing
the wages or other terms and conditions of em-
ployment of our employees in the appropriate
unit stated below without bargaining collectively
with the Union to an impasse about such
changes. The appropriate unit consists of:
All driver salesmen employed by Respondent
at its St. Louis, Missouri facility, excluding of-
fice clerical employees, professional employ-
ees, guards, supervisors as defined in the Act,
and all other employees.
WE WILL NOT solicit our employees to aban-
don the Union as their representative for pur-
poses of collective bargaining.
WE WILL NOT negotiate directly with our em-
ployees concerning changes in rates of pay, wag-
es, hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of employment in derogation of their
exclusive bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT discharge, threaten to discharge,
or otherwise discipline employees in the appro-
priate bargaining unit who refuse to accept uni-
lateral changes unlawfully imposed concerning
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
WE HEREWITH revoke the unilateral changes
399
made in the method of compensation and the
employment status of the employees in the ap-
propriate bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL reinstate Charles Behrens and David
Dreyfus to the positions they held under the
terms and conditions prior to our unilateral
changes in the employment status of the em-
ployees in the appropriate bargaining unit with-
out prejudice to their seniority or other rights
and privileges, and make them whole for any
loss of earnings they may have suffered.
WE WILL offer to Kermit Walker immediate
and full reinstatement to his former job or, if
that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his se-
niority or other rights and privileges, and make
him whole for any loss of earnings he may have
suffered.
WE WILL bargain in good faith, upon request,
with the Union as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit,
and embody in a signed agreement any under-
standing reached.
DUST-TEX SERVICE, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BERNARD NESS, Administrative Law Judge: This proceed-
ing was heard in St. Louis, Missouri, on March 20-22,
1974, pursuant to a charge filed on January 4, 1974, by
Construction, Building Material, Ice and Coal, Laundry,
Dry Cleaning and Industrial Laundry and Dry Cleaning
Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen, Yardmen and Allied
Workers, Local Union No. 682, affiliated with Internation-
al Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, hereinafter referred to as the
Union,' and a complaint issued on February 6, 1974, as
amended on February 28, 1974, and further amended at
the hearing, against Dust-Tex Service, Inc., hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Respondent. In issue are the questions
whether the Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, un-
lawfully discharged and refused to reinstate four employ-
ees, unlawfully refused to bargain in good faith in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, and engaged in other
acts of interference, restraint, and coercion of employees in
the exercise of their statutory rights in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. The Respondent in its answer has denied
An opposed motion was granted to correct the name of the Union to
that appearing in the caption
400 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses and after due consideration of the briefs filed by
the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the fol-
lowing: 2
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The facts found herein are based upon the pleadings and
the admissions made by the Respondent at the hearing.
The Respondent, a Missouri corporation, is engaged in the
rental of industrial cleaning supplies and related products
at its place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. During the
calendar year 1973, which period is representative of its
operations during all times material herein, Respondent, in
the course and conduct of its business operations, provided
services to customers in excess of $50,000. Said services
were rendered directly to customers located in States other
than the State of Missouri or to customers located in Mis-
souri, each of whom annually either produces and ships
goods and performs services valued in excess of $50,000
directly to and for customers located outside the State of
Missouri, or purchases goods and materials valued in ex-
cess of $50,000, which are transported and delivered to
such enterprise in Missouri directly from suppliers located
outside the State of Missouri. The parties agree and, based
upon the foregoing, I find that Respondent is engaged in
commerce and in operations affecting commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
Respondent, through its membership in a multiemployer
association," had a bargaining relationship with the Union
covering its driver-salesmen. The most recent contract be-
tween the parties was from December 1, 1969, to Decem-
ber 1, 1972, extended for 1 year to December 1, 1973.1
Prior to commencement of negotiations, Respondent time-
ly withdrew from the Association and gave the Union its
termination notice and requested negotiations for a new
contract. Two negotiation meetings were held-November
19 and November 29. The stumbling block to reaching
agreement was wages. On December 1, immediately upon
expiration of the contract, the Respondent implemented its
2 The transcript of the record contains a number of erros. I have listed a
number of corrections limited to those where the intended language is fairly
ascertainable from the context in which the errors appear Accordingly, the
transcript of the proceedings has been corrected accordingly
3 Linen Retail Employers Association
4 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates hereinafter refer to 1973
proposed changes in compensation and in the status of its
employees. Three of the four driver-salesmen employed by
the Respondent at the time were asked by Respondent to
work under the changed system and they refused.' They
were not permitted to return to work. The fourth was dis-
charged, allegedly for poor work .6
The General Counsel alleges in his complaint that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by ( a) negoti-
ating directly with the employees, threatening them with
reprisals, and thereafter discharging the employees in the
bargaining unit because of their activities on behalf of the
Union and in order to undermine the Union; (b) negotiat-
ing in bad faith with no intention of reaching an agree-
ment; and (c) unilaterally altering the terms and conditions
of employment. The complaint further alleges that the four
driver-salesmen were unlawfully discharged on November
30 in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The
complaint also alleges independent acts of interference, re-
straint, and coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
The principal issue involved is whether or not the Re-
spondent was privileged by an impasse or other consider-
ations to implement its contract proposal upon expiration
of the contract between the parties. Also involved is the
status of the three drivers who refused to work under the
implemented changes in the wage structure and the fourth
who was discharged outright allegedly for poor work.
B. The Respondent's Operations
The Respondent is engaged in the business of renting
industrial cleaning supplies and equipment such as mops
and mats to service institutions, retail stores, and industrial
establishments. Lee Matthey, Jr., is the Respondent's presi-
dent and chief operating official of the Company. Second
in command is the general manager, Anthony Catalano.
The Respondent regularly employed four driver-salesmen,
each of whom covered designated routes each day. Each
morning, they would pick up their supplies at the
Respondent's facility and then deliver the clean mops,
mats, and other supplies to the customers and retrieve the
dirty material. Upon completion of their routes, they
would return to the Respondent's place of business. They
drove company trucks and were permitted to take the
trucks home each evening and on weekends. Under the
terms of the contract with the Union which expired on
November 30, the drivers were paid $204 per week.' Al-
though not fully explicated in the record it appears, based
on the testimony of Dreyfus and Behrens, that the driver-
salesmen in December 1972 obtained withdrawal cards
from the Union and thereafter for a period of several
months possessed some form of independent contractor
status.
C. Independent Acts of Interference Restraint and Coercion
1. The complaint alleges that in early September Catala-
no solicited employees directly to induce them to refrain
s Charles Behrens , David Dreyfus, and Kermit Walker
6 Arthur Heidke
7 $5 10 per hour with 40 hours guaranteed
DUST-TEX SERVICE, INC.
from remaining members of the Union or give assistance
or support to it.
In support of this allegation, Dreyfus testified he had a
conversation with Catalano about mid-September at the
Respondent's loading dock. He testified Catalano "made
the comment that Mr. Matthey wanted to offer us 15 per-
cent gross sales and we maintain our trucks" and that "he
would like to get out of the union." About a week or two
later Catalano told him Mr. Matthey "wanted to give us a
proposition of 21 per cent and he would maintain the
trucks." Dreyfus further testified that on other occasions
he talked with Catalano about what would happen when
the contract expired and that sometimes he initiated the
conversation. He stated that in October, Catalano told him
"Mathey wanted out of the union and he wanted us as
independent agents."
Behrens testified as to a conversation with Catalano in
September. Catalano had brought some supplies to him at
a customer's premises.8 Behrens testified he asked what
was going to happen when the contract expired. Catalano
replied that Mr. Matthey wanted to give the employees 15
percent straight commission. Behrens further testified he
had another conversation with Catalano on the same sub-
ject in October. Catalano told him the Respondent would
probably propose a 21-percent commission and the drivers
would operate under some form of independent contractor
relationship as they had for several months early in 1973.
On cross-examination Behrens conceded that at the time of
this conversation the Union had requested his discharge if
he didn't pay his dues. He admitted he told Catalano he
was undecided whether to stay in the Union and that Cata-
lano urged him to stay in the Union.9
Catalano denied telling the employees what would or
might happen upon expiration of the contract or what the
Company's proposals would be. He testified that in Sep-
tember Matthey told him he was going to notify the Union
of his intention to terminate the contract and intended to
get a new contract with an incentive system Matthey told
him not to discuss the details with any employees. Catala-
no further related he was unaware of any specific proposals
to be made to the Union until November 17- -2 days be-
fore the first negotiation meeting.10 I do not credit
Catalano's denials. Although he may not have been aware
of the specific proposals which Matthey would ultimately
present to the Union, I am convinced he was aware of
Matthey's intentions to change the wage structure to pro-
vide for an incentive system and probably some form of
independent contractor status for the drivers. Accordingly,
I find that Catalano told Dreyfus and Behrens the Respon-
dent wanted to change the wage structure and the status of
employees to independent contractors. I further find that
Catalano told Dreyfus that Matthey "wanted out of the
Union."
The General Counsel contends in his brief that by the
aforementioned remarks the Respondent was soliciting the
employees individually to get their reaction to proposals
8 Jennings High School
9 This coincides with Catalano's testimony It should be noted the con-
tract contained a union-security clause
10 Corroborated by Matthey
401
designed to induce them to abandon the Union. I do not
agree. Both Dreyfus and Behrens testified they were con-
cerned about their status when the contract would expire
and themselves made inquiries of Catalano. Catalano only
expressed his opinion of what the Respondent wanted and
what it would propose. I do not construe these remarks to
convey the impression that Respondent intended to change
the wage structure or the status of the employees without
first pursuing negotiations with the Union. Nor do I be-
lieve Catalano was attempting to solicit reactions from the
employees or attempting to get them to desert the Union
His remark that Matthey wanted out of the Union is am-
biguous and its significance is entirely speculative. It may
be that Catalano intended to convey the thought that Mat-
they wanted the drivers to be converted to a form of inde-
pendent contractor status without being required to be a
member of the Union. Here too, I do not believe this re-
mark to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. li Accord-
ingly, I shall recommend this allegation of the complaint
be dismissed.
2. The complaint alleges that in the middle of Septem-
ber, Matthey threatened an employee that all employees in
the bargaining unit would be terminated upon expiration
of the contract unless the employees accepted
Respondent's contract proposals to be made in subsequent
negotiations.
Dreyfus testified that about mid-October he encountered
Matthey in the plant. According to Dreyfus, he greeted
Matthey and Matthey responded by pointing his finger at
him and said, "come November 30th I was out of a job to
start looking for a different job." Matthey denied making
the statement attributed to him by Dreyfus. Dreyfus im-
pressed me as an honest witness intent on presenting the
truth frankly and without overstatement and I credit him. I
find Matthey's threat violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. The threat of termination was not based upon short-
comings of Dreyfus as an employee since Respondent ac-
knowledged he was a good employee. Matthey implied that
when the contract expired Dreyfus would be terminated if
he would not accept changes in the working conditions
that Matthey intended to implement.
3. The complaint alleges that in November Paul Brown,
a salesman, as Respondent's agent, interrogated employees
as to their willingness to accept Respondent's forthcoming
contract proposals.
Both Dreyfus and Behrens credibly testified that in No-
vember, shortly before the expiration of the contract,
Brown arranged to meet with them in a bar after work. At
their meeting, Brown outlined to them what he said they
would get from the Company upon the expiration of the
contract-$250 weekly guarantee and 21-percent commis-
sion over a certain amount of sales, and in return the em-
ployees would pay the Company $30 per week for the use
of the company truck plus $15 or $16 per week for gas and
oil.',
11 This speculation on my part as to the significance of Catalano's remark
is based in part on a proposal made by Matthey at a later date, at the first
negotiation meeting on November 19 when Matthey proposed a form of
independent contractor status for the drivers with their option of remaining
in the Union
12 This closely parallels the Respondent's offer to the Union
402 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Brown is a salesman for the Company who solicits new
accounts, occasionally fills in for the drivers when they are
out, and occasionally makes special runs to customers. The
parties agree he is not a supervisor nor has he been includ-
ed in the bargaining unit. He testified the meeting was ar-
ranged by Dreyfus and Behrens and that the three sat
around speculating what the Company would offer and
that he had no knowledge of what the Company would
offer. There is no testimony that Brown was requested by
the Respondent to meet with the employees or to discuss
company proposals with them. In absence of any agency
relationship, I shall recommend dismissal of this allegation.
4. The complaint alleges that in November, Catalano
threatened that all employees in the bargaining unit would
be discharged unless they accepted the Respondent's con-
tract proposals.
On November 8, Respondent placed an ad in the news-
paper for driver-salesmen.13 Shortly thereafter two employ-
ees were hired and rode with Heidke and Walker on their
routes. Dreyfus testified that sometime thereafter, still in
November, he was told by Catalano that the new men were
going to replace the employees on the routes after Novem-
ber 30.14
Walker testified that on November 24 Catalano told
him, "Well, Kerm, I guess you're going on another paid
vacation." He did not recall any other comments made in
this conversation.
Heidke testified that shortly after a new employee was
assigned to accompany him on his route he engaged Cata-
lano in conversation. His testimony follows:
A. I asked Mr. Catalano about the men riding on
the trucks and he said they had accepted an indepen-
dent contract offered by Mr. Matthey and I then
asked him what about, you know, what would happen
to us drivers and he said, "Well," he said, "Kermit and
I had made it clear to him that we didn't want the
offer and that Mr. Behrens, he told me that Mr. Beh-
rens and Mr. Dreyfus, he wasn't sure about them be-
cause they had taken the offer last year."
Q. And what did he say about your continued em-
ployment after the end of the contract?
A. Oh, I was asking him what would happen to us
and he said, "Well, if you don't want the contract," he
said, "you will probably be out of work."
Q. What do you mean by "the contract," do you
know?
A. This offer, I was never made the offer but I
knew what it was.
Q. I see. Did you say anything about fringe bene-
fits?
A. Oh, I asked him about the hospitalization, and
so forth, again, and he said, well, then, under the new
contract, he said, if you wanted to work hard and long
hours he said you could make quite a bit of money,
and you could pay for your own hospitalization. I
asked him what about the retirement, and he said,
"Well, you can make a lot of money," he said, "You
won't need retirement." I proceeded to ask him about
Mr. Walker. I said, "Well, the man's going to retire
before too long," I said, "Are you dust going to kick
him out, and, you know, blow his retirement?" and he
said "Well, that's up to the man," he said, "If he
doesn't want the offer he will be out of work."
Catalano denied making the statements attributed to him. I
credit the testimony of Dreyfus, Walker, and Heidke in this
connection and find that Catalano made the remarks to the
employees as described above. However, I find that his
statement to Walker, in absence of any testimony regard-
ing the context in which it was made, is vague and ambigu-
ous and, accordingly, I do not find it violative of the Act.
On the other hand, Catalano's statements to Dreyfus and
Heidke conveyed clear threats to the employees that
the bargaining unit employees who did not accept
Respondent's intended changes in their status or method of
compensation would be replaced. I find these statements
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
D. The Alleged Refusal to Bargain
The contract between Linen Retail Employers Associa-
tion and the Union was due to expire on November 30.
The Respondent timely withdrew from the multiemployer
group and by letter dated September 12 informed the
Union of its action. The letter also contained a notification
of contract termination upon its expiration and a request to
set up a meeting for the purpose of negotiating a new con-
tract. By letter dated October 16 the Union replied it would
submit proposals for a new contract. By letter dated No-
vember 6 the Respondent suggested three dates available
to it to begin negotiations. The parties then agreed to meet
on November 19.15 Prior to the first meeting, the Union
submitted its proposals for modifications to the Respon-
dent.
The November 19 Negotiating Meeting
Present for the Respondent were Matthey, Catalano,
and Don Keithley, general manager of a related company
owned by Matthey. The Union was represented by Gene
Walla, its president, Robert Sansone, recording secretary,
and Paul Reynaud, business representative for the Union's
laundry division. Matthey and Walla were the principal
spokesmen.
Under the existing contract due to expire at midnight,
November 30, the driver-salesmen received $204 per week
($5.10 per hour with 40 hours guaranteed). The discussion
at the meeting focused principally upon wages. During the
course of the meeting, Matthey proposed two different
plans involving the wage structure, referred to as Plan A
and Plan B. Only Plan A was submitted in writing at the
13 G C Exh 3 It offered $200 per week guaranteed plus commission The
same newspaper ad appeared during the first week in December
14 Only one was still employed on November 30
15 The parties agree and I find the appropriate unit to be All driver
salesmen employed by Respondent at its St Louis, Missouri, facility, ex-
cluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, supervi-
sors as defined in the Act, and all other employees
DUST-TEX SERVICE, INC 403
meeting . Plan B was described orally
meetmg.16
by Matthey at the proposed plan B , stating , "Look, we have got a plan. We
Plan A. Routemen shall be paid a commission of 15%
on all Dust-Tex service delivered . Routemen will be
allowed a weekly drawing account of $165.00, payable
each week . The routeman 's earnings, based on the
15% commission , will be applied toward his weekly
drawing account on a cumulative basis (week to
week). When a routeman 's earnings exceed his total
draw, he will receive that excess in cash that week
along with his draw . When his drawing account is in a
deficit position , his earnings in excess of $165.00 per
week will be applied toward the deficit until the deficit
is eliminated . The drawing account of each routeman
will be on a calendar year basis commencing the first
complete week in January and ending the last com-
plete week in December.
Under this plan, the company would continue the
present welfare and pension payments to the Union in
the employees behalf but would not pay anything into
the Supplemental Fund. (See actual Proposal for any
other details)
Plan B . Route would be serviced by an independent
agent (non employee ) and paid a flat commission of
21% of all Dust-Tex sales. Agent would be guaranteed
a gross income of $1,000.00 every four weeks.
Company would (at agent's option) lease a truck to
agent for $30.00 per week. Agent can also provide his
own truck if he so chooses. In view of the impending
gasoline shortage, company will reimburse agent for
all gasoline and oil expense necessary to run his route
that exceeds an allocation of $64.00 per month.
Under this plan, all commissions earned in excess of
$1,000.00 for each four week period shall be paid at
the end of each four week period At this time any
gasoline and oil expense that exceeds $64.00 for the
four week period will also be paid by the company.
Example: Minimum 4-week income $1,000
Four week leasing cost (if need) 120
Maximum 4-Wk gas & oil cost 64
Total Minimum 4-week earnings $816
Matthey detailed his reasons for wanting to change from
a straight hourly rate to an incentive system and submitted
economic reasons to justify his desires. While discussing
the Company's economic situation under the existing wage
structure, Walla remarked that he was obligated to repre-
sent the unit employees. Matthey then remarked, "Well,
look, in that event, why don't you do this, why don't you
let these men operate with us on a contract basis wherein
they can be in the union or out of the union at their own
option. Then we can both solve our problems " He then
16 Both plans (in writing) were later shown by Matthey to the employees
on December I
guarantee these men a thousand dollars every four weeks
with a $30 a week truck lease, with a maximum gasoline
allowance due to this energy shortage of $16 so that the
men would be guaranteed $204 a week. If those men went
out and worked their routes they could make well over
$300 a week net." Matthey admitted to Walla that the men
would then have to pay for their own fringe benefits. Walla
said he wouldn't consider plan B. Matthey then presented
plan A in writing to the Union. Walla said he had no ob-
jection to an incentive system and thought something
could be worked out on a commission basis. He asked
Matthey if he thought a contract could be agreed upon
provided they agreed on economic issues. Matthey's re-
sponse was, "Frankly, Gene, a lot of other things we have
got in our agreement here are strictly for bargaining pur-
poses. As far as I am concerned, if we can get together on
the economics where we can keep our costs within the 15
per cent area, I am pretty positive we can get agree-
ment ." 17 Walla remarked he needed time to study and
evaluate the Company's proposal. He observed that as it
appeared to him the Company's proposal (plan A) would
result in the bargaining unit employees receiving less re-
muneration than under the existing contract and before he
would agree to any proposal resulting in a loss of pay he
would use his "economic strength." Upon prodding from
Matthey as to what he meant, Walla explained that he
meant picketing a related company owned by Matthey.
Matthey refused to agree to any retroactivity. The parties
agreed to meet again on November 29.
The November 29 Negotiation Meeting
Walla proposed an 18-percent commission on top of the
$165 account plus certain fringe benefits. Matthey rejected
this proposal and indicated he was receptive to improving
the amount of the draw. Considerable discussion then took
place regarding guarantee as compared to draw. Matthey
held firm to a 15-percent commission and Walla spoke in
terms of 18 percent. During the course of discussing their
proposals 18 Matthey announced they had reached an im-
passe Walla replied, "For now." Matthey said he intended
to offer the proposals to the employees 19 and asked if the
employees would work under his proposals upon expira-
tion of the contract. Walla responded that the Company
was obligated to retain the existing conditions until the
parties reached an agreement and the employees could not
work under a changed work structure. As the meeting
closed, Walla proposed another meeting on December 7.
Matthey said he would let Walla know on December I
when they both were scheduled to meet in negotiations
involving the Union and an employer association of which
one of Matthey's related companies was a member 2° Mat-
17 Included in the Company's proposals submitted to the Union on No-
vember 19 was elimination of the union-security clause
18 Matthey described it as "hemming and hawing "
19 Walla had said he had not informed the unit employees of the
Respondent 's proposals
2 All the participants at the meetings testified at the hearing except for
Walla who was out of the city and unavailable at the time of the hearing. I
find the above facts from mutually corroborative testimony of the witnesses
Continued
404 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
they did not contact Walla on December 1 and as of the
time of the hearing , no further meetings have been held.
The Implementation of Respondent's Proposed Change
in the Wage Structure and its Effect on the Employees
On Friday afternoon, November 30, when Behrens,
Dreyfus, and Walker returned to the plant upon comple-
tion of their routes, Catalano asked for the keys to the
trucks and requested them to report on Saturday to meet
with Matthey 2' Catalano did not explain why they
couldn't take the trucks home for the weekend which had
been the normal custom, nor did he explain why they were
to meet with Matthey. Dreyfus, Behrens, and Walker were
scheduled to meet individually with Matthey at hourly in-
tervals beginning , respectively, at 7 a.m.22
At the Saturday morning meetings Matthey held individ-
ually with Behrens, Dreyfus, and Walker, he showed them
a two-page document he had prepared.23 The second page
fully described plan A and plan B. The first page was as
follows:
To: Mr. Charles Behrens
Mr. David Dreyfus
Mr. Kermit Walker
Gentlemen:
For the past five years our company has experienced a
zero growth rate per route while operating under the
flat rate (no incentive) salary structure that the union
insisted on. This remuneration policy has increased
our wage and fringe routemen's cost to go from
15.55% to 22.70% of our total route sales dollar vol-
ume.
This information and other pertinent data was pre-
sented to Local 682 of the Teamsters Union. The
Union was also informed that the economics of our
business did not permit us to continue under the terms
of the contract that went out of existence on Novem-
ber 30, 1973.
Our company proposed several changes in the Union
contract along with two incentive plans for paying our
routemen for their services. The Union considered our
proposals and after ten days informed us that there
was no way that we could come to an agreement at
this time.
Testimony of any of these witnesses which conflicts with these findings is
not credited
21 They were not scheduled to work on Saturday
22 Based upon Catalano's credited version of his conversation with Held-
ke, when Heidke reported back from his route on Friday afternoon , Catala-
no handed him a dismissal letter The letter , dated November 30, stated his
dismissal was effective December 7 and explained his discharge was due to
the poor manner in which he handled his route He was not scheduled to see
Matthey on Saturday morning f do not credit Heidke's testimony that he
was told by Catalano to report on Saturday when he was first given the
dismissal letter
27 G C Exh 5
The necessity of serving our customers as per schedule
next week is essential to the survival of our firm. We
feel that the continuity of your employment with our
firm on a basis which we can afford is mutually essen-
tial to both you and our company.
We are therefor offering you employment on the basis
of either one of the two proposals offered to the
Union. The details of the two plans are described on
the following page.
I accept Plan A.
I accept Plan B.
I accept neither.
The employees read the document and Matthey asked
them to accept either one of the two plans. Matthey told
them neither of the plans was acceptable to the Union.
Walker rejected it outright. Dreyfus told Matthey he
couldn't accept it, that it was "not fair to me or to the other
boys or to the union without getting their advice." Matthey
asked him to consider it and return at 2 p.m. for further
discussion. Dreyfus did not return. Behrens told Matthey
he didn't think he could accept either plan. He did not
communicate later with Matthey.
Matthey explained it was under his direction the em-
ployees were not permitted to take the trucks home for the
weekend because he didn't know whether they would show
up on Monday. He testified that had they agreed on Satur-
day to accept either plan A or plan B, he would have per-
mitted them to take the trucks home and to continue work-
ing.
Matthey's explanation for meeting with Behrens, Drey-
fus and Walker on December I was as follows:
The purpose of these, presenting these proposals
was for us to find out what these men intended to do
as far as coming back Monday morning. We felt that
these men had indicated to us by merely saying they
would take one proposal or the other, we would want
to give them the keys to the truck and have them take
the truck on home, so we would know that we would
have men available Monday morning; because when
we left the meeting with the union, there was a tre-
mendous doubt in our mind as to whether these men
were going to show up Monday morning.
He conceded he did not ask the employees if they would
report for work on Monday, the next working day, under
the wage structure in the contract that expired the mid-
night before. All three employees credibly testified they
had fully intended reporting for work on, Monday under
the existing conditions and had not contemplated any
strike action nor had they had any discussion with the
Union about any strike action.
Dreyfus, who had been employed by Respondent since
1964, returned to work on February 12, 1974 . Sometime in
January he spoke to Catalano and said he was available for
work. Then Matthey again offered him either of the two
plans previously offered to him which Dreyfus again reject-
ed. Then in early February, Catalano contacted him and
DUST-TEX SERVICE, INC.
asked him to return to work under the same wage structure
as existed in the contract that had expired while negotia-
tions went ahead for a new contract. Dreyfus accepted and
returned on February 12.
Behrens was also contacted to return also under the
preexisting wage structure and accepted. He returned on
February 14, 1974.
Catalano also testified both Dreyfus and Behrens were
reinstated under the same wage structure as existed before.
He specifically stated they were not reinstated under plan
A or B. Matthey testified to the contrary. He stated they
were returned to work under plan B although they received
the same amount of gross pay-$204. The pay stubs, ac-
cording to him, did not reflect deductions called for in plan
B. It appears to the undersigned that the employees upon
reinstatement do receive the same amount as before-$204
per week, less deductions for withholding and other deduc-
tions made as before, but nevertheless under plan B. This is
not to say that Catalano or Dreyfus or Behrens are aware
of this.
Walker was not asked to return to work. He had been
employed by the Respondent since February 1968 and had
intended to retire in April 1974. He had made his inten-
tions known to Respondent in the fall of 1973. He had filed
retirement papers in October 1973 to be processed under a
Central States Retirement Program, not otherwise ex-
plained in the record. The retirement was to be effective in
April when he attained 57 years of age. Whether he retired
under this program, the record is silent He commenced
employment with a municipal school district in February
1974 where he was still employed at the time of the instant
hearing.
E The Discharge of Arthur Hetdke
Heidke began his employment as a driver salesman with
the Respondent in June 1973. Considerable testimony was
adduced through Catalano regarding the poor manner in
which he serviced his route and complaints from custom-
ers. Although it appeared to me that Catalano attempted to
embellish Heidke's deficiencies somewhat I am satisfied
that the Respondent received numerous complaints from
customers serviced by Heidke and despite his explanations,
the Respondent believed him to be careless and derelict in
the performance of his duties. The decision to terminate
Heidke was made in late October. The ad for employees
first appearing in the newspaper on November 8 was moti-
vated in part to seek a replacement for Heidke. His termi-
nation notice was given to him on November 30, effective
December 7.24 He rejected the offer to continue until De-
cember 7 under the wage structure then in existence. Un-
like the cases of the other three alleged discrimmatees, I
find that Respondent discharged Heidke because of its dis-
satisfaction with his performance of duties and was not
based on unlawful considerations. I shall therefore recom-
mend that this allegation of the complaint be dismissed.
24 Under art XIII of the contract expiring on November 30, the Employ-
er was required to give I week's notice in case of termination
405
Analysis and Conclusions
It is well settled that an employer who takes unilateral
action regarding terms and conditions of employment then
in the process of being negotiated with the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of his employees violates his collec-
tive-bargaining obligation under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
unless the parties have reached a genuine impasse in nego-
tiations.25 The Respondent contends that an impasse had
been reached in this case at the time it implemented its
changes in the wage structure at the expiration of the con-
tract on December 1. I cannot agree.
A genuine impasse in negotiations is one where despite
the parties' best efforts to achieve an agreement, neither
party is willing to move from its respective position.26 I am
convinced that Matthey had a fixed determination to
change the wage structure immediately upon expiration of
the contract from that provided for in the contract regard-
less of the status of negotiations. December I was
Matthey's target date for the change. Negotiations had not
even begun when both Catalano and Matthey had told the
unit employees they would be out of jobs come the expira-
tion of the contract. Even before the negotiations had be-
gun, in early November the Respondent had placed an ad
in the newspaper for route salesmen. As Matthey himself
stated, his motive for seeking new employees then had a
two-fold purpose-to obtain a replacement for Heidke,
and "in the event we had a work stoppage." According to
the Respondent, it took several weeks to break in a new
man. Matthey was uncertain whether his unit employees
would work under his contemplated changes which had
not yet been submitted to the Union and accordingly he
was preparing to have replacements available in the event
his unit employees found his changes in the wage structure
to be unacceptable.27 At only one meeting was there any
meaningful discussion of one of the proposals-plan A.
The Company's proposals were first submitted to the
Union at the first meeting on November 19. Walla said he
wanted time to study plan A and indicated he was recep-
tive to a commission basis. Matthey's pronouncement at
the November 29 meeting that the parties had reached an
impasse was only a self-serving statement artificially creat-
ed and motivated by his desire to implement a change to
the existing wage structure immediately upon expiration of
the contract. I do not attach any real significance to
Walla's response-"For now"-to Matthey's impasse dec-
laration. I do not view this as an acknowledgment by Wal-
la that an impasse had been reached. Rather I would look
upon his statement merely as recognition that the parties
were not yet in agreement after this one meeting of sub-
stance. Walla had proposed a higher commission basis
than that offered by Matthey but this is not to say that as
a result of that one meaningful meeting, the positions of
both parties were so solidified as to be immovable. It may
be that Matthey did not want to move beyond the 15-
percent commission but he appeared to be flexible on the
amount of the draw. I do not believe that the Union's post-
25
N L R B v Katz et a!, 369 U S 736 (1962) The Respondent does not
point to other "circumstances" to justify the unilateral action
26 Hi-Way Billboards, Inc, 206 NLRB 22 (1973)
27 He testified he prepared his proposals on November I
406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion was fixed and uncompromising. The Union asked for
another meeting for 8 days later but Matthey did not con-
firm it , instead implementing the changes . Strangely, while
the negotiations focused principally on plan A, plan B hav-
ing been somewhat brushed aside at the first meeting, it
was plan B that Matthey said he put into effect . It should
be noted too that under plan B , the driver-salesman would
not even be considered an employee, but to use Matthey's
term would be "an independent agent."
For the above stated reasons, I conclude that the parties
had not reached an impasse at the time the Respondent put
into effect on December 1, the changes in the wage struc-
ture which also affected the conditions of employment of
the employees and the integrity of the bargaining unit 28
Accordingly, the Respondent's action in this regard violat-
ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The General Counsel also alleges that the Respondent
engaged in surface bargaining with no intention of reach-
ing an agreement . I do not agree . The evidence does dis-
close that the Respondent was determined to have the
wage structure revised so that the changes it desired could
be put into effect immediately upon expiration of the con-
tract and attempted to seek acceptance from the Union to
one of its proposals, albeit unsuccessfully. The fact that
Matthey was firm in his insistence that the commission not
exceed 15 percent does not form a basis for concluding he
had no desire to reach an agreement. I shall accordingly
dismiss this allegation.
In addition to my finding above that the Respondent's
unilateral change violated the Act, I also conclude that
Respondent engaged in further violations of Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act by threatening the employees with discharge at
the expiration of the contract upon their failure to accept
Respondent 's contemplated changes in the wage structure.
The effect of such threats was to coerce the employees to
accept Respondent's terms and to induce them to abandon
their activity on behalf of the Union, thereby undermining
the Union's bargaining position in the forthcoming negoti-
ations.
With respect to the status of Behrens, Dreyfus, and
Walker, the General Counsel contends they were construc-
tively discharged. The Respondent on the other hand takes
the position that when they refused to accept either of
Matthey's proposals, they refused to continue working and
thereby engaged in a work stoppage and assumed the sta-
tus of strikers. One may liken this to which came first, the
chicken or the egg.
In considering this issue, a brief review of the facts is
appropriate. The employees had no knowledge of the pro-
posals put on the bargaining table by either party and were
deeply concerned as to what would happen when the con-
tract expired. The Union had not discussed a cessation of
work and the employees were fully prepared to and intend-
ed to report for work on December 3, the next working day
following the expiration of the contract. But without any
explanation and departing from the customary practice,
the truck keys were taken from the unit employees when
they returned from their routes on November 30, the last
28 Under plan B the driver-salesmen would no longer be considered em-
ployees
day of the contract period. They had no intimation this
would be taken and had to seek their own way to return to
their homes . Considering their apprehension as to their sta-
tus at the end of the contract period, the employees were
amply justified in assuming they were terminated. When
they reported the next morning to meet with Matthey pur-
suant to instructions, they were asked to work under one of
the two proposed plans of Matthey. None responded he
would work under either plan. Matthey did not say they
were fired or laid off nor did he inquire whether they
would continue to work under the existing conditions.
Matthey's conduct at these meetings with the employees,
following the appropriation of the truck keys the day be-
fore, would logically lead the employees to believe their
tenure of employment was concluded. Under these circum-
stances, I reject the Respondent 's contention they were
strikers. Whether they were discharged or laid off is only a
question of semantics . The plain fact is they were refused
continued employment. The refusal of the Respondent to
permit them to continue working was because the condi-
tions imposed by the Respondent were not acceptable to
the employees . Either of its proposals constituted a sub-
stantial change in the wage structure regardless of the ef-
fect on the actual take home pay. Moreover under plan B
their status as employees may have been lost. Imposing
these conditions upon the employees at a time when Re-
spondent was obligated to retain the existing working con-
ditions, was unlawful. It was no less unlawful than condi-
tioning continued employment upon abandonment of the
Union. The employees had the protected right to insist that
the existing wage provisions be retained at this time inas-
much as no impasse had been reached. Accordingly, I find
that by requiring the three named employees to accept uni-
laterally imposed changes in the wages, together with the
prospect of losing their employee status, as a condition of
continued employment, the Respondent thereby construc-
tively terminated their employment in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.?"
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of Re-
spondent described in section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all times material herein, the Union has been the
29 It would be entirely speculative to assume that absent his termination
on December 1, Walker would or would not have fully processed his retire-
ment papers Under the circumstances , I shall provide for the usual remedy
for an unlawfully discharged employee
DUST-TEX SERVICE, INC.
exclusive bargaining representative of the Respondent's
employees in the following appropriate unit:
All driver-salesmen employed by Respondent at its St.
Louis, Missouri, facility, excluding office clerical em-
ployees, professional employees, guards, supervisors
as defined in the Act, and all other employees.
4. By putting into effect on December 1, 1973, the pro-
posals previously submitted to the Union without bargain-
ing collectively with it concerning these proposals to an
impasse, the Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor
practice in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
5. By negotiating terms or conditions of employment di-
rectly with the employees and threatening them with termi-
nation in absence of their acceptance of its proposals, the
Respondent thereby has engaged in unfair labor practices
in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act and has interfered
with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed in Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By terminating Charles Behrens, David Dreyfus, and
Kermit Walker on December 1, 1973, because of their re-
fusal to accept unlawfully imposed conditions of employ-
ment, the Respondent has thereby engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act.
7. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
8. Except for the foregoing, Respondent has committed
no unfair labor practices under the Act
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I will recommend that it be
ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
It having been found that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by taking certain unilateral ac-
tion regarding its proposals concerning wages and terms or
conditions of employment without first bargaining collec-
tively to an impasse about such proposals, and deeming it
appropriate that the employees in the bargaining unit be
restored to their employment status they enjoyed prior to
Respondent's unlawful unilateral action, I shall recom-
mend that Respondent be ordered to revoke the unilateral
changes in the wages and other terms or conditions of em-
ployment.
As the Respondent unlawfully terminated Charles Beh-
rens, David Dreyfus, and Kermit Walker, failed to rein-
state Walker and reemployed Dreyfus and Behrens under
its unlawfully imposed unilateral changed terms or condi-
tions of employment, I shall recommend that it reinstate
Walker and reinstall Behrens and Dreyfus to the positions
they held under the terms and conditions in existence prior
to its unlawful changes and make them whole for any loss
of pay they may have suffered by reason of its unlawful
modification of their wages, rates of pay, and terms and
conditions of employment. Backpay shall be computed on
a quarterly basis, plus interest at 6 percent annum, as pre-
407
scribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, from the date
of the unilateral changes to the date of their revocations.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER30
Respondent, Dust-Tex Service, Ind., its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as
the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in
the aforesaid appropriate unit, by changing the rates of
pay, wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employ-
ment of the employees without bargaining collectively with
the aforesaid Union to an impasse about such changes.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge or other disci-
plinary action in order to cause them to refrain from sup-
porting the Union.
(c) Dealing individually with its employees with respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours, or other terms or conditions
of employment in derogation of their exclusive bargaining
representative.
(d) Discouraging membership in the Union, or any
other labor organization by discriminatorily discharging its
employees or by discriminating in any other manner with
respect to their hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment.
(e) In any like or related manner, interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Reinstall Charles Behrens and David Dreyfus to the
positions they held under the terms and conditions prior to
the unilateral changes made to the working conditions ex-
isting on November 30, 1973, without loss of seniority or
other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any
loss of earnings they may have suffered in the manner set
forth in "The Remedy" section of this Decision.
(b) Offer to Kermit Walker immediate and full rein-
statement to his former job or, if his former job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without loss of
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him
whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered in the
manner set forth in "The Remedy" section of this Deci-
sion.
(c) Revoke the unilateral changes made to the working
conditions existing on November 30, 1973.
30 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
408 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(d) Post at its plant in St. Louis, Missouri , copies of the ized representative , shall be posted by the Respondent im-
attached notice marked "Appendix ." 31 Copies of the no - mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60
tice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re - consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, includ-
gion 14 , after being duly signed by Respondent 's author- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
31 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United ered by any other material.
States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order (e) Notify the Regional Director , in writing , within 20of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
days from the date of this Order , what steps the Respon-National of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board " dent has taken to comply herewith.