Dunbinclipped Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 21, 2003

339 N.L.R.B. 1104 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1104
Dunbinclipped Inc. t/a Great Clips and Henrietta
Hindle. Case 5–CA–29452
August 21, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS WALSH
AND ACOSTA
The General Counsel seeks a default judgment1 in this
case on the ground that the Respondent has failed to file
a legally sufficient answer to the complaint. Upon a
charge filed by Henrietta Hindle on January 17, 2001, the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
issued a complaint on March 26, 2001, against Dunbin-
clipped Inc., t/a Great Clips, the Respondent, alleging
that it has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act. Copies of the charge and complaint were
properly served on the Respondent. On April 27, 2001,
the Respondent filed an answer and motion for bill of
particulars, which generally denied the allegations in the
complaint.
On May 2, 2001, the General Counsel filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment with the Board. On May 15,
2001, the Board issued an Order transferring the
proceeding to the Board and a Notice to Show Cause
why the motion should not be granted. On May 29,
2001, the Respondent filed a response and opposition,
with an attachment.

The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Ruling on Motion for Default Judgment
Section 102.20 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations
provides that a respondent “shall specifically admit,
deny, or explain each of the facts alleged in the com-
plaint, unless the respondent is without knowledge, in
which case the respondent shall so state, such statement
operating as a denial.” Section 102.20 further provides
that “any allegation in the complaint not specifically de-
nied or explained in an answer filed, unless the respon-
dent shall state in the answer that he is without knowl-
edge,” shall be deemed admitted unless good cause is
shown. On April 27, 2001, the Respondent filed an an-
swer and motion for bill of particulars, in which the Re-
spondent stated, inter alia: “The allegations in the Com-
plaint are denied. Respondent demands strict proof
thereof.”2

1 The General Counsel’s motion requests summary judgment on the
ground that the Respondent has failed to file a legally sufficient answer
to the complaint. Accordingly, we construe the General Counsel’s
motion as a motion for default judgment.
2 Sec. 102.20 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations also requires that
answers be filed within 14 days from service of the complaint. Pursu-
In his Motion, the General Counsel contends that the
Respondent’s general denial is legally insufficient be-
cause it fails to specifically admit, deny, or explain each
of the facts alleged in the complaint. In its response and
opposition (response), the Respondent stated, in relevant
part, as follows:
1. SPECIFIC DENIAL. The Complaint’s two or three
“facts”1 were denied. A more specific denial would
have unfairly burdened the Respondent, i.e., the literal
meaning would shift depending on whether the last
three clauses of the sentence in paragraph Four were
read as dependent or mispunctuated independent
clauses.
__________________
1 Described in about fifty words comprising two sentences.

Complaint paragraph 4 reads as follows:
On or about December 1, 2000, Respondent’s em-
ployee Henrietta Hindle concertedly complained to Re-
spondent, regarding the wages, hours and working
conditions of Respondent’s employees, by calling [Re-
spondent’s vice president] Ed Spirko and telling him
that all of the stylists were ready to start finding other
jobs, because they thought that it was unfair for man-
agement to terminate the employment of stylists Kim
Carrington and Tammy Bennett.
The Respondent further asserts in its response that it pro-
vided the Region a memorandum setting forth a detailed
chronology. A copy of this memorandum, dated February
16, 2001, is attached to the response. It is a copy of the Re-
spondent’s precomplaint statement of position submitted to
the Region during its investigation of the charge.
We find that the Respondent’s answer does not consti-
tute a proper answer to the complaint allegations under
Section 102.20 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations
because it fails to address any of the factual or legal alle-
gations of the complaint, and therefore is legally insuffi-
cient under the Board’s Rules.3 We are also unpersuaded

ant to Sec. 102.20, the Respondent’s deadline for filing an answer was
April 9, 2001, which the Respondent failed to meet. However, by letter
dated April 13, 2001, the General Counsel extended the Respondent’s
answering deadline until April 27, 2001. Thus, the timeliness of the
Respondent’s answer is not at issue.
3 See Jet Electric Co., Inc., 334 NLRB 1059 (2001) (finding insuffi-
cient a letter stating, “I deny all complaints directed at me . . . or my
company”); Central Apex Reproductions, 330 NLRB 1163 fn. 1 (2000)
(finding insufficient an answer “admitting” a fact not alleged in the
complaint, and further stating that “[e]ach allegation of fact not herein
above specifically admitted, is specifically and categorically denied,
and strict proof required thereof”); Eckert Fire Protection Co., 329
NLRB 920 (1999) (finding insufficient a memorandum stating, “After
talking with my attorney, I have the following response to the charges:
I deny any and all charges referenced above”); Triple H Fire Protec-
tion, Inc., 326 NLRB 463, 463–464 (1998) (finding insufficient a letter
339 NLRB No. 143
DUNBINCLIPPED INC. 1105
by the Respondent’s claim that a more specific answer
would have been unfairly burdensome. Complaint para-
graph 4 is not a model of correct punctuation, but it is not
ambiguous. Further, the response offers no explanation
whatsoever for the Respondent’s failure to specifically
deny or explain the allegations in the complaint’s other
paragraphs. Thus, we find that the Respondent has failed
to show good cause for the insufficiency of its answer.
In addition, we do not accept as an amended answer the
precomplaint statement of position that the Respondent
attached to its response. “[S]tatements of position, in-
cluding information submitted during the precomplaint
investigative phase, are insufficient to constitute answers
to complaints.” Mail Handlers Local 329 (Postal Ser-
vice), 319 NLRB 847 (1995).4
Our dissenting colleague states that he would not grant
default judgment here because answers that simply repeat
“denied” for every individual complaint paragraph are
routinely accepted, and the difference between such an
answer and the Respondent’s single denial of all allega-
tions “is not one of substance.” If one could be certain
that every respondent that answers a complaint with a
general denial actually intends to deny each separate
allegation in the complaint, then the specificity require-
ment of Section 102.20 would at least arguably be satis-
fied. But that is not the case. Indeed, in its response, the
Respondent made it clear that it had intended in its an-
swer to deny only “two or three ‘facts’” set forth in “two
sentences” of the complaint. The General Counsel, for
example, has no way to know whether jurisdictional facts
are denied and thus whether jurisdiction is to be litigated
before the administrative law judge. Yet, under our col-
league’s approach, this answer would suffice to put at
issue every allegation in the complaint, with the result
that the General Counsel would be needlessly put to the
proof on such matters as service of the charge, jurisdic-
tion, and agency. Thus, the procedural uncertainty cre-
ated here by the Respondent’s failure specifically to ad-
mit or deny each allegation in the complaint perfectly
illustrates why Section 102.20 requires specificity: to
“facilitate the joining of the issues and reduce the area of
litigation . . . in order that the rights of parties may be
more quickly established and wrongs sooner rectified.”

denying “any and all accusations”); Breeden Painting Co., 314 NLRB
870 fn. 1 (1994) (finding insufficient a letter stating that respondent
“denies the complaint”); Parisian Manicure Mfg. Co., 258 NLRB 203,
204 (1981) (finding insufficient a letter stating, “We Deny the allega-
tions stated in the notice you sent us”).
4 We note that the Respondent is represented by counsel in this pro-
ceeding. Cf. Central States Xpress, 324 NLRB 442 (1997) (accepting
precomplaint statement of position as answer where, inter alia, respon-
dent was acting pro se); Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center, 331 NLRB
1032 (2000) (same).
Pipeline Construction Workers, Local 692 (Fulhgum
Construction Corp.), 248 NLRB 1315, 1316 (1980).
Thus, the specificity requirement of Section 102.20 is not
a mere formality but rather springs from a concern about
the substantive rights of the parties. See Eckert Fire
Protection Co., supra, 329 NLRB at 921.
Our dissenting colleague feels that we have ignored
the Respondent’s answer to the complaint. In light of the
above discussion, it is quite clear that we have not.
Rather, we have considered the answer and found it to be
clearly inadequate under our Rules.
In the absence of good cause being shown for the fail-
ure to file a legally sufficient answer, we grant the Gen-
eral Counsel’s motion for default judgment.
On the entire record, the Board makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, the Respondent, a franchise with
four salons located throughout the State of Maryland,
including a salon in Belair, Maryland, has been engaged
in providing discount hair care services to its customers.
During the 12 months preceding issuance of the com-
plaint, the Respondent, in conducting its business opera-
tions, derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000, and
purchased and received at its four salons goods and ma-
terials valued in excess of $5000 directly from points
located outside the State of Maryland. We find that the
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
On or about December 1, 2000, the Respondent’s em-
ployee Henrietta Hindle concertedly complained to the
Respondent by telling its vice president, Edward Spirko,
that all of the stylists were ready to start finding other
jobs because they thought that it was unfair for manage-
ment to terminate the employment of stylists Kim Car-
rington and Tammy Bennett. Because Hindle engaged in
this conduct, and to discourage employees from engaging
in such concerted activities, the Respondent discharged
Hindle on or about December 4, 2000.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
By the conduct described above, the Respondent has
been interfering with, restraining, and coercing employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1106
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically, having
found that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by discharging employee Henrietta Hindle, we
shall order the Respondent to offer her full reinstatement
to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a sub-
stantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or any other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed. We shall also order the Respondent to make
Hindle whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
suffered as a result of the discharge. Backpay shall be
computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90
NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as prescribed in New
Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). The
Respondent shall also be required to remove from its
files any reference to Hindle’s discharge, and to notify
her in writing that this has been done.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Dunbinclipped Inc., t/a Great Clips, Belair,
Maryland, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees for engaging in concerted activities and in
order to discourage employees from engaging in con-
certed activities.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Henrietta Hindle full reinstatement to her former job or,
if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to her seniority or any other
rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Henrietta Hindle whole for any loss of earn-
ings and other benefits resulting from her unlawful dis-
charge, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of
this decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the unlawful discharge of
Henrietta Hindle, and within 3 days thereafter, notify her
in writing that this has been done and that her discharge
will not be used against her in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good-cause shown, provide at a reasonable place to be
designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by Region 5, post at its
facility in Belair, Maryland, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”5 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 5, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respon-
dent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during
the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since December 4, 2000.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps the Respondent has taken to comply.

CHAIRMAN BATTISTA, dissenting.
It is not unusual for a respondent/defendant, in answer
to a complaint in a civil case, to simply say “denied”
with respect to individual paragraphs of the complaint.
Such denials are routinely accepted. In the instant case,
the Respondent stated, albeit once, that all of the allega-
tions are denied. The difference between the two forms
of denial is not one of substance.
My colleagues say that they are not sure that the Re-
spondent denied the allegations of the complaint. My
colleagues have seemingly ignored the most important
document—the answer to the complaint. The answer,
filed on April 23, stated that “the allegations of the com-
plaint are denied. Respondent demands strict proof
thereof.” One wonders what would be plainer.
Instead of focusing on the answer to the complaint, my
colleagues focus exclusively on the response to the Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment. That response is to be read
in the context of the motion to which it responds. The

5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DUNBINCLIPPED INC. 1107
motion had asserted that the general denial of the answer
was not sufficient. The response to the motion explained
that specific denials were not used because of the multi-
ple character of the allegations of complaint paragraph 4.
Irrespective of whether that response is a valid expla-
nation of why the answer contained a general denial
(rather than a specific one), the critical fact is that the
answer contained a denial. There could be no confusion
on the General Counsel’s part. With particular respect to
jurisdiction, the General Counsel could either seek a
stipulation of fact or be prepared to prove the allegation
at trial.
Accordingly, I would not take the drastic step of im-
posing a forfeiture on Respondent’s right to contest the
allegations of the complaint. I would not grant default
judgment.1
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union

1 I adopt the dissenting opinions in All American Fire Protection,
Inc., 336 NLRB 767 (2001); Jet Electric Co., Inc., 334 NLRB 1059
(2001); and Eckert Fire Protection Co., 329 NLRB 920 (1999).
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your
behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.

WE WILL NOT discharge you or otherwise discriminate
against you for engaging in concerted activities and in
order to discourage you from engaging in concerted ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, offer Henrietta Hindle full reinstatement to her
former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substan-
tially equivalent position, without prejudice to her senior-
ity or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Henrietta Hindle whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits resulting from her unlawful
discharge, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful discharge of Henrietta Hindle, and WE WILL, within 3
days thereafter, notify her in writing that this has been
done and that her discharge will not be used against her
in any way.
DUNBINCLIPPED INC. T/A GREAT CLIPS