Dobbs Houses, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsFeb 7, 1964

145 N.L.R.B. 1565 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

DOBBS HOUSES, INC. 1565 RECOMMENDED ORDER Tidewater Oil Company, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from discouraging membership in United Petroleum Workers, Independent , or any other labor organization , by discriminatorily denying reinstate- ment to any employee because he has engaged in a protected strike or other con- certed activity. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to Robert Currie immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges , and make him whole in the manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy" for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against him. (b) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the Board and its agents, for examination and copying , all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards , personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary and per- tinent to compute the amount of backpay and to ascertain the right to reinstatement. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Second Region, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.23 21 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." Dobbs Houses, Inc. and Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union , AFL-CIO, Local 151. Case No. 10-CA-5276. February 7, 1964 DECISION AND ORDER On November 12, 1963, Trial Examiner John P. von Rohr issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re- spondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Decision. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem- bers Leedom and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that, no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner. [The Board dismissed the complaint.] 145 NLRB No. 155. 1566 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge duly filed on March 19, 1963, the General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board , for the Regional Director of the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia ), issued a complaint on June 21 , 1963, against Dobbs Houses, Inc., herein called the Respondent , alleging that it had engaged in certain unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 ( a)(1) and ( 3) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, as amended , 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. The Respondent 's answer denies the allegation of unlawful conduct alleged in the complaint. Pursuant to notice , a hearing was held in Atlanta, Georgia , on August 19 and 20, 1963, before Trial Examiner John P. von Rohr. All parties were represented by counsel and were afforded opportunity to adduce evidence , to examine and cross- examine witnesses , and to file briefs . Briefs have been received from the General Counsel and from the Respondent and they have been carefully considered. Upon the entire record in this case , and from my observation of the witnesses, J hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent , a Tennessee corporation , is engaged in operating retail chain restaurants and catering services in various Southeastern States, including various eat- ing establishments at the Atlanta Municipal Airport at Atlanta, Georgia . During the past calendar year it received gross revenue in excess of $500 , 000 from its Opera- tions, and it purchased and received supplies valued in excess of $50,000 from sup- pliers located outside the State of Georgia . I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, Local 151, herein called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. A. The alleged discrimination against Mildred Knight The complaint alleges, and Respondent denies, that on February 8, 1963, employee Mildred Knight was discharged in violation of Section 8(a) (3) and ( 1) of the Act. As a matter of background , it is noted that this is the second unfair labor practice proceeding to be brought against the Respondent out of a situation involving a cam- paign by the Charging Union to organize the Respondent 's employees . This cam- paign began in January 1962 , and culminated with the certification of the Union on January 24, 1963, for a unit of all Dobbs Houses, Inc., employees at the Atlanta air- port operation .' Although Knight testified on behalf of the General Counsel in the aforementioned unfair labor practice proceeding ( the hearing was held on August 29 and 30, 1962 ), there is no allegation or contention that her discharge on February 8, 1963, was in violation of Section 8(a) (4) of the Act .2 Mrs. Knight was employed as a waitress in Respondent 's coffeeshop at the Atlanta airport since the first week of April 1961. She signed a union authorization card on January 15, 1962, and thereafter became an active adherent of the Union among Respondent 's employees. It is undisputed that Respondent was aware of Knight's espousal of the Union 's cause prior to her termination? Conceding that Mildred 1 The election , which the Union won , was held on October 16, 1962. 2 The Intermediate Report in this proceeding issued on October 23 , 1962 , in Case No. 10-.CA-4991 ( IR-468-62) In that case the Trial Examiner recommended dismissal of two alleged discriminatees , including the husband of Mrs Knight, but found that Re- spondent violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by unlawfully interrogating its employees and by threatening to prohibit tipping if the Union came in. The case subsequently was closed upon compliance with the Intermediate Report 3 This is evident not only by her testifying adversely to the Respondent in the preceding unfair labor practice case, but, as noted hereinafter, Respondent had occasion to warn Knight prior to her discharge for engaging in union activities on company time. It is further noted that on February 5, 1963 , the Union wrote a letter to William Fortas, the Respondent 's attorney, naming Knight as one of seven employees constituting the DOBBS HOUSES, INC. 1567 Knight was a capable waitress, Respondent asserts that during the last several months of her employment Knight's conduct and attitude caused her to become involved in a series of incidents, all of which necessitated her being cautioned or reprimanded therefor. These culminated in an incident occurring on February 7, 1963, at which time she allegedly engaged in certain derogatory conduct against her employer, this being asserted by the Respondent as the final and prompting reason for her discharge. These incidents are set forth in their chronological order as follows: 1. In latter December 1962, or in early January 1963, Knight voiced a complaint to Thelma Coates, the head hostess of the coffeeshop, concerning the hiring of one Pat McCurry, the latter a waitress in the coffeeshop. On this occasion Knight told Coates that McCurry was incapable of performing her work as a waitress and that when she (Coates) hired waitresses she should not hire inexperienced waitresses. Coates reported the foregoing to B. F. Buttrey, Respondent's general manager who is in overall charge of Respondent's Atlanta airport facilities, whereupon Knight was called into Buttrey's office and in essence was told by him not to criticize the hostesses 4 2. In the middle of January 1963,5 a customer who was being served by Knight complained to her about the small size of a steakburger. Knight thereupon called over Head Hostess Coates. Coates attempted to placate the customer by agreeing with him that the steakburger was not up to par and that it would take but a few minutes to get him another. According to Coates, whose testimony I credit, Knight thereupon spoke up in front of the customer and said, "Well, it won't do no good. All of them are that size and it won't be any larger." About this time the manager of the coffeeshop, Lynda Williams, appeared on the scene. When informed of the situation Williams also offered to have the steakburger replaced. According to the credited testimony of Williams and Coates, Knight again spoke up and repeated that it wouldn't do any good, that the steakburgers were all the same size. Williams reported the incident to Buttrey the following morning. Knight was then called into the office and criticized by Buttrey in the presence of Williams and Coates for mishandling a customer complaint. When called on rebuttal, Knight conceded that the steakburger incident occurred much as related but denied that she was ever called to Buttrey's office and spoken to about the matter. Not only is such denial not credited, but in the face of all of the other testimony such denials impels me to question her reliability as a witness in other instances where her testimony is in dispute. Thus, it was the corroborative testimony of Buttrey, Williams, and Coates, all of whom were present, that Knight was called into Buttrey's office where she was spoken to about the incident in question. From my observation of the witnesses, I have no hesitation in believing that this in fact occurred. As noted elsewhere in this report, this is not the only instance where Knight denied matters in the face of other corroborative and credited testimony. 3. Willie Louise Farr, a waitress employed by the Respondent since February 1961, testified that on January 15, 1963, Knight approached her during working hours and asked her if she was about ready to join the Union. Farr said that she answered in the negative and that later that day she reported the matter to Coates. On the following morning she also reported the incident to Buttrey, this because, as she testified, she knew it was against the rules to solicit during company time.6 Buttrey testified that upon receiving this report he called Knight into the office. On this occasion, he testified, "I only criticized her . . . rather than take drastic action." Knight did not deny that she solicited Farr, as Farr testified, but on rebuttal denied that Buttrey called her into his office and spoke to her about the matter. I do not credit Knight's denial as aforesaid; rather, in accordance with the credited testimony of Farr, Coates, and Buttrey, I find that Knight solicited Union's bargaining committee However, B. F Buttrey, Respondent's general manager who discharged Knight, testified without contradiction that he was not notified by Fortas as to the identity of the individuals comprising the bargaining committee until a few days prior to February 19, 1963, the date of the first bargaining session. 4 The corroborative and credited testimony of Coates and Buttrey Knight's denial of having been called into Buttrey's office over this matter is not credited. Although Knight did testify that she was called into Buttrey's office on or about January 4, 1963, at which time Buttrey charged her with taking over a hostess' job and told her that he would "back his hostesses up 100%," her testimony as to what prompted her being called into Buttrey's office on this occasion was confused and contradictory 6 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates hereinafter refer to 1963. 6It is undisputed that Respondent has a posted rule prohibiting solicitation of union membership on company time. The validity of this rule is not challenged by the General Counsel 1568 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Farr on company time and that she was called into Buttrey 's office where Buttrey warned her about this infraction of a company rule. 4. There is no material dispute concerning an incident which occurred on February 5 between Knight and Frances Cotton , the latter a waitress who had been hired about 2 months previously . The incident occurred during working hours in the vicinity of the soda fountain at which time Knight approached Cotton and stated, "You knew we voted the Union in, didn 't you ?" Cotton replied that she had . Knight thereupon stated that the Union was a "good thing " and asked Cotton what she thought about the Union. Cotton replied that she "didn't want any part of it" and thereupon walked off. When Cotton so departed Knight re- marked to Ruth Griffin , a waitress who was present when Knight spoke to Cotton, "Well, I won't bother with her any more."' Cotton reported her conversation with Knight to Coates and the latter apprised Buttrey of the matter. On the following day , February 6, Knight was called into the office , as she this time con- cedes, and in the presence of Coates and Cotton was again warned about soliciting for the Union on company time. Knight testified that at this time she did not relate the conversation she held with Cotton on the preceding day but that she merely denied , upon being accused , that she had asked Cotton to join the Union on company time. 8 On the following day, February 7, Leverette Rollins, the assistant manager , handed Knight a memorandum signed by Buttrey in which Buttrey confirmed the conversation he held with her concerning the Cotton affair. The memorandum concluded by stating : "It is the privilege and right of every employees to believe as they so desire, but it will not be discussed with reference to pro and con, while on duty. This is to advise you that I will not allow or permit any solicitation of any kind while on company time and if it is brought to my attention again I will deal with the situation accordingly." 5. We turn now to the incident which Respondent asserts as the precipitating cause for Knight 's discharge . This incident involved a conversation which Knight had with employees Donna Auer and Billie Jones while having lunch with them in the early afternoon of Febuary 7 .9 Donna Auer , whose testimony I credit, summarized the conversation which ensued at this time as follows: Well, we were eating in the employees ' cafeteria , and Mildred was angry. She said that Mr. Buttrey had called her in the office because a new girl had been hired , and that this new girl had reported to him that she was soliciting for the Union . She said that she felt this new girl had been put up as a plant. She said , "Why should any new girl come in and try to take the old girl's job and get them fired , unless she was a setup or a plant?" She also said that nobody was going to be fired pretty soon ; that the Union was a national organization and that it would take care of its people; and that Mr. Buttrey and that the Company would have to stop their dirty planning, their lying , and their unethical tactics. She also stated that Mr. Buttrey really didn't know as much as he thought he did ; that he was stupid , and someday he'd find out.io Later that afternoon Billie Jones, who had been in Respondent 's employ for 6 years, reported the above conversation to Assistant Manager Rollins. About 6 p in., Rollins telephoned Buttrey at his home and related the conversation as reported to him by Jones. While Buttrey was still on the telephone Rollins had Jones called into his office where he asked her if she would relate the incident to Buttrey over the tele- phone . This she did. A short while later Rollins called Donna Auer at the latter's 4 The latter remark, which is undenled, was testified to by Griffin while under cross- examination as a General Counsel witness. 8 Knight testified that her conversation with Cotton occurred several days prior to her being called into Buttrey's office on February 6. I credit the testimony of Cotton and Coates that this incident occurred on February 5, the day before she was called into Buttrey's office. 9 There is confusion in the testimony as to whether Virginia Reddoek was present during this conversation or one of similar content. Without belaboring the testimony on this subject, suffice it to say that Reddock's testimony concerning this conversation was brief, undetailed, and adds little to the case. What there was of it is not in conflict with the testimony of either Knight, Auer, or Jones on the subject. 10 Knight did not deny the essence of this conversation. Although she said she did not make any "insulting" remarks about Buttrey, she testified that, "I did say Mr. Buttrey wasn't as smart as I thought about the knowledge of the . . . Labor Board; that I would give him credit for being more up-to-date on information concerning the Labor Board." Auer's version of this conversation, which I have credited, was corroborated in all material respects by the testimony of Billie Jones. DOBBS HOUSES, INC. 1569 home and she verified the conversation held with Knight and Jones earlier in the day.li Rollins asked her if she would telephone Buttrey at home and repeat the conversation to him. Auer complied with this request . After Knight heard from Auer, he called Rollins and instructed Rollins to have Knight report to his office on the following morning.iz About 10 a.m. on February 8 Knight appeared at Buttrey 's office at which time Buttrey told her that he had a prior engagement and that she should return in an hour. However, at this time Knight handed Buttrey a typewritten letter which was addressed to him and signed by herself . The initial and pertinent part of the letter stated as follows: In fairness to all concerned , I felt it necessary to answer your letter of Febru- ary 7. I wish to sustain the stand of denial, I have taken in the alleged solicita- tion for the Union , while on duty. It actually surprises and DISAPPOINTS me to know after almost two years of loyal service to Dobb's House, that you look for some angle to distrust and disapprove me as an employee . I ask you have you ever caught me in a lie? Knight reappeared in Buttrey 's office at 11 a.m . Present in addition to Buttrey were Assistant Manager Rollins, Donna Auer , and Billie Jones. Buttrey began the conversation by referring to the letter which Knight had handed him earlier and stated that he was surprised that she referred to herself as being such a "loyal" em- ployee in view of the fact that it had been necessary to call her into the office on several occasions during the last several months. He then went on to recapitulate the incidents which had prompted her being called to the office on the four previous occasions . 13 He next turned to the reports which he had received from Auer and Jones concerning the statements she had made to these employees on the preceding afternoon . At Buttrey 's request , Auer and Jones thereupon repeated the remarks she had made to them at lunch that day. Buttrey then turned to Knight and said that under all the circumstances he would have to "leave her go." When Knight asked if this meant she was being fired, Buttrey answered in the affirmative.14 Before stating my conclusions , another facet of the evidence remains to be con- sidered . Thus, for the apparent purpose of attempting to prove that Respondent deliberately sought to find an excuse to rid itself of Knight , as well as other leading union adherents , the General Counsel elicited certain testimony to this effect from Donald H. Smith , a former employee of the Respondent . Smith, who was first employed on May 5, 1960 , became a manager -trainee in the coffeeshop in February or March 1962. He was discharged in October 1962, allegedly for taking money from Respondent 's coffee shop cash register. Smith began his testimony by saying that Buttrey called him into the office on several occasions and on these occasions told him "that there were certain people that he wanted me to watch because he knew they were active in the Union and we had to get rid of them, but we had to do it legally." Continuing , Smith said that Buttrey specifically named the following employees whom he knew to be active in the Union ; Mildred Knight , Robertta Piercy, Robert Rainey, Anne Reddock, Calvin Harris, and one Benny . From this point forward Smith 's testimony concerning the foregoing was replete with contradictions and inconsistencies . Without detailing all of his testimony in this regard, suffice it 1 1 Auer gave Rollins the same version of this conversation as did Jones. 13 Knight 's hours were from 11 a in . to 8 p in. It is clear that she was still working at this time and that she was so notified 13I do not credit Knight's denial to the effect that Buttrey did not refer to these matters at this time. 14 Knight testified that during this conversation Buttrey stated she would have to apologize to him "for all these things " if she wanted to go back on the floor She said that she then stated, "Mr Buttrey, I did not say and do all these things , but I will apologize to you if that ' s what you want." According to Knight , Buttrey refused to accept her apology but discharged her after saying that she would have to be "more sincere than that." Buttrey testified that after referring to Knight 's "derogatory" remarks of the preceding day, he told Knight that he felt she owed him an apology . According to Buttrey, Knight then said , "Well, if my job hinges upon the fact of apologizing to you, I will apologize . But I didn 't say it" While I am inclined to accept Buttrey's version of the foregoing , I cannot see where this matter sheds any light on the issue of alleged discrimina- tion. Buttrey testified that he had determined to discharge Knight before the above con- ference was held One can but speculate whether Buttrey might have changed his mind if perhaps Knight had displayed a different attitude during the discharge conversation 734-070-64-vol. 14 5--10 0 1570 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to say that Smith contradicted himself as to the number of times and approximate occasions when Smith so spoke to him,15 the places where such conversations oc- curred, and the identity of the individuals whom Buttrey allegedly claimed to know as being leaders of the Union.16 Buttrey denied ever having told Smith to keep an eye on Knight or any other employee. Buttrey's denial to this effect is credited. In view of Smith's inconsistent and contradictory testimony, including my impression from observing him testify, I cannot and do not credit this witness 17 B. Conclusions as to Knight's discharge In weighing all of the evidence pertinent to the issue of Knight's discharge, I have given full consideration to the fact that Respondent was opposed to the Union,18 and that it was aware of Knight's being a leading supporter thereof. Nevertheless, upon the entire record and upon the credited testimony in this case, I am convinced that Respondent has proved its defense and that it has shown that Knight was discharged for cause rather than for reasons proscribed by the Act. As detailed heretofore, Knight engaged in various conduct which caused her to be called into Buttrey's office on no less than four occasions during the approximate last 2 months of her employ. With respect to the last two such occasions, I think it clear that Knight had ample warning not to engage in union activities while on the floor. Thus, Knight conceded in the instant case that as far back as January 1962 she had been warned by Buttrey that she was not to solicit for the Union on company time. She was also aware at this time that the Respondent had a posted no-solicitation rule. But notwithstanding the foregoing, Knight solicited an employee January 15, 1963, following which, and after receiving a warning therefore, she engaged in similar conduct on February 5.19 Again Respondent took no drastic action but let her off with a verbal and written reprimand. She was finally discharged when Buttrey took offense to the remarks which he learned she had made against him and the Company to other employees on the following day. I think it readily understand- able that by this time Buttrey's tolerance had finally reached the breaking point and that Knight's ill-timed and ill-advised criticism of her employer was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. Accordingly, and in view of all the foregoing, I find that the preponderance of the credible evidence does not sustain the General Counsel's allegation as to the discharge of Knight and I shall recommend that this allegation of the complain be dismissed.20 C. The allegation that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by refusing to permit a union representative to be present at Knight's termination interview It is undisputed that during the discharge conversation held in Buttrey's office on February 8 Knight requested that W. R. Thrasher, a staff representative of the 15 For example, Smith first testified that he had several such conversations with Buttrey ; on cross-examination he testified that he had only one such conversation, this just after he was made manager-trainee ; on redirect and recross he testified again that he had several such conversations with Buttrey, the last of which he stated occurred shortly before he was discharged. 16 As has been noted, Smith initially testified that Buttrey specifically named six em- ployees who he knew to be active union adherents Smith later testified that Buttrey named only Knight and Piercy as being active in the Union, that lie was not too sure about the others. 11 Smith also testified that on one or more occasions Buttrey told him that he could be fired for talking to or associating with anyone connected with the Union Whether or not Buttrey mentioned anything to this effect is not determinative to the issue herein 18 With respect to relevant background indicative of Respondent's opposition to the Union, see footnote 2, supra See also footnote 22, snfra 19 While it might be argued that as a technical matter Knight did not actually solicit Frances Cotton to join the Union on February 5, I am persuaded that this is what Knight in fact had in mind when she broached this employee about the Union This is evidenced particularly by Knight's statement to Griffin (after Cotton indicated she did not want any part of the Union) that "I won't bother with her any more " 00 Blue Bell, Inc, 107 NLRB 514, cited by the General Counsel, is entirely inapposite to the facts in the instant case There the "disrespectful epithets" were uttered during the course of an organizational campaign. In finding that they did not exceed the proper bounds of concerted activity, the Board noted that the use of such "epithets" was evoked in part by equally strong criticism of the Union by the Employer and occurred in the course of an exchange of letters containing charges and countercharges. DOBBS HOUSES, INC. 1571 Union who was present outside in the coffeeshop, be brought in as a participant to the conversational It is also undisputed that Buttrey refused Knight's request to have Thrasher brought in.22 The complaint alleges that Respondent's refusal to allow a representative of the certified bargaining agent to be present during Knight's termination interview constituted a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.23 I fail to perceive anything in the Act which obliges an employer to permit the presence of a representative of the bargaining agent in every situation where an employer is compelled to admonish or to otherwise take disciplinary action against an employee, particularly in those situations where the employee's conduct is un- related to any legitimate union or concerted activity. An employer undoubtedly has the right to maintain day-to-day discipline in the plant or on the working premises and it seems to me that only exceptional circumstances should warrant any interference with this right. Indirectly, the issue here involved came before the Board in Ross Gear and Tool Company, 63 NLRB 1012. In that case the Board found an employee to have been discriminatorily discharged for refusing to comply with an order to report to the office alone ad not, as the employee desired, with the union committee. However, recognizing but not passing upon the broader question presented here, the Board there confined itself to the peculiar circumstances involved. Thus, the Board stated as follows: Assuming, without deciding, that an individual employee is not entitled to insist upon union representation whenever he or she may be called in by management to be admonished, in the instant case Ford was being called in partly as a member of a union committee about a matter concerning which the respondent had already dealt with that committee as the exclusive bargain- ing representative. Under these circumstances we are of the opinion, and find, that Ford was within her statutory rights in refusing to handle the matter alone and in insisting that Strecker take it up with the entire union committee, of which she was a member. Therefore Strecker's order directing Ford to come in alone on penalty of discharge interfered with, restrained, and coerced Ford in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and hence was unlawful. It is clear that the factual situation involving Knight's being called into the office on February 8 bears no semblance to that in the Ross Gear case and I find no basis here for any further extension of the Board's holding in that case. As hereto- fore found, Knight was discharged for cause and the discharge conference was not predicated upon her involvement in any protected union activity. Under these circumstances, I find that ,the Respondent was within its rights in refusing to permit a representative of the bargaining agent to be present at the time of her discharge.24 Accordingly, I shall recommend that this 'allegation of the complaint be dismissed. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The allegations of the complaint that the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act have not been sustained. RECOMMENDATION It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. 21 Thrasher testified that Knight had called him on the preceding evening to advise that she was being called to the office the next morning and that she requested that he be present at the coffee shop at that time. ?2 The testimony is in dispute as to whether Buttrey at this time told Knight, as she claimed, that "if Mr Thrasher as much as sticks his head in that door, I'll have the police after him " However, whether or not Buttrey made this statement is not determinative of the alleged violation under discussion. Moreover, even assuming that the statement was made and was thereby indicative of union animus, this would not alter my finding as to the alleged violation of Section 8(a) (3) 23 No precedent has been cited by the General Counsel which is in direct support of this contention. 24 The issue does not arise in this case as to Respondent's obligation under Section 8(a) (5) of the At to bargain with the Union, upon request, concerning the matter of Knight's discharge.