Detroit Plastic Molding Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 8, 1974

213 N.L.R.B. 897 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

DETROIT PLASTIC MOLDING CO 897
Detroit Plastic Molding Co. and International Union,
United Automobile , Aerospace and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America (UAW). Cases 7-
CA-10790 and 7-RC-11911
October 8, 1974
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
On June 20, 1974, Administrative Law Judge John
F. Corbley issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Detroit Plastic Molding
Co., Detroit, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election held on No-
vember 21, 1973, among the Respondent's employees
be, and it hereby is, set aside, and that Case 7-RC-
11911 be, and it hereby is, severed and remanded to
the Regional Director for Region 7 for the purpose of
conducting a new election at such time as he deems
that circumstances permit the free choice of a bar-
gaining representative.
[Direction of Second Election and Excelsior foot-
note omitted from publication.]
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN F. CORBLEY, Administrative Law Judge: The consoli-
dated hearings in these cases was held on March 19, 20, and
21, 1974, at Detroit, Michigan, pursuant to: a charge filed
by International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW)
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Union) in Case
7-CA-10790 on December 14, 1973, and served by regis-
tered mail on Respondent on or about December 17, 1973;
Objections to Conduct Affecting the Results of the Election,
timely filed on November 29, 1973, in Case 7-RC-11911;
and a Complaint, Supplemental Decision on Objections,
Order Consolidating Unfair Labor Practice and Represen-
tation Cases and a Notice of Hearing, issued by the Region-
al Director for Region 7 of the National Labor Relations
Board on January 31, 1974, and served on Respondent by
registered mail on the following day. The complaint, which
was amended at the hearing, alleges that Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on various dates from July
through November 1973, by: changing working conditions
and granting wage increases to dissuade employees from
joining the Union; prohibiting union solicitation at any
time on company premises; advising its employees of the
futility of selecting the Union as their bargaining represent-
ative; coercively interrogating its employees; interfering
with employee distribution of representation election mate-
rials on behalf of the Union; threatening employees with
adverse personnel actions for supporting the Union; threat-
ening employees with loss of bonuses or discharge if they
selected the Union and advising employees of the inevitabil-
ity of strikes and violence, disruption of amicable employer-
employee relationships, and loss of business if employees
selected union representation. In its answer to the com-
plaint, which answer was also amended at the hearing, Re-
spondent denied the commission of any unfair labor
practices.
In his Supplemental Decision on Objections, included in
the same document with the complaint, the Regional Direc-
tor noted his approval of the withdrawal of 6 of the 16
objections filed by the Union to the conduct of the election.
He further concluded that the remaining unresolved objec-
tions, with the exception of Objection 1, paralleled in sub-
stantial part the aforementioned allegations of the
complaint and he, accordingly, consolidated the hearing on
the complaint with the hearing on the objections. As to the
Objection 1, which alleged the promulgation and mainte-
nance of an illegal no-distribution and no-solicitation rule,
the Regional Director noted that this matter was already
before the Board for its consideration in Case 7-CA-10398.1
In its answer to the consolidated complaint Respondent did
not fault the Regional Director's conclusion that the re-
maining objections paralleled the allegations of the com-
plaint but included a prayer for dismissal of these objections
to the election along with its prayer for dismissal of the
complaint. Respondent further prayed that the results of
this election in Case 7-RC-11911, which the Union lost, be
certified by the Board.
For reasons which will appear hereinafter, I find and
conclude that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) 'of
the Act by: changing working conditions to dissuade em-
ployees from joining the Union; coercively interrogating its
employees; telling employees of the futility of selecting the
Union as their bargaining representative; interfering with
1 The complaint raising that issue in that case was subsequently dismissed
by the Board in its decision reported at 209 NLRB 763 The matter of
Objection I will be taken up subsequently in this Decision.
213 NLRB No. 120
898 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employee distribution of representation election materials
on behalf of the Union and threatening employees with
adverse personnel action and loss of bonuses if they selected
the Union. I further find that Respondent did not violate
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in various other particulars al-
leged in the complaint.
I find merit in a number of the objections to the election
and I shall, accordingly, recommend that the election be set
aside.
At the hearing, the General Counsel and Respondent
were represented by counsel and all parties were given full
opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, intro-
duce evidence, and to file briefs. All parties waived oral
argument at the conclusion of the hearing. A brief has been
received from Respondent and has been considered.
Upon the entire record 2 in this case including the brief
and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the fol-
lowing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
ness operations , manufactured, sold and distributed at its
Ten Mile and Eleven Mile plants in Michigan products
valued in excess of $500,000, of which products valued in
excess of $50,000 were shipped from said plants directly to
points located outside the State of Michigan.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find, the
Respondent is now, and has been at all times material here-
in, and employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find, that
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) is, and
has been at all material times herein, a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Respondent's Relevant Hierarchy
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein,
a corporation duly organized under, and existing by virtue
of, the laws of the State of Michigan.
At all times material herein, Respondent has maintained
its principal office and place of business at 18125 East Ten
Mile Road, East Detroit, Michigan, herein sometimes re-
ferred to as the Ten Mile plant. Respondent has, at all times
material herein, maintained another place of business at
15201 Eleven Mile Road, Roseville, Michigan, herein some-
times referred to as the Eleven Mile plant. Respondent is,
and has been at all times material herein, engaged in the
manufacture, sales , and distribution of plastic and related
products-some to the automobile industry. Respondent's
Ten Mile plant and its Eleven Mile plant are the only facili-
ties involved in this proceeding.
During the year ending December 31, 1973, which period
is representative of its operations during all times material
hereto, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its busi-
ness operations, purchased and caused to be transported
and delivered at its Ten Mile and Eleven Mile plants, plas-
tics and other goods and materials valued in excess of
$100,000, of which goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 were transported and delivered to its Ten Mile and
Eleven Mile plants in Michigan directly from points located
outside the State of Michigan.
During the year ending December 31, 1973, which period
is representative of its operations during all times material
herein, Respondent in the course and conduct of its busi-
2 The transcript of record in this proceeding is hereby corrected in the
following particular : p. 192, 1. 10, "Mr. Barkley" is stricken and "Judge
Corbley" substituted.
On the second day of the hearing , I informed the parties that I was taking
administrative notice of a certain stipulation entered into between Respon-
dent and the Union (on the record of the prior hearing in Case 7-RC-11911)
and gave them 10 days to show to the contrary. An exhibit number was held
open for Respondent to forward a reply as to this matter after the conclusion
of the hearing . No reply has been received . It is, accordingly , hereby ordered
that the record in this proceeding be, and it hereby is, closed.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
the following held the titles opposite their names and are,
and have been at all times material herein, supervisors of the
Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act
and its agents:
Michael Ladney President
Ralph Bellamy Foreman
Ralph Winnie Foreman
The complaint, as amended, alleges, the answer, as
amended, admits, and I find that Victor Grambow is, and
has been at all times material herein, a supervisor of Re-
spondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and
Respondent 's agent.
The complaint further alleges, the answer admits, and I
find that Rudolph Tuten is, and has been at all material
times herein, a supervisor of Respondent within the mean-
ing of Section 2(11) of the Act and an agent of Respondent.
Tuten testified that he was plant manager of the Ten Mile
plant throughout 1973 until November." I further so find.
Peter Emanuel is the executive vice president and general
manager of Respondent and several other companies and
has held these positions for the past 6 or 7 years. Emanuel
credibly testified that in March 1973 he directed
Respondent's plant managers to give him their advice about
changing Respondent's payroll workweek and, on July 24,
1973, he directed the plant managers to change that work-
week to begin on the first shift on Monday and to end on
the third shift on Sunday each week. This change, as Eman-
uel testified, might cost Respondent money because it
would mean that many employees who worked Saturday
and Sunday would be paid overtime for such work-which
they had not always been before. I conclude from the fore-
Emanuel , about whom more will be said infra, credibly testified and I find
that Ladney is also known as Michael Ladney, Jr.
I also note that , on March 22, 1973, he was sent a Respondent communi-
cation as plant manager of the Ten Mile plant.
DETROIT PLASTIC MOLDING CO.
going that Emanuel at least has the authority, on behalf of
Respondent, to reward employees in a manner requiring
the exercise of independent judgment and is therefore a
supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
Emanuel, as indicated, likewise directs the activities of
Respondent's plant managers. I, accordingly, conclude
that he is also Respondent's agent.
The complaint further alleges, but Respondent denies,
that Joseph Sysling is a supervisor within the meaning of the
Act. I conclude that he is.
Sysling was promoted to "decorator foreman" on the
third shift on August 8, 1973. Although other individuals
holding the rank of foremen are admittedly supervisors, as
indicated supra, Respondent contends that Sysling is not a
supervisor because Sysling did not obtain the responsibility
and authority of a foreman upon his promotion-specifical-
ly, says Respondent, Sysling was not given responsibility as
far as disciplinary actions and pay increases are concerned.
Respondent also argues that the terminology of foreman
was used to describe Sysling's promotion because he had
already reached the top pay scale in the paint set-up classifi-
cation which he occupied and that Sysling's promotion was
merely to that of a nonsupervisory leader working with a
group of men. I reject these contentions.
If Sysling merely became a leader, he could have been
promoted to leader-a promotion Respondent specifically
made for other personnel in the same month although in
most instances at significantly lower pay rates.' Further
Hatmaker, another employee in the paint set-up, received a
pay increase to the same total amount as Syslmg, with there
being no indication on his promotion slip that Hatmaker
was either a foreman or a leader. Another employee, Math-
is, was promoted to paint set-up leader on August 14, 1973,
receiving the same pay rate to which Sysling was raised.
After receiving this promotion to foreman Sysling had a
crew of five working under him. It was his responsibility to
see that he and these men cleaned the machinery in the
decorating room and had it ready to run in the morning. He
was also required to be certain that he had enough people
to carry out this function and he would seek more help
through the third shift foreman, Winnie, if he felt his crew
was inadequate. The decorating room is shielded from the
rest of the plant by a partial wall.
The foregoing convinces me that Sysling, as decorator
foreman, possessed the authority responsibly to direct em-
ployees working with him and that this authority required
the exercise of independent judgment. I, accordingly, con-
clude that these duties constituted him a supervisor within
the meaning of Section 2(1.1) of the Act. Since Sysling stood
with other supervisors alongside President Ladney when the
latter made a speech to the employees on or about Novem-
ber 19, 1973, I conclude that he continued to hold that
position at that time and during the intervening period since
August 1973.
Respondent, in partial answer to an allegation of the
complaint, admitted that Harry Galloway was a foreman on
August 21, 1973, and that on and after that date he was an
agent of Respondent and a supervisor within the meaning
5 See, e g, G C. Exh. 5, promotions of Some , Shinliever, Shelly , Burski,
Ledbetter, Juhl, Marshall, and Oloff
899
of Section 2(11) of the Act. I so find.
There is an issue whether Galloway was also a foreman
and a supervisor within the meaning of the Act prior to
August 21, 1973. Rudolph Tuten, the plant manager during
the first I I months of 1973, admitted that before August 21,
1973, Galloway was a molding machine adjuster and start-
up man. Also before that date, according to Tuten, Joseph
Shanks was the molding room foreman. These positions
were switched on August 21, 1973, when, Tuten said, Gallo-
way became molding room foreman and Shanks assumed
the position of mold machine adjuster and Job start-up man.
I conclude, based on the record as a whole, that prior to
August 21, 1973, Galloway was also a foreman and a super-
visor within the meaning of the Act and I find that he held
such a position for at least several months preceding that
date.
Thus, Tuten admitted that Galloway had the authority, as
machine adjuster and start-up man, to assign employees to
machines. In July 1973 and earlier employees Jernigan,
Dawson and Monarity believed that Galloway had authori-
ty over them. Employee Monarity was in fact told that
Galloway was her foreman when she was hired in the mold-
ing room in October 1972. Healy, Respondent's personnel
manager, told employee Dawson in April 1973 that Gallo-
way was Dawson's supervisor. Also prior to August 21,
1973, when employees in the molding room were aggrieved
by Respondent's overtime policy-which was eventually
changed-they addressed their complaints to Galloway
who took action by speaking directly to plant manager Tu-
ten (and not to Shanks). More will be said about this over-
time policy change later in this decision.
In June 1973 Galloway informed employee Jernigan that
she was not permitted to solicit for the Union in the shop.
Jernigan, who was reading union literature at the time, told
Galloway that she was not soliciting merely reading. With
this Galloway picked up some union literature from a picnic
table where employees eat in or near the molding room and
threw the literature in the trash.6 Employee Moriarity credi-
bly testified to a similar incident in May 1973 where Gallo-
way threw union literature away.
When Galloway was admittedly promoted on August 21,
1973, his salary was increased from $4.90 to $5.50 per hour.
His $4.90 salary was higher than the foreman pay of Sysling
whom I have already found to be a supervisor.
Emanuel, Respondent's vice president, also admitted that
one of the reasons why the Shanks-Galloway change was
made on August 21, 1973, was because Shanks was fre-
quently absent prior to that date. This suggests-and I
find-that Galloway had numerous opportunities to fill in
for Shanks at such times. My further conclusion that he did
so, when the opportunity arose, is supported by other credi-
ble testimony of Jernigan that l week Shanks would be her
foreman and the next week Galloway would be. And it'is
likewise supported by Galloway's action in taking up em-
ployees overtime complaint directly with Tuten in July
1973, by what employees were told Galloway 's status was
even earlier and by his other activities recounted above.
I find based on all the foregoing that Galloway, since at
6 Jernigan credibly testified that this incident occurred in June or July
1973 Galloway only denied that such an incident occurred in July 1973
900 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
least May 1973, regularly functioned as a molding room
foreman and, at such times, assigned employees, disciplined
them, and responsibly directed their activities in a manner
requiring the exercise of independent judgment 7 I accord-
ingly conclude that during this period Galloway was a su-
pervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
As previously noted, Joseph Shanks was also a molding
room foreman until August 21, 1973. Since Shanks' position
before that date was the same as the admittedly supervisory
position of Galloway after that date I conclude that Shanks
was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act until Gallo-
way was given his promotion. And Shanks held the supervi-
sory position beginning no later than May 1973 and
exercised its authority by laying off employees after June 1,
1973.8 Moreover, as previously noted, Respondent and the
Union stipulated in Case 7-RC-11911 that, as of August 15,
1973, Shanks was a supervisor within the meaning of the
Act, based on Shanks' authority to discipline employees and
responsibly direct them-also his authority to adjust griev-
ances, effectively recommend suspension, promotion, dis-
charge , and, in some cases, hire.
All of the individuals heretofore found to be supervisors
within the meaning of the Act held such positions at the Ten
Mile plant where virtually all of the matters in question in
this case took place. Ladney and Emanuel not only have
authority over this plant but the Eleven Mile plant and other
plants as well. The plant manager of the Eleven Mile plant
during the summer of 1973 was Tiffany.
B. Background and Sequence of Events-
an Overview 9
On April 19, 1973, representatives of the Union, includ-
ing Donley, Jordan, Vidal, and Cessna, passed out union
handbills to employees leaving Respondent's Ten Mile
plant. This activity was reported to Tuten by Foreman Bel-
lamy who told Tuten that cars were having difficulty leaving
Respondent's driveway because of it. Tuten called the po-
lice and then went out to the driveway. There Tuten ob-
served the handbilling and obtained one of the materials
being passed out which Tuten recognized as a letter from
the Union.1°
r Respondent and the Union stipulated in Case 7-RC-l 1911 on August 15,
1973, that Shanks was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act at that time
based , inter alia, on his authority to discipline employees and responsibly
direct them . In view of the activities of Galloway previously recounted and
his substitution for Shanks , as also found supra, I conclude that at such times
Galloway, filling in for Shanks, possessed and exercised the authority of the
foreman 's position to discipline employees and responsibly direct them in a
manner requiring the exercise of independent judgment , and that this author-
ity was coupled with Galloway's authority to assign employees.
s According to the undisputed and credible testimony of Moriarity in both
respects.
Inasmuch as the charge herein was not filed and served on Respondent
until on or about December 17, 1973, the 10(b) limitations period extends
back only to on or about June 18, 1973. However , evidence in respect to
certain pre - l0(b) events was received at the hearing as background to the
events in question here . Local Lodge No. 1424, International Association of
Machinists, AFL-CIO [Bryon Mfg. Co.] v. N.L.R.B., 362 U.S. 411,416 ( 1960).
These earlier events have particular relevance to Respondent's knowledge
prior to June 18, 1973, that the Union 's organizational campaign had already
be sn and to Respondent's reaction thereto.
I deem incredible Tuten 's denial that he informed either Ladney or
Emanuel of this incident . For such an omission would be highly improbable
In May 1973, employee Moriarity began distributing
union literature inside the plant. Foreman Galloway no-
ticed this and made a joking reference to it in conversation
with Moriarity. On one occasion in May Moriarity saw
Galloway throw this literature in the trash."
On or about June 8, 1973, Ladney spoke to assembled
employees at the Ten Mile plant on no less than two occa-
sions .' On at least one of these occasions Ladney an-
nounced to the employees that he was giving them a 5-1/2
percent raise, was doubling pensions and was increasing
disability payments. He further told the employees that he
was aware that the Union was back in the plant and was
trying to reorganize, that he had given employees raises in
the past without a union, got along fine that way and that
there was no reason to have a union as long as the company
was managed the way it was. Ladney went on to say that
all the Union had ever done in the past was to cause strikes,
violence and loss of work and that any time the Union had
tried to get in before, it had always failed. The Union, he
said, had caused a strike in Canada which lasted for a year
or two but employees never got any more money. Ladney
further stated that if the employees continued to try to get
a union it would cost him money for lawyers' fees and he
might have to take away from bonuses to pay for it.13
An across-the-board increase of 15 cents per hour was
given to about 280 machine operators at the Ten Mile and
Eleven Mile plants effective with the pay period ending
June 8, 1973.
Also sometime in June 1973, but prior to the beginning
of the 10(b) period,"' Foreman Bellamy spoke about the
Union to employee Girlish at the latter's machine at the Ten
Mile plant. Girlish asked Bellamy if he thought the Union
would get into the plant to which Bellamy responded that
he did not advise Girlish to pass out literature in the shop
(which Girlish had been doing) because Ladney wouldn't
stand for it. Bellamy further advised Girlish on this occasion
that he had known Ladney several years and that the latter
would shut down before letting the "lousy union" in the
in view of Tuten's summoning of the police and in view of Respondent's
history of serious labor disputes with the same Union, which will be described
more fully hereinafter . In any event Bellamy could have also told higher
authorities of the incident. For the same reasons I likewise discredit
Emanuel's claim that neither he nor Ladney was previously aware of this
incident . Ladney did not testify but, as will appear , told employees in a
speech in June 1973 he was aware that the Union was starting up again.
11 Moriarity credibly so testified and Galloway did not deny it. A similar
incident in June 1973 involving Galloway and employee Jernigan has previ-
ously been recounted in the "Relevant Hierarchy" section of this Decision.
Since there is no basis to conclude that the latter incident occurred on or after
June 18 , 1973, 1 do not conclude that it took place within this 10(b) period.
12 Moriarity and Jernigan credibly so testified . The fact that Respondent
operates on several shifts also supports this testimony. Ladney, as noted, did
not testify. Emanuel did not deny that Ladney gave more than one speech
to employees at this time nor did he deny that Ladney mentioned the Union.
In answer to the question whether Ladney said anything about the Union
Emanuel merely answered " I never heard anything said ." I do not consider
this a denial that anything was said on this subject, particularly since there
is no showing that Emanuel followed the speech with care as he did Ladney's
subsequent speech in November 1973. The date of the instant June speech
is fixed on the basis of notes used by Ladney in making the speech.
13 Girlish credibly so testified and Ladney 's notes essentially corroborate
her recitation of changes in wages and benefits announced by him in his
speech. Jernigan testified that Ladney made similar comments in a speech
which she attended at or about the same time.
"The General Counsel so conceded at the hearing.
DETROIT PLASTIC MOLDING CO. 901
plant.15
Also sometime in June 1973 but after Ladney's aforemen-
tioned speech Grambow spoke to employee Eileen Jernigan
about the Union and asked Jernigan if she was going to
another speech to be given by Ladney at this time. Jernigan
refused, stating she had heard Ladney's earlier speech. In
the conversation which ensued between Jernigan and
Grambow, the latter asked Jernigan if she was in favor of
the Union. When she responded in the affirmative he asked
her to explain. She stated her position was based on her
feelings with regard to the treatment employees were receiv-
ing in the molding room.i6
The 10(b) period, as noted, began on or about June 18,
1973.
On July 11, 1973, the Union sent Ladney a letter demand-
ing recognition in a bargaining unit at the Ten Mile plant.
On July 13, 1973, the Union filed its petition (in Case
7-RC-11911) for a Board-conducted election in a unit of
the production and maintenance employees at the Ten Mile
and Eleven Mile plants.
On or about July 24, 1973, or shortly thereafter, Respon-
dent changed its workweek for the Ten Mile and Eleven
Mile plants and other plants. This change, when implement-
ed, meant essentially that the workweek would begin on
Monday instead of Saturday. The change resulted from
numerous complaints by employees at the Ten Mile plant
and other plants. The complaint was that, where an employ-
ee worked overtime on a weekend, the employee might not
get overtime pay for the weekend work if the employee
missed a day during the ensuing regular workweek. This
change to begin the workweek on Monday obviated these
complaints and, as Emanuel admitted, was a costly change
in Respondent's operations. It also resulted in the pay for
the weekend work being received in the paycheck following
the weekend rather than a week thereafter.
In July and August 1973 Respondent gave pay raises to
at least 113 individuals employed at the Ten Mile and Elev-
en Mile plants The combined complements of these two
plants ranged from approximately 400 in June 1973 to ap-
proximately 545 at the time of the Board-conducted elec-
tion.
In July, August, October, and November 1973 a number
of supervisors engaged in discussions with employees about
the Union. There is a conflict in the testimony in respect to
these discussions, hence each will be examined separately
later in this decision when I consider the allegations of the
complaint and the election objections.
In November 1973, Louis Serianni, an employee, pur-
chased 500 buttons bearing the legend "Happiness is no
Union dues" and distributed these buttons at the Ten Mile
and Eleven Mile plants. Some of these buttons got into the
hands of supervisors who distributed them to employees, as
will appear.
On November 19, 1973, Ladney gave a speech to the
employees of Respondent's Ten Mile and Eleven Mile
plants in which he stated Respondent's opposition to the
Union, recited the Respondent's experience with the Union
previously-an experience involving strikes and violence,
he said-and then reviewed the Respondent's policy with
respect to increasing wages and fringe benefits. This speech
will be discussed and analyzed in detail later in this decision.
The Board-conducted election in Case 7-RC-11911 was
held on November 21, 1973, in a unit of production and
maintenance employees at Respondent's Ten Mile and
Eleven Mile plants. Upon the conclusion of the election a
tally of ballots was served on the parties. This tally showed
the following: Approximate number of eligible voters, 545;
void ballots, 0; votes cast for Petitioner [the Union] 147;
votes cast against participating labor organization 206; val-
id votes counted 353; challenged ballots 42; and valid votes
counted plus challenged ballots 395.
The challenged ballots were insufficient in number to
affect the results of the election.
On November 29, 1973, the Union filed 16 objections to
conduct affecting the results of the election-six of which
(9, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16) were subsequently withdrawn by
the Union with the approval of the Regional Director. As
noted, the Regional Director concluded that the remaining
objections parallel in substantial part the allegations of the
complaint-a conclusion not disputed by Respondent's an-
swer to the complaint-and the Regional Director consoli-
dated the complaint and the objections for hearing.
C. Concluding Findings as to the Section 8(a)(1) Allegations
of the Complaint and the Objections to the Election
1. Promulgation and/or enforcement of an illegal no
solicitation rule (objection 1)
The General Counsel conceded and Respondent's coun-
sel agreed at the beginning of the hearing that in reaching
my conclusion in respect to this objection I should be guid-
ed by the Board's decision in Case 7-CA-10398 (dealing
with the same allegedly unlawful rule) The Board dismissed
the complaint in that case.'' In view of this dismissal and
the further fact, as found by the Board, that the instant rule
was only in effect for about a month in June 1973-hence
at a time remote to the November 21, 1973, election-I
overrule this objection
2 Alteration of the payroll period in July 1973 (subpara-
graph 9(a) of the complaint; objection 3)
As already found, after numerous employee complaints
15 Girlish credibly so testified Girlish was a poised, self-confident witness
who testified in my judgment in a straightforward manner She particularly
displayed this self-confidence on cross-examination when giving clear expla-
nations of her preheating affidavit when certain remarks thereon-because
of the poor handwriting in which they were recorded-might otherwise have
created confusion Bellamy did not create such a favorable impression He
appeared to be nervous on the stand and answered at least one question on
another matter before the question was completed I discredit his denial of
this incident
16 Jernigan credibly so testified I discredit Grambow's denial . After testi-
fying that he had "no conversation whatsoever" with Jernigan in answer to
a query whether he had talked to her in May or June and then testifying that
he had "no kind whatsoever that I can remember " when asked if he had any
kind of a conversation with Jernigan in November, Grambow admitted on
cross-examination that he had spoken to Jernigan in November "about the
job and the work" He thus directly contradicted his own earlier denial of
any conversation whatsoever
1209 NLRB No 136
902 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
about the matter, Respondent altered its payroll period on
or about July 24, 1973, so that the pay period will begin on
Monday and not Saturday, as it had previously. This change
was, as Emanuel admitted, one which would be costly. It
was a benefit to employees because they would be assured
of overtime pay for weekend work, assuming they had al-
ready put in a 40-hour week, and the overtime pay would
show up in their paychecks sooner than it had before.
A betterment of wages, hours, or other terms and condi-
tions of employment brought about by an employer after
the filing of a petition preceding a Board-conducted elec-
tion is not a per se ground for setting an election aside.
However, in the absence of a showing that the timing of the
announcement was governed by factors other than the pen-
dency of the election, the Board has set aside elections on
the ground that the granting of benefits at that particular
time was calculated to influence the employees in their
choice of a bargaining representative." The burden of
showing these countervailing factors is on the Employer.19
Respondent has attempted to undertake the burden
here-but not successfully, in my judgment, as will appear.
Thus, Emanuel testified that the question of the workweek
came to his attention in March 1973 as the result of a union
grievance filed at another plant. Upon investigation he
learned that the workweek (as it existed prior to the end of
July 1973) had, in fact, been a problem for some time and
had resulted in opposition by a number of employees to
working overtime on weekends. Accordingly, Emanuel tes-
tified, he issued a memorandum to all plant managers on
March 23, 1973-a date apparently prior to the advent of
the Union's organizational campaign-soliciting their opin-
ions in respect to changing the payroll period. All plant
managers, except for one (not involved here), had experi-
enced difficulty with employees because of the existing poli-
cy Emanuel learned in the managers' response to this
memorandum. Accordingly, he said, he issued his memo-
randum dated July 24, 1973, effecting the workweek change
at all plants 20 and noting in the memorandum that it would
be to Respondent's advantage to make the change at that
time since the 1974 model year (for new automobiles) was
due to start up. At the hearing Emanuel explained the latter
point from the memorandum by saying that Respondent
has a considerable amount of business in July and August
of each year (and the consequent need for extensive over-
time) because it then builds up the parts inventory for new
cars being produced by automobile manufacturers.
In the light of the full record, I am not persuaded that
Respondent has satisfied its burden of showing that it did
not change the workweek to influence the employees in the
coming election. For Emanuel's July memorandum was not
issued until at least 4 months after his original inquiry in
March 1973. The change announced in the July memo fol-
lowed the Union's election petition, however, by a matter of
less than 2 weeks. Further the month of July-in which the
need for overtime was so great-was already three-quarters
18 International Shoe Company, 123 NLRB 682; The Baltimore Catering
Company, 148 NLRB 970.
19 Id.
20 As Emanuel 's earlier memo noted, there was only one computerized
payroll for all plants.
over when the latter memorandum issued. Finally, there is
no question that the change occurred in the context of num-
erous employee complaints about the workweek-some of
which complaints were brought to the attention of Gallo-
way who told employees including Jernigan that he would
speak to Rudolph Tuten, which he subsequently did, to see
if a change could be made. Tuten agreed to talk to Emanuel
about working this out.21 After speaking to Tuten, Galloway
told Jernigan that the pay period would be changed and
weekend overtime would show up in checks paid the follow-
ing week.22 Further after the change was made, Galloway
spoke to employee Girlish and asked her if the change
would make employees happy because Respondent was
"trying to solve its problems without a union involved." 23
In view of the timing of the change after the filing of the
petition and the fact the change was made, in part, in re-
sponse to fresh complaints of employees at the Ten Mile
plant, and also in light of Galloway's instant statement to
Girlish and the remarks in Ladney's June speech that in the
past Respondent has given raises and got along fine without
a union, I further conclude that Respondent made this
change to influence the employees not to support the Union
and thereby interfered with, coerced and restrained employ-
ees in the exercise of their Section 7 right to support the
Union and in so doing violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act 24
On the same basis I shall sustain Objection No. 3.
3. Alleged acts of Galloway in July 1973 prohibiting em-
ployees from soliciting support for the Union at any time
on company premises (subparagraph 9(b) of the com-
plaint; Objection 2)
The only matter which I find in the record which seems
to relate to this allegation is an incident in June 1973 involv-
ing Galloway and employee Jernigan, which has been re-
counted in the "Relevant Hierarchy" section of this
Decision. As previously noted, since there is no basis to
conclude that this incident took place on or after June 18,
1973, I do not conclude that it took place within the 10(b)
period (nor within the period after the filing of the election
petition). I shall accordingly, recommend that this allega-
tion of the complaint be dismissed. I shall, however, find
merit in Objection 2 on the basis of other matters, infra.
21 Galloway admitted his actions as recounted above. Neither Emanuel
nor Tuten denied them.
22 Jernigan credibly so testified. Galloway in his full testimony did not
flatly deny the conversation. Thus, when asked if he had any further discus-
sions with Jernigan about the change he at first said "no" but added "they
all thought it would be a good idea if we did make the change."
23 Girlish credibly so testified. Galloway did not deny this conversation.
In answer to the question whether he remembered any conversation with
Girlish about this change, Galloway merely responded "Not right to her, no."
Respondent sought to discredit Girlish on this instance on the basis of her
recollection that this conversation occurred in early August whereas the
notice of the change was dated July 24, 1963. Girlish related the conversation
to the time in August when she thought she had transferred from the af-
ternoon to the day shift. Galloway admitted that Girlish came to work on
the day shift in July. Girlish's testimony is consistent throughout that this
conversation took place sometime after lunch during an afternoon.
24 Cf. Bauer Welding & Metal Fabricators, Inc., 154 NLRB 954, enfd. as
modified 358 F.2d 766 (C.A. 8).
DETROIT PLASTIC MOLDING CO.
4. Wage increases in July and August 1973 allegedly
given by Respondent to dissuade employees from
assisting the Union (subparagraph 9(c) of the complaint;
Objection 3)
As found earlier, and indeed as admitted in Respondent's
answer, it put into effect raises for employees at the Ten
Mile and Eleven Mile plants during the instant period which
is within the 10(b) limitations period. These raises mostly
occurred after the filing of the election petition. In these
circumstances, as discussed in the section of the decision
dealing with the change in payroll period, supra, the burden
is upon Respondent to establish a business basis for grant-
ing these increases if it is to avoid the inference that they
were granted to dissuade employees from supporting the
Union.
In my judgment Respondent has successfully sustained
that burden here. Thus, as the General Counsel conceded
at the hearing, the payroll change notices (113 in number
and constituting G.C. Exh. 5) indicate that the instant raises
were for promotions, merit increases, and automatic in-
creases at the Ten Mile and Eleven Mile plants. That Re-
spondent has a policy of automatic increases (e.g., at the end
of 13, 26, and 39 weeks) was confirmed by both Tuten and
witnesses for the General Counsel. Tuten further testified
that the number of promotions and merit increases in July
and August 1973-by comparison to 1972-was average.
The law is well settled that, if an employer is to avoid the
charge of an unfair labor practice during the course of a
union organizing campaign, it is obliged to proceed with
traditional wage increases, notwithstanding that campaign,
just as it would have where the union was not on the scene.25
I conclude on the basis of the entire record that Respondent
has done just that here in respect to the automatic increases,
the promotions and the merit raises. I shall, accordingly,
recommend dismissal of this allegation of the complaint. I
shall not overrule this objection, however, as I have already
sustained it on a different basis, supra.
5. Alleged statement by Shanks in August 1973 to em-
ployees advising them of the futility of seeking union
representation to effect beneficial changes in their wages,
hours, or other conditions of employment (subparagraph
9(d) of the complaint; Objection 10)
In July or August 1973-but before the notice was posted
promoting Galloway (hence also before Shanks' demo-
tion)-three or four employees including Moriarity were
discussing the Union and what they wanted changed at the
Ten Mile plant when they were joined by Foreman Shanks.
Shanks told these employees it did not matter what they
wanted changed because they would only get what Respon-
dent offered and that Ladney would only give what he
wanted them to get. Shanks further stated that if the em-
ployees didn't like it they would probably be out on the
street on strike.26
25 E g, The Gates Rubber Company, 182 NLRB 95
26 Moriarity credibly so testified I found Monarity, although she was
recovering from an illness at the time , to be a calm , self-confident witness
who testified in a straightforward manner Shanks admitted participating in
903
I conclude that in making this statement to the employ-
ees-in the context of Respondent's other conduct-
Shanks continued Respondent's efforts, already begun, to
convince employees of the futility of selecting the Union as
their collective-bargaining representative. Thus, it may be
recalled that in his June 1973, speech to the employees,
Ladney told them he had given raises in the past without a
union, got along fine that way and that there was no reason
to have a union. He further told them that the Union had
previously caused strikes and loss of work and employees
never received more money. A month and a half after
Ladney's speech and shortly after the election petition was
filed, the workweek was changed in the face of considerable
employee complaints and that change was made, as I have
found and as Galloway suggested to Girlish at the time, to
convince employees that they did not need a union and to
dissuade them from supporting one. In this context, for
Shanks to tell employees that Ladney would only give a
union what he wanted to and that a strike would probably
result from Ladney's position could only reinforce in the
employees' mind the uselessness of selecting the Union as
their bargaining representative and create in them a rea-
sonable doubt that Ladney would accept any obligation to
bargain in good faith.
I accordingly conclude that, in the context in which it
occurred, Shanks' instant remarks interfered with, coerced
and restrained the employees in the exercise of their Section
7 right to support the Union and that Respondent thereby
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. For the same reason I
find merit in Objection 10.27
6. The allegations that Rudolph Tuten and Galloway
interrogated employees about their own and other
employees' union activities, interfered with employee
distribution of campaign materials and threatened
employees with adverse personnel actions if they engaged
in activities in support of the Union (subparagraphs 9(e),
(f), and (g) of the complaint and Objections 2, 5,
6, and 14)
On or about October 3, 1973, employee Sandra Girlish
brought a copy of the transcript of the hearing in Case
7-RC-11911 to the Ten Mile plant and was carrying it with
her as she left the molding area to go to some nearby picnic
tables to eat lunch.28 Galloway stopped Girlish and asked
her what she was doing with the transcript to which Girlish
replied that she was reading it. Galloway then took the
transcript from Girlish and told her he thought Tuten would
like to see it. With this Galloway left and took the transcript
to Tuten's office. A few minutes later Galloway returned
and asked Girlish to come with him to see Tuten, which they
did.
The following occurred in Tuten's office with Girlish,
Tuten and Galloway present. Tuten initially asked Girlish
this conversation but testified that he said the Respondent would give what
it could afford and, if the Union made ridiculous demands that were the
extreme , there would have to be a strike Shanks did not create as favorable
an impression as Moriarity His eyes frequently moved while testifying thus
giving the appearance he was nervous I do not credit his version of this
incident
27 See, e.g, Dal-Tex Optical Company, Inc, 137 NLRB 1782.
28 These picnic tables are near the molding area and are apparently inside
the plant
904 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
what the transcript was and to this she replied that it was
a copy of Tuten's "testimony in court." He then asked her
what she was doing reading it to which she answered that
"some of us" couldn't attend the hearing so "we" asked to
have a copy run off in order to read it and learn what was
going on.To this Tuten responded that Girlish had no busi-
ness reading it because it was confidential between him and
the court and no concern of Girlish's. Tuten then asked
Girlish whether she was handing the transcript out in the
shop and whether the Union had told her to bring it down
there-to which she said no. When she admitted that the
Union had run the copies off, he said that this could cause
a lot of trouble and that she had no right to read it. She
rejoined that it was public property and that she was al-
lowed to read it. He repeated that the matter was confiden-
tial and that it was nobody's business but his and the court's.
When Girlish admitted that other employees in the shop
had copies of the transcript-after Tuten had said he knew
there were more copies of it there-he asked her who these
employees were but she refused to divulge their names.
Tuten then again asked her if the Union had asked her to
bring in the transcript, told her she could get in a lot of
trouble over it, and said that she had not heard the end of
the matter. With this Girlish was excused. Before she left,
however, Girlish asked for her transcript copy back to
which Galloway agreed, saying he had one of his own.29
I conclude based on the foregoing that Respondent,
through Tuten, coercively interrogated Girlish about her
own and her fellow employees' reading and circulation of
this public transcript reproduced by the Union and Respon-
dent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I further
conclude that Tuten's statement that the circulation of the
transcript would cause trouble and that Girlish had not
heard the end of it yet was an implicit threat of reprisal for
29 The foregoing account of this incident is based on the credible testimony
of Girlish in this regard . I do not credit the contrary versions of Tuten and
Galloway. Tuten, in part corroborated by Galloway, testified , inter alia, that,
when he confronted Girlish after Galloway brought him the transcript, he
merely told Girlish that he didn't think it was right for her to pass it around
and that he was going to check on the matter.
This testimony strikes me as improbable . For, if Tuten had been desirous
of checking with higher authority on the propriety of what Girlish had done,
it would seem to me that he would have done so before-not after-con-
fronting Girlish . His further testimony (that he spoke to Emanuel later, that
Emanuel told Tuten that the transcript was a public document; and that he,
Tuten, in a second meeting with Girlish , returned the document to her with
the offer to have more copies reproduced for her ) seems to me at odds with
Tuten's obvious concern over the distribution of the transcript and his implic-
it ratification of Galloway's act in taking the transcript away from Girlish in
the first place . Emanuel was not asked to corroborate Tuten's statement that
Tuten had checked the question with Emanuel.
Tuten also contradicted himself in part . Thus, Tuten at first denied that
he asked Girlish in their confrontation if she was passing the transcript
around , which he later admitted asking her and still later denied.
Further the versions of Tuten and Galloway do not entirely jibe. For
example, Tuten admitted that he told Girlish that he thought the transcript
was private information whereas Galloway stated, somewhat inconsistently,
that Tuten did not say the matter was confidential . Tuten , as noted, denied
he told Girlish he knew there were more copies around but Galloway thought
Tuten did say this. While Galloway stated he picked the transcript copy up
off the picnic table (near the molding area), rather than taking it directly from
Girlish, Galloway admitted that he knew the document belonged to Girlish.
Both Tuten and Galloway-unlike Girlish-impressed me as being nervous
on the stand; both frequently blinked their eyes. Galloway seemed particu-
larly nervous when testifying in regard to this matter. Galloway also looked
away when I swore him.
her actions in connection with the transcript and that Re-
spondent also thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Finally, I conclude that Tuten's entire course of conduct
here interfered with, coerced, and restrained Girlish in the
exercise of her Section 7 right to read and circulate the
transcript in nonwork areas of the plant on her own time
and that Respondent also thereby violated Section 8(a)(l) 30
of the Act.31 By reason of these unlawful acts, I also find
merit in the related objections to the election. I likewise find
merit in Objection 14 since Tuten' s statement to Girlish that
he knew there were other transcripts being circulated in the
shop created the impression of surveillance of the activities
of employees in this regard.
7. Allegation that Grambow coercively interrogated em-
ployees about their union activities (subparagraph 9(h) of
the complaint and objection 5)
In August 1973, Grambow spoke to employee Jernigan,
in the presence of foreman Lamanski and employee Bayer
in the molding room at the Ten Mile plant, and asked
Jernigan if she was for the Union. When Jernigan answered
in the affirmative, Grambow stated he was surprised.32
In view of Ladney's opposition to the Union as implicitly
expressed in his speech of June 8, 1973, Respondent's other
unfair labor practices, the lack of any justification for the
instant inquiry and the absence of any assurance against
reprisal, I conclude that Respondent, through Grambow,
coercively interrogated Jernigan about her Section 7 right to
support the Union, thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act 33 In view of this violation of the Act, I further find
merit in the Objection 5 (already sustained, on yet another
basis).
8. Allegation that Galloway, on November 17, 1973, in-
terrogated employees concerning their union activities
and threatened them with loss of bonuses or discharge if
they selected the Union (subparagraph 9(i), (j), and (k)
of the complaint; Objection 4, 5, and 6)
About a week before the election on November 21, 1973,
foreman Galloway spoke about the Union to employee
Dawson in the maintenance area near the molding room at
the Ten Mile plant and in the presence of another employee
named "Bob." In this conversation Galloway asked Daw-
son how the latter felt about the Union. Dawson stated that
he had not yet made up his mind. With this, Galloway
reminded Dawson that he, Galloway, had put Dawson in a
position where Dawson could get a 50-cent raise and he
placed Dawson in his then current job. Galloway went on
30 See, e.g., Wolverine World Wide Inc., 193 NLRB 441, 446.
31 While the complaint alleges that these acts occurred in September rather
than in October as I have found, I granted the General 's Counsel 's unop-
posed motion at the conclusion of the hearing to conform the pleadings to
the proof with respect to dates.
32 These findings are based on the credible testimony of Jernigan in this
regard. Grambow, whose contradictory testimony has previously been dis-
cussed, denied only that he had so spoken to Jernigan in November 1973.
Lemanski did not testify. Bayer did not deny the incident , testifying only that
he could not recall such an incident in November 1973.
33 While the complaint alleged that this incident occurred in November
1973, the complaint , as noted previously, was amended to conform the plead-
ings to proof , inter alia, as to dates.
DETROIT PLASTIC MOLDING CO. 905
that if the Union came in there was a chance everyone
would go back to his "hire in" job which, in Dawson's case,
was as an operator on a machine which Dawson had diffi-
culty running. Galloway also told Dawson that Ladney
would not pay bonuses if the Union came in the plant.34
I find from the above that Galloway coercively interro-
gated Dawson about the latter's union sympathies, threat-
ened that Ladney would do away with bonuses if the Union
came into the plant and finally threatened Dawson that the
latter would be transferred to a job he could not effectively
do if the Union came in-thus implicitly putting Dawson
in fear of his continued ability to retain employment with
Respondent. I conclude that by the instant interrogation
and by each of the two foregoing threats Respondent inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced Dawson in the exercise
of his Section 7 right to support the Union and that Respon-
dent, as to each matter, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
In view of these unfair labor practices I further find ment
in the related election objections, as enumerated above
(Nos. 5 and 6 have already been sustained on additional
bases, supra).
9. The allegation that on or about December 19, 1973,
Respondent, by Ladney, advised employees of the inevi-
tability of violence and strikes should they select union
representation and the concomitant disruption of amica-
ble employer-employee relationships, loss of business and
loss of bonuses (subparagraph 9(1) of the complaint; Ob-
jection 4, 8, and 10)
On November 19, 1973, as previously found, Ladney gave
a speech to the employees of Respondent's Ten Mile and
Eleven Mile plants in which he stated Respondent's opposi-
tion to the Union and recited in considerable detail the
Respondent's experience with the Union previously-an
experience which was marked by strikes and violence, he
said. He noted, however, that this did not mean that strikes
of Respondent's employees were inevitable. He then re-
viewed the Respondent's policy with respect to increasing
wages and fringe benefits, which he described as being equal
or better than those of Respondent's immediate competi-
tors. He stated that increases were dependent on work load,
efficiency, technical know-how and plant improvement. He
requested that employees carefully consider how the Union
would carry out its promises for increased benefits without
regard to these four items. He then reminded employees of
increases which Respondent had given them within the past
year and noted that they had received such benefits without
union dues, strikes, or threats. He stated that if employees
selected a union they could no longer directly deal with
management but would thereafter have to reach manage-
ment through the Union. He then again addressed the mat-
34 These findings are based on the credible testimony of Dawson in this
regard Dawson struck me as a conscientious witness who testified in a
generally reliable fashion "Bob" did not testify I discredit the contrary
version of Galloway who testified that Dawson was in conversation with
other employees about the Union when Dawson asked Galloway if the latter
thought the Union could get Dawson $4 or something an hour to which
Galloway replied he didn't know I also discredit Galloway's denials that he
made the above found remarks to Dawson on this occasion I have already
commented on the credibility of Galloway
ter of what he called certain union promises and criticized
the Union's ability to deliver on them. He continued by
saying that the Union had nothing to offer that the Respon-
dent had not already done of its own accord and he repeat-
ed that this had been accomplished without Respondent's
employees being required to pay union dues. He assured the
employees however that Respondent would bargain in good
faith with any lawful bargaining representative they selected
but would not be pressured into wage rates which would
endanger its competitive position and noted that it had,
indeed, already gone through five strikes to preserve this
position. He pointed out that at one plant (apparently of
another company operated by Respondent where a 2-year
strike had occurred) employees received the same rate and
worked under the same rules as the Detroit Plastic Molding
employees. He concluded with a request that employees
vote for "No Union" so that "we" will continue to work
together and he assured the employees that Respondent
would continue to improve wages, jobs and working condi-
tions as it had for the past 26 years.
The foregoing is a summary of Ladney's speech which, I
find, was given on two occasions at the Ten Mile plant and
is set forth in its entirety in General Counsel's Exhibit 6 .35
I conclude that this speech does not exceed the protective
bounds of Section 8(c) of the Act, and that in giving it the
Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act nor
35 Emanuel, who followed Ladney's delivery of the speech word for word
with his own copy of what is now G C Exh 6, credibly so testified, pointing
out that Ladney did not add anything before, during or after the speech as
written and answered no questions-and further pointing out that the adher-
ence to the speech as written was based on legal advice received by Respon-
dent In finding that Ladney did not depart from this written text, I have
considered the testimony of several of General Counsel's witnesses that
Ladney frequently raised his eyes from the paper which was in front of him
His raising of his eyes, however, does not necessitate the inference that he
was extemponzmg at such times I also attach no weight to the testimony of
Hailiburton that Ladney also stated on this occasion that Respondent would
shut down and lay off employees if the Union got in I believe that Hallibur-
ton confused these alleged threats with Ladney's description of the circum-
stances of a prior strike In any event , Halliburton 's recollection of Ladney's
instant speech was vague and not as convincing as her recollection of an
incident involving Bellamy , to be described I likewise attach no weight to
the somewhat contrary version of Moriarity particularly her statement that
Ladney said that, if the Union got in, all benefits would be done away with
and that bargaining would have to begin from scratch These attributions are
not corroborated by any other General Counsel witness, and Moriarty ad-
mitted having difficulty remembering back to the speech I do not credit
Girlish's somewhat inconsistent version that Ladney said he would never be
able to pay more than employees were already getting, union or no union,
because I believe this was an inference Girlish drew from Ladney's statement
that the basis for increases developed from improved efficiency , etc. I like-
wise discredit Jernigan's somewhat contrary recollection in particular regard
to her testimony that Ladney predicted strikes, violence and loss of contracts
and increased legal costs if a union come in I conclude that Jernigan, whose
recall of the speech was sketchy , was, in this instance , referring to statements
made by Ladney in connection with a prior strike. The recollection of the
remaining General Counsel witness , Dawson, as to the contents of the speech
is consistent with G C Exh 6 All of the General Counsel' s witnesses tvho
testified about the speech worked at the Ten Mile plant at the time it was
given. In discrediting the General Counsel's witnesses to the extent shown
supra, I am not persuaded that this weakens their general reliability in testify-
ing as to other matters For Respondent had a considerable opportunity-
which it took advantage of-in being able to prepare a written speech for
Ladney on this occasion and limiting him to the verbatim substance of that
speech The recollections of most of the General Counsel's witnesses, who
were not apparently provided copies of the speech, were predictably less
detailed, were somewhat vague or appeared to derive inferentially from a
confusion of the current situation with Ladney's detailed description of
Respondent's prior confrontations with the union
906 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
create a meritorious basis for an election objection.
For an employer is free to communicate to his employees
any of his general views about unionism or any of his specif-
ic views about a particular union, so long as these communi-
cations do not contain a threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit.36 I find no such threat or promise here.
While Ladney laid considerable stress on his past experi-
ence with the Union, he was within his rights in so doing,
as heretofore stated. There is no indication that any of his
statements in this regard do not represent the truth. While
it could perhaps be argued that this emphasis on the Union's
history of strikes of the Respondent's employees might im-
ply to some of Ladney's listeners that Ladney was saying
that such strikes are inevitable when the Union appears on
the scene, Ladney explicitly destroyed any such implication
by pointing out that his comment did "not mean that strikes
are inevitable in our company." Ladney's further statement
that existing company benefits had been brought about
without a union were not accompanied by any threat to
refuse to bargain with the Union about increasing employee
benefits if the Union was selected as the employees' bar-
gaining representative. Ladney rather assured employees
that Respondent would "make every effort to bargain in
good faith with this or any other union that legally repre-
sents our employees." Other than exhortations to vote "No
Union," the remainder of the speech for the most part
points up the existing direct relationship between the em-
ployees and Respondent as well as Respondent's need to
have a wage and benefit structure which enables it to main-
tain its competitive position with other automobile parts
manufacturers. The latter statements are, in my judgment,
no more than an objective appraisal of the existing employ-
er-employee relationship and a realistic examination of the
economics of managing a competitive enterprise.
I, shall, accordingly, recommend dismissal of this allega-
tion of the complaint and I find no merit in this aspect of
the related election objections 37 (Objections 4 and 10 have,
however, already been sustained on other bases, as found
supra.)
10. The allegation that Respondent by Bellamy, Gallo-
way, Sysling, and Winnie coercively interrogated employ-
ees by distributing antiunion buttons to them and
indicating that such buttons should be worn (subpara-
graph 9(m) of the complaint; Objections 5 and 7)
As previously found, employee Serianni purchased 500
buttons, bearing the legend "Happiness is No Union dues,"
and distributed these buttons at the Ten Mile and Eleven
Mile plants. Some of these buttons got into the hands of
supervisors, as will appear.
On the night before the election foreman Winnie con-
fronted employee Virginia Fitzpatrick as the latter was re-
porting for work on the midnight shift. Winnie took one of
the above-described buttons from a box in his office and
told Fitzpatrick to wear the button and pinned it on
36 N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
37 Testing Service Corporation, 193 NLRB 332; C. E. Glass Division of
Combustion Engineering, Inc., 189 NLRB 496; ITT Telecommunications, Divi-
sion of International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation, 172 NLRB 1785.
Fitzpatrick's coat. Winnie handed buttons to at least two
other employees, Beadie and Sieminowski, and asked them
if they would wear the buttons. In taking the buttons, these
other employees stated that it didn't matter whether they
wore the buttons or not.38
Foreman Bellamy also spoke to employee America Halli-
burton at the Ten Mile plant within a few days before the
election and asked her where her button was. To this she
responded that she did not have one. Bellamy rejoined that
he didn't even know whether Halliburton was an employee
if she didn't have a button and he asked Halliburton to
come with him. The two of them then went to an office
nearby where Bellamy got one of the above described but-
tons, handed it to Halliburton and asked her to wear it.
Halliburton refused and put the button in her pocket. Char-
lie Tuten, Rudolph Tuten's son, was standing nearby while
this incident took place.
Bellamy also gave buttons to other employees on the
same night, as did Sysling, but what, if anything, Bellamy
or Sysling may have said to these employees in these in-
stances was not known.39
I conclude on the basis of the foregoing that Winnie
engaged in a constructive and coercive interrogation of
Fitzpatrick, Beadie, and Sieminowksi and Bellamy did the
same in respect to Halliburton by asking these employees to
wear antiunion buttons. The device of requesting an em-
ployee to wear such a button is simply another way of
finding out an employee's attitude towards a union by mak-
ing the employee declare himself as being for or against it.
The declaration is shown by the employee's acquiescence in,
or refusal of, such a request 40 I find this activity coercive
in the light of Respondent's opposition to the Union, as
suggested in Ladney's June speech and made explicit by his
November speech as well as by Respondent's other unfair
labor practices. 1, accordingly, conclude that by this con-
duct of Bellamy and Winnie, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. On this basis, I also find merit in this
aspect of Objection 5 (already sustained on yet other bases,
supra). Since there is no indication that the employees to
whom Bellamy and Winnie spoke on this occasion engaged
38 These findings are based on the credible testimony of Fitzpatrick in this
regard . Winnie , Beadie and Sieminowski did not testify. Charles Tuten, a
witness called by Respondent , did not recall the incident. Fitzpatrick was
unable precisely to recall Winnie's response to the employees ' comment that
it didn't matter whether they wore the buttons except that Winnie made a
.nark to the effect that it was up to the employees if they wanted to vote.
39 These findings in respect to the actions of Bellamy and Sysling on this
occasion are based on the credible testimony of Halliburton in this regard.
Halliburton appeared to me to be a sincere witness who testified conscien-
tiously and with self-confidence as to this incident . I discredit Bellamy's
denial that the incident took place. I have already commented on the credi-
bility of Bellamy who appeared nervous on the stand and, inter alia, gave a
negative answer to a question about his possible possession of buttons before
the question was completed . Charles Tuten testified merely that he did not
recall the incident.
40 United Butchers Abbattoir, Inc., 123 NLRB 946, 948; Guy's Foods, Inc.,
158 NLRB 936, 944-946, enfd . 379 F.2d 160 (C.A.D.C.); cf., John F. Cuneo
Company, 152 NLRB 929, 930. The fact that this conduct may have been
accompanied by a joking manner on the part of the supervisor does not make
it any the less an effort to learn the employee's attitude toward the Union.
Cf. General Automation Manufacturing, Incorporated, 167 NLRB 502, enfd.
408 F .2d 380 (C.A. 6).
DETROIT PLASTIC MOLDING CO. 907
in any union activities or that Bellamy and Winnie were
aware thereof, I overrule Objection 7.41
D. In Further Regard to the Objections to the Election in
Case 7-RC-11911
I have found merit in and hence am sustaining Objections
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, and 14. In so doing, I have considered the
total weight of the Respondent's objectionable conduct in-
cluding its unfair labor practices That is, I have considered
its unlawful conduct specifically aimed at some 11 individu-
al employees in a unit of 545 employees at both plants as
well as its unlawful change in the workweek, which, as I
have found, was a benefit to all employees of this two-plant
unit. While the change occurred almost 4 months before the
election, it was a benefit employees enjoyed during the en-
tire 4-month period and particularly at the end of July and
throughout August when overtime-which the change was
designed to make worthwhile to employees-tripled, ac-
cording to Emanuel.
I shall, therefore, recommend that the election of Novem-
ber 21, 1973, be set aside and a new election directed.42
IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce and the Union is
a labor organization all within the meaning of the Act.
2. By granting employees a beneficial change in the work
week to influence them not to support the union; suggesting
to them that it would be futile to select the Union as their
bargaining representative; coercively interrogating employ-
ees about their own or their fellow employees' union activi-
ties or sympathies; threatening them with loss of bonuses,
transfer to more difficult assignments and other reprisals
because of their union activities or sympathies; and by in-
terfering with an employee's right to read and circulate a
union-reproduced transcript of a prior Board hearing on her
own time in nonwork areas of the plant, Respondent has
interfered with, restrained and coerced employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act,
thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
41 Objection 7 is "Made pro-company campaign insignia available to em-
ployees who engaged in union activity"
4 See, e g , Spotlight Company, Inc, 188 NLRB 819, enfd 426 F 2d 18
(C A. 8)
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act. , .
4. Election Objections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, and 14 are meri-
tious objections, are therefore sustained and warrant setting
aside the election in Case 7-RC-11911. The remaining ob-
jections which have not been withdrawn lack merit and are
overruled.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following:
ORDER 43
Respondent, Detroit Plastic Molding Co., its officers,
agents, successors and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Granting employees beneficial changes in their work-
ing conditions to influence them not to support the Union;
suggesting to them that it would be futile to select Interna-
tional Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America (UAW) as their
bargaining representative; coercively interrogating employ-
ees about their own or their fellow employees' union activi-
ties or sympathies; threatening employees with loss of
bonuses, transfer to more difficult assignments'or other re-
prisals because of their union activities or sympathies; and
interfering with the right of employees to read and circulate
material reproduced by the above-named Union in non-
work areas of the plant on their own time.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its Ten Mile Road and Eleven Mile Road
plants copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 44
Copies of the said notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 7, after being duly signed by
Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places at both said plants where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and
it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor prac-
tices not found herein.
IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that the election held in Case
43 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided in Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings , conclusions , and order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes
44 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board"
908 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
7-RC-1 1911 on November 21, 1973, be, and it hereby is, set
aside.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had the chance to give evi-
dence , it has been decided that we, Detroit Plastic Molding
Co., have violated the National Labor Relations Act and we
have been ordered to post this notice.
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act gives
you, as employees, certain rights including the right to
self-organization , to form, join or help unions, and to
bargain through a representative of your own choosing,
or to act together for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any or all
such activities.
Accordingly, we give you these assurances:
WE WILL NOT grant you beneficial changes in your
working conditions to influence you not to support
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW).
WE WILL NOT suggest to you that it would be futile to
select the above-named union as your collective-bar-
gaining representative.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate you about your
own or your fellow employees' union activities or sym-
pathies.
WE WILL NOT threaten you that you will lose bonuses,
receive more difficult work assignments or suffer other
reprisals because of your union activities or sympa-
thies.
WE WILL NOT interfere with your right to read or cir-
culate union materials on your own time in nonwork
areas of the plant.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with any of your rights described above which are pro-
tected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act.
Dated By
DETROIT PLASTIC MOLDING CO.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning
this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct-
ed to the Board's Office, 500 Book Building, 1249 Washing-
ton Boulevard , Detroit, Michigan 48226 , Telephone
313-226-3214.