Dravo Lime Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 1998

326 N.L.R.B. 1222 (N.L.R.B. 1998)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1222
Dravo Lime Company, Maysville Division and United
Mine Workers of America, District 17, AFL–
CIO. Case 9–CA–33609
September 30, 1998
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, HURTGEN, AND BRAME
On September 24, 1997, Administrative Law Judge
Richard H. Beddow Jr. issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to
affirm the judge's rulings, findings,1 and conclusions2
and to adopt the recommended Order.

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility
findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance
of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Stan-
dard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d
Cir. 1951 ). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis
for reversing the findings.
The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is denied,
as the record, exceptions, and brief adequately present the issues and
the positions of the parties.
2 The judge concluded, and we agree, that the Respondent violated
Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee Jack Gilbert.
In this regard, we note that the judge did not specifically find that the
Respondent harbored animus against Gilbert for his union activities.
However, we find that the record amply demonstrates such animus,
because the Respondent has effectively admitted an antiunion motive.
Its termination letter to Gilbert referred to an earlier incident in which
he allegedly “threatened” a supervisor who had given him a warning.
In that episode, according to the credited testimony, Gilbert told Plant
Production Superintendent Michael Hartley that “you've got to do what
you've got to do and I've got to do what I've got to do, which is call the
Union.” As the judge found, an employee who has just been disci-
plined has the protected right to take his problem to a union, and cannot
be further disciplined for announcing his intention to do so, absent
other abusive conduct not present here. By citing Gilbert's “threat” to
go to the Union as part of the reason for firing him, the Respondent has
admitted that union animus contributed to his discharge. See Precision
Industries, 320 NLRB 661, 661 (1996), enfd. 118 F.3d 585 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. denied 118 S.Ct. 1299 (1998). Accordingly, under all the
circumstances of this case, and in light of the pretextual nature of the
proffered reasons for Gilbert's discharge, we find that discharge was
unlawful.
In finding antiunion animus, Member Brame does not rely on the
Respondent's statements of opposition to the Union's organizing, de-
scribed in sec. III, par. 1 of the judge's decision. He finds these state-
ments are protected by Sec. 8(c) of the Act. See Holo-Krome Co. v.
NLRB, 907 F.2d 1343, 1345–1347 (2d Cir. 1990), and cases cited
therein, and Medeco Security Locks, Inc. v. NLRB, 142 F.3d 733, 744
(4th Cir. 1998).
The Respondent excepts to the judge's finding that Gilbert is entitled
to reinstatement. It contends that the judge erred by precluding it from
fully litigating subsequently acquired evidence of misconduct allegedly
sufficient to disqualify Gilbert from reinstatement. The Respondent
argued (i.e., its ninth proffered affirmative defense) that Gilbert “physi-
cally and verbally threatened an incumbent employee of the Respon-
dent and verbally threatened such employee's spouse,” and that this
conduct would have warranted Gilbert's termination on November 1,
1996. When the Respondent raised this issue, the General Counsel
suggested it should be addressed at the compliance stage of this pro-
ceeding. The judge granted the General Counsel's motion to strike this
defense, along with certain other affirmative defenses offered by the
Respondent. The judge allowed the Respondent to make a written offer
of proof as to the stricken defenses. The Respondent did so. In fn. 4 of
his decision, however, the judge appears to reject the offer of proof and
to decide the reinstatement issue as if the matter had been fully litigated
at the hearing. Under these circumstances, we do not adopt fn. 4 of the
judge's decision, and instead we shall permit the Respondent to pursue
this matter in compliance proceedings.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Dravo Lime Company,
Maysville Division, Maysville, Kentucky, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Order.

Engrid Emerson Vaughan, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Don T. Carmody, Esq., of Kirhonkson, New York, for the Re-
spondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD H. BEDDOW JR., Administrative Law Judge. This
matter was heard in Cincinnati, Ohio, on March 12 and May
12–14, 1997. Subsequent to an extension in the filing date
briefs were filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent.
The proceeding is based upon a charge filed February 15,
1996,1 by United Mine Workers of America, District 17, AFL–
CIO. The Regional Director's complaint dated May 2, as
amended alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by discharg-
ing employee Jack Gilbert because of his union or other pro-
tected concerted activities.
Upon a review of the entire record2 in this case and from my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is engaged in the mining, distribution and sale of
lime. It annually ships goods valued in excess of $50,000 from
its Maysville location to points outside Kentucky. It admits
that at all times material is has been an employer engaged in
operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. It also admits that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.

Member Hurtgen emphasizes that his decision here is limited to the
particular and peculiar facts of this case. On these facts, and given the
blatantly pretextual reasons for Gilbert's discharge asserted by the Re-
spondent, he agrees that the discharge violated the Act.
1 All following dates will be in 1996 unless otherwise indicated.
2 I affirm all rulings on motions and objections made prior to conclu-
sion of the hearing and find no need to discuss further matters pertain-
ing to the Respondent's so called affirmative defenses except as it re-
lates to the reinstatement remedy and as discussed below.
326 NLRB No. 118
DRAVO LIME CO. 1223
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Respondent has operated a lime mining and processing
facility at Maysville for many years. Jack Gilbert was a long-
term employee having been employed there from August 1976
until his discharge in February 1996. Gilbert had been the
primary employee behind some prior union campaigns as well
as the most recent 1995 campaign on behalf of the United Mine
Workers. His longstanding union advocacy was prominent and
well known among the management and hourly personnel at the
Maysville facilities. Gilbert initiated the 1995 campaign by
handing out flyers and acting as liaison between the Union and
the employees by setting up and notifying employees of union
meetings. During late fall and early winter of 1995, the Union
generated some employee interest, and scheduled a meeting for
February 1996, after the holidays.
On the morning of February 9, before any union meeting was
held, Gilbert's carpool was delayed when the designated
driver's vehicle would not start. After some failed efforts to
start the vehicle, it was decided that Gilbert would drive his
truck to work, although Gilbert had promised the use of his
truck that day to the son of his girl friend that the son would
have to be notified to make other arrangements. There were no
easily assessable phone on the route to work but otherwise
Gilbert was aware of the company phone procedures and on
arrival at work he looked for a supervisor to get an okay to use
the phone. He testified that he checking both the offices of
Supervisor Danny Pruitt and Plant Maintenance Supervisor
Kenny Flack but did not see either of them. He passed by the
phones in the empty offices and went to the nearby warehouse
where he saw Jerry Barbour the employee in charge of the
warehouse at his desk looking over some paper work. Gilbert
testified that it was 20 minutes before his 7 a.m. starting time
and that he asked if he could use the phone, and Barbour looked
up, nodded “yes” and went back to his paperwork. He reached
for the phone on Barbour's desk and verbally confirm with
Barbour that he had to push “9” for an outside line and then
made a 2- to 3-minute phone call. While on the phone he saw
Electrician Supervisor Jerry Armstrong walk by an adjoining
area.
At between 9:30 and 10 a.m. company manager and vice
president, Jim McCann, came to Gilbert's work area and asked
if he had used the phone prior to going to work. When he an-
swered yes he was instructed to come back to Kenny Flack's
office with McCann. They then went to the conference room
when McCann asked Gilbert if he knew the Company's policy
about using the phone. Gilbert said he did and that he had
asked Barbour for permission. McCann said lets go ask “Jerry”
and they went to the warehouse. Barbour was questioned and
responded that he did not recall. They returned to the confer-
ence room and McCann told Gilbert he was terminated pending
hearing.
Gilbert thereafter requested a hearing before the company
peer review committee and on February 15 was given a letter
(confirming a phone call the previous day) terminating him
immediately “for using a Company telephone for personal use
in violation of Company policy.” The letter also added the
following:

Moreover, during my initial investigation into this
matter, during which you were informed of you suspen-
sion, at the conclusion of the meeting with Kenny Flack,
you made threatening and coercive remarks. This is the
second time you have made such remarks to a supervisor
in recent months.
As you also know, you have been previously disci-
plined for repeated occurrences of similar behavior, and
have nevertheless failed to heed a Final Written Warning,
issued on 9/12/95.
Your conduct warrants your termination.
III. DISCUSSION
In proceedings involving changes in conditions of employ-
ment and disciplinary action against employees, applicable law
requires that the General Counsel meet an initial burden of
presenting sufficient evidence to support an inference that the
employee's union or other protected concerted activities were a
motivating factor in the employer's decision to change their
conditions of employment or to discipline them. Here, the
record shows Gilbert was an open proponent of a new organiza-
tional drive and that the Respondent was aware of the em-
ployee's past union activity and knew that he had repeatedly
supported prior attempt to organize the employees. It also is
shown that shortly after Gilbert's November 30 union organiza-
tional meeting (which the Respondent admitted knew about
prior to the meeting), Vice President McCann told Gilbert that
he did not think “we” needed a union, that it would tie “their”
hands, “they” could not be flexible with a union, and he did not
understand why “we” wanted a union.
Under these circumstances and in view of the timing of the
Respondent's actions in terminating Gilbert before the second
union meeting could occur, I find that the General Counsel has
met his initial burden by presenting a showing sufficient to
support an inference that the employee's union activities were a
motivating factor in Respondent's subsequent decision to ter-
minate him. Accordingly, the testimony will be discussed and
the record evaluated in keeping with the criteria set forth in
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), see NLRB v. Transporta-
tion Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), to consider Re-
spondent's defense and whether the General Counsel has car-
ried his overall burden.
As pointed out by the Court, in Transportation Management
Corp., supra:

[A]n employer cannot simply present a legitimate reason for
its action but must persuade by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the same action would have taken place even in the
absence of the protected concerted activity.

Here, the record shows that Gilbert was a long-term employee,
however, he was a prime initiator of efforts to bring in a union
and his latest efforts in union organizing was to promote a
meeting of interested employee to be held in February. Before
the meeting could be held he was terminated for allegedly using
a company phone in violation of company policy, an action that
resulted in an effective end to any union organizational activi-
ties.
The Respondent argues that Gilbert was fired because he was
observed using the phone by Kenneth Flack, Respondent's plant
maintenance superintendent, who, knowing that Gilbert had not
yet begun work, immediately asking Gilbert's direct supervisor,
Danny Pruitt whether he had granted Gilbert's permission.
Upon being told that he had not, Flack told McCann (the Com-
pany's work manager at that time), of the apparent violation of
the Company's telephone policy. McCann met with Flack later
in the morning, and Flack explained that he had not given Gil-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1224
bert permission to use the telephone and that he had asked
Pruitt whether he had given Gilbert permission and was told
“no.” Superintendent Flack did not exercise his own authority
to question Gilbert when he saw Gilbert on the phone but de-
ferred any timely confirmation and brought this seemingly
minor incident to the immediate attention of McCann, the most
senior management representative on site. This action would
seem to be unusual were it not for the fact that Gilbert was not
just any employee but was known to be one engaged in a new
union organizing effort and McCann had questioned why Gil-
bert or the employees would want a union that would tie man-
agement's hands.
After getting Gilbert to accompany him back to the main of-
fice, McCann asked Flack to repeat for Gilbert what he had
observed earlier that morning and accused Gilbert of using of a
Company telephone without permission. When Gilbert then
said that he had been given permission to use the telephone by
Jerry Barbour, they went directly to the warehouse, and
McCann asked Barbour whether he had given Gilbert permis-
sion to use the telephone. Barbour stated that Gilbert had asked
him how to get an “outside line,” but that he could not recall
Gilbert having asked for permission to use the telephone.
McCann then reminded Gilbert that he had been placed on a
“Final Written Warning” several months previously, told him
that he had violated company policy by his use of the telephone
without permission, and immediately told him that he was be-
ing suspended, pending termination. Gilbert responded imme-
diately by stating to McCann, in a “firm” tone of voice, words
to the effect “You've got problems.” When McCann reacted by
uttering words to the effect “You think so?” Gilbert responded
immediately with words to the effect “No, you've really got
problems!” McCann testified that he perceived Gilbert's re-
marks to the effect that he had “problems” as threatening.
As pointed out by the General Counsel the Respondent's em-
ployee handbook states that misconduct resulting in discipline
is divided into three groups and among the group A rules (vio-
lations of which are less serious in nature) is “unauthorized use
of the telephone during working hours.” The record reveals
that in about January 1995, in response to an egregious abuse of
phone use, involving astronomical long-distance bills racked up
by a particular employee, Respondent posted an additional
“Notice” referring to use of the telephone as follows:

Dravo Lime receives an itemized long-distance tele-
phone bill similar to the bill we all receive for our home
phone.
The use of company telephones should be for company
use not personal use.

Here, the records shows that both before and after this notice
the company supervisors had a practice of freely granting per-
mission for employees to use the phone for any emergency or
explained necessary reason. The record also shows that em-
ployees felt free to use the phone for their personal use espe-
cially in circumstances where either a supervisor was not read-
ily available for permission or it was a matter of personal ur-
gency.3

3 Nearly every employee witness who testified had used the phone
for personal use without prior supervisory permission. Indeed, the
testimony reveals an attitude that using the phone for personal use was
such an accepted practice that employees hardly gave it a thought.
Employee Larry Mason testified that employees “always use the
phone” and that he has been on the phone when a supervisor saw him
Here, I am not persuaded that the top plant official would be
immediately and directly involved in the accusation and inves-
tigation of a possible minor policy violation that occurred be-
fore work started (and without any loss of worktime) were it
not for Gilbert's notorious union activities and the budding new
organizational attempt.
While it appears that there was some past phone abuse at the
Company there is no showing at all that that abuse was related
or like Gilbert's use of the phone. Moreover, the notice that the
Respondent relies upon makes no mention of permission and I
find that the accepted practice at the facility was described by
the General Counsel's witnesses, see footnote 3. Here, the Re-
spondent's top manager accused Gilbert of a policy violation
and became personally involved in the preliminary investiga-
tion. This investigation did not disprove Gilbert's defense that
he had obtained permission to use the warehouse phone. In fact
McCann learned from Barbour that Gilbert had asked him how
to get an outside line, a statement that would tend to corrobo-
rate Gilbert's claim. While Barbour then said he didn't “recall”
whether Gilbert had actually asked “permission,” McCann
chose not to credit Gilbert but immediately reached the oppo-
site conclusion, told Gilbert he had acted without permission
and fired him.
At best, Barbour's statement was not conclusive and, in the
light of the regular company practices regarding phone use,
McCann's decision to immediately terminate a 20-year em-
ployee under these circumstances appears to be specious and
pretextual.
The additional charge in Gilbert's letter of termination that he
made “threatening and coercive remarks” after he was told he
was terminated pending hearing for merely saying, “[Y]ou've
got problems” (in an apparent reference to Gilbert's thoughts of
pursuing unfair labor changes), actually tend to further indicate
the pretextual nature of the Respondent's claim.
The letter claimed that Gilbert had made such remarks to an-
other supervisor in recent months and the Respondent called
Plant Production Superintendent Michael Hartley who testified
that after he gave Gilbert a written warning in late 1995, as
Gilbert was leaving, Gilbert was not happy with it and said;
“[I]n a rather stern voice. He wasn't screaming or yelling”—
“[Y]ou've got to do what you've got to do and I've got to do
what I've got to do.” Hartley then reported those last remarks

and received no disciplinary action. Employee Charles Williams testi-
fied that he knew of no restrictions on the phone and used it to call
home to check on his wife on occasion and that his supervisor had seen
him using it without prior permission, but he received no disciplinary
action therefor. Employee Mike Yates, likewise testified that just about
everybody used it and that he had, during a period of time, called home
about two or three times a month. If a supervisor was there, he asked
but if not, he went ahead, which was something “everybody did” with
no resultant threat of disciplinary action. In addition, during the time in
question, Yates acted as a fill-in supervisor but never received any
instructions with regard to allowing or denying employees the use of
the phones, and he never denied any employee such use. Employee
Allen Hickle testified that one time he was talking to his son, and his
supervisor, Pruitt, walked in, and Hickle simply told him he was check-
ing on his son. Hickle received no disciplinary action. Likewise, em-
ployee Ronnie Sartan testified that employees use the phones for per-
sonal use and that he had used the warehouse phone, without prior
permission and even though the warehouseman saw him, he was not
disciplined. Gary Maddox testified that the practice with regard to the
phone was “just to use it;” and Randy Lewis, likewise testified that
employees used the phones whenever they wanted.
DRAVO LIME CO. 1225
to McCann. Gilbert agreed that he made these remarks to Hart-
ley but credibly testified that he also said what he had to do,
“which is call the union.”
The direct or implied threat to an employer that an employee
who has just been disciplined will refer his problem to a union
is a protected activity and cannot be a justifiable basis for disci-
pline unless accompanied by independently abusive words or
behavior neither of which is shown to have occurred in these
two instances and I reaffirm my conclusion that the Respon-
dent's overall reasons for Gilbert's discharge are pretextual.
Here, the record shows that the Respondent had a generally
permissive policy for the local use of company phones and that
it seized upon one ambiguous possible breach of a strict inter-
pretation of the rule to immediately discharge a long-term em-
ployee who happened to be a known union activist. These facts
and the factors discussed above persuasively show that Gilbert
was unjustifiably subjected to disparate treatment and I find
that the record supports a conclusion that Gilbert's discharge
was motivated by a discriminatory intent based on his union
activities and his position as a primary union activist, see Broy-
hill & Associates, 296 NLRB 904 (1989).
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Respondent
has failed to shown that Gilbert would have been discharged
absent his union activities and protected concerted activity.
The General Counsel otherwise has met its overall burden of
proof and I further conclude that Respondent's discharge of
Gilbert is shown to have been in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act, as alleged.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Jack Gilbert on February 9 and 15, 1996,
respectively, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices, it is recommended that the Respondent be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and to take the affirmative action
described below which is designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
With respect to the necessary affirmative action, it is rec-
ommended that Respondent be ordered to reinstate4 Jack Gil-
bert to his former job or, if that job no longer exist, to a sub-
stantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority
or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make him
whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered because of

4 The Respondent contends that Gilbert should be denied reinstate-
ment because he made a threat to the spouse of another employee.
Gilbert testified that a month or two before the hearing he received a
phone call from the wife of another employee who said:
Is this the same Jack Gilbert that told my husband he needed
a set of balls? I said yes, it is. She said would you like to say that
to my face? I said yes, I would. She said if you say that to me
I'll slap you. I said if you slap me I'll knock you on your ass and
hung up the phone.
In this instance I find that Gilbert did not initiate the confrontation
and his alleged threat was impulsive and defensive in nature and is not
so egregious as render him unfit for further employment, see Consumer
Power Co., 282 NLRB 130, 132 (1986).
the discrimination practiced against him by payment to him a
sum of money equal to that which he normally would have
earned from the date of the discrimination to the date of rein-
statement, in accordance with the method set forth in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as com-
puted in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987),5 and that Respondent expunge from its files any refer-
ence to the discharge, as well as the unlawfully warning, and
notify him in writing that this has been done and that evidence
of this unlawful discipline will not be used as basis for future
personnel action against him.
Otherwise, it is not considered to be necessary that a broad
order be issued.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended6
ORDER
The Respondent, Dravo Lime Company, Maysville Division,
Maysville, Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging any employee for activity protected by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Jack
Gilbert full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previ-
ously enjoyed.
(b) Make Jack Gilbert whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
him, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the deci-
sion.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to Jack Gilbert unlawful discharge and
within 3 days thereafter notify him in writing that this has been
done and that the evidence of unlawful discharge will not be
used against them in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Or-
der.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cilities in Maysville, Kentucky, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”7 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
5 Under New Horizons, interest is computed at the “short-term Fed-
eral rate” for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amend-
ment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621. Interest accrued before 1 January 1987 (the
effective date of the amendment) shall be computed as in Florida Steel
Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
6 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1226
by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being signed by the
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since June 28,
1995.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT discharge any employee for activity on behalf
of United Mine Workers of America, District 17, AFL–CIO, or
any other union or for any activity protected by Section 7 of the
Act.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board's Order,
offer Jack Gilbert full reinstatement to his former job or, if that
job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Jack Gilbert whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits resulting from his discharge, less any net
interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board's Order,
remove from our files any reference to Jack Gilbert's discharge
and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify him in writing that
this has been done and that the evidence of unlawful discharge
will not be used against him in any way.

DRAVO LIME COMPANY, MAYSVILLE DIVISION