Disney Enterprises, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 2, 2021

2020005490 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/469,361 03/24/2017 Vladislav Feldman 0260517 3672
63649 7590 11/02/2021
DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.
C/O FARJAMI & FARJAMI LLP
26522 LA ALAMEDA AVENUE, SUITE 360
MISSION VIEJO, CA 92691
EXAMINER
TRAN, HAI V
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2423
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@farjami.com
farjamidocketing@yahoo.com
ffarjami@farjami.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte VLADISLAV FELDMAN and MICHAEL J. STREIN

____________________

Appeal 2020-005490
Application 15/469,361
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before MARC S. HOFF, JOHN A. EVANS, and JOYCE CRAIG,
Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1
Appellant2 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final
rejection of Claims 1, 4, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, and 18, all pending claims. Appeal
Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed February 18, 2020
(“Appeal Br.”); Appellant’s Reply Brief filed July 20, 2020 (“Reply Br.”);
Examiner’s Answer mailed May 18, 2020 (“Ans.”); the Final Action mailed
August 30, 2019 (“Final Act.”), and the Specification filed March 24, 2017
(“Spec.”).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The Appeal Brief identifies Disney Enterprises, Inc., a
Appeal 2020-005490
Application 15/469,361
2
We REVERSE.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
INVENTION.
The claims relate to a system for redirecting to content after an
interruption. See Abstract. Claims 1, 8, and 15 are independent. An
understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of Claim 1,
which is reproduced below with some formatting added:
Claim 1. A system comprising:
a computing platform including a hardware processor and
a system memory;
a content redirection software code stored in the system
memory;
the hardware processor configured to execute the content
redirection software code to:
playout a primary content being received from a
first source and carried by a programming stream to a
client device over a packet-switched network (PSN);
track a playout status, including a frame location,
of the primary content being played out to the client
device over the PSN;
detect a pause to the playout of the primary content
being received from the first source, due to receipt of an
interrupt content from a second source;
save the playout status of the primary content
being tracked, due to receipt of the interrupt content from
the second source the playout status including the frame
location and a first PSN address of the first source of the
primary content;

wholly owned subsidiary of The Walt Disney Company, as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2020-005490
Application 15/469,361
3
playout the interrupt content to the client device
carried by the programming stream over the PSN as a
substitute content for the primary content that was being
carried by the programming stream, the interrupt content
being received from a second PSN address of the second
source;
detect completion of the playout of the interrupt
content;
in response to detecting the completion, return to
the primary content after the pause using the saved first
PSN address of the first source of the primary content;
and
resume the playout of the primary content at the
saved frame location by receiving the primary content
from the saved first PSN address of the first source of the
primary content.

Prior Art
Name3 Reference Date
McCoy US 2012/0209961 A1 Aug. 16, 2012
Yin US 2015/0172342 A1 June 18, 2015

REJECTION4 AT ISSUE
1. Claims 1, 4, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Yin and McCoy. Final Act. 2–6.

3 All citations herein to the references are by reference to the first named
inventor/author only.
4 The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being
examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA. Final Act. 2.
Appeal 2020-005490
Application 15/469,361
4
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejection for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential),
cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t
has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the
alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”). We have considered in this
decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any
other arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in
the Briefs are deemed to be forfeit. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). After
considering the evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant’s
arguments, we are persuaded that Appellant identifies reversible error. We
add the following primarily for emphasis.

CLAIMS 1, 4, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, AND 18: OBVIOUSNESS OVER YIN AND MCCOY.
Independent Claim 1 recites, inter alia: a “hardware processor
configured to execute the content redirection software code to. . . track a
playout status, including a frame location, of the primary content.”
Independent Claims 8 and 15 recite commensurate limitations.
The Examiner finds Yin teaches this limitation. Final Act. 3. The
Examiner finds the recitation: “track a playout status, including a frame
location” reads on “a position” or “time position” in the video program. Id.
(citing Yin ¶ 57).
Appellant contends the Specification distinguishes the claimed “frame
location” from a “time location.” Appeal Br. 8 (citing Spec. 15, ll. 9–12)
(“an elapsed time location or frame location within programming stream
118/218”) (further citing Spec. 17, ll. 4–8; Spec. 18, ll. 9–13). Appellant
Appeal 2020-005490
Application 15/469,361
5
argues, thus, the Office’s interpretation that the claimed frame location is
broad enough to include Yin’s time position is not reasonable because it is
inconsistent with Appellant’s Specification. Appeal Br. 8. Appellant argues
that Yin does not disclose tracking a playout status using frame location, but
rather, Yin exclusively relies on a time position. Appeal Br. 8–9.
The Answer finds: “Appellant’s specification merely recites ‘an
elapsed time location or frame location within program stream 118/218’ and
does not describe on ‘how’ the ‘time location’ is distinguished from the
‘frame location’.” Ans. 8.
Appellant’s Reply contends that the Examiner reads the term “frame”
from the claim term “frame location” to re-interpret the claims to merely
recite “location” so as to include “time location.” Reply Br. 2.
The PTO is required to give claims their “broadest reasonable
construction,” however, the “claims should always be read in light of the
specification” and the broadest reasonable construction rule does not provide
“an unfettered license to interpret claims to embrace anything remotely
related to the claimed invention.” See In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d
1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1010). Moreover, the broadest reasonable
interpretation (BRI) does not obviate the need to show that all the words of
the claim are given effect. Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[C]laims are interpreted with an eye toward giving effect
to all terms in the claim.”).
The Specification discloses:
client systems . . . may enable a return to primary content 104
by resuming programming stream 118/218 at the playout pause
point of primary content 104 substantially coinciding with the
pause, i.e., the playout pause point substantially coinciding with
Appeal 2020-005490
Application 15/469,361
6
an elapsed time location or frame location within programming
stream 118/218 at the pause.
Spec. 18, ll. 9–13. The Specification recites “the pause, i.e., the playout
pause point,” The recitation “i.e.,” indicates the term “the pause” is
synonymous with the term “the playout pause point.” But, the Specification
recites “an elapsed time location or frame location.” Thus, indicating “an
elapsed time location” is a, non-equivalent, alternative to a “frame location.”
The claims recite the term “frame location.” See independent Claims
1, 8, and 15. The Examiner’s prima facie case omits the term “frame” so as
to read the residual “location” on the prior art “position.” The Examiner
finds the recitation: “track a playout status, including a frame location” reads
on “a position” or “time position” in the video program, thus, improperly
rendering the term “frame” superfluous. Final Act. 3 (citing Yin ¶ 57); see
Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 525 F.3d 1327, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(rejecting claim construction that would render a claim term meaningless);
see also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A claim construction that gives meaning to all the
terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”); Power
Mosfet Techs.,
L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“[I]nterpretations that render some portion of the claim language
superfluous are disfavored.”).
In view of the foregoing, we decline to sustain the rejection of Claims
1, 4, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

Appeal 2020-005490
Application 15/469,361
7
DECISION
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4, 7, 8,
11, 14, 15,
18
103 Yin, McCoy 1, 4, 7, 8,
11, 14, 15,
18

REVERSED